Robertson v. Pinnacle Asset Group, LLC et al
Filing
99
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS (Doc. 96). Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (MVer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBIN ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 15-13446
PINNACLE ASSET GROUP, LLC.,
HON. AVERN COHN
Defendants.
___________________________________/
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS (Doc. 96)
I. Introduction
This is a case under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692. In 2015, plaintiff sued multiple defendants claiming violations of the FDCPA
and Michigan’s Occupational Code (MOC), M.C.L. §§339.915. Due to difficulties in
serving many of the defendants, summons were extended. Eventually, plaintiff
dismissed all but ten (10) defendants either voluntarily or by settlement. All of the 10
defendants were served. None responded. The Clerk entered defaults against each of
the 10 defendants. Eventually, plaintiff filed a second amended motion for entry of a
default judgment. (Doc. 89). Plaintiff sought a default judgment in the amount of
$201,000.00. The Court granted the motion (Doc. 92) and entered a Judgment (Doc.
93).
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and no-taxable costs.1 In
1
The Clerk recently taxed costs in the amount of $1,415.56. (Doc. 98)
the motion, which is unopposed, plaintiff seeks $29,832.50 in attorney fees and $739.82
in non-taxable costs. (Doc. 96). For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
II. Legal Standard
The FDCPA provides for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing
consumer, Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995). These mandatory
fees reflect Congress’s intent that the Act be enforced by debtor’s counsel acting as
private attorneys general. See DeJesus v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 918 F.2d
232, 235 (1st Cir. 1990).
At the same time, fee awards should encourage counsel to undertake these
types of cases and provide compensation which is commensurate with other types of
cases. Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1993). In so doing,
courts generally apply the lodestar method in conjunction with a request for fees, see
e.g., Cruz v. Local Union No. 3, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994); see Savino v.
Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1998). Courts have also observed
that “FDCPA plaintiffs ‘seek to vindicate important rights that cannot be valued solely in
monetary terms.’” Bogner v. Masari Investments, LLC, 2010 WL 2595273, (D. Az.
2010) The mandated payment of attorney's fees under the FDCPA serves a punitive
purpose. Sanders v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000).
The starting point for this calculation of a reasonable attorney's fees award
“should be the determination of the fee applicant's ‘lodestar,’ which is the proven
number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied by his [or
her] court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury, 227
F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
2
A calculation of the number of hours reasonably expended can involve consideration of
three issues, (1) whether the lawyer actually worked the number of hours claimed, (2)
whether the work performed was sufficiently related to the points on which the plaintiff
prevailed, and (3) whether the attorney used poor judgment in spending too many hours
on some part of the case or by unnecessarily duplicating the work of co-counsel. See
Coulter v. State of Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1986). The party seeking
an award of fees bears the burden of demonstrating that the request is reasonable.
See Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990). To
determine a reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees, the courts look to the prevailing
market rate for similar services of local attorneys with comparable skill, experience, and
reputation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989).
III. Discussion
Here, Attorney Bolos and the rest of the Lyngklip & Associates staff have
expended over 264 hours to resolve this case. The billing records attached to the
motion provide a chronological listing of those hours, identifying the staff member who
expended the time and the amount of time expended. The Court finds after review that
the work performed was necessary, reasonably related to the file, directed at moving
the matter through the legal system expeditiously.
Of the 264 hours billed, across ten staff members, 75 hours were billed by four
paralegals, 14 hours were billed by one summer law clerk, nearly 6.8 hours were billed
by Senior Attorney Lyngklip, and 167.80 hours were billed by four associate attorneys,
including Attorney Bolos. Bolos billed 127.90 of those hours, constituting nearly 80% of
all time billed by attorneys and 48% of all time billed across all staff members. Bolos
3
has reduced her total billing time by 66.30 hours, a 52% reduction in her time billed.
Additionally, of the total hours billed of 264.10 hours, plaintiff identified 140.05 hours
attributable to dismissed defendants, duplication of efforts, and unnecessary work and
accordingly reduced the requested billable time by 140.05 hours to 124.05 hours –
netting a 53% reduction of the time billed. (Exhibit 9 – Adjusted Billing Records).
Plaintiff’s discretionary billing amounted to a reduction in the amount billed from
$63,955.00 to $29,832.50. Plaintiff’s billing reduction reflects appropriate billing
discretion and provides a reasonable check on the overall amount of this petition.
In short, plaintiff is entitled to the requested amount of attorney fees.
In addition to attorney fees, plaintiff is entitled to an award of "non-taxable" costs.
See Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1100 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000); Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We believe
that it would be unduly restrictive to find that neither the general term ‘costs of litigation'
nor the term ‘attorney's fees' includes incidental expenses of attorneys that are routine
to all litigation and routinely billed to private clients."). Non-taxable costs include time
for paralegals and staff. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as travel and
other ordinary expenses that "are typically charged to paying clients by private
attorneys.” Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir.1992).
Here, to identify and locate the defendants, plaintiff’s counsel sought account
holder information for the phone numbers, websites, and PO Box addresses at issue
from several third parties. To secure production in response to her requests and related
directly to these ten remaining defendants, plaintiff’s counsel expended $739.82. This
cost is reasonable and will be awarded.
4
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is
awarded $29,832.50 in attorney fees and $739.82 in non-taxable costs.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: 8/16/2019
Detroit, Michigan
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?