Stallworth v. City of Pleasant Ridge et al

Filing 58

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Granting Defendant James Farris' 40 Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Scott Champine's 43 Motion for Summary Judgment; and (3) Dismissing Claims Against Defendant City of Ferndale. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LARRY STALLWORTH
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-10696
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
SCOTT CHAMPINE, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT JAMES FARRIS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #40); (2) GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT SCOTT CHAMPINE’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #43); AND (3) DISMISSING
CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY OF FERNDALE
In this action, Plaintiff Larry Stallworth alleges Defendant police officers
Scott Champine and James Farris violated his Fourth Amendment rights and caused
him physical injury during a traffic stop. (See First Am. Compl., ECF #14.)
Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. (See ECF ## 40, 43.) For the
reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant Farris’ motion and GRANTS
IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant Champine’s motion.1

1

Stallworth also brought claims against the City of Pleasant Ridge and the City of
Ferndale. (See First Am. Compl., ECF #14.) On January 5, 2018, the Court entered
a Stipulated Order in which Stallworth dismissed his claim against the City of
Pleasant Ridge with prejudice. (See ECF #57.) Stallworth has also abandoned his
claim against the City of Ferndale. (See Stallworth Resp. Br., ECF #45 at Pg. ID
1

I
On March 1, 2014, Stallworth was at a nightclub in the City of Ferndale when
another man, Francis Thomas, offered to drive Stallworth home. (See Stallworth
Dep. at 138, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 137.) Stallworth accepted Thomas’ offer, and the
two of them left in Thomas’ Lincoln Towncar. (See id. at 138, 140, Pg. ID 137.)
Stallworth sat in the back seat as Thomas drove. (See id.)
Defendant Champine, a City of Pleasant Ridge police officer, witnessed
Thomas driving erratically as Thomas was traveling northbound on Woodward
Avenue. (See Champine Dep. at 21-24, ECF #43-5 at Pg. ID 687.) He pulled his
marked police car behind Thomas’ vehicle, activated his police lights, and
effectuated a traffic stop. (See id. at 28-29, Pg. ID 688-89.)
Thomas had been drinking and did not have a valid driver’s license, and he
was concerned about facing possible criminal charges as a result of his driving. (See
Thomas Dep. at 24-25, 29-31, ECF #54-2 at Pg. ID 1262-63, 1264.) So, once
Thomas brought his vehicle to a complete stop, he “jumped over” to the front
passenger seat, “grabbed [Stallworth] up under [his] arms[,] and pulled [Stallworth]
into the front [driver’s] seat.” (Stallworth Dep. at 141, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 866.)

827.) Accordingly, through this Opinion and Order, the Court DISMISSES
Stallworth’s claim against the City of Ferndale with prejudice.
2

Champine saw Thomas and Stallworth switch places, and he called for
backup. (See Champine Dep. at 33-35, ECF #43-5 at Pg. ID 690.) Champine
explained that he “needed the backup” because he was “working by [him]self,” and
the seat switching signaled to him that “somebody didn’t want to be seen as the
driver.” (Id. at 35, Pg. ID 690.) Shortly after Champine called for assistance,
Defendant Farris, a City of Ferndale police officer, arrived on the scene. (See id. at
38, Pg. ID 691.)
Farris asked Stallworth to exit the vehicle, and Stallworth did so on his own.
(See Stallworth Dep. at 144, 181-82, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 866, 876.) Stallworth says
that after he stepped out of the car, Farris “grabbed” his arm so hard that his hearing
aide fell out, “turned [him] around,” and handcuffed him. (Id. at 146 180, Pg. ID
867, 875.) Farris then “pushed [Stallworth] towards the car and started patting [him]
down.” (Id. at 147, Pg. ID 867.) Once Farris completed the pat down, he again
grabbed Stallworth’s arm – hard enough to leave a “red” mark – and placed
Stallworth into the back seat of an unoccupied police car. (Id. at 157-58, Pg. ID 870.)
Stallworth says that Champine later entered the police car and sat in the front
seat.2 (See id. at 174, 220, Pg. ID 874, 885.) Stallworth says that he immediately
told Champine that the handcuffs were injuring his wrists. (See id.) Champine did
not respond to Stallworth’s complaints.

Instead, after the passage of some

2

Champine denies that he was ever in a police car with Stallworth.
3

undetermined period of time, and near the end of the stop, either Champine or Farris
took the cuffs off.3
Champine eventually issued Stallworth a misdemeanor ticket for interfering
with a police officer, and Champine then drove Stallworth home. (See id. at 176,
189-90, Pg. ID 874, 878.) The state court ultimately dismissed Stallworth’s ticket
after two preliminary hearings. (See id. at 230-31, Pg. ID 888.)
II
Stallworth filed this action on February 26, 2016. (See ECF #1.) He amended
his Complaint on August 29, 2016. (See ECF #14.) In the First Amended Complaint,
Stallworth brings the following constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
 Excessive force against Defendants Farris and Champine;
 Unreasonable seizure/false arrest against Defendant Champine; and
 Malicious prosecution against Defendant Champine.4
Defendants moved for summary judgment on July 10, 2017, and July 31, 2017.
(See ECF ## 40, 43.) The Court held a hearing on the motions on January 8, 2018.

3

At one point during his deposition, Stallworth appeared to testify that Farris
removed the cuffs. (See, e.g., Stallworth Dep. at 188-89, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 87778.) At another point, Stallworth appeared to testify that Stallworth removed them.
(See id. at 189-90, Pg. ID 878.)
4

As noted in footnote one above, Stallworth also brought constitutional claims
against the City of Ferndale and the City of Pleasant Ridge. He has dismissed and/or
abandoned those claims.
4

III
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact....” SEC v. Sierra
Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When
reviewing the record, “the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. “The
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s]
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for [that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is
not appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Id. at 251-52. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge....” Id. at 255.
Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person should have known.” Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d
853, 864 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
5

“Once raised, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the defendant[ ] [is] not entitled
to qualified immunity.” Kinlin v. Kline, 749 F.3d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 2014).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals “has generally used a two-step [qualified
immunity] analysis: (1) viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
[the court] determines whether the allegations give rise to a constitutional violation;
and (2) [the court] assesses whether the right was clearly established at the time of
the incident.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted). “[U]nder either prong [of this
inquiry], courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking
summary judgment.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). Indeed, in
Tolan, the Supreme Court vacated a grant of summary judgment on a qualified
immunity defense because, among other things, the lower court “credited the
evidence of the party seeking summary judgment and failed to properly
acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing that motion.” Id. at 1867–
68. The Supreme Court explained that “[b]y weighing the evidence and reaching
factual inferences contrary to [the non-moving party’s] competent evidence, the
court below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary
judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Id. at 1867. Simply put, “where the legal question of qualified immunity
turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must
determine liability.” Green, 681 F.3d at 864.
6

IV
A
In Stallworth’s First Amended Complaint, he alleges that Defendant Farris
subjected him to excessive force in two respects. The evidence in the record is
insufficient to support a viable Fourth Amendment claim with respect to either
alleged use of force.
Stallworth first alleges that “[w]hile [he] was complying with [Farris’] request
[to step out of Thomas’ car], [] Farris violently grabbed [his] arm and pulled [him]
out of the vehicle.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶15, ECF #14 at Pg. ID 69.) But, as
Stallworth’s counsel candidly acknowledged at oral argument, this alleged act did
not occur. Indeed, Stallworth testified at his deposition that he stepped out of
Thomas’ car on his own and that Farris did not make physical contact with him until
after he had exited the vehicle. (See Stallworth Dep. at 144, 146, 148-49, ECF #452 at Pg. ID 866-68.) Because Stallworth now acknowledges that Farris never “pulled
[him]” out of the car, Stallworth cannot maintain a claim related to this alleged act
of excessive force.
Stallworth next alleges that Farris “handcuffed [him] extremely tightly …
causing him pain.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 18-19, ECF #14 Pg. ID 70.) In order to
maintain an excessive force claim related to “unduly tight or excessively forceful
handcuffing,” a plaintiff must “offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
7

material fact that: (1) he or she complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the
officer ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced some physical
injury resulting from the handcuffing.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 608 (6th
Cir. 2015) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Stallworth’s claim against
Farris fails because Stallworth never complained to Farris about the tightness of the
handcuffs.
Indeed, in the First Amended Complaint, Stallworth does not even allege that
he complained to Farris about the handcuffs. Instead, he alleges that “[o]n no less
than three occasions, [he] told Defendant Champine that the handcuffs were too tight
and were causing him pain.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶19, ECF #14 at Pg. ID 70;
emphasis added.) Moreover, Stallworth admits that he did not complain to Farris
about the tightness of the handcuffs. In fact, Stallworth testified that he never spoke
to Farris after Farris placed Stallworth in a police car:
Q: Okay. At any time did you say anything to the
handcuffing officer?
A: No. That officer – […] told me don’t say anything and
I didn’t say nothing.
Q: Okay. So if I understand what you’ve told me, from
the time you got out of the Lincoln to the time that you had
your handcuffs taken off, you never actually spoke to the
handcuffing officer, is that accurate?
A: Yes.
(Stallworth Dep. at 189, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 878.)
8

Stallworth directs the Court to a different portion of his testimony that, he
says, establishes that he did complain to Farris about the handcuffs:
I didn’t say nothing at all, and then the only time when I
was talking it was inside the car when I was trying to get
the officer’s attention that it feels like it’s hurting my arm.
The handcuffs were hurting me.
(Id. at 161, Pg. ID 871; emphasis added.) Stallworth now maintains that “the officer”
he referenced is Farris. (See Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #45 at Pg. ID 815.)
However, Stallworth’s answers to careful follow-up deposition questions by
Farris’ counsel confirmed that the “officer” referenced by Stallworth was Champine,
not Farris. In response to these questions, Stallworth testified that the only officer
who was ever “in the car” was Champine and that he “never actually spoke” with
Farris after he was handcuffed (which occurred before he was placed “in the car”).
(Stallworth Dep. at 164, 166, 172, 189, ECF #45-2 Pg. ID 871-73, 878.) Stallworth
simply has not produced any competent evidence that he ever told Farris that his
handcuffs were too tight. Accordingly, Farris is entitled to summary judgment on
Stallworth’s excessive force claim related to the handcuffs.
B
In Stallworth’s response to Farris’ summary judgment motion, Stallworth
asserts that Farris subjected him to two additional incidents of excessive force.
Stallworth says that Farris “violently grabbed” him after he exited Thomas’ car and
forced his “right arm behind [his] back,” causing “immediat[e]” pain. (Stallworth
9

Resp. Br., ECF #45 at Pg. ID 814.) Stallworth also says that after Farris handcuffed
him, Farris “forcefully grabbed [him] by the right arm and forced him into the
backseat” of a police car. (Id. at Pg. ID 815.) These new claims against Farris fail
for two reasons.
First, neither of these incidents of excessive force are pleaded in the First
Amended Complaint. A plaintiff may not “expand [his] claims to assert new theories
… in response to [a] summary judgment [motion].” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WM
Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Tucker v. Union of
Needletrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005)
(same).

Moreover, Stallworth has not moved to amend the First Amended

Complaint to add these new claims. See Tucker, 407 F.3d at 788 (“At the summary
judgment stage, the proper procedure for [a] plaintiff[] to assert a new claim is to
amend the complaint in accordance with Rule 15(a)”). Nor would the Court be
inclined to grant leave to add these claims at this late date. Stallworth has no
justification for failing to raise these alleged incidents of excessive force earlier.
Indeed, these new alleged incidents were not hidden from Stallworth or uncovered
for the first time during discovery.

On the contrary, Stallworth’s allegations

concerning these incidents are based on his personal knowledge of his interaction
with the officers – knowledge that Stallworth had long before he filed his initial

10

Complaint. Stallworth may not avoid summary judgment by raising new claims now
that he should have raised long ago and well before the close of discovery.
Second, and in any event, even if the Court treated these two new alleged
incidents of excessive force as part of this case, Farris would still be entitled to
summary judgment. The determination as to whether a police officer has exerted
excessive force during the course of a seizure is reviewed “under the Fourth
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 388 (1989). “[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court must analyze this conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Three
factors guide the Court’s determination of whether a particular use of force is
reasonable: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether [the suspect]
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
Applying the Graham factors, the Court concludes that Farris’ decision to
tightly grip Stallworth’s arm and to force Stallworth’s arm behind his back was
reasonable. The Court acknowledges that the crime of interfering with a police
officer is not necessarily severe and that Stallworth claims that he was not actively
11

resisting at the time Farris applied the force in question. But Farris was aware that
Stallworth was involved in conduct designed to evade detection of, and
responsibility for, a potential crime, and thus it would not have been unreasonable
for Farris to conclude that Stallworth posed a risk of engaging in additional conduct
aimed at evading criminal responsibility – conduct like fleeing from the scene.
Likewise, it would not have been unreasonable for Farris to conclude that he needed
to apply an extra measure of force – such as a tighter-than-normal grip to
Stallworth’s arm – to ensure that Stallworth did not attempt to flee as he was being
moved to a police car. Under these circumstances – and because the force allegedly
applied by Farris was not extreme and was proportional to the need to control a
potential flight risk – Farris did not violate Stallworth’s right to be free from
excessive force.
And even if the force applied by Farris was excessive, Farris would still be
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Stallworth has
not directed the Court to any controlling authority holding that an officer may not
apply a tighter-than-normal grip and use arm manipulation to control a suspect who
could reasonably be perceived as a flight risk. Thus, Stallworth has not shown that
Farris violated a clearly-established constitutional right. Accordingly, Farris would
also be entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these additional incidents of
force.
12

C
Next, Stallworth claims that Defendant Champine failed to protect him from
the excessively-tight handcuffs. (See Stallworth Resp. Br., ECF #53 at Pg. ID 116871.) “A police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may still
be held liable where (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive
force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and
the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Floyd v. City of Detroit, 119 F.3d
425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted). When
the evidence is viewed in Stallworth’s favor, he has satisfied both elements of this
test.
A jury could first reasonably find that Champine “had reason to know that
excessive force was being used.” Id. As explained above, police use excessive force
with

respect

to

the

handcuffing

of

a

suspect

where

the

suspect

“(1) … complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer ignored those
complaints; and (3) the [suspect] experienced some physical injury.” Baynes, 799
F.3d at 608. Here, Stallworth says that while he and Champine were both in a police
car, he told Champine that the handcuffs were so tight that they were hurting his
wrists, and Stallworth further says that Champine ignored those complaints. (See
Stallworth Dep. at 161, 174, 176, 185, 219-220, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 871, 874, 877,
885.) Stallworth also submitted evidence that shortly after the incident he sought
13

medical treatment related to the wrist injuries he claims to have suffered. (See ECF
## 54-4 – 54-9.) A jury could also reasonably conclude that Champine had the
opportunity and ability to prevent harm from occurring.
Champine resists this conclusion. He first argues that he did not ignore
Stallworth’s complaints because he never “heard” them. (Champine Mot., ECF #43
at Pg. ID 548-49.)

Indeed, Champine insists that he could not have heard

Stallworth’s complaints because during the time that they were allegedly together in
a police car, his (Champine’s) back was to Stallworth, and they were separated by a
thick plastic divider in the police car. (See id. at Pg. ID 548.) But Stallworth
maintains that once he was in a police car with Champine, he complained repeatedly
to Champine about the handcuffs (see Stallworth Dep. at 161, 174, 176, 185, 219220, ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 871, 874, 877, 885), and Thomas testified that when
Stallworth was in the police car, Stallworth was very “loud.” (Thomas Dep. at 6364, ECF #54-2 at Pg. ID 1272.) On this record, determining whether or not
Champine heard Stallworth’s complaints requires assessing Champine’s credibility,
and that is the province of the jury, not the Court on summary judgment. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“Credibility determinations … are jury functions, not
those of a judge....”).
Champine next asserts that even if he did hear Stallworth complain about the
tightness of the handcuffs, Stallworth cannot maintain an excessive force claim
14

because it was “only … a matter of minutes” between the time Stallworth first
complained and the time Champine removed the cuffs. (Champine Mot., ECF #43
at Pg. ID 548.) But Champine has not identified sufficient evidence to support a
finding that he removed Stallworth’s cuffs mere “minutes” after Stallworth
complained. Stallworth insists that he was handcuffed for hours and that at some
points he complained about the tightness of the cuffs, and there is no evidence in the
record that establishes the time interval between Stallworth’s first complaint and
Champine’s removal of the cuffs. (See Stallworth Dep. at 161-62, 164-65, 221-22,
ECF #45-2 at Pg. ID 871-72, 886.) While evidence introduced at trial may ultimately
support Champine’s timeline and version of events, the Court cannot say that on this
record that it was “only a matter of minutes” between the time that Stallworth first
complained and Champine removed the handcuffs.
Finally, Champine contends that even if Stallworth could establish the
elements of a failure to protect/excessive force claim with respect to the handcuffs,
he (Champine) would be entitled to qualified immunity. In support of this argument,
Champine relies heavily upon the Sixth Circuit’s decision in O’Malley v. Flint, 652
F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2011). In O’Malley, a plaintiff brought an excessive force claim
against a defendant-officer related to injuries the plaintiff sustained after being
handcuffed.

The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant-officer was entitled to

15

qualified immunity because, among other things, the plaintiff had not specifically
asked the officer to loosen the handcuffs:
In the present case, we hold that it would not have been
clear to a reasonable officer in [the officer’s] position that
his failure to immediately loosen [the plaintiff’s]
handcuffs was a constitutional violation. While [the
plaintiff] claims that he told [the officer] that his handcuffs
were too tight, [the plaintiff] did not ask [the officer] to
loosen the handcuffs. Furthermore, [the plaintiff] did not
have an obvious physical injury and was handcuffed for
only about two minutes before [a second officer] arrived
and escorted him to her vehicle.
Because our precedents fail to notify officers that any
response to a complaint of tight handcuffing other than an
immediate one constitutes excessive force, and because in
the absence of an obvious physical problem caused by the
handcuffs or a plea by the defendant to loosen them, it is
fair to ask how a reasonable officer should know that a
problem has occurred, we hold that [the officer’s] failure
to loosen [the plaintiff’s] handcuffs did not violate clearly
established federal law.
Id. at 671-72 (internal punctuation and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Champine insists that he is entitled to qualified immunity under O’Malley because
Stallworth never asked for his cuffs to be loosened. The Court disagrees.
O’Malley does not control here because, as the Sixth Circuit confirmed after
O’Malley, that decision is an “outlier” that is inconsistent with “at least 10 published
cases, not to mention additional unpublished cases” from the past twenty years.
Baynes, 799 F.3d at 616. Indeed, in published decisions before and after O’Malley,
the Sixth Circuit identified the elements of excessive force handcuffing claims and
16

did not include a specific request to remove the cuffs as a required element. See, e.g.,
Baynes, 799 F.3d at 616-17; Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th
Cir. 1993); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 247-48 (6th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, the facts in O’Malley differ from those here (especially when
viewed in Stallworth’s favor). In O’Malley, the court noted that it would be “fair to
ask how reasonable officer should know that a problem occurred.” O’Malley, 652
F.3d at 671. But here, Stallworth repeatedly complained to Champine that the
handcuffs were causing injuries to his wrists. Moreover, the plaintiff in O’Malley
was handcuffed for only “two minutes.” O’Malley, 652 F.3d at 672. In this case, as
noted above, Stallworth says that he was handcuffed for hours and there is no
definitive accounting for how long Stallworth was handcuffed.
Finally, it is beyond dispute that “[t]he extent of case law in this Circuit
suffices to put a reasonable officer on notice that excessively forceful or unduly tight
handcuffing is a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment.” Baynes, 799
F.3d at 614. And Champine acknowledged that he understood this settled rule. He
testified that when he received a complaint from a suspect that his handcuffs were
too tight, his general practice was to remove or loosen the cuffs. (See Champine Dep.
at 65-66, ECF #43-5 at Pg. ID 698.) Under these circumstances, when the facts are
viewed in Stallworth’s favor on summary judgment, Champine is not entitled to
qualified immunity.
17

D
In Count II of the First Amended Complaint, Stallworth alleges that Champine
falsely arrested him and wrote him a misdemeanor ticket without probable cause.
(See First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 31-38, ECF #14 at Pg. ID 72-73.) “A false arrest claim
under federal law requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412
F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). “For a police officer to have probable cause for arrest,
there must be facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about
to commit an offense.” Crockett v. Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause is assessed from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
Here, Champine had probable cause to write Stallworth a ticket for interfering
with a police officer. Champine issued the ticket under City of Pleasant Ridge
Ordinance 42-4(a). That ordinance provides that “[n]o person shall resist any police
or firefighter … while in the discharge or apparent discharge of his duty, or in any
way interfere with or hinder him in the discharge of his duty.” (ECF #43-9 at Pg. ID
739.) Champine had probable cause to believe that Stallworth “interefere[d]” with
18

or “hinder[ed]” the discharge of his duties here. As described above, after Champine
stopped Thomas’ Lincoln Towncar, Champine witnessed Thomas and Stallworth
switch places in the vehicle. (See Champine Dep. at 33-35, ECF #43-5 at Pg. ID
690.) That fact alone was sufficient to establish probable cause that Stallworth was
interfering with the discharge of Champine’s duties.
Stallworth counters that Champine “knew” that he and Thomas had switched
seats and that that knowledge precludes a finding that Champine had probable cause
to believe that they committed a crime. (Stallworth Resp. Br., ECF #53 at Pg. ID
1172-73.) But the fact that Stallworth and Thomas did not succeed in tricking
Champine does not somehow immunize them from culpability for interfering with a
police officer.
Finally, even if Champine did not have probable cause to arrest Stallworth,
Champine would be entitled to qualified immunity. “[A]rresting agent[s]” like
Champine are “entitled to qualified immunity if [they] could reasonably (even if
erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information possessed at the time by the arresting agent[s].” Everson v.
Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 498-99 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, even if Champine erroneously
believed that he had probable cause to write Stallworth the ticket, that conclusion
was reasonable. Therefore, for all of the reasons stated above, Champine is entitled
to summary judgment on Stallworth’s false arrest claim.
19

E
Finally, in Count III of the First Amended Complaint, Stallworth claims that
Champine maliciously prosecuted him. (See First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 39-46, ECF #15
at Pg. ID 73-74.) In order to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must prove that “(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and the
defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there
was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal
proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial
seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015). Stallworth’s malicious
prosecution claim fails for two reasons.
First, for all of the reasons described above, there was probable cause for
Stallworth’s criminal prosecution.
Second, Stallworth has not established that he suffered a deprivation of liberty
apart from the initial seizure. Stallworth claims that he had to attend two preliminary
hearings in state court before that court dismissed his misdemeanor ticket, and he
asserts that his attendance at these hearings was a sufficient additional deprivation
of his liberty. (See Stallworth Resp. Br., ECF #53 at Pg. ID 1173-74.)

But

Stallworth’s argument is inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Noonan v.
City of Oakland, 683 Fed. App’x 455 (2017).
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In Noonan, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-officer maliciously
prosecuted him. The Sixth Circuit held that that claim failed as a matter of law
because the plaintiff – who had been required to attend a court proceeding and who
had suffered other indignities as a result of a criminal charge – had not suffered a
sufficient deprivation of liberty apart from his initial arrest:
The determinative question in this appeal is whether
Noonan suffered a deprivation of his liberty and, as to this
question, the facts are not in dispute. To state a claim for
malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must
prove, among other things, that he suffered a deprivation
of liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment. Noonan
contends that he did. He asserts that the police called him
in for questioning (twice) and he had to undergo a
polygraph exam; he had to hire a criminal defense
attorney; the court required him to attend a status
conference; the police/prosecutor withheld his car from
him, in impound, for over five months; and the false
charges caused substantial embarrassment, personally and
professionally, as he had to reveal this prosecution to his
employer; all of which inhibited his practice as a lawyer
and cost him thousands of dollars. These facts are not in
dispute.
[…]
Noonan was never arrested or incarcerated, required to
post bail or bond, or subjected to any travel restrictions. In
short, despite the aggravation, financial cost, and personal
humiliation that Noonan suffered as a result of these false
charges, we must conclude as a matter of law that he did
not suffer a deprivation of liberty as understood in our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 462-63.

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Since having to attend a court status conference in Noonan was not a sufficient
“deprivation of liberty as understood in [] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,” then
Stallworth having to attend two preliminary hearings likewise is insufficient to
establish a “deprivation of liberty.” Id. Moreover, the “aggravation” and “financial
cost[s]” to Stallworth pale in comparison to that of the plaintiff in Noonan. While
Stallworth only had to attend two preliminary court hearings, the plaintiff in Noonan
had to subject himself to police questioning on two occasions, had to take a
polygraph exam, had his car impounded for months, and had to attend at least one
court hearing. If the hardships the plaintiff had to endure in Noonan were not enough
to rise to a Fourth Amendment violation, the substantially more limited
consequences that Stallworth faced certainly did not violate the Constitution.
Champine is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Stallworth’s malicious
prosecution claim.
V
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
 Defendant Farris’ motion for summary judgment (ECF #40) is GRANTED;
 Defendant Champine’s motion for summary judgment (ECF #43) is
GRANTED IN PART with respect to Stallworth’s claims of false arrest and

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malicious prosecution and DENIED IN PART with respect to Stallworth’s
claim of excessive force; and
 Stallworth’s municipal liability claim against the City of Ferndale is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated: February 2, 2018

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on February 2, 2018, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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