Lott v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings LLC

Filing 30

OPINION and ORDER Denying Lott's 13 MOTION to Vacate, Modify and/or Correct Arbitration Award and Granting Morgan Stanley's 18 MOTION to Confirm Award,(Status Conference set for 8/16/2016 at 3:00 PM before District Judge Sean F. Cox.) Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (TMcg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Bradley Lott,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-14338

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, et al.,

Sean F. Cox
United States District Court Judge

Defendants.
_____________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
DENYING LOTT’S MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD AND
GRANTING MORGAN STANLEY’S MOTION TO CONFIRM AWARD
Plaintiff is a stock broker who borrowed a large sum of money from Defendants
when he went to work for them, and signed a promissory note that required him to pay
back the outstanding balance if he left the firm. When Plaintiff failed to do so,
Defendants filed a statement of claim in an arbitration proceeding, seeking the balance
plus the attorney fees and costs they would incur in the arbitration. Plaintiff filed a
separate arbitration proceeding, asserting that he should not be required to pay back the
money because Defendants had engaged in misconduct. The two arbitrations were
consolidated and the panel ultimately awarded Defendants the outstanding balance they
sought, along with interest, and the entire amount of attorney fees and costs that they
sought.
Unhappy with the award, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award in state court,

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that was later removed to this Court. Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate that portion of the
award that awarded attorney fees and costs to Defendants. Defendants ask the Court to
confirm the award in all respects. The parties concede that the federal standard applies to
the pending motions.
The Court finds that the issues have been adequately presented in the parties’
briefs and that oral argument would not aid the decisional process. See Local Rule
7.1(f)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. The Court therefore orders
that the motions will be decided upon the briefs.
“When courts are called on to review an arbitrator’s decision, the review is very
narrow; one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American
jurisprudence.” Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. United Steelworkers, 913 F.2d 1166, 1169 (6th
Cir. 1990)). As explained below, this is not one of those rare instances where it is
appropriate for the Court to disturb an arbitration award. The Court shall DENY Lott’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein he asks the Court to vacate the award, and shall
GRANT Morgan Stanley’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein it asks the
Court to confirm the award.
BACKGROUND
On or about November 24, 2015, Plaintiff Bradley Lott (“Lott”) filed a “Complaint
to Vacate, Modify and/or Correct Arbitration Award” in state court, challenging an
arbitration award. Defendants Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney FA Notes Holdings, LLC (collectively “Morgan Stanley”) removed the
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action to this Court. Thereafter, Morgan Stanley filed an Answer, Defenses, and
Counterclaim that asks the Court to confirm the arbitration award.
The Court held a Scheduling Conference, after which it issued a Scheduling Order
that simply gave the parties a deadline of March 1, 2016 to file their cross-motions.
The parties have now each filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s
motion asks the Court to vacate the arbitration in part, with respect to the attorney fees
and costs awarded to Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley’s motion asks the Court to
confirm the arbitration award in all respects.
This Court’s practice guidelines, which are expressly included in the Scheduling
Order issued in this case, provide, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) and (e), that:
a. The moving party’s papers shall include a separate document entitled
Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute. The statement shall list in
separately numbered paragraphs concise statements of each undisputed
material fact, supported by appropriate citations to the record. . .
b. In response, the opposing party shall file a separate document entitled
Counter-Statement of Disputed Facts. The counter-statement shall list in
separately numbered paragraphs following the order or the movant’s
statement, whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is
admitted or denied and shall also be supported by appropriate citations to
the record. The Counter-Statement shall also include, in a separate section,
a list of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a
genuine issue for trial.
c. All material facts as set forth in the Statement of Material Facts Not in
Dispute shall be deemed admitted unless controverted in the CounterStatement of Disputed Facts.
(Docket Entry No. 30 at 2-3).
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In compliance with this Court’s guidelines, in support of Lott’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Lott filed a “Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute” (Docket
Entry No. 14) (“Pl.’s Stmt. A”). In response to that submission, Morgan Stanley filed a
“Counter-Statement” (Docket Entry No. 17) (“Defs.’ Stmt. A”). Likewise, in support of
Morgan Stanley’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it filed a “Statement of Material Facts
Not in Dispute” (“Defs.’ Stmt. B”), to which Lott filed a Counter-Statement (“Pl.’s Smt.
B”).
The following facts, unless noted otherwise, are undisputed.
Morgan Stanley previously employed Lott as a registered representative, or a
stockbroker. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. A at ¶ 1). As a securities broker-dealer and an
associated person, Morgan Stanley and Lott were required to arbitrate disputes through
the auspices of the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (“FINRA”). (Pl. and Defs.’
Stmts. A at ¶ 9).
The underlying arbitration claim was brought by Morgan Stanley before FINRA to
collect a January 12, 2007 Promissory Note owed to the firm by Lott, which became due
and payable when Lott voluntarily resigned on August 18, 2011. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B
at ¶ 1). Paragraph 8 of the Promissory Note states:
8.

Cost of Collection. The Borrower [Lott] promises to pay [Morgan
Stanley] for all expenses it incurs, including attorney’s fees, in
connection with the collection of any outstanding indebtedness due
under this Note or to enforce any provision hereunder.

(Promissory Note at ¶ 8).
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In its Statement of Claim, Morgan Stanley indicated that it was seeking to recover
the outstanding principal balance of the Promissory Note, plus interest, from Lott. (Ex. D
to Pl.’s Br.). Morgan Stanley also indicated that it was seeking an award of all costs and
attorney fees incurred in the arbitration, pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Not, that
were not yet determined. (Id.)
After Morgan Stanley filed its Statement of Claim before FINRA, Lott filed an
Answer and Counterclaim asserting that Morgan Stanley engaged in misconduct which
both relieved Lott of his obligations under the Promissory Note and justified an award of
money damages to Lott. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 3; see also Ex. 3 to Defs.’ Stmt. B
at 3-4).
Lott also filed a separate Statement of Claim with FINRA advancing those same
allegations in an independent arbitration action. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 4; see also
Ex. 4 to Defs.’ Stmt. B). Morgan Stanley filed a Response and Affirmative Defenses to
Lott’s Statement of Claim (Ex. 7 to Defs.’ Stmt. A) where it asserted that Lott’s
Statement of Claim “is nothing more than a painfully transparent attempt to avoid paying
a debt justly due,” and that Lott filed his “Statement of Claim in an effort to avoid
repayment.” (Id. at 1 & 6). Morgan Stanley again indicated that it was seeking an award
of costs and attorney fees incurred in the arbitration proceedings. (Id. at 15).
Lott and Morgan Stanley each signed FINRA Arbitration Submission Agreements,
stating, among other things, that they agreed to be bound by FINRA’s procedures and
rules. (Ex. 5 to Defs.’ Stmt. B).
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On or about August 1, 2012, Lott requested that the two arbitration matters be
consolidated because “[b]oth actions and their claims, counterclaims and affirmative
defenses revolve around Bradley Lott’s affiliation with, and departure from, Morgan
Stanley. As all of these claims are related, Bradley Lott requests that they be combined
pursuant to FINRA Rule 13314.” (Ex. 6 to Defs.’ Stmt. B). Morgan Stanley did not
oppose the consolidation efforts and the two FINRA matters were joined as a single
arbitration proceeding at Lott’s request. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 7).
In Morgan Stanley’s FINRA 13514 Disclosures, it indicated that it had provided
Lott with all documents it intended to introduce at the hearing, with the exception of
documents supporting its “request for costs and fees which cannot be finalized” until the
hearings had been held. (Ex. 8 to Defs.’ Resp. Br.).
The arbitration hearing took place over the course of ten days in May 2014, May
2015, and October 2015 (18 months) before a panel of three duly appointed FINRA
arbitrators. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 8).
From the outset of the arbitration hearing, all involved understood that, under the
terms of the Promissory Note, Morgan Stanley was seeking its costs and attorney fees in
the combined arbitration proceeding. For example, Morgan Stanley’s opening statement
discussed that issue. (See Morgan Stanley’s opening statement, Ex. 9 to Defs.’ Resp. Br.
at 18). During the hearings in May 2014, Morgan Stanley examined Lott regarding the
attorney fee provision in the Promissory Note:
Michaels:

I’ll refer you to ex, to paragraph 4. Would you agree with me
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that that paragraph indicates that if your employment
terminates, that the outstanding balance due on the Note will
become immediately due and payable?
Lott:

Yes.

Michaels:

Along with interest accruing from the date of termination at a
rate of prime plus 6%. Do you agree with me that that’s what
it provides?

Lott:

That’s what it, yes.

Michaels:

And you signed this Note?

Lott:

Yes I did.

Michaels:

And you agreed to the terms?

Lott:

Yes I did.

Michaels:

Okay. Now let’s look at paragraph 6. Would you agree with
me that this Note provides that you as the borrower, promise
to pay for all expenses incurred, including attorney’s fees, in
connection with the collection of any outstanding
indebtedness due under the Note or to enforce any provision
thereunder?

Lott:

Yes.

Michaels:

And you signed the Note?

Lott:
....
Michaels:

Yes I did.

Lott:

You would agree with me that you owe the cost of collection
including attorney’s fees in connection with the Note?
That’s what it says, yes.
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(Id. at 88-90).
On the final day of the hearing, Counsel for Lott argued that the attorney fees
Morgan Stanley could recover should be limited to the enforcement of the agreement
only, and not allowed for Lott’s counterclaims. (Ex. 10 to Defs.’ Br. at 42-43).
Morgan Stanley again sought the attorney fees it had incurred in the combined
arbitration proceeding, as a cost of collection of the Promissory Note. (Ex. 10 to Defs.’
Resp. Br. at 59). Morgan Stanley’s counsel asked for $351,000.00 in attorney fees, and
stated, “I know that’s a lot of money but that was incurred as a result of Mr. Lott’s
intransige[ce].” (Id. at 62). He asserted that Lott’s so-called “counterclaims” were
nothing more than defenses to Morgan Stanley’s collection matter. (Id. at 62-63).
Morgan Stanley’s counsel also presented the Panel with a statement of its
attorney’s fees. (Id. at 88). Counsel for Lott stated that he had not seen that final
statement and the Panel instructed Morgan Stanley’s Counsel to show it to Lott’s
Counsel. Lott’s Counsel then made an objection, that the statement was “irrelevant”
because it is not broken up between the claim and counterclaims. Counsel did not object
to the requested attorney fees on any other basis.
The statement of attorney fees and costs submitted by Morgan Stanley to the
Panel, which was signed by counsel, is attached as Exhibit 6 to Defendants’ Response
Brief.
The Panel accepted the statement of attorney’s fees submitted by Morgan Stanley,

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stating: “We will accept this as an exhibit. There was argument on it and so the way that
that has been argued, so we’ll accept it for what it’s worth.” (Id. at 89). Lott’s counsel
then asked if he could submit a packet of cases that he had discussed and the Panel
allowed that too. (Id.). Before concluding the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
Arbitrator No. 1:

Mr. Kowalski, anything else for the record or verbally
for
the record?

Mr. Kowalski:

Nothing. Thank you.

Arbitrator No. 1:

Okay. All right. The decision that the arbitrators reach
on this case will be forwarded by FINRA to the parties
in order to expedite the delivery of the panel’s decision
to the parties. . . .With that, the record will remain open
in this case until the party – the panel does arrive at a
decision or the panel determines that it is closed . . .

(Id. at 90-91). Although the record remained open until the Panel arrived at a decision,
the materials submitted by the parties reflect that neither side requested anything further
from the Panel in connection with the arbitration and neither side asked the Panel to
consider anything further.
On November 10, 2015, the Panel issued an Award in favor of Morgan Stanley
and against Lott. The Award began by stating that “[a]fter considering the pleadings, the
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the Panel has decided in full and final
resolution of the issues submitted for determination” that Lott is liable for and shall pay to
Morgan Stanley:
1)$534,326.12 in compensatory damages, which reflects the outstanding principal balance
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of the Promissory Note at the time Lott resigned from Morgan Stanley; 2) interest in the
amount of $204,469.10, pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note; 3) attorney fees in
the amount of $351,362.03, pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note; and 4) costs in
the amount of $44,062.03. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 10; Arbitration Award at 4).
The Panel also denied Lott’s Counterclaim in its entirety, his request for attorney fees,
punitive damages and expungement. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 11; Arbitration Award
at 4).
On November 24, 2015, Lott filed a complaint in Oakland County Circuit Court,
seeking to vacate or modify the Arbitration Award. (Ex. 7 to Defs.’ Stmt. B). Morgan
Stanley removed the action to this Court. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.
Lott’s Motion for Summary Judgment does not seek vacatur, modification or
correction of any portion of the Award except the portion of the Award related to attorney
fees and costs. (Pl. and Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 18). On December 4, 2015, and again on
February 20, 2016, Morgan Stanley submitted written demands to Lott that he pay the
uncontested portion of the Arbitration Award but Lott has refused to do so. (Pl. and
Defs.’s Stmts. B at ¶ 19).
ANALYSIS
In their briefs, both sides appeared unsure as to whether this Court should apply
Michigan law (MCR 3.602 and related Michigan case law) or federal law (the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. and federal case law) as their briefs referenced both,
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without analyzing the issue.
As a result, prior to the hearing, the Court issued a show cause order wherein the
Court stated that “[b]ased upon this Court’s initial review of the pending motions, it
appears that the federal standard should be applied in this case. See, e.g., Muskegon Ctrl.
Dispatch v. Tiburon, Inc., 462 F. A’ppx 517, 522-23 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing issue and
noting that any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the federal standard). Nevertheless,
the Court shall give the parties the opportunity to brief the issue if they believe
otherwise.” (Docket Entry No. 26). The Court ordered the parties show cause, in writing,
no later than May 2016, “why the Court should not apply the federal standard to the
pending motions.”
Neither party filed anything in response to the Show Cause Order. Thus, they
concede that the federal standard should be applied to the pending motions. It is as
follows:
“The Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) expresses a presumption that
arbitration awards will be confirmed.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2005). “ ‘When courts are called on to
review an arbitrator’s decision, the review is very narrow; [it is] one of the
narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence.’ ”
Id. (quoting Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. United Steelworkers, 913 F.2d 1166,
1169 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. A’ppx 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008). Section 10 of
the FAA sets forth the statutory grounds to vacate an arbitration award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
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either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; and
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award from the subject matter
submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
Within the Sixth Circuit, a district court’s “ability to vacate an arbitration award is
almost exclusively limited to [the above] grounds, although it may also vacate an award
found to be in manifest disregard of the law.” Id.
To constitute manifest disregard for the law, a “‘mere error in the interpretation or
application of the law is insufficient. Rather, the decision must fly in the face of clearly
established legal precedent.’” Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1995)). Arbitrators are considered to act with manifest
disregard only if “(1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to
reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.” Id.
The FAA makes clear that confirmation or vacatur is to be a summary proceeding
and that the court must confirm the award where it is not vacated, modified or corrected.
9 U.S.C. § 9.
Here, Lott does not assert that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means, or that there was any evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.

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Rather, Lott asks this Court to vacate the portion of the award pertaining to
attorney fees and costs based upon subsections (3) and (4) above and based upon
“manifest disregard for the law.”
A.

Misconduct In Refusing To Hear Evidence Pertinent And Material To The
Controversy
Lott claims that the Panel allowed Morgan Stanley to engage in “trial by ambush

and surprise” as to the attorney fees and costs by “denying Lott any opportunity
whatsoever to respond and defend against” Morgan Stanley’s requested attorney fees and
costs. (Pl.’s Br., Docket Entry No. 13, at 11).1 Lott argues that the Panel improperly
accepted Morgan Stanley’s Summary Statement over Lott’s objections. (Pl.’s Br., Docket
Entry No. 13, at 10). Lott claims that despite his “immediate objections,” the Panel
simply rubber-stamped Morgan Stanley’s request for attorney fees and costs. (Id. at 11).
Lott further claims that the Panel “precluded [him] from having any opportunity to
review, investigate or contest any aspect of the Summary Statement.” (Id. at 10). He
characterizes this as a “refusal to hear evidence.”
The Court rejects these arguments. There was no trial by ambush. From the
outset, Lott was well aware that Morgan Stanley was seeking an award of all costs and
attorney fees it incurred in connection with the combined arbitration proceeding.
After Morgan Stanley submitted its requested attorney fees, the only objection that

1

Lott also makes scattered arguments about the order that proofs were made, but Lott
himself concedes that under the applicable rules the Panel has the discretion to vary the order in
which the hearing is conducted.
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Lott made after reviewing the claimed fees and costs was his objection that the statement
was “irrelevant” because it was not broken up between the claim and the counterclaims.
Notably, Lott did not object to the requested fees on any other basis, nor did he request
additional time to review the claimed fees. Lott could have objected to the claimed fees
as unreasonable or insufficiently supported but he simply failed to do so – either during or
after2 the hearing.
Lott has not identified any evidence, or any argument or legal authority, that he
sought to present to the Panel but was precluded from presenting. Thus, his argument
that the Panel refused to hear evidence fails.
B.

Arbitrators Exceeded Their Powers
Lott also argues that the Panel exceeded its authority by awarding attorney fees

and costs incurred in defending against Lott’s affirmative claims.
Courts may vacate an arbitration award where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). But, as the Sixth Circuit has explained, the burden of
proving that the arbitrators exceeded their authority is “very great.” Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 442 F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir.
2006).
Where, as here, an arbitrator is accused of misconstruing or misapplying the
2

Although the record remained open until the Panel arrived at a decision, the materials
submitted by the parties reflect that neither side requested anything further from the Panel in
connection with the arbitration after the hearing concluded and neither side asked the Panel to
consider anything further.
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contract, “courts must accord an arbitrator’s decision substantial deference because it is
the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement, not the court’s construction, to which the
parties have agreed.” Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
442 F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Akron Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1997)).
“The terms of the contract define the powers of the arbitrator and ‘as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to
overturn his decision.’” Solvay, 442 F.3d at 476 (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). This means that:
“[C]ourts must refrain from reversing an arbitrator simply because the court
disagrees with the result or believes the arbitrator made a serious legal or
factual error.” Id. (emphasis added). And “[i]f a court can find any line of
argument that is legally plausible and supports the award then it must be
confirmed.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418,
421 (6th Cir. 1995).
Solvay, 442 F.3d at 476.
Here, the Court can certainly find an argument that is legally plausible and
supports the arbitration award. The Promissory Note contains an express provision that
Lott must pay for “all expenses” that Morgan Stanley incurs, including attorney’s fees, in
connection with the collection of any outstanding indebtedness due under the note.
(Promissory Note at ¶ 8). The arbitrators rejected Lott’s argument that the provision does
not allow Morgan Stanley to recover the attorney fees it incurred in defending against

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Lott’s counterclaims. The arbitrators reasonably concluded that the provision allows
Morgan Stanley to recover all attorney fees it incurred in the combined arbitration
proceeding because both Morgan Stanley’s claim and Lott’s counterclaims required
Morgan Stanley to incur fees and costs in order for Morgan Stanley to collect the
outstanding balance owed under the Promissory Note.
C.

Manifest Disregard For The Law
Finally, Lott argues that the arbitration award should be vacated based on manifest

disregard for the law. Lott argues that the Panel disregarded the law by awarding
attorney fees and costs without legally required evidence regarding reasonableness.
The Sixth Circuit has “emphasized that manifest disregard of the law is a very
narrow standard of review. Anaconda Co. v. District Lodge No. 27, 693 F.2d 35 (6th Cir.
1982). A mere error in interpretation or application of the law is insufficient. Anaconda,
693 F.2d at 37–38. Rather, the decision must fly in the face of clearly established legal
precedent.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d at 421.
Moreover, where, “as here, the arbitrators decline to explain their resolution of
certain questions of law, a party seeking to have the award set aside faces a tremendous
obstacle. If a court can find any line of argument that is legally plausible and supports the
award then it must be confirmed. Only where no judge or group of judges could
conceivably come to the same determination as the arbitrators must the award be set
aside.” Id. (citations omitted).
During the arbitration, Morgan Stanley submitted a signed statement of its attorney
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fees and costs that were incurred during the combined arbitration proceeding. Lott
objected to the requested fees on the ground that fees incurred in connection with
defending against his counterclaims were included in the requested fees. Notably, Lott
did not object to the requested as fees as being unreasonable for the work performed.
Moreover, as Morgan Stanley notes, the three experienced FINRA arbitrators who issued
the award “lived with the case for over three years” and were therefore in a position to
judge the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested.
Under these circumstances, Lott has not shown that the arbitrators acted with
manifest disregard for the law in awarding Morgan Stanley its requested attorney fees and
costs.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Lott’s Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Morgan Stanley’s motion asking the Court to
confirm the arbitration award is GRANTED and this Court hereby CONFIRMS the
arbitration award in all respects.
The Court further ORDERS the parties to promptly meet and confer in order to
determine if they can agree upon the Judgment that should be issued, given this Court’s
rulings. If the parties are unable to agree upon the form of the Judgment that should be

17

issued, the parties shall appear for a Conference on August 16, 2016 at 3:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: July 28, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on July
28, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Teresa McGovern
Case Manager Generalist

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