Iannucci v. Michigan, State of et al

Filing 58

ORDER Overruling Plaintiff's 55 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's 53 Report and Recommendation and Granting Defendants' 18 , 23 and 24 Motions to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YANN IANNUCCI,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-10255
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #55)
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
(ECF ## 18, 23, 24)
In this action, Plaintiff Yann Iannucci (“Iannucci”) seeks review of, and
relief from, (1) a child support order entered in his state-court divorce proceedings
and (2) a state-court criminal judgment entered after the State of Michigan
successfully prosecuted him for failing make the court-ordered child-support
payments. (See Compl., ECF #1 at 2-3, Pg. ID 2-3.) Iannucci contends that these
orders were contrary to federal law because the state courts improperly included
income from his federally-provided veterans’ benefits when calculating his child
support obligations. (See id.)

1

Defendants1 have filed three separate motions to dismiss Iannucci’s
Complaint (the “Motions to Dismiss”). (See ECF ## 18, 23, 24.) The assigned
Magistrate Judge has issued a Report and Recommendation in which she has
recommended that the Court grant the Motions to Dismiss because the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2 (the “R&R”). (See
ECF #53.) That doctrine provides that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
hear “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005).

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because Iannucci is complaining about injuries caused by the statecourt divorce and criminal judgments entered against him. (See R&R, ECF #53.)

1

Iannucci has named the following eleven defendants in this action: Governor
Rick Snyder, Attorney General William Schuette, Assistant Attorney General
Robert Viar, Michigan Friend of the Court Director Steven Capps, Macomb
County Friend of the Court Referee Zaira Maio, Macomb County Friend of the
Court Investigators Janine Darlow and Valeria Berishaj, Macomb County
Probation Department Field Agent Carolyn Black, Catherine Cole, Gail PamukovMiller (Iannucci’s attorney in the state-court criminal action), and Zenell Brown
(collectively, “Defendants”). (See Compl., ECF #1 at 1-2, Pg. ID 1-2.) For ease of
reference, the Court refers to each Defendant in this action by his or her last name.
2

The so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine was established by two United States
Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
2

The Magistrate Judge also suggested an alternative ground for dismissal of
some of Iannucci’s claims. She noted that Iannucci has alleged that the Defendants
committed fraud (including perjury and fabricating evidence) during his criminal
case, and she explained that these claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), because the claims amount to “an impermissible collateral attack
on the validity of Iannucci’s state court conviction” and because that conviction
has “not been successfully invalidated.” (R&R, ECF #53 at 10-11, Pg. ID 537-38.)
Iannucci filed timely objections to the R&R (the “Objections”).3 (See ECF
#55.) In the Objections, Iannucci argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply because he has alleged that the state-court judgments were obtained by
fraud and that his alleged injuries were caused by the Defendants’ misconduct, not
by the judgments themselves. (See id. at 1, 3, Pg. ID 556, 558.) Notably, Iannucci
has not objected to (nor even mentioned) the portion of the R&R suggesting
dismissal (in part) under Heck.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Iannucci’s action fits
squarely within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Iannucci is complaining
about injuries caused by state-court judgments. Indeed, several federal circuit
courts of appeals have held that this doctrine precludes a district court from
3

Iannucci originally filed objections to the R&R on May 18, 2016. (See ECF #54.)
Iannucci then filed an amended set of objections to the R&R on May 20, 2016.
(See ECF #55.) The Court treats Iannucci’s amended objections as the operative
objections in this Order.
3

exercising jurisdiction over actions just like this one.

See, e.g., McSparin v.

McSparin, 489 Fed. App’x 348, 350-51 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over action alleging that state court
wrongly ordered plaintiff to pay child support from veterans’ benefits); Fortune v.
Domestic Relations York County, 440 Fed. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2011) (same);
Brackman v. Indiana, 93 Fed. App’x 989, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (same).
Moreover, Iannucci has waived any challenge to the R&R’s alternative
recommendation that his claims related to the alleged fraud in his criminal case are
prohibited under Heck, and, in any event, the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that Heck bars those claims.
Accordingly, for the reasons explained in more detail below, the Court
OVERRULES the Objections, ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
that the Court dismiss the Complaint, GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss, and
DISMISSES the Complaint.
I.
Iannucci is a disabled veteran who previously served in the United States
Army. (See Compl., ECF #1 at 6, Pg. ID 6.) In 2011, he filed for, and was
granted, a divorce from his wife.

(See id. at 1, Pg. ID 1.)

In the divorce

proceedings, the Macomb County Circuit Court “ordered [Iannucci] to pay child
support from his title 38 veterans compensation benefits.” (Id. at 2, Pg. ID 2.)
4

Iannucci was later criminally prosecuted for, and convicted by a jury of, failing to
pay child support. (Id.) The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction.
(Id.; see also People v. Iannucci, 2016 WL 232330 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).)
Iannucci now brings this pro se action against the Governor of the State
Michigan, the Michigan Attorney General, a Friend of the Court Referee, his
criminal defense attorney (whom he fired before his trial) and others involved his
divorce and criminal cases. (See Compl., ECF #1 at 1-2, Pg. ID 1-2.) He alleges
that the child support order and the subsequent criminal conviction were both
unlawful because federal law prohibited the State of Michigan from requiring him
to pay child support from his federally-provided veterans’ benefits. (Id.) He
complains that the state-court judge presiding over his divorce case “continuously
ignored the federal ruling” that purportedly protected his benefits payments. (Id. at
2, Pg. ID 2.) He likewise asserts that the Michigan Court of Appeals wrongly
affirmed his criminal conviction without citing any “federal laws or federal cases.”
(Id. at 3, Pg. ID 3.) And he has attached to his Complaint an “Affidavit in Support
of Child Custody Case” in which he sets forth at length his argument as to how
federal law precluded the state courts from requiring him to pay child support from
his veterans’ benefits. (Id. at 6-11, Pg. ID 6-11.)
For his requested relief, Iannucci asked this Court “to enforce federal laws,
protect my rights and freedom, and hold those accountable who . . . were involved
5

in any criminal activity involving violation of my federal protections.” (Id. at 3,
Pg. ID 3.) Iannucci also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in which he
further developed his theory that the state-court orders entered against him were
unlawful (the “Preliminary Injunction Motion”). (See ECF #5.) In the Preliminary
Injunction Motion, Iannucci asked the Court to bar the state courts from requiring
him to pay child support from his veterans’ benefits, to restore his “second
amendment rights,” to permit him “to travel without restrictions,” and to terminate
“all reporting demands to the Macomb County Probation Department and
Michigan Department of Corrections.” (Id. at 1-6, Pg. ID 38-43.) Iannucci also
asked the Court “to acquit” him of the criminal charges on which the state court
convicted him. (Objections, ECF #55 at 8, Pg. ID 563.)
Iannucci has explained to the Court that he is “working together” with Peter
Barclay (“Barclay”) to challenge state-court orders like the ones entered against
him in this action. (Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF #5 at 7, Pg. ID 41.)
Barclay is a veteran (from Oregon) who, like Iannucci, was ordered to pay child
support from his veterans’ benefits. (See id.) Iannucci highlights that he and
Barclay “often copy each other’s writings,” and he directs this Court to a similar
civil action filed by Barclay in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon. (Id.) In that action, Barclay challenged a state-court order that required
him to pay child support from his veterans’ benefits. Notably, the federal court in
6

Oregon summarily dismissed Barclay’s claims on the ground that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Barclay v. Oregon,
No. 6:15-cv-01920, ECF No. 10 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2015).
The Magistrate Judge reached a similar conclusion in this action.

She

explained that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court may not
exercise jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review of
those judgments.” (R&R, ECF #53 at 5, Pg. ID 532 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.,
544 U.S. at 284).) She carefully reviewed Iannucci’s Complaint and determined
that he was complaining about injuries caused by the state-court judgments:
In fact, plaintiff’s complaint expressly asserts that he was harmed
by and seeks relief from the child support order and the state court
conviction themselves . . . the complaint’s statement of claim
contains the following specific allegations of harms to plaintiff
derived from the orders:
 plaintiff was ordered to pay child support from his veterans
benefits;
 the [state] court increased the support obligation from
$250/month to $875/month;
 the [state] court continuously ignored the apportionment
ruling from the Department of Veterans Affairs;
 plaintiff was convicted [of failing to pay child support] by a
jury;

7

 the Michigan Court of Appeals returned an unfavorable
ruling against plaintiff [in his criminal appeal];
 at sentencing, plaintiff was ordered to get a job to pay
financial demands of the [state] court;
 the [state] court demanded he pay $300/month in addition to
child support demand.
(Id. at 8, Pg. ID 535 (citing Compl., ECF #1).) She recommended that the Court
dismiss Iannucci’s Complaint because all of his alleged injuries resulted from the
state-court orders. (Id. at 4-11, Pg. ID 531-38.)
As noted above, the Magistrate Judge suggested in the alternative that, under
Heck, the Court should dismiss all of Iannucci’s claims related to the alleged
misconduct in his criminal case because those claims call into question the validity
of the underlying conviction in that case and because he has not obtained relief
from his conviction. (Id. at 10-11. Pg. ID 537-38.)
Iannucci has now filed timely objections to the R&R. (See ECF #55.) The
Court considers each objection individually below.
II.
Objection No. 1: In this objection, Iannucci argues that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized “an exception” to the RookerFeldman doctrine that applies “if fraud is committed at any point during legal
proceedings.” (See id. at 1, Pg. ID 556.) He argues that the “exception” applies
here because “fraud, misrepresentation, and other improper means exist.” (Id.)
8

Iannucci does not cite any Sixth Circuit decisions in this objection, but he cited In
re Sun Valley Foods Co., 801 F.2d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1985), in support of his
“fraud exception” argument in his responses to the motions to dismiss. (See ECF
## 37, 38, 39.) In In re Sun Valley Foods, the Sixth Circuit said that there is an
“exception” to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine under which a federal court “may
entertain a collateral attack on a state court judgment which is alleged to have been
procured through fraud, deception, accident, or mistake.” Id. at 189. But In re Sun
Valley Foods does not save Iannucci’s claims.
As another district court in this Circuit recently explained, there is reason “to
question the continuing validity of In re Sun Valley Foods.”

Dale v. Selene

Finance LP, 2016 WL 1170772, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2016) (Carr, J.).
“Since recognizing [the fraud] exception [in In re Sun Valley Foods] nearly thirty
years ago, the Sixth Circuit has, in cases involving the exception, yet to find it
applicable.” Id. at *4 (collecting cases). More importantly, the Sixth Circuit
decided In re Sun Valley Foods before the Supreme Court clarified the scope and
nature of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil, supra, and the Sixth
Circuit’s more recent, post-Exxon Mobil decisions applying the doctrine make
clear that the sole “inquiry . . . is the source of the injury plaintiff alleges in the
federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
Thus, “[i]f the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker9

Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If
there is some other source of the injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the
plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id. Whether a state-court judgment was
improperly obtained is no longer a factor.
As the court in Dale explained, permitting a plaintiff to avoid the RookerFeldman doctrine by alleging that the judgment under attack was obtained through
fraud would– in contravention of the more recent Rooker-Feldman precedent
described above – allow a plaintiff to pursue a claim in federal court even if the
claim sought to redress an injury caused by a state-court judgment:
After all, the [Sixth Circuit] emphasized in McCormick, supra, 451
F.3d at 393, that the dispositive question, for purposes of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is the source of the plaintiff’s injury. If
the source is a state-court judgment, then a federal court has no
jurisdiction to hear the claim. But if the plaintiff can avoid that
result by alleging some fraud, deception, accident, or mistake
contributed to a state-court judgment, there is a wide road indeed
around the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Dale, 2016 WL 1170772, at *5. This in part explains why several more recent
circuit-level decisions decline to follow In re Sun Valley Foods and/or to adopt the
fraudulent-procurement “exception.” See, e.g., Scott v. Frankel, 606 Fed. App’x
529, 532 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015); Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773
F.3d 423, 426-27 (2d Cir. 2014); West v. Evergreen Highlands Ass’n, 213 Fed.
App’x 670, 674 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007).

10

Simply put, under the most recent on-point holdings of the Supreme Court
and Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff may not avoid application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine merely by alleging that the state-court judgment under attack was
procured by fraud.
Moreover, even if the “fraud” exception from In re Sun Valley Foods
applied here, Iannucci would still lose because “the gist of [his] federal complaint
is that he is unhappy with the results of the state court proceedings.” Belock v.
Burt, 19 Fed. App’x 323, 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that district court lacked
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear claim that state-court child
support order had been procured through fraud because essence of suit was
plaintiff’s unhappiness with state court result). Indeed, in Iannucci’s presentation
to the Magistrate Judge, he stressed that he “is not pleased with the State ruling in
any manner” because the state courts “erred by using federal relief funds to
calculate child support,” and his requested relief included “an acquittal” in the state
criminal case. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF #38 at 9, 20, Pg. ID 399, 410.) Because “the gist”
of this action is an attack on state-court judgments, the “fraud” exception from In
re Sun Valley Foods cannot salvage Iannucci’s claims even if the exception still
exists.
Finally, Iannucci’s allegations that the state-court judgments were obtained
by fraud are deficient. That is yet another reason that the “fraud” exception would
11

not save his claims even if it still exists. The Complaint does not identify any
“fraud” that led to the entry of the child support order. Instead, the Complaint
alleges that the Macomb County Friend of the Court and the Macomb County
Circuit Court made legal errors in calculating his child support obligations.
(Compl., ECF #1 at 2, Pg. ID 2.) And the Complaint does not identify any fraud
that led to the entry of judgment against him in the criminal case. (See id. at 2-3,
Pg. ID 2-3.)
For all of these reasons, the Court overrules Objection Number 1.

Objection No. 2: This objection argues that this Court has removal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)(a). (See Objections, ECF #55 at 1-2, Pg. ID 556-57.)
This objection does not entitle Iannucci to relief because this action was never
removed from state court to federal court, nor is the removal statute involved in
this action in any way. In this objection, Iannucci also argues that this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction because he alleges that federal laws have been violated.
However, the fact that Iannucci alleges violations of federal laws does not make
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine any less applicable. Iannucci is not entitled to relief
based upon this objection.

12

Objection No. 3: This objection seeks appointment of counsel. (See id. at 2, Pg.
ID 557.) Thus, it is not truly an objection to the R&R. To the extent Iannucci
objects that he was not appointed counsel, that objection is overruled (and the
Court declines to appoint counsel for him).

Pro se plaintiffs have “no

constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case.”

Abdur-Rahman v.

Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995). And Iannucci
has not provided the Court any basis to exercise its discretion and appoint counsel
for him here.

Objection No. 4: This objection contends that the R&R erroneously “seems to
rely on dismissal through rules, not the actual laws.” (Objections, ECF #55 at 2,
Pg. ID 557.) Here, Iannucci seems to suggest that this Court need not follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no merit in that argument and the Court
overrules this objection.

Objection No. 5: This objection begins with a question – asking why “the State,
its actors and principles [sic]” felt the need to manufacture income withholding
orders that were false. (Id.; emphasis added.) This question is not a proper
objection to the R&R.

In any event, the question actually underscores that

Iannucci is complaining about injuries inflicted by “orders” of the state court and,
13

accordingly, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here. The objection ends by
restating the central premise of this civil action – that federal law precluded the
state courts from requiring Iannucci to use his veterans’ benefits to pay child
support. This contention says nothing about how Iannucci’s claims may proceed
notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and this objection is overruled.

Objection No. 6: This objection refers to various provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and to the remedy of quo warranto, but it does not explain how
any of the cited rules or the quo warranto remedy entitle Iannucci to relief. (Id. at
3, Pg. ID 558.) Nor does the objection identify any error with the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis in the R&R. The objection is therefore overruled.

Objection No. 7: In this objection, Iannucci argues that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction because “the source of [his
alleged] injury is the trickery, scheme, misrepresentation, disobedience and fraud
the defendants are all accused of participating in to some degree . . . not the [statecourt] decision itself.” (ECF #55 at 3, Pg. ID 558.) The legal foundation for this
objection is solid: as noted above, the Sixth Circuit has explained that the RookerFeldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction only where the source of
the alleged injury is the state-court judgment. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393.
14

The problem for Iannucci is that the injuries he identified his Complaint and
asked this Court to remedy – i.e., the invasion of his veterans’ benefits, his
criminal conviction, and the deprivation of his rights to vote and possess firearms –
were all caused by the state-court judgments. Indeed, Iannucci’s Complaint and
Preliminary Injunction Motion do not identify any injury that he suffered separate
and apart from the judgments.

Iannucci complains bitterly about the alleged

misconduct of those involved in the civil and criminal litigation against him, but he
does not identify any independent injury – i.e., an injury apart from the state-court
orders – that he suffered as a result of that purported misconduct. Indeed, any fair
reading of Iannucci’s Complaint reveals that his real “beef” is that the State of
Michigan – through judgments entered by its courts – wrongly required him to use
his federally-provided veterans’ benefits to pay his child support obligations and
then criminally convicted him for failing to make the payments. The excerpt from
the R&R quoted above at pages 7-8 of this Order effectively illustrates that all of
Iannucci’s alleged injuries flow from the state-court judgments, not from alleged
misconduct by any of the Defendants. (R&R, ECF #53 at 8, Pg. ID 535 (citing
Compl., ECF #1).) Simply put, Iannucci’s Complaint belies his current assertion
that the source of his alleged injuries was something other than the state-court
judgments themselves. And because those judgments caused his alleged injuries,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. His objection is therefore overruled.
15

In any event, even if Iannucci’s Complaint could be read as asserting claims
for injuries caused by the Defendants’ alleged fraud (not by the state-court
judgments themselves) – claims over which this Court arguably could have subject
matter jurisdiction – the Complaint would still be subject to dismissal. That is
because Iannucci has failed to assert any viable claims (for fraud or for anything
else) against any of the Defendants. Iannucci’s claims against each Defendant fail
for the following reasons (among others):
 Defendant Snyder: Iannucci’s sole allegation against Defendant Snyder in
the Complaint is that he (Iannucci) “contacted the office of Governor Rick
Snyder in order to acquire a pardon [of his state-court criminal conviction].
The request was denied.” (Compl., ECF #1 at 3, Pg. ID 3.) Iannucci has
failed to show that Defendant Snyder had any involvement in, or was even
aware of, the civil or criminal cases against him in state court.
 Defendant Schuette: Iannucci’s sole allegation against defendant Schuette
in the Complaint is that Schuette “ignored the federal laws presented to
him.” (Id.) This allegation fails for the same reasons his allegation against
Defendant Snyder fails: Iannucci has not shown that Defendant Schuette had
any involvement in, or was even aware of, the civil or criminal cases against
him in state court.

16

 Defendant Viar: Iannucci’s Complaint does not make a single allegation
against Defendant Viar. The Complaint therefore completely fails to state a
claim against Defendant Viar.
 Defendant Capps: Iannucci’s sole allegation against Defendant Capps in
the Complaint is that he “obviously ordered the Michigan Friend of the
Court system to assume subject matter jurisdiction over veterans
compensation payments, while ignoring the plain wording of several federal
laws.” (Id.) Iannucci has failed to explain how the state court assuming
subject matter jurisdiction over veterans’ compensation benefits amounts to
fraud.
 Defendant Maio: Iannucci’s sole allegation against Defendant Maio in the
Complaint is that he (Iannucci) argued that his veterans’ benefits may not be
used to pay child support, and that “[Defendant] Maio claimed that the legal
argument was insolvent, and concluded that plaintiff was in receipt of BAH
and BAQ payments for active duty military personnel.” (Id. at 2, Pg. ID 2.)
Iannucci has failed to explain how Defendant Maio’s rejection of his legal
argument amounts to fraud.
 Defendant Cole: Iannucci alleges in his Complaint that he cross-examined
Defendant Cole at his criminal trial “regarding income withholding orders
that falsely established that he was a civilian employed by the federal office
17

of the Department of Veterans Affairs . . . .” (Id.) He alleges further that
Defendant Cole testified that computers “can be manipulated to generate an
income withholding order by a human operator.” (Id. at 3, Pg. ID 3.) But
Iannucci does not allege that Defendant Cole committed any improper
manipulation. Iannucci has therefore failed to show that Defendant Cole
helped to procure, by fraud, a judgment against him.
 Defendants Darlow and Berishaj: In the Complaint, Iannucci claimed that
Defendants Darlow and Berishaj investigated his state-court criminal
conviction and concluded that “there were no changes and continued the
[criminal sentence’s] demand for payment.” (Id. at 2, Pg. ID 2.) At most,
Iannucci’s allegations against Defendants Darlow and Berishaj establish that
they reviewed the terms of his sentence and concluded that those terms were
proper. Iannucci has not explained how that amounts to fraud.
 Defendant Pamukov-Miller:

Defendant Pamukov-Miller represented

Iannucci prior to his criminal trial in state court. In the Complaint, Iannucci
alleged that Defendant Pamukov-Miller applied “psychological pressure”
and made “several direct threats to him.” (Id.) But Iannucci also stated that
he fired Defendant Pamukov-Miller before he proceeded to trial. (See id.)
Iannucci has not identified any injuries flowing from Defendant PamukovMiller’s conduct.
18

 Defendant Black: Iannucci alleged in his Complaint that “Probation officer
Carolyn Black chose to impose unusually strict demand [sic] upon me. She
claimed I had failed to change my address, which was proven false, but the
court allowed her to change her complaint to non-payment of maintenance
fees. Those monies were then used to pay into the child support system, not
the Michigan Department of Corrections fee collection system.” (Id. at 3,
Pg. ID 3.) But, again, Iannucci has failed to explain how Defendant Black’s
actions amount to fraud.
 Defendant Brown: Iannucci’s sole allegation against Defendant Brown is
that “the name of Zenell Brown was found in a document that claimed that
no laws applied to the veterans’ compensation and that there was no
authority over the payments. It is the belief of plaintiff . . . that this may be a
core factor governing the problems he has been forced to endure.” (Id.)
Here, Iannucci has established only that Defendant Brown’s name appeared
in an unidentified document. He has not identified any fraudulent actions on
the part of Defendant Brown. And Iannucci has not made any allegations
that Defendant Brown was ever aware of the civil or criminal actions against
him in state court.
 All Defendants: Iannucci appears to assert a civil claim under 18 U.S.C. §
1964 against all Defendants for violation of the Racketeer Influence and
19

Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”). (Compl., ECF #1 at 4, Pg. ID 4.) But
Iannucci has not identified any RICO predicate acts, nor has he alleged the
existence of a RICO enterprise.

Objection No. 8: In this objection, Iannucci seeks restoration of his right to vote.
(Objections, ECF #55 at 3, Pg. ID 558.) The objection says nothing about how the
Magistrate Judge allegedly erred. It thus provides no basis for the Court to reject
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

Moreover, the objection actually

underscores that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because Iannucci is
complaining about an injury (his loss of his right to vote) that flowed directly from
the judgment in his state-court criminal case.

Therefore, this objection is

overruled.

Objection No. 9: In this objection, Iannucci seeks restoration of his right to bear
arms. (Id.) The objection says nothing about how the Magistrate Judge allegedly
erred. It thus provides no basis for the Court to reject the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. Moreover, the objection actually underscores that the RookerFeldman doctrine applies here because Iannucci is complaining about an injury
(his loss of his right to bear arms) that flowed directly from the judgment in his
state court criminal case. This objection is overruled.
20

Objection No. 10: In this objection, Iannucci complains about a statement in the
Michigan Court of Appeals decision affirming his criminal conviction. (Id. at 4,
Pg. ID 559.) The objection presents no ground on which the Magistrate Judge
allegedly erred. Once again, this objection underscores that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies here because Iannucci is asking this Court to review a decision by
the state court in his criminal case. This objection is overruled.

Objection No. 11: This is a lengthy objection in which Iannucci contends that the
state courts lacked authority to compel him to use his veterans’ benefits to pay
child support and that the state court orders should thus be deemed “void ab initio.”
(Id. at 4-6, Pg. ID 559-61.) The objection presents no ground on which the
Magistrate Judge allegedly erred. And again, the objection underscores that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because Iannucci is asking this Court to
review state-court decisions. This objection is overruled.

Objection No. 12: This is a lengthy objection in which Iannucci asks this Court
(1) to review “evidence” concerning whether he may be compelled to pay child
support from his veterans’ benefits and (2) “to acquit” him of the criminal charge
for which he was convicted. (See id. at 6-10, Pg. ID 561-65.) Like so many of his
21

other objections, this one says nothing about how the Magistrate Judge erred and
only underscores that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here because the source
of Iannucci’s claimed injuries are the orders entered by the state courts.

This

objection is overruled.
III.
Iannucci

has

not

objected

to

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

additional

recommendation that the Heck decision bars his claims based on alleged fraud
committed during his criminal case because (1) those claims amount to an attack
on the validity of the criminal conviction and (2) Iannucci has not obtained any
relief from the conviction. By failing to object, Iannucci has waived review of the
portion of the R&R recommending (in the alternative) dismissal under Heck. See
United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Taylor, 281 Fed. App’x 467, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Litigants who fail to object
to a magistrate’s report and recommendation, within the time provided, generally
waive their right to challenge the decision.”).
In any event, the Court has independently considered the merits of the Heck
issue and agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Heck bars Iannucci’s claims that
the Defendants committed fraud that led to his criminal conviction.

In his

Objections (but not specifically in his Complaint), Iannucci alleges that the
Defendants fabricated evidence and committed “perjury in order to convict [an]
22

innocent [person].” (Objections, ECF #55 at 2, Pg. ID 557.) This Court and many
others have held that Heck bars such claims (if the plaintiff has not obtained relief
from the conviction) because they attack the validity of the underlying conviction.
See, e.g., Ketchum v. Khan, 2014 WL 3563437, at *15 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(collecting cases); Word v. City of Detroit, 2006 WL 1704205, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
Thus, to the extent that Iannucci complains about fraud committed in his
criminal case, that claim would fail even if the Court had subject matter
jurisdiction over it.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Objections (ECF #55) are OVERRULED, that the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to dismiss the Complaint is ADOPTED, that the Motions to
Dismiss (ECF ## 18, 23, 24) are GRANTED, and that the Complaint is
DISMISSED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 2, 2016

23

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on August 2, 2016, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

24