Bonnier v. Woods et al

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 20 Joint MOTION to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer filed by Daniel Woods, Badge No. 2598, Ryan Paul, Canceling hearing and ordering Answer to Complaint be filed on or before 5/2/2017, see order for further details. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH BONNIER,

Case No. 15-cv-14432

Plaintiff,

Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

v.
Stephanie Dawkins Davis
United States Magistrate Judge

DETROIT POLICE OFFICER
DANIEL WOODS, and
DETROIT POLICE OFFICER
RYAN PAUL,
in each of their official and individual
capacities, jointly and severally,
Defendants.
_____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
AND CANCELING APRIL 26, 2017 HEARING
This action involves Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant officers detained
Plaintiff in a traffic stop and searched his vehicle without probable cause and caused
him physical injuries during the course of the illegal stop and detention. Plaintiff has
alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and also alleges state law claims of assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and false arrest. All of Plaintiff’s claims
arise from the same alleged illegal stop and detention and the conduct of the
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Defendant officers in connection with the stop.
Defendants do not contest the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this
action, which is undisputed based upon Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
Defendants however move the Court to exercise its discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and to dismiss Plaintiff’s
related state law claims.
The Court has determined that oral argument will not assist in resolving the
issues raised in Defendants’ motion and the Court will decide the matter on the
parties’ written submissions. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). Accordingly, the Court
CANCELS the hearing on the motion currently scheduled for April 26, 2017 at 3:00
p.m. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss (ECF No.
20) and ORDERS Defendants to file Answers to the Complaint on or before May 2,
2017.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully stopped by Defendant Detroit Police

Officers Daniel Woods and Ryan Paul on November 22, 2014, and that his car was
thereafter illegally searched. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant officers stopped him,
demanded Plaintiff’s Driver’s License and after receiving it told Plaintiff not to “make
a f***ing move.” (Compl. ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff refused to consent to a search of his car,
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to which the Defendant officers responded that they did not need his consent because
he was in a high drug area. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant officers
became belligerent, placed Plaintiff in a “full nelson hold,” grabbed his arm and
twisted it painfully before placing Plaintiff in handcuffs that were too tight. (Id. ¶¶
13-16.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant officers patted him down and then
searched his car and trunk without consent. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) The Defendant officers
ultimately released Plaintiff and did not place him under formal arrest or charge him
with any crime. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that he has undergone surgery as a result
of the Defendant officers’ treatment of him and that he has suffered other economic
and non-economic damages. (Id. ¶¶ 21-24.)
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, committed an assault and battery upon his person, intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on him and falsely arrested him, all based upon the
aforementioned conduct.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims, but inappropriately file their motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. This is an improper basis for
their motion. The motion does not challenge the factual sufficiency of Plaintiff’s
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claims in any manner. Recognizing this faulty basis for the Defendants’ motion,
Plaintiff suggests that the Court analyze the motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
which governs the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case. This too is an
improper basis under which to analyze the claims, as it is undisputed that the Court
enjoys subject matter jurisdiction over the entirety of Plaintiff’s action which alleges
a violation of constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gamel v. City
of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010) (observing that district court’s
decision to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is “not based on a
jurisdictional defect but on its discretionary choice not to hear the claims despite its
subject-matter jurisdiction over them”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The Defendants challenge only the Court’s discretionary authority to
entertain and resolve Plaintiff’s state law claims. Accordingly, although Defendants
bring their motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court analyzes the issues raised
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which governs supplemental jurisdiction.
III.

ANALYSIS
The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides in relevant part:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.
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28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The district court may only decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction;
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction; or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). “‘[I]f there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default
assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related
claims.’” Id. (quoting Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th
Cir. 1998)).
Here there is no dispute that the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Nor is there any dispute that Plaintiff’s state law claims for
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false arrest arise out
of the identical factual allegations that underlie his constitutional claims. There is no
credible argument that this case falls within any of the exceptions set out in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1367(c)(1-3), nor have Defendants identified any extraordinary circumstance or
compelling reasons that would require the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Defendants offer only overbroad statements that
merely paraphrase the governing principles without any factual argument specific to
this case. Defendants complain generally that trying these claims together will
prolong trial, complicate jury instructions on the issue of immunity and confuse jurors
given the conflicting damage models. The Court is certain that “carefully drafted jury
instructions will alleviate any possible jury confusion,” on these bases. Poteet, II v.
Polk County, Tenn., No. 05-cv-309, 2007 WL 1189625, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. April 19,
2007). Defendants offer no reasoned basis why these state law claims (which are
commonly adjudicated in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in federal court) are so
unique that the Court is compelled to decline jurisdiction over them. “[A]lthough
Plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims have different substantive requirements, the
facts necessary to prove each claim are similar.” Humes v. Gilless, 154 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1364 (W.D. Tenn. 2001). “Supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
and its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, and convenience and
fairness to litigants.” Id. In this case, there is a far a greater potential for a waste of
judicial resources and unfairness to the litigants if Plaintiff is forced to separately try
these claims, which arise out of the identical common nucleus of operative facts as
Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, in a state court proceeding where the same facts will
be presented by the same witnesses. Consideration of judicial economy favors
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permitting Plaintiff to try these claims together in a single judicial proceeding before
this Court. Id.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court the Court DENIES Defendants’ vexatious

and frivolous motion to dismiss (ECF No. 20), CANCELS the hearing scheduled for
April 26, 2017, and ORDERS Defendants to file Answers to the Complaint on or
before May 2, 2017.
Additionally, if as it appears from both parties’ filings on the motion to dismiss,
Defendant “Officer Donia Woods” is in fact “Officer Daniel Woods,” the parties shall
file with the Court a stipulated order on or before May 2, 2017, directing that the
caption of the case be corrected to reflect this change.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Paul D. Borman
PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 18, 2017

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each
attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on April
18, 2017.

s/Deborah Tofil
Case Manager

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