Hatton v. Haas
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Denying the 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying a Certificate of Appealability and Denying Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KARL HATTON, #866369,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 2:15-CV-13726
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
v.
RANDALL HAAS,
Respondent.
_______________________________ /
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I.
Introduction
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Karl
Hatton (“Petitioner”) pleaded no contest to manslaughter, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.321, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b,
in the Ogemaw County Circuit Court and was sentenced, as a second habitual offender,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10, to consecutive terms of eight to 22 ½ years imprisonment and
two years imprisonment in 2014. In his petition, he raises claims concerning the validity of
his sentence and the effectiveness of trial counsel. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
denies the habeas petition. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies
leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
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II.
Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner’s convictions arise from the shooting death of an unarmed man who came
to his residence to collect a minor drug debt. He was originally charged with second-degree
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony
firearm. He pleaded no contest to manslaughter and felony firearm in exchange for dismissal
of the other charges. There was no sentencing agreement.
At sentencing, the trial court determined that the sentencing guidelines were correctly
scored with a minimum sentencing range of 43 to 107 months imprisonment. There was no
objection by defense counsel. The trial court then sentenced Petitioner, as a second habitual
offender, to eight to 22 ½ years imprisonment on the manslaughter conviction and a
consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction.
Following sentencing, Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with
the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claims presented on habeas review. The
court denied the application for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v. Hatton, No.
325329 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished). Petitioner then filed an application
for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order.
People v. Hatton, 498 Mich. 868, 866 N.W.2d 441 (2015).
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition. He raises the following claims:
I.
The trial court unlawfully deprived him of his due process, equal
protection, and other protected rights under the United States and
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Michigan Constitutions when it scored 25 points on OV 6; on plain
error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel grounds this Court should
review this issue.
II.
The trial court violated the United States and Michigan Constitutions
in sentencing him to a prison term of eight to 22 ½ years on a habitual
offender 2d supplement arising out of the manslaughter conviction; on
plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel grounds this Court
should review this issue.
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because
the claims are not cognizable and/or lack of merit. Petitioner has not filed a reply.
III.
Standard of Review
Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim –
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540
U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas
court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
[the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also
Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state court’s application
of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more
than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively
unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S.
at 409. “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico
v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti,
537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “a state court’s determination that a
claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme
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Court emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported
or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain
federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s rejection of his claim
“was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended
in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.; see also White v.
Woodall, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). “When reviewing state criminal
convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect
by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were
wrong.” Woods v. Donald, _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of
whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams,
529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the
Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not ‘an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule
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that has not been squarely established by this Court”) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552
U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. Section 2254(d) “does
not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been
‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it “does not require
citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme
Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.
The requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined solely by Supreme
Court precedent. Thus, “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and “[i]t therefore cannot form the basis for
habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)
(per curiam). The decisions of lower federal courts, however, may be useful in assessing the
reasonableness of the state court’s resolution of an issue. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488,
493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003));
Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas
review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear and
convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover,
habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
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563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
IV.
Analysis
A.
The Scoring of OV 6 and the Effectiveness of Trial Counsel
Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court
improperly scored Offense Variable 6 of the state sentencing guidelines at 25 points instead
of 10 points in violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the Michigan
and United States Constitutions, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the scoring of OV 6. Respondent contends that this claim is not cognizable in part and that
it lacks merit.
Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal in the state courts. The Michigan Court
of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit and the Michigan Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal in a standard order. The state court’s decisions are neither contrary to
Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts.1 A
sentence imposed within the statutory limits is generally not subject to federal habeas review.
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (E.D.
Mich. 1999). Claims which arise out of a state trial court’s sentencing decision are not
cognizable upon federal habeas review unless the petitioner can show that the sentence
exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly unauthorized by law. Lucey v. Lavigne, 185 F.
1
The Court notes that it would reach the same conclusion under a de novo standard
of review.
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Supp. 2d 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Petitioner makes no such showing. His sentences are
within the statutory maximums for a second habitual offender, see MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
750.321, 750.227b, 769.10, and are within the minimum sentence guideline range.
Moreover, Petitioner cannot prevail on any claim that the trial court erred in scoring
OV 6. Such a claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review because it is a state law
claim. See Howard v. White, 76 F. App’x 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s alleged
misinterpretation of state sentencing guidelines and crediting statutes is a matter of state
concern only.”); Cheatham v. Hosey, 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WL 478854, *2 (6th Cir. Nov.19,
1993) (departure from state sentencing guidelines is a state law issue which is not cognizable
on federal habeas review); see also McPhail v. Renico, 412 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Any error in
scoring the offense variables and determining the guideline range does not merit habeas
relief. State courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not intervene
in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326,
328 (6th Cir. 1987).
Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner asserts a violation of the Michigan
Constitution or contests the state court’s interpretation of state law regarding the scoring of
the offense variables and the application of that law, he is not entitled to relief. It is
well-settled that “a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct
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appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting on habeas review.”
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691
(1975) (state courts are the final arbiters of state law); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d 855, 860
(6th Cir. 2002). Habeas relief also does not lie for perceived state law errors. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Petitioner thus fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted as to this issue.
Petitioner also asserts that his sentences violate federal due process. A sentence may
violate federal due process if it is carelessly or deliberately pronounced on an extensive and
materially false foundation which the defendant had no opportunity to correct. Townsend,
334 U.S. at 741; see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); United States
v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant must have a meaningful
opportunity to rebut contested sentencing information). To prevail on such a claim, a
petitioner must show that the court relied upon the allegedly false information. United States
v. Polselli, 747 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1984); Draughn v Jabe, 803 F. Supp. 70, 81 (E.D.
Mich. 1992). Petitioner makes no such showing. The record reveals that he had a sentencing
hearing before the state trial court with an opportunity to challenge the scoring of the
guidelines. Petitioner also presented his sentencing issues to the state appellate courts and
was denied relief. Petitioner fails to establish that the trial court relied upon materially false
or inaccurate information in imposing his sentences which he had no opportunity to correct.
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No due process violation occurred. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
Petitioner further asserts that his sentences violate his federal equal protection rights.
To state an equal protection claim, a habeas petitioner must show that he was intentionally
treated differently from other similarly-situated people and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Petitioner fails to allege
any facts which show that he is being treated differently than a person similarly situated to
him. Conclusory allegations, without evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for habeas
relief. See, e.g., Workman v. Bell, 178 F.3d 759, 771 (6th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel do not justify habeas relief); Perez v. Hemingway, 157
F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (conclusory allegations that federal prisoner’s equal
protection rights were violated did not justify relief). Petitioner fails to state an equal
protection claim in his pleadings.
Petitioner relatedly asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the scoring of OV 6. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court
set forth a two-pronged test for determining whether a habeas petitioner has received the
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was
not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. Second, the
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petitioner must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Counsel’s
errors must have been so serious that they deprived the petitioner of a fair proceeding. Id.
With respect to the performance prong, a petitioner must identify acts that were
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance” in order to prove deficient
performance. Id. at 690. The reviewing court’s scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly
deferential. Id. at 689. The court must recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment. Id. at 690.
To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. “On balance, the benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.” McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311-12 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
The Supreme Court has confirmed that a federal court’s consideration of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from state criminal proceedings is quite limited
on habeas review due to the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts
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reviewing their performance. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both
‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington,
562 U.S. at 105 (internal and end citations omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question
is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Id.
In this case, Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective under the
Strickland standard. The state trial court scored OV 6 at 25 points and the Michigan Court
of Appeals found that Petitioner’s claim challenging that score lacked merit. The state
court’s rulings on this underlying state law issue are binding on a federal habeas court.
Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76; Sanford, 288 F.3d at 860. Consequently, Petitioner cannot
establish that trial counsel erred and/or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. Defense
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a futile or meritless objection. See
Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 752 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Omitting meritless arguments is neither
professionally unreasonable nor prejudicial.”); United States v. Steverson, 230 F.3d 221, 225
(6th Cir. 2000). Habeas relief is not warranted.
B.
Consideration of Sentence and the Effectiveness of Trial Counsel
Petitioner next asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court failed
to properly consider mitigating factors and accurate information in imposing his sentence in
violation of the Michigan and Federal Constitutions and that trial counsel was ineffective in
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such regard. Respondent contends that this claim is not cognizable in part and lacks merit.
Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal in the state courts. The Michigan Court
of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented and the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in a standard order. The state courts’
decisions are neither contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable
application of federal law or the facts.2 Again, to the extent that Petitioner asserts a violation
of Michigan law with respect to his sentencing, he fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. As discussed, state courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal
courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; Oviedo, 809 F.2d at 328.
Habeas relief does not lie for perceived state law errors. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.
Petitioner also fails to establish a violation of his federal constitutional rights. As with
the offense variable scoring claim, Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that he is entitled
to habeas relief because the trial court failed to consider all of the mitigating evidence. There
is no constitutional requirement that a court consider mitigating evidence at sentencing in
non-capital cases. Engle v. United States, 26 F. App’x 394, 397 (6th Cir. 2001); Hastings
v. Yukins, 194 F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The Supreme Court has limited its
holding concerning mitigating evidence to capital cases. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 996 (1991) (“We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital
2
The Court notes that it would reach the same conclusion under a de novo standard
of review.
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cases, and see no basis for extending it further.”); see also Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066,
1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Harmelin). Petitioner thus fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted as to this issue.
Furthermore, while a sentence may violate federal due process if it is carelessly or
deliberately pronounced on an extensive and materially false foundation which the defendant
had no opportunity to correct, Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741, Petitioner makes no such showing.
The record reflects that the trial court considered the circumstances of the crime, Petitioner’s
criminal record and substance abuse issues, the pre-sentence reports, and other permissible
factors at sentencing. Petitioner had an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the reports,
to present mitigating evidence, and to make a statement at sentencing. He thus fails to
establish that the trial court relied upon materially false or inaccurate information in imposing
his sentence which he had no opportunity to correct.
Petitioner also fails to establish that trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland
standard.
The record indicates that counsel discussed mitigating factors, including
Petitioner’s limited criminal record, his substance abuse problems, his strong familial
support, and his remorse, at the sentencing hearing and urged the trial court to impose a
sentence at the low end of the guidelines. The trial court imposed a sentence within the
guidelines. The fact that counsel’s strategy was not fully successful does not mean that
counsel was ineffective. See Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851, 859 (6th Cir. 2002) (an
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim “cannot survive so long as the decisions of a
defendant’s trial counsel were reasonable, even if mistaken”). Counsel acted reasonably
under the circumstances. Petitioner fails to establish that counsel erred and/or that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. Habeas relief is not warranted.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal
habeas relief on his claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES and DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court’s decision, a certificate of appealability must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability
may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the
substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists
would find the court's assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). Having considered the matter, the Court concludes
that Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to
his habeas claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. The Court
also DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be taken in
good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). This case is closed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: March 8, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon parties/counsel of
record on March 8, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/C. Pickles
Judicial Assistant
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