Studstill El v. Michigan Department of State

Filing 16

ORDER Adopting 13 Report and Recommendation, Overruling Plaintiff's Objection, and Granting 10 Motion to Dismiss filed by Michigan Department of State. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (SPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HERBERT STUDSTILL EL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case Number 15-14043
Honorable David M. Lawson
Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS,
AND DISMISSING CASE
Plaintiff Herbert Studstill El filed the present lawsuit over a dispute with the Michigan
Department of State over the suspension of his driver’s license. Studstill El contends that the
suspension of his license by the Michigan Secretary of State after he failed to submit a physician’s
statement upon his reexamination of his qualification for driving privileges amounts to a violation
of his rights under articles 1 through 7 of the Moorish Zodiac Constitution and Amendments I, IV,
V, and XI of the United States Constitution. The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Mona
K. Majzoub for pretrial management. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint. Judge Majzoub filed a report on May 12, 2016 recommending that the motion be granted
because the defendant, a department of the State of Michigan, is immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. The plaintiff filed timely objections, the defendant filed
a response, and the matter is before the Court for de novo review. After considering the motion, the
pleadings, and the magistrate judge’s report in light of the objections filed, the Court finds that the
magistrate correctly determined the issues. Therefore, the Court will adopt the report and
recommendation and dismiss the case.

The magistrate judge accurately described the plaintiff’s complaint in her report. For the
purpose of the legal issue under discussion, it is enough to observe that the plaintiff is attempting
to sue the Michigan Department of State, and that he seeks in his complaint an order reinstating his
driving privileges and damages of $750,000. The defendant moved for dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim for which relief
can be granted, because his lawsuit is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. As noted, the
magistrate judge agreed.
The plaintiff objected to the recommendation because he says that (1) the rules of procedure
do not supersede the Constitution; (2) dismissing his case would show favoritism to the defendant;
and (3) the defendant, not the Court, should file a proper response to the motion.
The filing of timely objections to a report and recommendation requires the court to “make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo review requires the
court to re-examine all of the relevant evidence previously reviewed by the magistrate judge in order
to determine whether the recommendation should be accepted, rejected, or modified in whole or in
part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“The filing of objections provides the district court with the opportunity to consider the
specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors immediately,” Walters, 638 F.2d at 950,
enabling the court “to focus attention on those issues — factual and legal — that are at the heart of
the parties’ dispute,” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). As a result, “‘[o]nly those specific
objections to the magistrate’s report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate review;

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making some objections but failing to raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may
have.’” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v.
Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987)).
The plaintiff’s arguments do not meet directly the magistrate judge’s determinations, and
they do not explain why the lawsuit can proceed in light of the Eleventh Amendment’s bar. It is true
that the rules of practice and procedure do not supersede the Constitution. However, Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe any substantive rights. It is merely one of the
“rules [that] govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Congress has conferred upon the “Supreme Court . . . the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). And the Supreme Court has done precisely that when it
enacted Rule 12.
Of course, a rule of procedure could not alter a constitutional doctrine, such as allowing a
lawsuit that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. That is because “[s]uch rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). These rules must
be respected by litigants and courts alike, because they have been enacted by a process that “draws
on the collective experience of bench and bar[] and . . . facilitates the adoption of measured, practical
solutions.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 114 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2073).
So when determining whether a complaint filed in a federal district court may advance, the Court
generally looks to Rule 12.

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“The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff is entitled to legal relief if all the facts and allegations in the complaint are taken as true.”
Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d
635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences
are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th
Cir. 2008). “However, while liberal, this standard of review does require more than the bare
assertion of legal conclusions.” Columbia Nat’l Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.
1995); Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C., 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009). “To survive
a motion to dismiss, [a plaintiff] must plead ‘enough factual matter’ that, when taken as true,
‘state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556,
570 (2007). Plausibility requires showing more than the ‘sheer possibility’ of relief but less than
a ‘probab[le]’ entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [556 U.S. 662, 678] (2009).” Fabian v.
Fulmer Helmets, Inc., 628 F.3d 278, 280 (6th Cir. 2010). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
That explains the procedure. To determine if the plaintiff may sue the Michigan Department
of State to recover damages and his driving privileges, the Court must look to the substantive law,
which here is found in the Eleventh Amendment and the cases interpreting it. The Eleventh
Amendment plainly states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

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The Supreme Court has explained on a number of occasions that “an unconsenting State is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.”
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep’t, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) (citing Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); and Parden v. Terminal
R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). And as to the scope of immunity afforded by the Amendment, the
Court has declared that “[i]t is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the
State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984).
With these well-established tenets of federal substantive and procedural law in mind, it is
clear that the magistrate judge was on sound ground recommending dismissal of the plaintiff’s
lawsuit. His objection based on the relationship between the rules of procedure and the Constitution
is overruled.
The plaintiff’s objection that dismissing his case would show favoritism to the defendant
likewise lacks merit. To the contrary, allowing the lawsuit to proceed in light of the strong
pronouncements by the Supreme Court barring lawsuits of the present kind against states and their
agencies would show favoritism to the plaintiff that is not warranted by any construction of existing
law.
Finally, the plaintiff’s objection based on his belief that the defendant, not the Court, should
file a proper response to the motion to dismiss ignores the procedure followed in this case. The
defendant in fact filed a proper motion; the Court did not act sua sponte. As the Sixth Circuit court
of appeals has explained, “sua sponte means ‘[o]f his or its own will or motion.’” Page v. City of

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Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1013 (6th ed. 1990)).
The court pointed out that the “most logical interpretation of the term motion . . . is that which a
party requests a court to do, not what a court does on its own accord.” Ibid. It was the defendant,
not the magistrate judge, that asked for a dismissal through its “motion.” The magistrate judge
simply applied existing law and made a recommendation to the Court, as she was required to do
under the order of referral. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The report and recommendation was not
a response to the defendant’s motion; it was a recommendation to the Court, which was appropriate
when a party (here, the defendant) has asked the Court for an order that could terminate the case.
See Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir.1993); see also Fharmacy Records v.
Nassar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 865, 876 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 465 F. App’x 448 (6th Cir. 2012). The
plaintiff’s third objection will be overruled.
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the magistrate judge and finds that the
plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Upon de novo review, the Court determines that the
defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [dkt.
#13] is ADOPTED, and the plaintiff’s objections [dkt. #14] are OVERRULED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to dismiss [dkt. #10] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: July 18, 2016

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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on July 18, 2016.
s/Susan K. Pinkowski
SUSAN K. PINKOWSKI

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