Bush v. Lumileds, LLC et al

Filing 104

ORDER signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson Overruling Plaintiff's Objections [86, 87, 88]. (Grimes, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ADRIENNE BUSH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-11761
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

LUMILEDS, LLC a/k/a PHILIPS
AUTOMOTIVE LIGHTING,
Defendant.
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [86, 87, 88]

Adrienne Bush used to work for Lumileds, LLC. Bush alleges that while she worked there
she was treated differently because of her race. She also claims that when she complained about
disparate treatment, Lumileds retaliated.
Five sets of objections are now before the Court. This order addresses three of them. (The
other two are the parties’ objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to grant
Lumileds’ summary-judgment motion.) In particular, Bush filed a motion to compel discovery, a
motion for sanctions (for Lumileds’ alleged spoliation and discovery abuses), and a motion to
strike two declarations attached to Lumileds’ summary-judgment motion. Magistrate Judge
Elizabeth A. Stafford, to whom all pretrial matters are referred, denied all three motions. (R. 83.)
Bush objects to all three denials. (R. 86, 87, 88.)
Before reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, it makes sense to nail down the standard
of review. None of Bush’s motion to compel, to strike declarations, or for sanctions sought
dispositive relief; so the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s denial of those three motions with
deference. In particular, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72(a), the Court will uphold the Magistrate Judge’s order unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary
to law.” United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001). And, while “the language
‘contrary to law’ appears to invite plenary review,” “many matters such as discovery scheduling
or disputes might better be characterized as suitable for an abuse-of-discretion analysis.” Charles
Alan Wright, et al., 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3069 (2d ed.); see also State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, LLC, 255 F. Supp. 3d 700, 703 (E.D. Mich. 2017) report and
recommendation adopted No. 14-11700, 2017 WL 3116261 (E.D. Mich. July 21, 2017).
One more word about the legal standard. In responding to Bush’s objections, Lumileds
suggests that Bush’s objections could be overruled simply because she makes the same argument
before this Court as she did before the Magistrate Judge. (R. 91, PageID.3143–3144.) Lumileds
even cites some law to that effect. (R. 91, PageID.3144.)
But so long as the plaintiff’s objection is specific, a party is not barred from making the
same argument before the district court as before the magistrate judge. Indeed, what is discouraged
is running one case past the magistrate judge and a completely differently one past the district
judge. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). And if a party is barred from
presenting new theories to the district court—and, as Lumileds suggests, is also barred from
presenting the same theories to the district court—there would be, as the Sixth Circuit has recently
pointed out, a “null set.” Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir.
2018) (“[Under the district court’s reasoning] . . . [e]ither the argument is prohibited because the
party did previously make that argument [before the magistrate judge], or it is prohibited because
the party did not previously make that argument. The heads-I-win-tails-you-lose restrictions that
the district court has imposed on objections are illogical and without legal support.”). So the Court
will consider the merits of Bush’s objections—even if her arguments are not novel.

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The Court will first consider Bush’s objections relating to her motion to compel. The Court
then turns to Bush’s objections relating to her motion for sanctions. Lastly, the Court will examine
Bush’s objections relating to her motion to strike Lumileds’ summary-judgment declarations.
I.
In her motion to compel, Bush sought information about Lumileds’ hiring of Anna Arends
and information about the salaries of five customer-service representatives.
A.
The Court starts with Lumileds’ hiring of Arends.
Bush claims that Arends was the wife of a Lumileds employee and could not work in the
United States unless she was granted a work visa. (See R. 79-2, PageID.2443.) And Bush claims
that after Arends was hired, Lumileds reassigned her “exact duties” to Arends—but paid Arends
more. (R. 79-2, PageID.2443.) Arends is Caucasian; Bush is African-American. Additionally,
Bush alleges that she complained about the improper hiring of Arends to Lumileds’ human
resources, and, following her whistleblower complaint, Lumileds retaliated. (R. 79-2,
PageID.2443.)
In her motion to compel, Bush asked the Magistrate Judge to make Lumileds answer this
request for admission (RFA): “Admit that [Lumileds] sponsored and paid for Arrend’s [sic] work
authorization in accordance with USCIS regulations.” (R. 58, PageID.766.)
The Magistrate Judge declined to compel Lumileds to answer. According to the Magistrate
Judge, whether or not Lumileds procured a visa for Arends was “not relevant to Bush’s claim of
discriminatory treatment or unequal pay.” (R. 83, PageID.2588.)
Bush objects. Bush again says that Arends was paid more to do the exact work she had
been doing. (R. 86, PageID.2650.) And she says that if Lumileds is not required to answer the

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RFA, Lumileds would be able to “hide whether they followed US immigration laws and if they
practice what is published in the corporate handbooks.” (R. 86, PageID.2650.) In her reply brief
in support of her objection, Bush seems to shift ground somewhat, suggesting that an answer to
her RFA is relevant to her whistleblower complaint which, in turn, is relevant to her retaliation
claim. (See R. 96, PageID.3331.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s decision not to compel Lumileds to answer
the RFA about Arends’ visa. While procuring the visa for Arends might tend to show that Lumileds
had strong interest in hiring Arends, it is very weak evidence, if any, that Lumileds favored Arends
over Bush because of their races. As for Bush’s claim of retaliation, it is not clear how the fact that
Lumileds properly procured Arends’ visa would tend to corroborate Bush’s whistleblower
complaint. In any event, Arends’ offer letter was produced in discovery and the letter states that
Lumileds was “sponsor[ing] your application for work authorization, in accordance with USCIS
regulation.” (R. 58, PageID.767.) Absent evidence to the contrary, Bush’s request to admit is
cumulative of the offer letter.
B.
Bush also sought to compel information about the salary of five customer-service
representatives.
Bush believes that there was disparate treatment among five customer-service
representatives (CSRs) at the Lumileds office where she worked. In particular, Bush believes that
Stephanie Clark, who is Caucasian, was paid more than four other African-American CSRs who
had worked at Lumileds longer than Clark.
Bush sought to confirm this belief in two ways. Via four RFAs, she asked Lumileds to
admit that it paid Clark a “higher wage” than each of the four African-American CSRs. (R. 58,

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PageID.768–773.) And via five interrogatories, Bush asked Lumileds to state the “hourly wage”
for Clark and each of the four African-American CSRs. (R. 58, PageID.773–780.) Bush did not
ask Lumileds to produce documents—only to answer the four RFAs the five interrogatories. When
Lumileds refused to answer asserting numerous objections, Bush moved to compel.
The Magistrate Judge denied Bush’s request to compel answers to her wage questions.
Regarding the four RFAs, the Magistrate Judge reasoned, “None of the claims in Bush’s complaint
pertain to any of those [CSRs], and the Court has already held that allegations that Lumileds
discriminated against other employees is not relevant.” (R. 83, PageID.2589.) The Magistrate
Judge’s reference to “already held” was to her earlier ruling on a different motion to compel: “other
employees’ complaints of discrimination are not relevant to the claims or defenses here, they are
outside of the admissible scope of discovery.” (R. 59, PageID.837.) In turn, the “admissible scope
of discovery” reference is to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), a rule that bars admitting
evidence that shows that a person acted consistent with a general character trait on specific
occasion. (See R. 59, PageID.836.) As for Bush’s interrogatories asking Lumileds to state the
hourly wages of the five CSRs, the Magistrate Judge similarly ruled: “discrimination against other
employees are not relevant to [Bush’s] claims.” (R. 83, PageID.2589.) “And,” said the Magistrate
Judge, “the pattern-or-practice method of proving discrimination is not available to individual
plaintiffs.” (Id.)
Bush objects. She explains, “it was stated [in my final amended complaint] that the African
American [CSRs] and the Plaintiff were treated differently than the Caucasian employees[,] [a]ll
of which were supervised by Rhonda McKee-Hessel and Thomas Stolzenfeld.” (R. 86,
PageID.2651.) She further states that “Ms. [McKee-]Hessel and Mr. Stolzenfeld paid Stephanie
Clark more than the Plaintiff and the Customer Service team.” (R. 86, PageID.2651.)

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Bush does have some basis for seeking the salary information. In her complaint, Bush
implied, if not stated, that McKee-Hessel and Stolzenfeld were her supervisors. And she accused
McKee-Hessel and Stolzenfeld of discriminating based on race. And then in moving to compel,
Bush asserted that McKee-Hessel and Stolzenfeld “were involved in every decision of wage pay
and over-time pay” and that the four African-American CSRs were paid less than Clark. (R. 64,
PageID.948–949.) In other words, Bush implied, if not stated, that her supervisors, McKee-Hessel
and Stolzenfeld, were the very people who paid African-American CSRs less than a Caucasian
CSR. And, in Bush’s view at least, that disparate treatment is circumstantial evidence that her
supervisors held animus toward African Americans. As for Rule 404, subsection (b) of that rule
permits character evidence to show “motive” and a Title VII claim is all about whether race was
“a motivating factor” for the employer’s decision. Moreover, it is not necessary that discoverable
information be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
That said, the Court is not convinced that the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion. The
salary information that Bush sought—standing alone—would not be particularly probative of
racial animus against Bush even if McKee-Hessel and Stolzenfeld were the ones that set CSR
salaries. This is because there may have been reasons (such as work experience before joining
Lumileds) for Clark to have been paid more than the four African-American CSRs even though
they had been working at Lumileds longer. And even the affidavit from Janice Combs, one of the
four African-American CSRs, does not establish substantial similarity between Clark and the other
four CSRs. True, Combs avers that she was a “Level 3” and “Lead” CSR and that McKee-Hessel
and Stolzenfeld did not pay her according to those designations. (R. 86, PageID.2675.) But Combs
also suggests that Clark was a Level 2 and paid more than Level 1s: “As Ms. Clark continued to
work with the group, she made it known that she was a Customer Service Representative Level 2.

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Unfortunately, the other CSRs were all still a Level 1.” (R. 86, PageID.2679.) If Clark was a Level
2 and was paid more than African American CSRs who were Level 1, then the pay difference
would not be particularly probative of animus—the pay difference would be explained by the
different levels (1 versus 2). So, while the Court does believe that there is some relevance to Bush’s
discovery requests, the Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred or abused her
discretion in not compelling Lumileds to answer them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (providing that
parties may obtain discovery on “matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case” (emphasis added)).
* * *
In sum, the Court does not find that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in denying Bush’s
motion to compel.
II.
The Court thus turns to Bush’s objections relating to her motion for sanctions. (R. 63, 70.)
A.
In her sanctions motion, Bush alleged that Lumileds abused discovery or spoliated
evidence in several ways.
For one, Bush claimed that Lumileds had not properly answered her discovery requests
pertaining to other individuals who, like her, received a Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act notice (i.e., a notice saying that she would be laid off in 60 days due to a reductionin-force). Bush pointed out that in November 2017 discovery responses, Lumileds stated that Bush
was the “only employee in the decision unit who received notice pursuant to the WARN Act in
January 2016” (R. 70, PageID.1793), but then in January 2018, Lumileds changed its response to
state that McKee-Hessel also “received notice pursuant to the [WARN Act] in January 2016” (R.

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70, PageID.1792). In addition to pointing out Lumileds’ changed answer, Bush also complained
of Lumileds’ inability to produce McKee-Hessel’s WARN Act notice despite state and federal
preservation requirements. (R. 70, PageID.1787, 1801; R. 77, PageID.2101.) Bush also implied
that the WARN notice that she received when she was terminated from Lumileds differed from
the one that Lumileds produced in discovery. (R. 70, PageID.1787, 1796, 1800.)
As a second or additional basis for sanctions, Bush asserted that Lumileds had improperly
answered her requests to identify employees who received an “annual bonus in March 2014.” (R.
70, PageID.1798.) Bush pointed out that in August 2017 discovery responses, Lumileds stated that
Marjorie Marion “received a merit bonus” (R. 70, PageID.1798), but then, in its November 2017
discovery responses, Lumileds stated that while no one on the sales team received a “Performance
Sharing Plan” bonus, “Marjorie Marion received a 3% merit-based increase in her base salary
(inadvertently mischaracterized in Defendant’s original answer to this Interrogatory as a merit
bonus . . .)” (R. 70, PageID.1799). In addition to highlighting Lumileds’ changed interrogatory
answer, Bush also implied that Lumileds had improperly answered because she had asked about
“annual bonus[es]” generally not Performance Sharing Plan bonuses specifically and, in fact, some
employees received Annual Incentive Plan bonuses. (R. 70, PageID.1799–1800; see also R. 87,
PageID.2774.)
As a third grounds for sanctions, Bush asserted that despite the Magistrate Judge’s order to
do so, Lumileds had not produced certain emails about flextime instead answering that the emails
were “unable to be located.” (R. 70, PageID.1801.)
In short, Bush argued that Lumileds’ “continued changes in responses to interrogatories,
request for production and request for admissions, altered documents and non-preserved
documents” warranted sanctions. (R. 70, PageID.1802.)

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B.
The Magistrate Judge disagreed. She reasoned that Bush had “not allege[d] that any
specific evidence was lost or destroyed, or that Lumileds lost or destroyed particular evidence with
a culpable state of mind.” (R. 83, PageID.2592.)
C.
Bush objects. In doing so she sharpens slightly her earlier arguments. She asserts that
sanctions are warranted because the WARN Act notice she received at the time of her termination
is different than the one Lumileds produced in discovery. (R. 87, PageID.2684–2696.) From this
she reasons that Lumileds breached its duty to preserve relevant evidence. (R. 87, PageID.2684–
2696.) Bush also points to Lumileds’ changed answer about who received a WARN Act notice (at
first Lumileds said just her, later it said McKee-Hessel too). (R. 87, PageID.2688.) Bush highlights
Lumileds’ inability to produce McKee-Hessel’s WARN Act notice despite federal and state
requirements to preserve it. (R. 87, PageID.2689.) And Bush again raises the issue with Lumileds’
responses to her “annual bonus” inquiry. She points out that (1) Lumileds initially stated that
Marion received a “merit bonus,” but later changed that answer, (2) Lumileds never disclosed the
Annual Incentive Plan despite that her interrogatory used the broad term “annual bonus,” and (3)
Lumileds “still refuses to provide the list of individuals that receive[d] bonuses in March 2014.”
(R. 84, PageID.2690–2691.) Finally, Bush claims that there were emails relating to flextime that
Lumileds has not produced or even preserved. (R. 87, PageID.2691.) She believes that this further
justifies a sanction. (R. 87, PageID.2691.)
D.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate sanctions for discovery abuses and for
spoliation. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) lists various sanctions, including any “just order[],” for the failure to

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comply with an order to provide discovery. Under Rule 37(c)(1), a party’s failure to supplement a
discovery response precludes that party from using the information unless “the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.” Rule 37(c)(1) also permits a court to “impose other
appropriate sanctions” for a failure to supplement a discovery response, including those listed in
Rule 37(b)(2)(A). Likewise, a failure to answer interrogatories may result in any of the Rule
37(b)(2)(A) sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). And, under Rule 37(e), if “electronically stored
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it,” the court may (1) “upon finding
prejudice,” “order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice” or (2) issue harsher
sanctions, including an adverse inference or even judgment, if “the party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.”
The Court starts with Lumileds’ alleged failure to produce or preserve Bush’s WARN Act
notice. Lumileds has explained that the WARN Act notice it produced in discovery differs from
the one Bush received at termination because it produced a template. (R. 91, PageID.3151.)
Additionally, it appears that the differences from the template and the notice Bush actually
received are not substantive. (R. 91, PageID.3151.) And even if Lumileds had a legal duty to
preserve not just the template but the actual notice provided to Bush, the Court fails to see how
Bush is prejudiced: she has the actual notice. And while Bush seeks to amend to add claims about
WARN Act violations, as it stands, this case is not about the WARN Act.
As for the fact that Lumileds changed its answer about who received a WARN Act notice,
Bush has not shown that Lumileds did not correct its response as soon as it was aware that McKeeHessel also received one—as it is required to do under the Federal Rules. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(1), (d)(3). Nor has Bush shown that the mistake was anything but innocent. Cf. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 37(c)(1), (d)(3). And while Lumileds may not have preserved McKee-Hessel’s notice, again,
this case is not about violations of the WARN Act.
Thus, no sanctions are warranted for Lumileds’ handling of Bush’s discovery requests
relating to WARN Act notices.
The Court likewise finds that no sanctions are warranted for Lumileds’ answer to Bush’s
inquiry about “annual bonus[es] in March 2014.” True, Bush has evidence that there were bonuses
that were excluded from Lumileds’ answer. (R. 87, PageID.2774.) But Bush has not shown that
Lumileds’ failure to include Annual Incentive Plan bonuses in its answer was for the purposes of
hiding information that would have supported Bush’s claims in this case. Indeed, Bush has not
shown that those similarly-situated to her were eligible for an Annual Incentive Plan—and some
evidence suggests otherwise (R. 87, PageID.2774; R. 69-3, PageID.1347). Perhaps Lumileds
should have been compelled to provide a more complete interrogatory response, but the Magistrate
Judge did not clearly err in finding that Lumileds’ incomplete response did not warrant a sanction.
Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1) (providing sanctions for “fail[ing] to serve . . . answers, objections, or
written response” to interrogatories).
That leaves Lumileds’ failure to produce emails about flextime requests and approvals.
Before Bush filed her sanctions motion, the Magistrate Judge ordered as follows:
Bush requests all documents relating to Lumiled’s “Weekly Out of Office
Movement” for Farmington Hills for years 2014 to 2016. Bush argues that this
request is relevant to her claim of discrimination arising out Thomas Stolzenfeld’s
alleged denial of her request for an alternative work/flextime schedule to allow her
to take a class. The Court ORDERS Lumileds to produce, by the time of
Stolzenfeld’s deposition on January 25, 2018, all written requests for flex time/an
alternative work schedule by any Farmington Hills employee, and all written
approvals and denials of those requests, from 2014 to 2016. Beyond this, Bush’s
request is overly broad and is denied.
(R. 59, PageID.837.)

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In responding to Bush’s sanctions motion, Lumileds explained that it “immediately
undertook an exhaustive search for any documents that met the description in the Court’s
Order. . . . [D]efense counsel ran several keyword searches across the Company email files for
both Stolzenfeld and McKee-Hessel for the period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2016, in
an effort to locate email correspondence in which any employee had requested, been approved for,
or been denied flex-time or an alternative work schedule.” (R. 73, PageID.1912.) But Lumileds
could find no such emails.
Bush has not offered anything to persuade the Court that Lumileds did not conduct a goodfaith, diligent search for documents that would have complied with the Magistrate Judge’s order.
Nor does the Court have any reason to doubt Lumileds’ search results, i.e., that no responsive
documents were found.
The Court, however, wondered if the reason no documents were found was because they
were not preserved. So the Court ordered Lumileds to file a supplemental brief on that issue.
(R. 101.)
Lumileds’ supplemental brief adequately quells the Court’s concern. It explains,
As Stolzenfeld described in detail in his declaration, when employees asked him
for permission to use flex-time or an alternative work schedule, they typically did
so verbally. He testified he did not recall any employee other than Plaintiff
submitting such requests via email or otherwise in writing, and did not recall
approving or denying such requests via email or otherwise in writing. Had such
emails existed, they would have been retained. After Plaintiff filed her first EEOC
charge in September 2015, a litigation hold was promptly placed on the email
accounts of Stolzenfeld, Rhonda McKee-Hessel, and others. The litigation hold
turned off any auto-delete function for the affected email accounts, and Stolzenfeld
and McKee-Hessel were specifically instructed to retain all documents and
communications relating to Plaintiff and her claims (electronic or hard copy). To
the best of Lumileds’s knowledge, the procedure was followed and no relevant
documents were lost, deleted, or otherwise destroyed.

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(R. 102, PageID.3452 (citations omitted).) While Lumileds’ response does not directly address
Bush’s assertion that “emails were stored and kept in the possession of Marjorie Marion,” the
Court finds that Lumileds’ response indicates a good-faith effort to preserve all documents it
thought relevant to this lawsuit.
In short, the Court finds that sanctions are not warranted.
III.
That leaves Bush’s objections relating to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of her motion to
strike declarations attached to Lumileds’ summary-judgment motion.
In this motion, Bush argued that Stolzenfeld’s and McKee-Hessel’s declarations were
contrary to their deposition testimony and should therefore be stricken. (R. 78, PageID.2121.) In
support, she relied on this law: “A party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after
a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition
testimony.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986). Of course, Lumileds
has no desire to create fact issues (it is the party moving for summary judgment). But the Court
gets Bush’s point: a defendant should not be allowed to change its sworn testimony to eliminate a
genuine issue of material fact.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ruled correctly on Bush’s
motion. In her motion to strike, Bush made no effort to identify a statement in a declaration that
differed from a statement during a deposition. Instead, she broadly stated, “Defendant[] provided
Declarations of Thomas Stolzenfeld and Rhonda McKee-Hessel [that] must be stricken in [their]
entirety as they contradict their own earlier sworn deposition testimonies.” (R. 78, PageID.2121.)
She then attached the entirety of their two declarations and the entirety of their two deposition
transcripts leaving it for Lumileds or the Magistrate Judge to figure out. And even after Lumileds

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pointed out that Bush had failed to specifically identify any pair of contradictory statements (R.
81, PageID.2488–2489), Bush made no attempt to do so by filing a reply brief. Indeed, she filed
no reply brief. The Magistrate Judge thus very-sensibly ruled as follows: “[Bush] attaches
Stolzenfeld’s and McKee-Kessel’s declarations and deposition testimony, but her one paragraph
argument does not point to any contradictions within those documents. . . . The Court has no
obligation to scour the documents on Bush’s behalf in order to identify any contradictions.” (R.
83, PageID.2593.)
In her objections, Bush has, for the first time, identified specific statements that she
believes are contradictory. (R. 88, PageID.2889–2891.)
As noted, a party is not permitted to present one case to the Magistrate Judge and a
completely different one to the District Judge. “Allowing parties to litigate fully their case before
the magistrate and, if unsuccessful, to change their strategy and present a different theory to the
district court would frustrate the purpose of the Magistrates Act.” See Williams v. McNeil, 557
F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d
633, 638 (9th Cir. 1988)). This rule applies here as Bush did not even file a reply brief once
Lumileds highlighted the fact that she had failed to specifically identify any pair of contradictory
statements. 1

1

Out of an abundance of caution, the Court reviewed the alleged discrepancies identified
by Bush. There are two possible discrepancies between declaration and deposition. (Compare 6933, PageID.1686, with R. 69-25, PageID.1532; compare R. 69-26, PageID.1637, with R. 69-25,
PageID.1598–1599.) But striking Stolzenfeld’s or McKee-Hessel’s declarations is not the proper
remedy. Instead, in deciding Bush’s motion for summary judgment, these alleged inconsistencies
can be resolved by simply taking the facts in the light most favorable to Bush.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons the Court OVERRULES Bush’s objections to Magistrate Judge’s
order denying her motion to compel, motion for sanctions, and motion to strike two declarations.
SO ORDERED.

Date: September 25, 2018

s/Laurie J. Michelson
Hon. Laurie J. Michelson
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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