Antoine v. Klee et al

Filing 6

ORDER of Dismissal. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SUFFREN ANTOINE,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 15-14329
HONORABLE SEAN F. COX

v.
P. KLEE, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
On December 8, 2015, plaintiff Suffren Antoine filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time, Plaintiff was a state prisoner at the Gus Harrison
Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan.

Records maintained by the Michigan

Department of Corrections on its official website indicate that Plaintiff was released on
parole on January 5, 2016.1 The defendants are dozens of state correctional officers
and other individuals employed at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendants have engaged in racial
profiling and have defamed him by calling him a homosexual and a boy, not a man.
Plaintiff also contends that the defendants have conspired to kill him. As a result of the
defendants’ conduct and remarks, Plaintiff asserts that he has been subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment, placed at risk of being assaulted by other prisoners, and
1

See http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=581263.
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deprived of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
Plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities for money damages. He also
wants the Court to discipline the individuals responsible for allegedly abusing him.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Framework
Federal district courts are required to screen a prisoner’s complaint and to
dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir.
2010); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous
if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
In determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted, courts construe the prisoner’s complaint in the light most favorable to him or
her, accept the factual allegations as true, and determine whether the prisoner can
prove any set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420
F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005).

While a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations,” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)
(footnote and citations omitted). In other words, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
B. Application
Plaintiff has sued 132 individuals, but he has not alleged what any of them
personally did to violate his constitutional rights. In fact, he has not mentioned a single
defendant by name in his statement of facts, in his statement of claims, or in his request
for relief. He merely makes general allegations about the defendants’ conduct and
remarks.
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 676. Claims against governmental officials
for alleged violations of constitutional rights “cannot be founded upon conclusory,
vague, or general allegations.” Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d
834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, “for the plaintiff to proceed, he should provide detail as
to how each defendant allegedly violated his constitutional rights.”

Ridgeway v.

Kentucky, 510 F. App'x 412, 413 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has not alleged what each
defendant did to violate his constitutional rights.
Furthermore, Plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacity for money
damages. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no

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different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal and end citations omitted). The Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against a state and its departments unless the State has consented to suit,
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam), and the State has not
consented to suit here. Moreover, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. For these additional
reasons, Plaintiff has no right to money damages from the defendants.
“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive
relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective
relief are not treated as actions against the State.’” Id. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985)). But a prison official’s verbal harassment of a
prisoner is “insufficient to support a section 1983 claim for relief.” Wingo v. Tennessee
Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (2012) (citing Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955
(6th Cir. 1987)). Harassment and verbal abuse, such as Plaintiff describes, simply “do
not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits.”
Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Ivey, 832 F.2d
at 954-55). Minor threats also do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Carney v. Craven, 40 F. App’x 48, 50 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, even assuming that the Court has authority
to discipline the defendants, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks protection from the defendants or from other prisoners, his claim is moot

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because he has been released from prison on parole. Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dep’t
of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995).
III. Conclusion
The complaint is frivolous because it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.
The complaint also fails to state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted. The
Court therefore summarily dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court also certifies that an appeal from
this decision would be frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442-45 (1962).

Dated: January 14, 2016

s/ Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that on January 14, 2016, the document above was served on counsel
of record via electronic means and upon Suffren Antoine via First Class Mail at the
address below:
Suffren Antoine 581263
Harrison (MSP)
Gus Harrison Correctional Facility
2727 E Beecher St.
Adrian, MI 49221

s/ J. McCoy
Case Manager

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