Gushen v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 30

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Sustaining Plaintiff's Objection (# 26 ) to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF # 25 ), (2) Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF # 15 ), (3) Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF # 19 ), and (4) Remanding Plaintiff's Claim for Benefits for Further Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Sandusky, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PATRICK GUSHEN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-10003
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION
(#26) TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (ECF #25), (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #15), (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #19), AND (4)
REMANDING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR BENEFITS FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS
In March of 2014, the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) denied
Plaintiff Patrick Gushen’s applications for disability benefits.

Gushen then

requested and received a hearing before an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”).
Gushen twice argued to the ALJ that he was disabled by a somatoform disorder, a
mental disorder recognized in the SSA’s disability regulations, but the ALJ affirmed
the SSA’s denial of benefits without considering that argument. The SSA Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision. Gushen now challenges the denial
of benefits in this Court.

1

The Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) concedes that the
ALJ erred by failing to consider whether Gushen suffered from a somatoform
disorder. The Commissioner nonetheless argues that this Court should affirm the
denial of benefits on the ground that the ALJ’s error was “harmless.” The assigned
Magistrate Judge agreed with the Commissioner and issued a report and
recommendation in which he recommended that the Court grant summary judgment
in favor of the Commissioner (the “R&R”). (See ECF #17.) Gushen filed a timely
objection to the R&R (the “Objection”). (See ECF #18.)
For the reasons below, the Court does not share the Commissioner’s
confidence that the ALJ’s error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS
the Objection, DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment,
GRANTS Gushen’s motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS Gushen’s
claim for benefits for further proceedings before the SSA.
I
A
On November 7, 2013, and July 9, 2014, respectively, Gushen filed
applications for Social Security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) (the “Applications”).1 (See Admin. R., ECF

1

As noted in the R&R and in the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment,
the administrative regulations for DIB and SSA “essentially mirror each other.”
(ECF #25 at 2, Pg. ID 603.) Compare, 20 C.F.R § 404 (DIB), with 20 C.F.R. § 416
2

#13-5 at 2, 16, Pg. ID 186, 200.) In the Applications, Gushen claimed that he
suffered from a variety of conditions including:
Bipolar disorder;
Trembling from head to toe;
Loss of vision and depth perception;
Hands and feet going numb;
Loss of manual dexterity, fine motor tasks, and concentration; and
Nausea and confusion.
(See Admin. R., ECF #13-3 at 2-3, Pg. ID 110-11.) On March 28, 2014, the SSA
denied the Applications on the ground that Gushen was not disabled. (See Admin.
R., ECF #13-4 at 2-5, Pg. ID 122-125.)
Thereafter, Gushen filed a written request for a hearing before an ALJ. (See
id. at 21-32, Pg. ID 141-152.) The hearing was scheduled for June 17, 2015. (See
id.)
Before the hearing, Gushen submitted a memorandum (the “Prehearing
Memorandum”) in which he argued that he was disabled and entitled to benefits
because “he suffers from a somatoform disorder” as defined in Listing 12.07 of the
Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments (“Listing 12.07”). (ECF #13-4 at 59-62, Pg.

(SSI). For ease of reference, the Court will cite only the DIB regulations in this
Opinion and Order.
3

ID 179-182.) To be found disabled on the basis of Listing 12.07, a claimant must
satisfy both “Paragraph A” and “Paragraph B” of the listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.07.2 Paragraph A requires a showing that the claimant
suffers certain physical symptoms associated with a somatoform disorder. See id.
Paragraph B requires a showing that the claimant suffers from at least two out of
four functional limitations defined by the SSA. See id. In full, Listing 12.07 reads:
12.07 Somatoform Disorders: Physical symptoms for which
there are no demonstrable organic findings or known
physiological mechanisms. The required level of severity for
these disorders is met when the requirements in both A and B are
satisfied.
A.

Medically documented by evidence of one of
the following:
1. A history of multiple physical symptoms
of several years duration, beginning
before age 30, that have caused the
individual to take medicine frequently,
see a physician often and alter life patterns
significantly; or

2

On September 26, 2016, the SSA finalized new regulations that revise the mental
disorders portion of its Listing of Impairments, including Listing 12.07. See Revised
Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138 (Sept. 26,
2016). Although these revisions went into effect on January 17, 2017, the
regulations provide the following instruction regarding retroactive application: “We
expect that Federal courts review our final decisions using the rules that were in
effect at the time we issued the decisions. If a court reverses our final decision and
remands a case for further administrative proceedings after the effective date of these
final rules, we will apply these final rules to the entire period at issue in the decision
we make after the court’s remand.” Id. at 66138 n.1. Accordingly, the Court applies
the rules that were in effect when the ALJ issued his decision. On remand, the Court
expects the ALJ to apply the new regulation.
4

2. Persistent nonorganic disturbance of one
of the following:
a. Vision; or
b. Speech; or
c. Hearing; or
d. Use of a limb; or
e. Movement and its control (e.g.,
coordination
disturbance,
psychogenic seizures, akinesia,
dyskinesia;) or
f. Sensation (e.g., diminished or
heightened).
3. Unrealistic interpretation of physical
signs or sensations associated with the
preoccupation or belief that one has a
serious disease or injury;
AND
B.

Resulting in at least two of the following:
1. Marked restriction of activities of daily
living; or
2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning; or
3.

Marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace;

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation,
each of extended duration.
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.07.

5

The Prehearing Memorandum addressed both Paragraph A and Paragraph B
of Listing 12.07. With respect to Paragraph A, Gushen identified medical evidence
that supported a conclusion that he suffered from “persistent nonorganic disturbance
of his vision and sensation,” such as blurred vision, tunnel vision and numbness of
his limbs. (ECF #13-4 at 61, Pg. ID 181.) With respect to Paragraph B, Gushen cited
to medical evidence demonstrating that his symptoms interfere with his daily living,
social functioning, and concentration. (See id.)
At the June 17, 2015, hearing, Gushen’s attorney reiterated to the ALJ that
Gushen “meets [L]isting 12.07,” and he echoed the points in the Prehearing
Memorandum concerning Paragraph A and Paragraph B of that listing. (ECF #13-2
at 40, Pg. ID 77.) The ALJ then confirmed on the record that he had read the
Prehearing Memorandum. (Id. at 41, Pg. ID 78.)
On September 4, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Gushen’s
claim for benefits (the “ALJ’s Decision”). (See ECF #13-2 at 18-29, Pg. ID 55-66.)
The ALJ first explained that he would apply the SSA’s required five-step sequential
analysis to determine whether Gushen was disabled. The five steps are as follows:
Step One: Has claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
If not, move to Step Two.
Step Two: Does claimant suffer from one or more severe
impairments? If so, move to Step Three.
Step Three: Does claimant’s impairments or combination of
impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an
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impairment listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments,
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If so, claimant is
disabled. If not, move to Step Four.
Step Four: Considering claimant’s residual functional capacity,
can the claimant perform his or her past relevant work. If not,
move to Step Five.
Step Five: Considering claimant’s age, education, past work
experience, and residual functional capacity, can the claimant
perform other work available in the national economy. If not,
claimant is disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
At Step One, the ALJ found that Gushen did not engage in substantial gainful
activity, and at Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Gushen suffered from the severe
impairments of “hypertension, obesity, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder.” (ECF
#13-2 at 20-21, Pg. ID 57-58.)
At Step Three, the ALJ made the following finding:
[Gushen] does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404 Subpart P,
Appendix 1.
(Id. at 21-23, Pg. ID 58-60.) In arriving at this finding, the ALJ discussed only
whether Gushen’s condition satisfied Listing 12.04 (“Affective Disorders”) and
Listing 12.06 (“Anxiety-related Disorders”).3 (See id.) The ALJ did not address

3

The ALJ’s analysis of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 is discussed in more detail below.
7

whether Gushen’s condition satisfied Listing 12.07. The ALJ ignored Listing 12.07
even though Gushen twice brought it to the ALJ’s attention. (See id.)
The ALJ ultimately concluded that Gushen was not disabled because “there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the Gushen
can perform.” (Id. at 28, Pg. ID 65.)
B
On January 3, 2016, Gushen filed this action challenging the SSA’s denial of
benefits. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Gushen and the Commissioner then filed crossmotions for summary judgment. (See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #15; Def.’s Mot.
Summ. J., ECF #19.)

The Court referred the cross-motions to the assigned

Magistrate Judge. Although the cross-motions raised a number of issues, the
Magistrate Judge invited the parties to narrow the issues prior to oral argument on
the motions. (See R&R, ECF #21 at 9-10, Pg. ID 610-611.) On December 21, 2016,
Gushen’s counsel notified the Magistrate Judge that Gushen wished to proceed
solely on his claim that the ALJ committed a reversible error by failing to consider
whether his impairments met Listing 12.07. (See ECF #24 at 1, Pg. ID 601.)
On December 29, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R in which he
recommends that the Court grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Gushen’s
motion. (See ECF #25.) While the Magistrate Judge “agreed with [Gushen] that the

8

ALJ erred by inexplicably failing to discuss Listing 12.07,” he ultimately concurred
with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s error was “harmless.”4 (Id.)
On January 11, 2017, Gushen filed the Objection. (See ECF #26.) The
Objection objects solely “to the finding of the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ’s failure
to address Listing 12.07 was harmless error.” (Id. at 4, Pg. ID 627.)
II
A
When a party objects to a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court
reviews that portion de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Lyons v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to
conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party has not
objected. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla

4

The reasoning underlying the Commissioner’s harmless error argument is
described in more detail below.
9

of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “It is of course for the
ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including
that of the claimant.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247. “[A] court is obligated to remand for
further administrative proceedings if there are any unresolved essential factual
issues.” Meehleder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 3154968, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (6th Cir. 1994)).
III
The Commissioner’s harmless error argument effectively involves several
steps, and it is most easily understood when broken down into those steps. The steps
are as follows:
Step 1:
The ALJ analyzed in detail whether Gushen
satisfied the mental disorders found at Listing 12.04 (“Affective
Disorders”) and Listing 12.06 (“Anxiety-related Disorders”).
Step 2:
Like Listing 12.07, Listings 12.04 and 12.06 both
require a claimant to satisfy criteria set forth in two separate
paragraphs: Paragraph A and Paragraph B. And as with Listing
12.07, Paragraph A of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 identifies a set
of symptoms, and Paragraph B of Listings 12.04 and 12.06
identifies a set of functional limitations caused by the symptoms.
Step 3:
The wording of Paragraph B is identical for Listings
12.04, 12.06, and 12.07. For all three Listings, Paragraph B
provides as follows:
10

B.

Resulting in at least two of the following:
1. Marked restriction of activities of
daily living; or
2. Marked difficulties in maintaining
social functioning; or
3. Marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or
4. Repeated
episodes
of
decompensation, each of extended
duration.

Step 4:
Because the wording of Paragraph B is identical for
Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.07, the analysis of whether a
claimant satisfies Paragraph B of Listing 12.07 is necessarily the
same as the analysis of whether a claimant satisfies Paragraph B
of Listing 12.04 and Listing 12.06.
Step 5:
By considering whether Gushen satisfied Paragraph
B of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 and finding that he did not, the
ALJ effectively considered whether Gushen satisfied Paragraph
B of Listing 12.07 and effectively found that Gushen did not
satisfy that paragraph.
Step 6:
The ALJ’s finding that Gushen did not satisfy
Paragraph B of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 is supported by
substantial evidence.
Step 7:
Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to mention and
separately address Listing 12.07 was a harmless error.
(See Commissioner’s Response to the Objection, ECF #28 at 2-5, Pg. ID 652-655.)
The Court cannot accept a central premise of this argument: namely, that the
analysis of whether a claimant satisfies Paragraph B of Listing 12.07 is necessarily
11

the same as the analysis of whether a claimant satisfies Paragraph B of Listing 12.04
and Listing 12.06. While the language of Paragraph B in all three listings is
identical, SSA regulations make clear that the application of Paragraph B in Listing
12.07 will not always mirror the application of Paragraph B of Listings 12.04 and
12.06.
The key SSA regulation in this regard is 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
Listing 12.00(A) (“Listing 12.00(A)”) – the introductory listing to the SSA’s
regulations on mental disorders. Listing 12.00(A) addresses how the SSA must
apply Paragraph B in, among other things, Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.07. It
provides:
The criteria in paragraphs B and C describe impairmentrelated functional limitations that are incompatible with
the ability to do gainful activity. The functional
limitations in paragraphs B and C must be the result of the
mental disorder described in the diagnostic description
that is manifested by the medical findings in paragraph A.
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.00(A) (emphasis added). The italicized
language from Listing 12.00(A) requires the SSA to consider the Paragraph B
functional limitations for each listing in light of the specific mental disorder in
Paragraph A of that listing. Thus, in analyzing whether Gushen’s limitations met
Paragraph B of Listing 12.04 (“Affective Disorders”), the ALJ was required to
consider functional limitations that were the result of affective disorders. And in
analyzing Paragraph B of Listing 12.06 (“Anxiety-Related Disorders”), the ALJ was
12

obligated to consider functional limitations that were the result of anxiety-related
disorders. Finally, had the ALJ applied Paragraph B of Listing 12.07, he would have
had to consider functional limitations that were the result of somatoform disorders.
Critically, the functional limitations that result from affective disorders and
anxiety-related disorders may differ from the limitations that result from somatoform
disorders. Affective disorders and anxiety-related disorders manifest themselves
through emotional “disturbances,” such as “depressive syndrome,” “manic
syndrome,” or anxiety. 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.04, Listing
12.06. Thus, when conducting a Paragraph B functional limitation analysis for these
disorders, the SSA considers whether the claimant’s mental/emotional symptoms
cause two of the four listed limitations. In contrast, somatoform disorders manifest
themselves through “physical symptoms for which there are no demonstrable
organic findings or known psychological mechanisms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1, Listing 12.07 (emphasis added). Thus, when conducting a Paragraph B
functional limitations analysis for somatoform disorders, the SSA considers, among
other things, whether the claimant’s physical symptoms result in two of the four
listed limitations. Stated another way, when a claimant seeks benefits based upon a
somatoform disorder under Listing 12.07, “the salient issue” for purposes of the
Paragraph B functional limitations analysis may be “whether the physical symptoms
manifested by the disorder [are] so debilitating as to render [the claimant] disabled

13

and unable to work.” Strickland v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1270633 at *6 (N.D. Ala. 2016)
(emphasis added).
Simply put, the analysis of whether a claimant’s somatoform disorder satisfies
the Paragraph B functional limitations criteria in Listing 12.07 does not necessarily
mirror the analysis of whether a claimant’s affective disorder and/or anxiety-related
disorder satisfies the same criteria in Listing 12.04 and 12.06. Accordingly, the
ALJ’s consideration of the Paragraph B functional limitations for affective disorders
and anxiety-related disorders is not necessarily a fair substitute for an independent
consideration of whether Gushen’s somatoform disorder satisfied the Paragraph B
functional limitations criteria in Listing 12.07.5
The ALJ’s written decision confirms that he restricted his Paragraph B
analysis to limitations that were the result of emotional disturbances caused by
affective disorders and anxiety disorders and did not consider potential limitations
that were the result of the physical symptoms of a somatoform disorder. In analyzing

5

The Court is aware of decisions that suggest that the Paragraph B functional
limitations analysis in Listings 12.04 and 12.06 always mirrors the Paragraph B
functional limitations analysis in Listing 12.07. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Astrue, 2013
WL 791771 (D. Minn. Feb 13, 2013); Pizarro v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1276699 (C.D.
Cal. March 19, 2015). But those decisions do not discuss the requirement of Listing
12.00(A), noted above, that “[t]he functional limitations in paragraphs B and C must
be the result of the mental disorder described in the diagnostic description that is
manifested by the medical findings in paragraph A.” See Henningsen, 2013 WL
791771 at *18-19; Pizarro, 2015 WL 1276699 at *5-6
14

the first Paragraph B factor, “marked restriction of activities of daily living,” the
ALJ wrote:
The claimant indicated that he experienced some difficulty
performing his activities of daily living when experiencing
acute episodes of depression or anxiety. His physician
corroborated this assertion. However, the record does not
establish that he experienced these acute episodes with
sufficient frequency to restrict his performance of these
activities, and his testimony shows that he was generally
able to perform these activities without difficulty. The
treatment notes generally showed that his psychological
symptoms were moderate, but they do not show that these
symptoms had a meaningful impact on his capacity to
perform these activities. This evidence warrants only a
finding of mild restriction.
(ECF #13-2 at 21, Pg. ID 58; emphasis added.)
In analyzing the second Paragraph B factor, “marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning,” the ALJ wrote:
In social functioning, the claimant has moderate
difficulties. The claimant indicated that he lost jobs in the
past due to his behavioral and communication problems
second to his bipolar and anxiety disorders. The treatment
notes confirm that the claimant manifested signs of
irritability, anger, depression, and anxiety, and that these
conditions negatively affected his capacity for appropriate
socialization with others. However, the treatment notes
and examination reports show that he generally
communicated effectively with, and behaved well
towards, medical staff. Moreover, the notes show that he
only manifested signs of moderate depression and anxiety.
(ECF #13-2 at 21-22, Pg. ID 58-59; emphasis added)

15

In analyzing the third Paragraph B factor, “marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace,” the ALJ wrote:
The claimant indicated that his depression and anxiety
negatively affected his memory, as well as his capacity to
concentrate and adapt to changing environments and
stressors. The treatment notes show that he manifested the
above psychological symptoms, and that his doctor
indicated that his symptoms were aggravated by exposure
to stressors.
However, the treatment notes and
examination reports show that he was able to accurately
answer the questions asked of him during the
psychological examination, and that he showed no signs
of acute or overt cognitive impairment. Moreover, the
notes show that he only manifested signs of moderate
depression and anxiety.
(ECF #13-2 at 22, Pg. ID 59; emphasis added.)
Because Gushen may have suffered from additional limitations that were the
result of the physical symptoms of his possible somatoform disorder, the Court
concludes that the ALJ’s Paragraph B analysis for Listings 12.04 and 12.06 – which
focused only on limitations caused by mental/emotional symptoms – was not
necessarily an effective substitute for an analysis under Paragraph B of Listing
12.07. Thus, the Court declines to affirm the denial of benefits based upon the
Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ’s failure to consider Listing 12.07 was a
mere harmless error.

16

IV
The Commissioner also argues that Gushen did not satisfy Paragraph A of
Listing 12.07 because “nowhere in the record was [Gushen] diagnosed with
somatoform disorder.”6 (ECF #19 at 11, Pg. ID 580.) But the ALJ’s Decision did
not consider whether there is evidence in the record (including the medical evidence
Gushen identified in the Prehearing Memorandum) that satisfies Paragraph A of
Listing 12.07. The case is remanded to the Commissioner to determine whether
Gushen’s impairments meet the requirements of Listing 12.07. See Reynolds v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 424 Fed. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011) (“In short,
the ALJ needed to actually evaluate the evidence, compare it to Section 1.00 of the
Listing, and give an explained conclusion, in order to facilitate meaningful judicial
review. Without it, it is impossible to say that the ALJ’s decision at Step Three was
supported by substantial evidence.”).

6

In making this argument, the Commissioner relies on the premise that Gushen’s
diagnosis for “conversion reaction disorder” is not the same as a diagnosis for
“somatoform disorder.” (See ECF #28 at 4-5, Pg. ID 644-45.) Gushen insists that a
“conversion reaction disorder” is synonymous to a “somatoform disorder.” (See ECF
#26 at 6 n.1, Pg. ID 629.) Although the Court does not take a position on this
question here, it points out that the revised regulations – enacted after the ALJ
decision in this matter – instruct that “conversion disorder[s]” should be evaluated
under Listing 12.07 (“Somatic symptom and related disorders”). See Revised
Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66162 (Sept.
26, 2016).
17

V
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Gushen’s Objections to the R&R (ECF #26) are SUSTAINED;
Gushen’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #15) is GRANTED;
The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #19) is
DENIED; and
The case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this order. Such proceedings shall include an
assessment of Gushen’s claim that he satisfies the criteria set forth in
Listing 12.07.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 23, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on February 23, 2017, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Karri Sandusky (in the absence of Holly A. Monda)
Case Manager
[phone]

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