Morris v. Nelson et al

Filing 9

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 6 AND SUMMARILY DISMISSING CASE. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DALE MORRIS,
Plaintiff,

Case Number 2:16-cv-11349
Honorable Gershwin A. Drain

v.
MARK NELSON, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
[#6] AND SUMMARILY DISMISSING CASE
Plaintiff Dale Morris, a state inmate incarcerated at the Gus Harrison
Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, and
he is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee in this action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has filed a motion to supplement his complaint [Dkt. 6], which
the Court will grant. After careful consideration of the complaint and its supplement,
however, the court will summarily dismiss the case.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2016, Plaintiff was convicted in the Washtenaw County Circuit
Court after a bench trial for bank robbery in violation of MICH. COMP. LAWS §
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750.531. Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of 71 to 360 months.1 Plaintiff’s complaint
and supplement name various actors in his criminal prosecution as the defendants in
this action. They include: Ypsilanti District Court Judge Mark Nelson, Ypsilanti
Police Officers Tom Eberts, Annette Coppock, and Brook Mullender, Washtenaw
County Prosecutor Kirk Tabbey, Washtenaw Circuit Court Judge Archie Brown, the
City of Ypsilanti, the City of Ann Arbor, and United States Marshall Angel Espinal.
The complaint alleges the defendants committed various constitutional violations
during Plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent prosecution and conviction that led to his
imprisonment. Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $7,000,000.
II. STANDARD
Civil rights complaints filed by a pro se prisoner are subject to the screening
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th
Cir. 2000). Section 1915(e)(2) requires district courts to screen and to dismiss
complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). A
complaint is frivolous and subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e) if it lacks
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The Court obtained the information about Plaintiff’s convictions from the Michigan
Department of Corrections’ Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), of which this Court
is permitted to take judicial notice. See Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821 n.3
(E.D. Mich. 2004).
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an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, when, construing
the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all the factual
allegations as true, the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support if his
claims that would entitle him to relief. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194,
197 (6th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996); Wright v.
MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995).
To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights plaintiff
must establish that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) the
offending conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Bloch v.
Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981)). “If a plaintiff fails to make a showing on any essential element of a § 1983
claim, it must fail.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges various constitutional violations occurred during his state
prosecution. In light of his allegations, a judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this action
would necessarily require a finding that his continued confinement is the result of an
invalid conviction. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme
Court held such claims to be improper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
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[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court
must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the
appropriate vehicle for challenging the fact or duration of a state prisoner’s
confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1973). The Court cannot
convert this matter into a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, however. When a suit
that should have been brought under the habeas corpus statute is prosecuted instead
as a civil rights suit, it should not be “converted” into a habeas corpus suit and decided
on the merits. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F. 3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Instead, the
matter should be dismissed, leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether to refile it as
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. Moreover, Heck clearly directs a federal
district court to dismiss a civil rights complaint which raises claims that attack the
validity of a conviction; it does not direct a court to construe the civil rights complaint
as a habeas petition. See Murphy v. Martin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 603, 610 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
When a prisoner’s civil rights claim is barred by the Heck v. Humphrey
doctrine, the appropriate course for a federal district court is to dismiss the claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), rather than to
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dismiss the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, because the former course of action
is not an adjudication on the merits and would allow the prisoner to reassert his claims
if his or her conviction or sentence is later invalidated. See Murphy, 343 F. Supp.2d
at 609. Therefore, because this Court is dismissing plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint under
Heck, the dismissal will be without prejudice. See e.g. Finley v. Densford, 90 F.
App’x 137, 138 (6th Cir. 2004).
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to amend the complaint [#6] is
GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2016
/s/ Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of
record on
June 20, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Tanya Bankston
Case Manager

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