Hart v. Hillsdale, County of et al

Filing 122

ORDER Denying Motions to Dismiss Filed by County Defendants 70 and City Defendants 83 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANTHONY HART,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-10253
v.
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
COUNTY OF HILLSDALE, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
FILED BY COUNTY DEFENDANTS [#70]
and CITY DEFENDANTS [#83]

I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Anthony Hart’s (“Hart”) complaint

that he was wrongfully convicted for failing to register his proper residency with the
Michigan Sex Offender Registry (“SOR”). Defendants Hillsdale County (“County”),
Christine Wahtola (“Wahtola”), Kwinn Leva (“Leva”), and Lieutenant Timothy
Parker (“Parker”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”) (Doc. 70) and Defendants
City of Hillsdale (“City”), Officer Shelby Rathbun (“Rathbun”), and Officer Todd
Holtz (“Holtz”) (collectively, the “City Defendants”) (Doc. 83) have filed separate
motions to dismiss. Responses to the motion to dismiss were filed, the City
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Defendants filed a reply, and the period for filing reply expired without the County
Defendants filing a reply. On August 2, 2107, the Court held a hearing on the motions
for August 2, 2017. For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.
II.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are based on the allegations by Hart, all of which must be

accepted as true for purposes of deciding the motions discussed herein.
Hart violated MCL § 750.520(e) when he was 16 years old, though by the time
of his juvenile conviction for fourth degree criminal sexual conduct (a Tier II offense),
he was 17 years old. At that time, the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act, MCL
§ 28.721 (“SORA”), required that Hart register his address bi-annually for 25 years
due to his conviction. SORA was amended as of July 1, 2011, and offenders
adjudicated of a Tier II offense as juveniles were no longer required to register. It is
undisputed that, as of July 1, 2011, Hart no longer had a legal obligation to register
his residency with the SOR.
The Michigan State Police (“MSP”) was required to remove Hart from the SOR
following the 2011 SORA amendment. MSP employees did not properly remove
Hart’s name from the list. Neither the Hillsdale County Sheriff Department nor the
City of Hillsdale Police Department removed Hart’s information from the SOR or
took any action to cause such a removal. Neither the Michigan State Police (MSP),
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Defendant Hillsdale County, nor Defendant City informed Hart that, pursuant to a
change in the law, he was no longer legally required to report and register. (Doc. 43-1,
SAC ¶¶ 38-39).
Rathbun and Holtz were, at all times relevant herein, employed by the City as
officers with the Hillsdale Police Department and acted within the scope of their
employment pursuant to the policies and practices of the City. The City, through the
Hillsdale Police Department serves as a SORA local registering authority. As a
registering authority, the City—through its officers, including Rathbun and Holtz—is
responsible for collecting and maintaining extensive and detailed information on all
persons required to register under SORA, including Hart. M.C.L. §§ 28.722(n) and
28.727 et seq.
Wahtola and Leva were both County Sheriff’s Department registration officials,
responsible for receiving and maintaining detailed information on the identity of
proper registrants and those persons who should not have been included on the SOR,
including criminal history and SORA-related obligations of each registered sex
offender residing in Hillsdale County. (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶¶ 41-42). See M.C.L. §§
28.722(n) and 28.727 et seq. SORA registration is required to include, among other
things, the text of the provision of law that defines the criminal offense for which the
sex offender is registered, the offender’s tier classification, and the individual’s
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complete criminal history record, including the dates of all arrests and convictions, in
addition to a summary of the offender’s convictions for all SORA-listed offenses.
M.C.L. 28.727(1)(n); (2)(b), (d) and (f). Hart has alleged that, as local SORA
registering officials, Wahtola and Leva were expected to be familiar with
developments in the law concerning SORA. Based on those expectations, Wahtola and
Leva possessed all the necessary information to know that, after the 2011 Amendment
to the SORA, Hart was no longer required to register as a sex offender.
On March 4, 2012, Wahtola, either deliberately or with reckless disregard for
the truth contained in the information available to her, required Hart to register as a
sex offender when he was no longer required to do so. (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶ 43). In so
doing, Wahtola knowingly propagated false information that would later be used to
erroneously establish probable cause for Hart’s arrests and prosecutions.
On July 17, 2013, Leva, deliberately or with reckless disregard for all the
information she possessed indicating that Hart was no longer required to register as
a sex offender, advised Parker that Hart had registered an incorrect address. (County
Incident Report, Doc. 70-2, PgID 693). Parker then used that information to obtain
a warrant for Hart’s arrest. Id. On December 30, 2013, when Hart did not report to
the Sheriff’s Department to register, Leva herself registered Hart as a sex offender,
and transmitted this information to the MSP (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶ 62), thereby falsely
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conveying that Hart had committed a criminal act, and knowingly propagating false
information to be used to arrest and prosecute Hart.
From July 2011 through July 2013, Hart continued to register on the SOR,
including identifying his address. On July 5, 2013, unaware that he was no longer
required to register his address with the SOR, Hart erroneously registered his address
as “79 Bulldog” in Hillsdale. Hart’s actual address was “76 Bulldog” in Hillsdale.
On July 17, 2013, Parker arrested Hart for violating SORA by listing an
incorrect address. At the time Parker arrested him, Parker was aware of Hart’s
computerized criminal history and his SOR documents—documents that included
Hart’s birth date, the date of his 2001 conviction, and his designated offender tier level
(Tier II) that reflected that Hart was 17 years old in 2001, such that Hart was no longer
required to register as a sex offender. (Id. at ¶ 56) Hart alleges that, despite that
knowledge, Parker, deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth, signed a
warrant request and transmitted it to the County Prosecutor’s Office for the purpose
of obtaining an arrest warrant for Hart on the basis of an alleged violation of a SORA
requirement to which Parker knew Hart was not subject. Id. at ¶ 57. The warrant was
approved by the County Prosecutor’s Office on July 18, 2013. On August 14, 2013,
Hart entered a plea of nolo contendere, was found guilty of one count of failure to
register pursuant to SORA (MCL § 28.279), and was placed on probation.
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From July 2013 through December 2013, Hart continued to register as a sex
offender with local registering authorities (Hillsdale County). On January 23, 2014,
Parker advised Rathbun and Holtz that Hart had failed to verify his address for the
SOR, notwithstanding the fact that he knew Hart was under no obligation to register,
falsely accusing Hart of criminal acts. Id. at ¶ 63. Parker’s false representation was
used to manufacture probable cause for a warrant to arrest Hart. On January 23, 2014,
after learning that the City Police were looking for him, Hart voluntarily appeared at
the County Sheriff’s Department, where he was met by Rathbun and Holtz and
wrongfully arrested for failing to comply with SORA reporting duties. Id. at ¶ 65. On
February 10, 2014, MSP analyst Marci Kelley transmitted to Rathbun a certified copy
of Hart’s “Sex Offender Registration” records, which falsely stated that Hart was still
required to report and register on a semi-annual basis until February 20, 2054—a
duration that did not exist, either prior to or after the 2011 amendment. Id. at ¶¶ 69,
71.
Hart’s SOR records included his birth date, the date his registration obligation
began, the statute under which he had been convicted, his designation as a Tier II
offender, as well as the registration end date of February 20, 2054, which Hart
suggests made it blatantly obvious that the record was inaccurate and unreliable. Id.
at ¶ 70. On the faulty advice of his attorneys, Hart pleaded guilty to the felony of
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failure to register and, on March 17, 2014, was sentenced to 16-24 months in state
prison and ordered to pay $1,026.94 in fines, costs, and restitution. Id. at ¶¶ 72-74.
Hart was wrongfully incarcerated for 17 months, until August 2015.
In August 2015, an agent of the Michigan Department of Corrections became
aware that Hart was being detained wrongfully and notified the MSP. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.
On August 25, 2015, Hillsdale County Circuit Court Judge Michael Smith vacated
Hart’s 2014 guilty plea, conviction and sentence and the following day, Hart was
released from prison. Id. at ¶¶ 79-80. On November 17, 2015, Hart’s 2013 guilty plea,
conviction and sentence were also vacated. Id. at ¶ 81.
At the time of Hart’s 2013 and 2014 wrongful arrests and prosecution, the MSP,
the County’s, and the City’s law enforcement databases contained all the necessary
information to indicate that Hart was no longer required to register as a sex offender
after July 2011.
On April 26, 2016, Hart filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On
March 31, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part Hart’s Motion for Leave
to File a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and Hart has since filed the SAC.
III.

APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Rule 12(b)(6)

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A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Accepting all factual allegations as true, the court will review the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of
Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). As a general rule, to survive a
motion to dismiss, the complaint must state sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The complaint must demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that the
defendant’s conduct was unlawful. Id. at 556. Claims comprised of “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
B.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the
Section 1983 claims Hart filed against them. Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense against a Section 1983 claim. Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 160 (6th Cir.
1996). The doctrine of qualified immunity “shields ‘governmental officials
performing discretionary functions . . . from civil damages liability as long as their
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actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged
to have violated.’” Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). See also Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (government officials performing
discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages to the extent that
“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”).
“[T]he test for qualified immunity has only two prongs—whether the defendant
violated a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly established.”
Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 417 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Plumhoff v. Rickard, —
U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014), and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232,
236 (2009)). For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is
doing violates that right.” Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640. This standard does not require
the very action in question to have previously been held unlawful, only that its
unlawfulness be apparent in light of pre-existing law. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)).
Once a government official has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the
plaintiff “bears the ultimate burden of proof to show that the individual officers are
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not entitled to qualified immunity.” Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App'x 491,
494 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must also establish that each
individual defendant was “personally involved” in the specific constitutional violation.
See Salehphour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998); Bennett
v. Schroeder, 99 F. App’x 707, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“It is wellsettled that to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must allege some
personal involvement by the each of the named defendants”).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Hart’s Claims Against the Individual Defendants
(Wahtola, Leva, Parker, Rathbun, and Holtz)

Hart first claims that each of the individual Defendants was responsible for one
or both of his false arrests, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. For a plaintiff
to have a viable false arrest claim under Section 1983, he must prove that the arresting
officer lacked probable cause for the arrest.
A false arrest claim under federal law requires a plaintiff to prove that
the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Fridley
v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Painter v.
Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 569 (6th Cir. 1999)). An arrest pursuant to a
facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal
constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant
to § 1983.
Voticky v. Village of Timberlake, OH, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). A
government official who applies the means by which a person is seized in violation
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of the Fourth Amendment can be held liable under Section 1983. See, e.g., Berg v.
City of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (“a government official’s liability
for causing an arrest is the same as for carrying it out”). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (an individual is “responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions”).
Hart next alleges that the individual Defendants maliciously prosecuted him.
To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, Hart must satisfy four elements:
(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and the
defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute;
(2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a
consequence of the legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation
of liberty apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding
was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2014). As the Sixth Circuit recently
stated, a police officer violates a person’s clearly established right to freedom from
malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment “only when his deliberate or
reckless falsehoods result in arrest and prosecution without probable cause.” Johnson
v. Mosely, 790 F.3d 649, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Newman v. Township of
Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Hart’s third claim against the individual Defendants is for defamation, in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive or procedural due process rights.
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may not recover under Section 1983 for
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damages to reputation if the alleged defamatory acts did not also result in the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or interest. See Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 701 (1976). In this case, to establish the violation of a constitutional right,
Hart must establish: (1) the defendant(s) stated a deliberate falsehood or showed
reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) the allegedly false or omitted information was
material to the finding of probable cause. Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). There is no dispute that Hart has alleged that the false
information was material to the finding of probable cause, but the Defendants argue
that Hart has failed to allege that the individual Defendants stated a deliberate
falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth when pursuing then arrests and
prosecutions of Hart.
Both the City Defendants and the County Defendants argue that none of the
individual Defendants had reason to suspect that Hart was improperly on the SOR.
The City Defendants assert that it was the MSP’s responsibility for maintaining an
accurate SOR and that Rathbun (and Holtz, to whom only Rathbun communicated
relevant information) had been informed: (a) by Parker that Hart was on the SOR; (b)
by Parker that Hart had failed to register as required; and (c) by Hart that he was
subject to registration (because, the City Defendants assert, “[P]laintiff had previously
admitted [that fact] when he signed the 2012 “Explanation of Duties to Register as a
Sex Offender”). (Doc. 83, PgID 1025). The County Defendants attribute all of the
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fault to the MSP, stating that the MSP provided inaccurate information to Hillsdale
officials.
The County Defendants’ argument ignores the allegations in Hart’s pleadings.
As set forth above, Hart alleged that, on March 4, 2012, Wahtola, either deliberately
or with reckless disregard for the truth contained in the information available to her,
required Hart to register as a sex offender when he was no longer required to do so.
(Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶ 43). In so doing, Wahtola created false information that would later
be used to erroneously establish probable cause for Hart’s arrests and prosecutions.
Similarly, Hart alleged that, on July 17, 2013, Leva, deliberately or with reckless
disregard for all the information she possessed indicating that Hart was no longer
required to register as a sex offender, advised Parker that Hart had registered an
incorrect address. (County Incident Report, Doc. 70-2, PgID 693). Parker then used
that information to obtain a warrant for Hart’s arrest. Id.
Then, on December 30, 2013, when Hart did not report to the Sheriff’s
Department to report and register, Leva registered Hart as a sex offender, and
transmitted this information to the MSP (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶ 62). In doing so, she
falsely conveyed that Hart had committed a criminal act and created false information
that was used to arrest and prosecute Hart in 2014 after Parker directed Rathbun and
Holtz to arrest Hart. The Court finds that Hart has alleged that each of the individual
County Defendants had responsibility for receiving and maintaining detailed
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information on the identity, criminal history and SORA-related obligations of each
registered sex offender residing in Hillsdale County, such that Hart’s claims for false
arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation can proceed against each of them.
The City Defendants’ argument has more merit, but it still fails. In his response
brief, Hart states that the individual City Defendants had “responsib[ility] for
collecting and maintaining extensive and detailed information on all persons required
to register under the SORA” (City Defendants), see Doc. 89, PgID 1170, but Hart
does not make those allegations in the SAC. Hart has alleged that Rathbun and Holtz
were employed as officers by the City and acted within the scope of their employment
and pursuant to the policies and practices of the City. (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶¶ 19-21). Hart
also has conclusorily alleged that, pursuant to Parker’s directives, Rathbun and Holtz
looked for Hart and arrested him when Hart appeared at the City Police Department.
(Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶¶ 63-65). None of those allegations support a finding that Rathbun
or Holtz had any knowledge that would enable them to knowingly or recklessly
disregard information that demonstrated Hart was not required to register on the SOR.

Despite the foregoing deficiencies, the Court notes that Hart has alleged that
Rathbun and Holtz “sought a felony arrest warrant for Hart, for failing to comply with
reporting duties” and “failure to comply with registration act” pursuant to M.C.L. §
28.725 and 28.729, even though those statutes did not apply to Hart. (Doc. 43-1, SAC
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¶ 66) Hart further alleged that the warrant for his arrest was authorized by the
Hillsdale Prosecutor’s Office “on January 24, 2014, based upon false information
provided deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth[.]” (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶
68).
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged claims against the individual Defendants for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and defamation. Plaintiff has alleged that each of the individual
Defendants is a government official who was involved in causing the seizure of
Plaintiff, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff has alleged that each of
those persons knew or recklessly disregarded information to enable him or her to
know that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on the 2011 SORA
amendment and that each of those persons “influenced, or participated in the decision
to prosecute” Plaintiff in 2013 and/or 2014. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the
Vakilian requirements that (1) the individual Defendants stated a deliberate falsehood
or showed reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) the allegedly false or omitted
information was material to the finding of probable cause. Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517.
Hart argues that the individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity because they violated his constitutional right to be free from arrest and
detention based on materially false information and that the individual Defendants had
direct roles in one or both of Plaintiff’s arrests and, therefore, prosecutions. As
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discussed above, (1) Wahtola and Leva were responsible for maintaining accurate and
reliable information regarding the identity of persons of persons on SOR and it was
their responsibility to register the offenders themselves or notify the detective office
if an offender failed to register for purposes of initiating criminal proceedings; (2)
Wahtola required Hart to register as a sex offender in March 2012 (after the SORA
Amendment); (3) Parker wrongfully sought a warrant to arrest, and then arrested, Hart
in July 2013 for violation of SORA, when Parker knew or showed reckless disregard
for the fact that Plaintiff did not need to register at that time; (4) Leva deliberately or
recklessly and erroneously registered Hart as a sex offender in December 2013; (5)
Parker advised Rathbun and Holtz in January 2014 that Hart had failed to verify his
address for the SOR, even though Hart had no duty to do so; and (6) Rathbun and
Holtz sought a felony arrest warrant for Hart – and arrested Hart –for failure to
comply with reporting duties and SORA, even though Hart had no duty to do so.
The Court finds that Hart’s allegations satisfy his burden to overcome the
claims of the individual Defendants that they are entitled to qualified immunity. First,
Hart has alleged that the individual Defendants violated Hart’s constitutional right to
be free from arrest in the absence of probable cause, a right clearly established by
2013. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); McCallum v. Geelhood, No. 1512676, 2017 WL 1250756, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Donta v. Hooper,
774 F.2d 716, 721 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Individuals have a clearly established federal right
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not to be arrested without probable cause.”)); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Second, Hart
has alleged that the individual Defendants violated Hart’s constitutional not to be
prosecuted based on false information they supplied to establish probable case, a right
clearly established by 2013. See, e.g., Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 205-06 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“[f]alsifying facts to establish probable cause to arrest an prosecute an
innocent person is . . . patently unconstitutional”).
For these reasons, the motions to dismiss the individual Defendants is denied.
B.

Monell Claims against the City and the County

A municipal defendant can only be subject to direct liability if it causes a
constitutional violation and harm to the plaintiff because it “implements or executes
a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by” that body’s officers. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

“[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity
is responsible under Section 1983.” Id. at 694. A plaintiff cannot allege a viable claim
based solely on vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Id. at 691.

The

municipality’s policy (or absence of one) must be a “moving force” in the deprivation
of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and such policy must have arisen from

17

“deliberate indifference” to the rights of its citizens. Doe v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn., 103
F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996).
In addition to policy or custom, the inadequacy of police training may serve as
a basis for Section 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The question is “whether the training program
is adequate; and if it is not, the question becomes whether such inadequate training
can justifiably be said to represent ‘city policy.’” Id. at 390.
The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the motions to
dismiss. Plaintiff has alleged that the County and the City failed to train their police
officers, including the individual Defendants herein, with regard to when it was proper
to issue warrant requests and to arrest for SORA violations following the
2011amendments to SORA. (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶ 98a). In light of the fact that the City
and the County are SORA registering authorities, tasked with handling SORA-related
information and violations (Doc. 43-1, SAC ¶¶ 39-42), such training is highly relevant
to the job requirements and tasks of the individual Defendants and other officers. For
these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the first prong of the
Monell liability test—that the City’s and the County’s “training or supervision was
inadequate for the tasks performed” by its officers. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun.
Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Plaintiff further alleges that the City and the County had actual notice that its
officers would use the information on the SOR to make decisions about arrests and
prosecutions for SORA violations, and that its failure to train, supervise, and/or
discipline its officers, would be highly likely to cause violations of the constitutional
rights of members of the public. (Doc. 43-1,SAC ¶ 98b). This allegation that the City
and the County knew of the possible consequences of failing to adequately train their
officers satisfies the “deliberate indifference” requirement of the second prong of the
test. See Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff satisfies the
causation element of the test by pleading that the City’s and the County’s failure to
properly train its officers in understanding changes to SORA ultimately led to (was
the moving force behind) Plaintiff’s arrest and resulting harm. (Doc. 43-1,SAC ¶¶ 39,
98).
The motions to dismiss the Monell claims against the City and the County are
denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the County

Defendants [Dkt. No. 70] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the City
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Defendants [Dkt. No. 83] is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: February 21, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on February 21, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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