Lee v. Money Gram Corporate Office

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER denying 18 Motion ; denying 18 Motion to Stay; denying 19 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 19 Motion. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT E. LEE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-13474
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

v.

Mona K. Majzoub
United States Magistrate Judge

MONEY GRAM CORPORATE
OFFICE,
Defendant.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD ON
COPY OF HARASSMENT LETTER AND TO STAY (ECF NO. 18) AND
(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD ON RECONSIDERATION
AND FOR A CONSULTANT (ECF NO. 19)
On June 27, 2016, this Court entered an Order Adopting Magistrate Judge
Majzoub’s May 23, 2016 Report and Recommendation to grant Plaintiff’s application
to proceed without prepayment of fees and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 9, Order Adopting Report and Recommendation and
Dismissing Complaint.) On September 20, 2017, this Court entered an Order
Adopting Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s June 23, 2017 Report and Recommendation
to deny Plaintiff’s “Motion to Submit New Address,” a motion filed without reference
to any rule and which Magistrate Judge Majzoub appropriately construed as a motion
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for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). (ECF No. 15, Order Adopting
Report and Recommendation and Denying Motion to Submit New Address.) Before
the Court are additional filings by Plaintiff presumably asking once again that this
Court revisit its prior rulings in this case. For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s
motions are denied.
Plaintiff has now filed two additional “motions” (ECF Nos. 18, 19), one of
which appears to add a defendant to this closed case, and an apparently related filing
(ECF No. 17), that again do not rely on any court rule or seek any specific form of
relief and which this Court construes as requests for relief from judgment under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b). It is unclear whether Plaintiff is seeking to have this Court revisit its
June 27, 2016 Order or its September 20, 2017 Order but in either case, the Plaintiff’s
filings do not provide any valid basis for setting aside either Order of this Court.
Rule 60(b) allows the Court, upon motion, to relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding based upon any of the following reasons:
(1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2)

newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b);

(3)

fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4)

the judgment is void;
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(5)

the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable
time – and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the
judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

“Regardless of circumstances, no court can consider a motion brought under Rule
60(b)(1), (2), or (3) a year after judgment.” In re G.A.D., Inc., 340 F. 3d 331, 334 (6th
Cir. 2003)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); McDowell v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 931
F. 2d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1991)).

“[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is circumscribed by

public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.
Accordingly, the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of
establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Info-Hold,
Inc. v. Sound Merchandising, Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, he has failed to establish grounds for
relief under Rule 60(b). As to the Court’s June 27, 2016 order dismissing Plaintiff’s
Complaint, the only available basis for seeking relief as to that Order would be Rule
60(b)(6), as a motion invoking relief under Rules 60(b)(1-3) must be filed within one
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year of the final judgment or order appealed from and the Court can discern no basis
for the application of Rules 60(b)(4-5). Plaintiff has not demonstrated entitlement to
relief under Rule 60(b)(6):
[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is “circumscribed by public policy favoring
finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Waifersong Ltd., Inc.
v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir.1992). This is
especially true in an application of subsection (6) of Rule 60(b), which
applies “only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are
not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule.” Olle v.
Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64,
108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). This is because “almost every
conceivable ground for relief is covered” under the other subsections of
Rule 60(b). Olle, 910 F.2d at 365; see also Hopper v. Euclid Manor
Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989). Consequently,
courts must apply Rule 60(b)(6) relief only in “unusual and extreme
situations where principles of equity mandate relief.” Olle, 910 F.2d at
365.
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519,
524 (6th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s filings are difficult to decipher but he appears to continue to
complain about issues regarding his credit that animated his filing of the Complaint
in this case, which was dismissed by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on June 27, 2016. Plaintiff
attaches to his new filings a few single-sheet exhibits completely devoid of context
and makes a number of disjointed statements seemingly related to a credit dispute
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such as: “That color woman and their company on the Negro side of Detroit did this
to me and my credit;” and “Darn, please court read my brief yourself any layman can
tell wrote out to the courts I was in distress from arguing with them men over my
account and Capital One credit card not getting my payment that went to another
company.” (ECF No. 18, PgID 119; ECF No. 19, PgID 123-24; ECF No. 17, PgID
113, 116.) Plaintiff also requests “a consultant.” Nothing in Plaintiff’s filings
presents grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Nor do Plaintiff’s filings establish grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1-3),
such as would be sufficient to challenge the Court’s September 20, 2017 Order.
Plaintiff makes no cognizable claim of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect as would satisfy Rule 60(b)(1) and there is no cognizable claim of fraud or
misrepresentation by an opposing party as would satisfy Rule 60(b)(3). The only
“evidence” that Plaintiff attaches to his filings that could conceivably be directed at
an effort to invoke Rule 60(b)(2) are unauthenticated pages from some type of a 97page report (not identified) (ECF No. 19, PgID 123-24) and an unauthenticated
“email” appearing to be from a Julia Roberts at “lexingtonlaw-firm.com” to a Julia
Roberts at “lexingtonlaw-firm.com,” dated January 30, 2017, demanding payment
and threatening legal proceedings, that appears to have been forwarded by Plaintiff
to another email addressee on February 11, 2017 (ECF No. 18, PgID 119). “To
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prevail under Rule 60(b)(2), Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) ‘that [he] exercised due
diligence in obtaining the information’ and that (2) ‘the evidence is material and
controlling and clearly would have produced a different result if presented before the
original judgment.’” Green v. Bank of America Corp., 530 F. App’x 426, 429 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff
has demonstrated neither of these prerequisites to invoking this ground for relief as
to these items of “evidence.”
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s filings cognizant of his pro se status and has
viewed his filings in the most generous and favorable light. Plaintiff has presented no
viable basis for setting aside either this Court’s June 27, 2016 Opinion and Order or
this Court’s September 20, 2017 Opinion and Order. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion to Add On Copy of Continued Harassment Letter and to Stay (ECF
No. 18) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Request An Add On to Reconsideration (ECF No.
19).
Additionally, although not styled as a Motion, the Court also denies Plaintiff’s
“Request for Reconsideration Count I,” which appears to be an untimely motion
seeking reconsideration of the Court’s September 20, 2017 Opinion and Order. (ECF
No. 17.) See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(1) (“A motion for rehearing or reconsideration
must be filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order.”). Even if
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considered as a “motion” for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) this “Request”
contains more of the same commentary regarding damage to Plaintiff’s credit rating
and seeking “a consultant,” and presents no grounds for setting aside this Court’s June
27, 2016 Opinion and Order or this Court’s September 20, 2017 Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Paul D. Borman
PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 25, 2018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each
attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on June
25, 2018.

s/Deborah Tofil
Case Manager

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