Green v. Southfield et al

Filing 229

ORDER Denying 221 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Dawn Green,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-13479

City of Southfield, et al.,

Sean F. Cox
United States District Court Judge

Defendants.
_________________________/
ORDER
DENYING THE SOUTHFIELD DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER § 1988 (D.E. NO. 221)
On October 4, 2012, Plaintiff Dawn Green was involved in an automobile accident in
Southfield, Michigan. She later filed this action on October 3, 2015, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985(3), and 1986, asserting that officers of the Southfield Police Department violated her
constitutional rights, and conspired to do so, in the manner in which they investigated the
accident.
Discovery and motion practice in this matter was very contentious, on both sides. After
discovery ultimately closed, the Southfield Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In an Opinion & Order issued on March 7, 2018, this Court granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the Southfield Defendants, and dismissed all claims against them.
(D.E. No. 214). This Court ruled that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and that Plaintiff could not proceed with a Monell claim
against the City because there was no underlying constitutional violation. The Court further
ruled that Plaintiff’s conspiracy counts failed.
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Thereafter, on April 4, 2018, the Southfield Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing that Plaintiff’s cause of action against them was frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The Court concludes that
oral argument would not aid the decisional process and therefore orders that the motion shall be
decided without oral argument.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides ‘[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section . . . 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title,” the “court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party” a “reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). As
Defendants’ motion acknowledges, Defendants bear the burden of establishing entitlement to an
award under § 1988.
“An award of attorney fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action ‘is an extreme
sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.’” Riddle v. Egensperger,
266 F.3d 542m 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232
(6th Cir. 1986)). Prevailing Defendants such as the Southfield Defendants should only recover if
the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith. Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed district courts considering prevailing
defendants’ applications for attorney fees to ‘resist the understandable temptation to engage in
post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation.’ Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421–22, 98
S.Ct. at 700. The decision is committed to the discretion of the trial judge, and is reviewed only
for abuse of discretion. Tarter, 742 F.2d at 986.” Wayne, 36 F.3d at 530.
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While this Court ultimately ruled in favor of the Southfield Defendants, and granted
summary judgment in their favor, this Court concludes that this is not an egregious case that
warrants the extreme sanction of an attorney fee award under § 1988. Accordingly, the
Southfield Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions under § 1988 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: May 24, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
May 24, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Jennifer McCoy
Case Manager

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