Gardner v. St. Clair, County of et al

Filing 11

OPINION and ORDER dismissing Civil Rights Complaint, denying the Mandamus Complaint and MOTION to Appoint Counsel, MOTION for Joinder of Claims, and MOTION to Stay proceeding. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC ANDREW GARDNER, #287557,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 2:16-CV-10198
HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

ST. CLAIR CO. et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT AND
DENYING THE MANDAMUS COMPLAINT AND MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL, JOINDER OF CLAIMS, AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Michigan
prisoner Eric Andrew Gardner (“plaintiff”) challenges his state criminal proceedings.1 The
plaintiff names St. Clair County, the City of Port Huron, two state prosecutors, a state court
clerk, five state court judges, his defense attorney, and four city police officers as the
defendants in this action and sues them in their official and individual capacities. The
plaintiff seeks injunctive-type relief and monetary damages. The plaintiff has also filed a
complaint for mandamus, as well as motions for appointment of counsel, joinder of claims,

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The plaintiff was convicted of seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct following a trial in the St. Clair County Circuit Court and was sentenced as a
fourth habitual offender to concurrent terms of 30 to 50 years imprisonment in 2002.
See Offender Profile, Michigan Offender Tracking Information System (“OTIS”),
http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=287557.
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and stay of proceedings. The Court has granted the plaintiff leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to
sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it
determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly
required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and
employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in
fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3).
The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). While this notice pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual
allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the
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defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)
he or she was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution
or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under
color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville,
583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Criminal Proceedings
The plaintiff’s claims in this case concern his state criminal proceedings and are
subject to summary dismissal because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a
state prisoner challenging a condition of his imprisonment, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973), not the validity of continued confinement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights
claim challenging his or her imprisonment if a ruling on the claim would necessarily render
his or her continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for that confinement
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal, or been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

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corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the
plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.
Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state
prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). The underlying basis for the holding in Heck is that “civil tort
actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal
judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
The plaintiff’s claims concern the validity of his state criminal proceedings. If he
were to prevail on those claims, his state criminal convictions and continued confinement
would be called into question. Consequently, the plaintiff’s civil rights claims against all of
the defendants are barred by Heck and his civil rights complaint must be dismissed.
B. Claims against Defense Counsel
The plaintiff names a defense attorney as one of the defendants in this action. It is
well-settled, however, that appointed and retained attorneys performing traditional functions
as defense counsel do not act "under color of state law" and are not state actors subject
to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 325 (1981); Elrod
v. Michigan Supreme Ct., 104 F. App'x 506, 508 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Cicchini v.
Blackwell, 127 F. App'x 187, 190 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Lawyers are not, merely by

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virtue of being officers of the court, state actors for § 1983 purposes."). The plaintiff’s
complaint against defense counsel must thus be dismissed for this additional reason.
C. Claims against St. Clair County
The plaintiff names St. Clair County as a defendant in this action. Municipalities and
local governments may be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Monell
v. Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, a local government may only
be sued under § 1983 when the execution of a government policy or custom, for which the
government as an entity is responsible, inflicts the injury. Id. at 692. In other words, for a
government entity to be held liable under § 1983, “the entity's policy or custom must be the
moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks, 499 F.3d
553, 563 (6th Cir. 2007). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs
a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
In his complaint, the plaintiff does not allege any facts which indicate that St. Clair
County operates unconstitutionally, maintains an unconstitutional policy or custom, or that
any of its policies or customs accounted for any alleged improper conduct by the other
defendants which caused him injury. As discussed infra, the state courts and their
employees are arms of the State of Michigan, not entities operated by the counties. The
actions of the state court judges, the court clerk, and the prosecutors occurred in their
service as agents of the State, not St. Clair County, such that St. Clair County is not liable
for their actions. See Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 345 (6th Cir. 2009). The claims
against St. Clair County must therefore be dismissed for this additional reason.

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D. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
The plaintiff names several state prosecutors as defendants in this action and sues
them in their individual capacities for damages. Such claims are subject to dismissal based
upon immunity. It is well-established that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for
conduct intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir.
2002); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342-43 (2009). This immunity
covers a prosecutor’s actions in preparing and filing charging documents, including
requests for arrest warrants, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997), and the decision
file a criminal complaint. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1446 (6th Cir. 1997). It even
applies when a prosecutor acts wrongfully or maliciously. See Grant v. Hollenbach, 870
F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit for allegedly
conspiring to present false charges to the grand jury). The state prosecutors are entitled
to absolute immunity on any personal claim for damages arising from their advocacy in the
plaintiff’s criminal proceedings.
E. Absolute Immunity for State Court Judges and Court Clerk
The plaintiff names several state court judges and the court clerk as defendants and
sues them in their individual capacities for damages. Judges and judicial employees are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from
suit seeking monetary damages even if acting erroneously, corruptly or in excess of
jurisdiction); Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F. App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2002) (two court clerks who did
not provide prisoner with copies of previous filings and transcripts were entitled to quasi-6-

judicial immunity); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996); Bush v. Rauch, 38
F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (court clerk who issued erroneous warrant on judge’s order was immune from suit);
Yarbrough v. Garrett, 579 F. Supp. 2d 856, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (adopting magistrate
judge’s report). Moreover, the 1996 amendments to § 1983 extended absolute immunity
for state judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief is unavailable”); see also Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F. App’x 691 (6th Cir. 2003)
(federal judges’ immunity); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (E.D.
Mich. 2006). The plaintiff’s claims against the state court judges and the court clerk
concern the performance of judicial and quasi-judicial duties.

Consequently, those

defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity and the
claims against them must be dismissed for this additional reason.
F. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The plaintiff also sues the state court judges, the court clerk, and the state
prosecutors in their official capacities. These defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity
on claims against them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars civil
rights actions against a state and its agencies and departments unless the state has waived
its immunity and consented to suit or Congress has abrogated that immunity. Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The State of Michigan has not
consented to be sued for civil rights actions in federal court, Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d
874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986), and Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
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when it enacted § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The Michigan
Supreme Court and its lower courts operate as arms of the state, and are thus entitled to
the same sovereign immunity as the State of Michigan. Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628
F.3d 752, 762-64 (6th Cir. 2010); Chambers v. Michigan, No. 10-12509, 2011 WL 940830,
*3-4 (E.D. Mich. March 16, 2011); Young v. District & Supreme Cts. of Mich., No.
2:10-CV-15144, 2011 WL 166331, *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing cases); Brown v.
Michigan Dep’t of Corr., et al., No. 2:10-CV-12649, 2010 WL 5056195, *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
6, 2010). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state employees, such as judges, court
clerks, and prosecutors who are sued in their official capacities. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764;
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady, 574 F.3d at 344); Moore
v. Michigan, No. 13-11789, 2014 WL 1260702, *2-3 (E.D. Mich. March 27, 2014). The
state court judges, the court clerk, and the state prosecutors are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity and the claims against them in their official capacities must be
dismissed for this additional reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that the plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted in his complaint and that several defendants are entitled
to immunity. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the civil rights complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Given this determination, the Court also DENIES the
complaint for mandamus and the motions for appointment of counsel, joinder of claims, and
stay of proceedings. Lastly, the Court finds that an appeal from this decision cannot be

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taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
445 (1962).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 9, 2016
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
March 9, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also on
Eric Gardner #287557, Oaks Correctional Facility,
1500 Caberfae Highway, Manistee, MI 49660.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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