Cece et al v. Wayne, County of et al

Filing 63

ORDER denying 61 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (MLan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CECE ET. AL.,

Case No. 16-10410
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTHUR J. TARNOW

Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF WAYNE, ET. AL.,

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS

Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [61]
Plaintiffs, former employees of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department,
filed a complaint against Defendants on February 4, 2016. Plaintiffs allege a claim
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for unilaterally changing the Plaintiffs’ vested pension
benefits, constituting a taking of property. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also bring a
breach of contract claim. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [44]
on January 27, 2017. Plaintiffs filed a response [49] on February 21, 2017 and
Defendants replied [51] on March 7, 2017. The Court held a hearing on the Motion
on June 26, 2017. The Court entered an Order granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment [59] and entered Judgment [60] on June 28, 2017.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration [61] on July 12, 2017. For the
reasons stated below, this Motion is DENIED.
Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) provides that:

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Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the
court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration
that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court,
either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must
not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and
the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion
have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will
result in a different disposition of the case.
See Hansmann v. Fid. Invs. Institutional Servs. Co., 326 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir.
2003). A Motion for Reconsideration “is not properly used as a vehicle to re-hash
old arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued earlier but were
not.” Smith v. Mount Pleasant Schools, 298 F.Supp.2d 636, 637 (E.D.Mich.2003)
(citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 357, 374
(6th Cir.1998); see also Scottsdale Insur. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th
Cir.2008) (“We have found issues to be waived when they are raised for the first
time in motions for reconsideration.”). “The decision whether to grant
reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the court.” Yuba Natural Res.,
Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred because it entered judgment in the case
without addressing the promissory estoppel argument made by Plaintiffs in their
complaint.1 There is not an actual count of promissory estoppel to be found in the

1

Plaintiffs cite the Third Amended Complaint [33] in this Motion. However, the
final complaint is actually the Fourth Amended complaint [41]; therefore the Court
will refer to that complaint in this order.
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complaint. Rather there is one paragraph under the breach of contract claim that
states:
Each of the above named Plaintiffs retired from Wayne County under
the terms of one of the four Memorandums of Agreement Exhibit 2, 3,
4 and 5, relied upon the promised made by Defendants, that being
they would not be required to pay medical insurance premiums.
[41 at ¶18]. Despite amending the complaint three times, a claim of promissory
estoppel was never raised outside of the indirect reference presented in ¶18 above.
“[T]here is no duty on the part of the trial court or the appellate court to create a
claim which appellant has not spelled out in his pleading.” Clark v. National
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.1975).
The Plaintiff amended the complaint three times, filed a response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment and was present at a hearing on that Motion.
Plaintiff does not present any argument for why the promissory estoppel claim was
not spelled out in any of the various versions of pleadings that were filed or why it
was not raised at any time prior to this Motion. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s Motion
for Reconsideration [61] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2017

s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge

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