Gauthier v. VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, INC. et al

Filing 14

ORDER denying 4 Motion for More Definite Statement; granting in part and denying in part 5 Motion to Dismiss Claims for Sex Discrimination and Retaliation. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (MLan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NICOLE GAUTHIER,
Case No. 15-14401
Plaintiff,
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTHUR J. TARNOW

v.
VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, INC., ET
AL.,

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
R. STEVEN WHALEN

Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OR FOR MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT [4] AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION [5]
Plaintiff filed her Complaint [Dkt. #1] in this suit on December 21, 2015,
bringing claims for race discrimination under Title VII, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; claims for sex discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII and ELCRA; and a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Michigan tort law. On April 29, 2016, Defendants filed a
Motion for Dismissal or for More Definite Statement [4] and a Motion to Dismiss
Claims for Sex Discrimination and Retaliation [5]. Plaintiff filed a Response [8] to
the former motion on May 13, 2016, and a Response [9] to the latter motion on May
20, 2016. The Court deems the motions suitable for determination without oral
argument in accord with Local Rule 7.1(f)(2).

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For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal or for More
Definite Statement [4] is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims for Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation [5] is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII
claim for sex discrimination but DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims
and her sex discrimination claim under ELCRA.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is a white woman. According to her Complaint, she used to work for
Defendant Volunteers of America (VOA) as a social worker focused on serving
veterans. Defendants Inez Brown, Carl Crockett, and Dorian Mitchell were her
superiors within VOA. Defendants treated Plaintiff differently than they treated male
employees and/or employees of color. This disparate treatment included subjecting
Plaintiff to unfair discipline. In December 2014, an African-American coworker
threatened Plaintiff and called her a “fucking bitch.” Defendants refused to
(adequately) respond to Plaintiff’s complaints of disparate treatment. In fact, they
retaliated against her for protesting the alleged discrimination. Their retaliatory acts
included transferring Plaintiff to a less desirable workplace, falsely accusing her of
unsatisfactory performance (including in performance reviews), and disciplining her.
Defendants terminated Plaintiff in June 2015. Plaintiff’s race, gender, and/or

1

For purposes of this Order, the Court assumes that the allegations in Plaintiff’s
Complaint are true. The truth of the allegations has not been established.
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complaints about discrimination were motivating factors in Defendants’ decision to
terminate her.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in late July 2015. In the space
provided for factual allegations underlying her charge, Plaintiff wrote the following:
I began employment with the above-named employer on
10/23/2014, and I was last employed as a Case Manager.
On 12/30/2014, I was disciplined for having an altercation with an
African-American Case Manager. On 01/15/15, I was transferred from
Warren to Detroit. On 06/09/15 I was discharged without reason by my
African-American Supervisor.
I believe I was disciplined, and ultimately discharged due to my
race, Caucasian, in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended.
The form directed Plaintiff to “check” one or more boxes to identify the varieties of
discrimination she was alleging. Plaintiff did not check the boxes for sex
discrimination and retaliation; she only checked the box for race discrimination.
ANALYSIS
I.

Motion for Dismissal or for More Definite Statement [4]
Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
“When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine
whether the complaint alleges sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” In re Darvocet, Darvon, and

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Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The plausibility standard is met when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In the alternative, Defendants move for a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. “A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). A Rule 12(e) motion
“should not be granted unless the complaint is so excessively vague and ambiguous as
to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously in attempting to answer
it.” Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 13–14356, 2014 WL 2207136, at *11
(E.D. Mich. May 28, 2014) (quoting In re European Rail Pass Antitrust Litig., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). “[A]llegations that are unclear due to a lack of
specificity are more appropriately clarified by discovery.” Id. (quoting In re
European Rail, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 844); see also 5C FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1377
(3d ed.) (“[A] Rule 12(e) motion based [only] on the belief that a better affirmative
pleading by the opposing party will enable [the movant] to provide a more
enlightening or accurate response will be denied.”).

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Plaintiff has pled factual content allowing the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Further, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is not so vague as to be unintelligible or to prejudice Defendants in
meeting the minimal standards for their answer. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for
Dismissal or for More Definite Statement [4] is denied.
II.

Motion to Dismiss Claims for Sex Discrimination and Retaliation [5]
Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for sex

discrimination and retaliation on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. In the event the Court dismisses a Title VII claim,
Defendants ask the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
corresponding ELCRA claim.
Generally, a plaintiff may not bring Title VII claims in federal court without
first exhausting her administrative remedies on those claims by including them in a
charge filed with the EEOC. Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir.
2013) (citing Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Under the Sixth Circuit’s “expected scope of investigation” test, a plaintiff’s EEOC
charge may satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect to a Title VII claim
despite her failure to “check the box” corresponding to that claim or otherwise raise
the claim explicitly. See Dixon v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 212, 217 (6th Cir. 2004).
“[W]here facts related with respect to the charged claim would prompt the EEOC to

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investigate a different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing
suit on that claim.” Id. (quoting Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 302 F.3d
367, 380 (6th Cir. 2002)). Title VII’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to
ELCRA claims. Fuller v. Michigan Dept. of Transp., 580 F. App’x 416, 425 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Rogers v. Bd. of Educ., 2 F.3d 163, 168 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Under the “expected scope of investigation” test, Plaintiff exhausted her
administrative remedies on her Title VII retaliation claim despite her failure to check
the “retaliation” box on her EEOC charge. Plaintiff’s charge informed the EEOC that
Plaintiff was transferred to a different location about two weeks after an “altercation”
with a coworker. The EEOC could reasonably be expected to investigate whether the
transfer was motivated by Plaintiff’s conduct during the “altercation” and whether any
of that conduct was protected within the meaning of Title VII’s retaliation provisions.
In contrast, Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her Title
VII sex discrimination claim. Plaintiff did not mark the “sex” box on the EEOC
charge, and did not refer to her gender or the gender of anyone else when identifying
the factual basis for her charge. Accordingly, Plaintiff concedes that the exhaustion
issue is “closer” with respect to her sex discrimination claim than with respect to her
retaliation claim. Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that the charge could reasonably
trigger an investigation into sex discrimination because the charge referred to the
December 2014 altercation between Plaintiff and a coworker, during which, as

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Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint, the coworker called Plaintiff a “fucking bitch.”
This argument fails because Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, unlike her Complaint, did not
mention the word “bitch” or otherwise suggest that any of Plaintiff’s coworkers used
sexist language. Because the charge did not include any content that could reasonably
be expected to prompt the EEOC to investigate sex discrimination, Plaintiff’s Title
VII sex discrimination claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ELCRA sex
discrimination claim despite dismissing her corresponding claim under Title VII.
Defendants have not disputed that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim under ELCRA
is sufficiently related to her remaining claims to permit the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction; they simply ask the Court to decline to do so. “In
determining whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should
consider and weigh several factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951–
52 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988)). A district court may also consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in forum
shopping or other manipulative tactics. Id. (citing Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357).
Defendants’ sole argument concerning these considerations is that Michigan courts
“are best equipped to interpret and apply their own State’s law governing sex

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discrimination.” The Court does not feel compelled by comity to forego adjudicating
Plaintiff’s ELCRA sex discrimination claim; indeed, federal courts in Michigan
frequently adjudicate ELCRA claims, given the frequency with which they are filed
alongside Title VII claims. Further, the evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s sex
discrimination claim likely overlaps substantially with the evidence relevant to
Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for race discrimination and retaliation. Judicial economy
and convenience therefore weigh in favor of addressing the claims together in a single
forum.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal or for More Definite
Statement [4] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims for
Sex Discrimination and Retaliation [5] is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s Title
VII claim for sex discrimination but DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation
claims and her sex discrimination claim under ELCRA.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2016

s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge

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