Astra Associates v. Sijora Enterprises, LLC

Filing 13

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment 9 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (KJac)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ASTRA ASSOCIATES, INC.,
dba Mid-West Instruments,
Case No. 15-14148
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

Plaintiff,
v.
SIJORA ENTERPRISES, LLC,
dba Acugauge,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [9]
Plaintiff Astra Associates, Inc., doing business as Mid-West Instruments (“Mid-West”),
sells “backflow prevention test kits,” under the trademarks “845-2,” “845-3,” and “845-5” (the
“845 marks”). According to Mid-West, Defendant Sijora Enterprises, LLC, doing business as
“Acugauge,” sells inferior products using those same marks, and through Acugauge’s website,
implies that some of these inferior products are Mid-West’s products. Mid-West sued Acugauge
for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and under state law. When Acugauge failed to
appear or answer despite service of process, the Clerk entered default. Mid-West now seeks a
default judgment, permanently enjoining Acugauge from misusing the 845 marks. For the
reasons discussed, the Court will grant Mid-West’s motion.
I.
A.
Mid-West’s Complaint includes the following allegations. Mid-West manufactures
backflow prevention test kits, which are used to test backflow prevention assemblies that protect

water supplies from contamination. (R. 1, PID 3 ¶ 6.) Mid-West claims that its backflow
prevention test kits are “the benchmark of the industry.” (Id.)
For over a decade, Mid-West has used the designation “845” to identify a line of its
backflow prevention test kits when advertising, promoting, and selling them worldwide. (R. 1,
PID 4 ¶ 7.) Three specific marks are at issue here: “845-2,” “845-3,” and “845-5.” (Id.) MidWest alleges that each of the 845 marks is “arbitrary and distinctive” and that the marks have
become “well known in the backflow prevention/potable water industry,” giving Mid-West
“inestimable value” due to the associated “enormous goodwill.” (Id.)
Since 2003, Mid-West has promoted its test kits bearing the 845 marks on the website
www.backflowtestkits.com, advertising that the kits come from “[o]ver 30 [now 40] years of
input from backflow technicians,” are made and sold in the United States, and are “Capable of
performing test procedures including those recommended by ABPA, ASSE, AWWA, CSA,
FCCC & HR-USC, NEWWA and UF-TREEO.” (R. 1, PID 5 ¶ 9 (first alteration in original).)
In June 2012, Mid-West learned that Acugauge was advertising and selling backflow
prevention test kits using the same 845 marks—“845-2,” “845-3,” and “845-5”—at another
website, www.backflow-test-kit.com. (R. 1, PID 5 ¶ 10.) Acugauge’s website also “purported” to
sell Mid-West test kits with the 845 marks, though the Complaint does not clarify whether
Acugauge was actually selling Mid-West test kits or simply selling counterfeit kits under MidWest’s brand. (Id.) The website also copied text and photographs from Mid-West’s advertising
and fact sheets. (Id.) None of this was authorized. (Id.) Finally, the website also made false
statements about the Acugauge products, including that they are “Acceptable by both USC and
AWWA.” (R. 1, PID 5–6 ¶ 10.)

2

More than two years later, on November 25, 2014, Mid-West was issued the following
United States Trademark Registrations for its 845 marks for backflow prevention test kits:
Registration No. 4,643,459 (for 845-5); Registration No. 4,643,460 (for 845-2); and Registration
No. 4,643,461 (for 845-3). (R. 1, PID 4–5 ¶ 8.)
At some point (the Complaint does not say when), Mid-West sent Acugauge a cease and
desist letter. (R. 1, PID 6 ¶ 11.) In response, Acugauge removed from its website the text copied
from Mid-West’s materials but continued to use the 845 marks, offering backflow prevention test
kits for sale from a link on the website identified as “Mid-West® Backflow Test Kits.” (Id.)
Again, the Complaint does not say whether Acugauge was actually selling Mid-West kits or
counterfeit ones. Mid-West sent other demand letters in July 2013 and December 2014, but the
unauthorized use of the 845 marks continued, and Acugauge has not responded. (Id.)
Acugauge’s website also now promotes products with the 845 marks through a link
identified as “Mid-West/Acugauge Backflow Test Kits,” representing that the products come
from “[o]ver 30 years of input from backflow technicians” and that the products with the 845-5
designation are “Acceptable by both USC and AWWA in all 50 states” and are “Approved in all
50 states and Canada.” (R. 1, PID 7 ¶ 12.) The website also misleadingly identifies Acugauge as
an “original manufacturer” of backflow prevention test kits even though “at most, Acugauge
only assembles such kits from the parts manufactured by others.” (Id.) Finally, the website
misrepresents features that Acugauge’s products have compared to Mid-West’s, including false
assertions that its products have certain features that Mid-West’s products do not have. (Id.)
This has all caused actual confusion—including customer complaints to Mid-West about
the quality of Acugauge products that were mistakenly believed to have come from Mid-West.
(R. 1, PID 7 ¶ 13.)

3

B.
Mid-West filed this action against Acugauge on November 25, 2015. (R. 1.) The
Complaint asserts five counts: (1) trademark infringement and counterfeiting under the Lanham
Act; (2) false designation and false or misleading description and representation of fact under the
Lanham Act; (3) injurious falsehood under Michigan common law; (4) dilution and tarnishment
under Michigan common law; and (5) unfair competition under Michigan common law. MidWest served Acugauge’s registered agent on December 24, 2015, but no appearance or response
followed. (R. 4.) At Mid-West’s request, the clerk entered and served default on February 2,
2016. (R. 7, R. 8.) Mid-West moved for default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(b)(2) on August 2, 2016. (R. 9.) Mid-West seeks a permanent injunction and attorneys’ fees.
(R. 9, PID 52.)
II.
As a threshold issue, in order to render a valid judgment, a court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties, and must act in a manner consistent with due process.
Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995).
The focus of Mid-West’s motion for default judgment appears to be solely its Lanham
Act claims. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1338. As Mid-West does not specifically address its other claims—and seeks only a
permanent injunction under the Lanham Act—the Court will dismiss its state-law claims.
As for due process considerations, the Court notes that while a defendant may waive a
personal jurisdiction challenge or chose to contest it later in the proceedings or in a collateral
proceeding, courts have nonetheless sua sponte addressed the issue prior to entering a default
judgment. See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Epplett, No. 15-10442, 2015 WL 5439946, at *3

4

(E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2015) (citing cases); see also Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200,
1203 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Based on this practice, the Court asked Mid-West to brief
whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Acugauge (R. 10). Mid-West’s response (R. 12)
has convinced the Court that at least a prima facie case can be made that personal jurisdiction is
proper over Acugauge.
“When a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must be both authorized by the forum State’s long-arm
statute and in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2016).
To start, the Court finds that personal jurisdiction over Acugauge is proper under
Michigan’s long-arm statute. “There is no Michigan statute that addresses personal jurisdiction
over limited liability companies, such as the defendant in this case. However, the personal
jurisdiction rules governing corporations generally have been applied to limited liability
companies as well.” Magna Powertrain De Mexico S.A. De C.V. v. Momentive Performance
Materials USA LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 824, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2016). The Michigan long-arm
statute for corporations, Mich. Comp. Laws See § 600.715, extends personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident corporation for claims “arising out of the act or acts which create any of the
following relationships,” including “[t]he transaction of any business within the state.” The
Michigan Supreme Court interprets “any” under the state’s long-arm statute to mean “just what it
says”—even the “slightest” business. Sifers v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623, 624 (Mich. 1971). That
is easily met here. Mid-West’s Complaint alleges that Acugauge transacts business in Michigan.
(R. 1, PID 2 ¶ 2.) Acugauge’s website implicitly confirms this, representing that “on any given
day we calibrate and ship backflow test kits to every State in the country.” (R. 12, PID 110

5

(emphasis added).) At around the time of the Complaint, a Mid-West employee ordered an
infringing product from Acugauge’s website, confirming that the website ships to Michigan. (R.
9-8, R. 12-2.) Furthermore, “[t]he ‘arising out of’ requirement of § 600.715 is satisfied because
the alleged economic harm and trademark infringement that form the basis of [Mid-West’s] suit
were directly related to [Acugauge’s] transaction of business in Michigan.” See Neogen Corp. v.
Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002).
Moving to the due process inquiry, “[t]he relevant question . . . is whether [Acugauge]
possessed such ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state that exercising jurisdiction would
comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” SFS Check, LLC v. First
Bank of Delaware, 774 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Such “minimum
contacts” exist if (1) Acugauge “purposefully avail[ed] [it]self of the privilege of acting in
[Michigan] or caus[ed] a consequence in [Michigan],” (2) the cause of action arises from
Acugauge’s activities in Michigan, and (3) “the acts of [Acugauge] or consequences caused by
[Acugauge] . . . have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.” Id.
Starting with the first factor, “[a] defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
acting in a state through its website if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals
specifically intended interaction with residents of the state.” Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890.
Acugauge’s website meets that degree of interaction. It allows customers to place online orders
to have products with the infringing marks shipped to destinations including Michigan (see R.
12-3). See Chanel, Inc. v. Huang Cong, No. 10-2086, 2011 WL 6180029, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 8, 2011) (“Where, through a website, a defendant sells products and services to customers
in the forum state, the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in the

6

forum state, even if the customers initiate the sales by placing orders through the website.”). The
website also holds itself out as welcoming Michigan business, stating that it ships products to
“every” state on a “daily basis.” See Neogen, 282 F.3d at 891 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding purposeful
availment where a website “holds itself out as welcoming Michigan business” by stating it would
“do a genetic newborn screening test for any parent in any state”). This suggests that Acugauge
routinely does business with Michigan residents through its website.
Thus, for the purpose of this motion, the Court finds that Acugauge purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of acting in Michigan by specifically intending interaction with Michigan
residents. If for some reason the claims on its website are false—and Acugauge does not really
ship backflow prevention test kits to Michigan—Acugauge may come to this Court to explain
itself.
The second factor is met here as well: the cause of action arises from Acugauge’s
activities in Michigan. The standard under this prong is “lenient,” and “the cause of action need
not ‘formally’ arise from defendant’s contacts.” AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543,
552 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “At a minimum, this factor is satisfied if ‘the cause of
action, of whatever type, ha[s] a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities.”
Id. (citation omitted). Here, it does. As one court has explained, “trademark infringement is
essentially a tort, the effect of which is felt in the state where [a] Plaintiff is located. Therefore,
to the extent that [a] Defendant has allegedly violated Plaintiff’s federal trademarks, the cause of
action arises in Michigan, where Plaintiff is located.” Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse
Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874, 882 (W.D. Mich. 2014).
The third factor is also met: the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Acugauge would be
reasonable because of Acugauge’s connection to Michigan. “An inference arises that the third

7

factor is satisfied if the first two requirements are met.” Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Even without that inference, the factors that guide the inquiry under
this factor, see id, all support the exercise of personal jurisdiction: the burden to Acugauge is
slim, as its Michigan business should have made it reasonably expect to be hailed to court here;
Michigan has an interest in protecting its businesses like Mid-West; Mid-West has an interest in
vindicating its trademark rights here in its home-state; and the Court can think of no overriding
interests of other states.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Mid-West has established a prima facie case that the
Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Acugauge, so there is no jurisdictional barrier to
entering a default judgment.
III.
The Court now turns to Mid-West’s claims. The Court accepts as true Mid-West’s well
pled allegations to determine whether they are “sufficient to state a claim and support a judgment
of liability.” See Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 407
(6th Cir. 2010).
A.
The Court finds that Mid-West has stated plausible Lanham Act claims. “A party proves
trademark infringement by showing (1) that it owns a trademark, (2) that the infringer used the
mark in commerce without authorization, and (3) that the use of the alleged infringing trademark
‘is likely to cause confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the
parties.’” Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see
also Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “only a ‘likelihood of
confusion’ must be shown in order to obtain equitable relief” (emphasis in original)). Under the

8

Lanham Act, the Sixth Circuit “use[s] the same test to decide whether there has been trademark
infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion
between the two marks.” D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 542.
Mid-West alleges that it owns the following valid United States Trademark Registrations
for its 845 marks for backflow prevention test kits, all of which issued November 25, 2014:
Registration No. 4,643,459 (for 845-5); Registration No. 4,643,460 (for 845-2); and Registration
No. 4,643,461 (for 845-3). (R. 1, PID 4–5 ¶ 8.) Those registrations are all attached to its
Complaint as well. (See R. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4.)
Mid-West also alleges in detail how Acugauge has used those marks without
authorization. Specifically, Acugauge advertises and sells on its website its own backflow
prevention test kits using Mid-West’s marks, “845-2,” “845-3,” and “845-5.” (R. 1, PID 5 ¶ 10.)
The website also purports to sell Mid-West test kits with the 845 marks. (Id.) Furthermore, the
website promotes products with the 845 marks through a link identified as “Mid-West/Acugauge
Backflow Test Kits.” (R. 1, PID 7 ¶ 12.) According to Mid-West, none of this was authorized—it
sent Acugauge several letters asking it to stop infringing the 845 marks, but the unauthorized use
continues. (R. 1, PID 6 ¶ 11.)
As for whether this has caused a likelihood of confusion, Courts consider the following
factors: “(1) strength of plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks;
(4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing of channels used; (6) degree of purchaser care;
(7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion in selecting the
mark.” D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 542–43.
With several of these factors in mind, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges
a likelihood of confusion due to Acugauge’s conduct. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d

9

1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[A] plaintiff need not show that all, or even most, of the factors
listed are present in any particular case to be successful.”); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v.
Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 509 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]his court has sometimes resolved the
question of confusion by reference to only one or a few of these factors, without inquiring into
the rest”).
For one, the goods are related because they are “marketed and consumed such that buyers
are likely to believe that the . . . [goods], similarly marked, come from the same source, or are
somehow connected with or sponsored by a common company.” D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 543.
Acugauge has been advertising and selling backflow prevention test kits—similar to Mid-West’s
products and using the same marks—and attributing the products to Acugauge, Mid-West, or
some combination of the two.
The marks at issue are also similar, if not identical. Mid-West alleges that Acugauge used
the same three marks—845-2, 845-3, and 845-5—for which Mid-West owns trademarks. See
Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir.
1997) ( “Similarity of marks is a factor of considerable weight.”).
Furthermore, Mid-West has alleged that actual confusion has ensued: consumers have
complained to Mid-West about Acugauge’s products, mistakenly believing the products to have
come from Mid-West, (R. 1, PID 7–8 ¶ 13). See id. at 284 (“Evidence of actual confusion is
undoubtedly the best evidence of likelihood of confusion.”).
The marketing channels are the same: both Acugauge and Mid-West sell their back-flow
prevention test kits online. See D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 544 (“[S]imultaneous use of the Internet as
a marketing tool exacerbates the likelihood of confusion,” given the fact that “entering a web site
takes little effort—usually one click from a linked site or a search engine’s list; thus, Web surfers

10

are more likely to be confused as to the ownership of a web site than traditional patrons of a
brick-and-mortar store would be of a store’s ownership.”). And Acugauge’s website—which has
an address that bears a striking resemblance to Mid-West’s website—has copied text and
photographs from Mid-West’s advertising and fact sheets, and has made false statements about
the Acugauge products, including that they are “Acceptable by both USC and AWWA.” (R. 1,
PID 5–6 ¶ 10.)
Finally, the allegations support the inference that Acugauge intended to benefit from
Mid-West’s reputation in using the 845 marks. See D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 544 (noting under the
seventh factor that “[t]he intent of defendants in adopting [their mark] is a critical factor, since if
the mark was adopted with the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of [the plaintiff],
that fact alone may be sufficient to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.”).
In conclusion, accepting as true Mid-West’s well-pled factual allegations, the Court finds
that Mid-West has stated Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement and false designation of
origin and false or misleading description and representation of fact.
B.
Though Mid-West’s Complaint seeks money damages, its motion for default judgment
asks only for injunctive relief. Specifically, Mid-West asks for an order permanently enjoining
the following:
Defendant, and each of its managers, members, agents, servants, employees, and
representatives, and all those acting in concert or participation with Defendant
who receive actual notice, from:
(i)

using in any manner any of Plaintiff’s 845-2®, 845-3® and 845-5®
marks, or any counterfeit of, colorable imitation or simulation thereof, in
connection with the importation, advertising, promotion, distribution,
offering for sale, and/or sale, of any backflow prevention test kits or
product in the United States, other than to identify the genuine, authorized
backflow prevention test kits of Plaintiff;
11

(ii)

publishing on the www.backflow-test-kit.com website and/or on any other
advertising or promotional material, false statements and/or
misrepresentations as to the nature, characteristics and/or qualities of the
backflow prevention test kits of Plaintiff and/or Defendant, including, but
not limited to, claims that Defendant’s products are the result [of] “Over
30 years of input from backflow technicians” and/or are “Capable of
performing all known backflow test procedures including those
recommended by ASSE, AWWA, CSA, FCCC and HR-USC 10th
Edition, and NEWWA,”, that Defendant is an “original manufacturer” of
Defendant’s backflow preventer test kits, and/or that the factory producing
the Mid-West backflow preventer test kits is “retooling” or otherwise
unable to deliver product; and

(iii)

advertising and/or offering for sale any products purporting or represented
to be Mid-West backflow preventer products, including but not limited to
the Mid-West 845-2®, 845-3® and/or 845-5® backflow preventer test
kits, “mid-west-stylebackflow-test-kits”, and/or otherwise representing or
implying that Defendant is an authorized dealer, seller or distributor of any
of the Mid-West backflow preventer products and/or that such products
may be purchased from Defendant online, via telephone order, and/or any
other manner.

(R. 9-10, PID 97.) Mid-West also asks that the Court order “that any and all backflow prevention
test kits, and any packaging, labels, signs, prints, advertisements, brochures, and any other
objects or materials, bearing any of the 845-2, 845-3 and/or 845-5 marks, and all plates, molds,
matrices and other means of making same, be delivered to Plaintiff [by Acugauge] for
destruction within twenty days.” (Id., PID 97–98.)
The Lanham Act authorizes this Court to issue an injunction “to prevent the violation of
any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(a). “A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate that it has suffered
irreparable injury, there is no adequate remedy at law, ‘that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted,’ and that it is in the
public’s interest to issue the injunction.” D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted).
These factors are all met here. First, Mid-West has made a showing of irreparable
injury—something that “ordinarily follows” when, as discussed, a “likelihood of confusion or
12

possible risk to reputation appears” from the infringement. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Lucky’s Detroit, LLC v. Double L,
Inc., 533 F. App’x 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2013) (“In trademark infringement cases, a likelihood of
confusion or possible risk to the requesting party’s reputation satisfies the irreparable injury
requirement.”). Second, in balancing the relative hardships, Acugauge faces no hardship from
refraining from its willful violations of the Lanham Act, but Mid-West would continue to suffer
hardship from any continued violations, including damage to its reputation and loss of sales. See
D’Amato, 469 F.3d at 550. Third, because of the potential of future harm to Mid-West if
Acugauge continues to violate Mid-West’s rights to the 845 marks, there is no adequate remedy
at law. See id. Finally, an injunction would further the public interest—“prevent[ing] consumers
from being misled” by Acugauge. See id.
With respect to Mid-West’s request for the injunction to order Acugauge to “return” all
of its infringing materials to Mid-West for destruction, Mid-West has cited no authority
suggesting that such relief is warranted, and commonly, other courts have simply ordered
infringing materials to be destroyed, not returned directly to the plaintiff. See Great Lakes
Transp. Holding LLC v. Metro 2 Airport Sedan Serv., No. 14-13594, 2015 WL 871111, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2015); Goulas v. Maxmo, Inc., No. 14-10993, 2014 WL 2515217, at *6
(E.D. Mich. June 4, 2014); Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Dickerson, 995 F. Supp. 2d 753, 757 (E.D. Mich.
2014).
IV.
As a final issue, Mid-West asks the Court to award attorney’s fees. Under the Lanham
Act, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). “Although this provision does not define ‘exceptional,’ [the Sixth
13

Circuit] ha[s] held that a case is not exceptional where the trademark infringement was not
malicious, willful, fraudulent, or deliberate.” Goodfellow, 717 F.3d at 505 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). As described in the Complaint, Acugauge’s Lanham Act violations
have been willful and deliberate. Acugauge has copied marketing material directly from MidWest, and even after several warnings by Mid-West, has continued to use Mid-West’s marks
without permission. And Acugauge has provided no explanation for its conduct. Thus, the Court
finds that Mid-West is entitled to attorney’s fees. Mid-West should submit to the Court a
supplemental brief identifying and documenting its time spent on its Lanham Act claims. See
U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1193 (6th Cir. 1997). (“[U]nder 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a), attorneys’ fees are recoverable only for work performed in connection with
claims filed under the Lanham Act.”).
V.
For the reasons discussed, Mid-West’s Motion for Default Judgment (R. 9) is GRANTED
to the extent that the motion and the requested injunctive relief applies to Counts I and II. Counts
III, IV, and V are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mid-West has until March 8, 2017 to
submit a supplemental brief on its request for attorneys’ fees. A separate default judgment will
issue for the requested injunctive relief.
SO ORDERED.
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 27, 2017

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 27, 2017.
s/Keisha Jackson
Case Manager

15