Hampton v. Social Security

Filing 21

OPINION and ORDER (1) Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Plaintiff's 19 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's 18 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, (2) Granting in Part Plaintiff's 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment, (3) Denying Defendant's 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and 4) Remanding Plaintiff's Claim for Benefits for Further Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARY R. HAMPTON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-12135
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING
IN PART PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #19) TO THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #18), (2)
GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #10), (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #14), AND (4) REMANDING PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIM FOR BENEFITS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
In this action, Plaintiff Mary Rosellamay Hampton (“Hampton”) alleges that
the Commissioner of Social Security wrongly denied her application for Social
Security disability benefits. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a comprehensive Report and
Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant the
Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) deny Hampton’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (the “R&R”). (See ECF #18.)
objections to the R&R (the “Objections”). (See ECF #19.)

1

Hampton filed timely

The Court has conducted a de novo review of the portions of the R&R to
which Hampton has objected. While the Court appreciates the Magistrate Judge’s
careful consideration of the issues presented in the motions, for the reasons
explained below, the Court respectfully disagrees with one aspect of his analysis and
recommended disposition. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART AND
OVERRULES IN PART Hampton’s objections, GRANTS IN PART Hampton’s
motion for summary judgment, DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment, and REMANDS this action to the Commissioner for further
administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
I1
A
On May 8, 2013, Hampton filed an application for disability benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Application”). (See Application, ECF #6-6
at Pg. ID 205-216.)

Hampton alleged that her period of disability began on

December 1, 2012. (See id.) In the Application, Hampton claimed that she suffered
from a number of disabling conditions, including:






fibromyalgia
severe depression
muscle damage and rotator cuff damage in both shoulders
carpal tunnel syndrome; and
torn tendons in both elbows.

1

The Court recites only the facts relevant to Hampton’s Objections.
description of the facts is available in the R&R.
2

A full

(See id. at Pg. ID 209.) On July 18, 2013, the Social Security Administration (the
“SSA”) denied the Application on the ground that Hampton was not disabled. (See
Denial Letter, ECF #6-4 at Pg. ID 139-42.)
Hampton thereafter filed a written request for a hearing before an
administrative law judge. (See Hearing Request, ECF #6-4 at Pg. ID 143-44.) The
hearing was held on October 8, 2014 before an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”).
(See Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 68.)
Hampton testified as follows at the hearing:
 She stopped working in November 2012. (See id. at Pg. ID 76.) Before
that time, she worked as a part-time salesperson at a beauty supply
store. (See id.)
 She has been unable to work due to symptoms related to fibromyalgia,
which include “headaches every day, neck pain, shoulder pain, [pain in
her] arms, wrist, hands, hips, [] knees, [] feet, [] back[, and] practically
[her] whole body.” (Id. at Pg. ID 82.) She also testified that that her
body feels like she has rigor mortis. (See id.)
 Her carpal tunnel syndrome and other wrist problems were getting
worse and were making it more difficult for her to use her upper
extremities. (See id. at Pg. ID 85-86.)
 She can sit and stand for about ten minutes and experiences pain after
walking “about 20, 25 feet.” (Id. at Pg. ID 93.)
 She rarely drives, and when she does, she is able to drive for fifteen
minutes. (See id. at Pg. ID 74-75.)

3

 She cannot get into a bathtub, and she typically requires assistance from
a family member while bathing. (See id. at Pg. ID 87, 96.)
 She performs “very few” chores, and “very rarely” does dishes or
laundry. (Id. at Pg. ID 93, 96.) She does not vacuum, mop, sweep, or
dust the house. (See id. at Pg. ID 96.)
 She “very rarely” goes shopping by herself and instead shops with her
son or daughter. (Id. at Pg. ID 94.) She needs to take frequent breaks
while shopping and sometimes waits at a bench while her family shops
without her. (See id.)
 She has memory loss. When she watches television, she has difficulty
following and understanding what is happening. (See id. at Pg. ID 97.)
 She cannot sleep more than three or four hours at night. (See id. at Pg.
ID 99, 109.) As a result, she typically takes a “couple” “hour and a
half” naps during the daytime. (Id. at Pg. ID 99.)
 Since December 2012, she has traveled only twice. She attended a
family wedding, and she took a day-trip to check on a family owned
property. (See id. at Pg. ID 102.) During the seventy-five minute ride
to the destination of the day-trip, she needed the driver of the vehicle to
stop “a couple of times.” (Id.)
 She has a dog, but she last took the dog for a walk two or three years
ago. (See id. at Pg. ID 110.)
 Her symptoms and impairments prevent her from working. (See id.)
A vocational expert also testified at the hearing. To guide the vocational
expert in her testimony, the ALJ described a hypothetical individual of Hampton’s

4

age, educational level, and work experience, who had the following functional
limitations:
[T]his individual is limited to sedentary work. They could
perform occasional pushing and pulling. They could
occasionally operate foot controls. They could never
climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds. They could occasionally
climb ramps or stairs; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, crawl. They could perform occasional overhead
reaching. They would be limited to frequent handling of
objects and fingering bilaterally. They would have to
avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme
heat, and to humidity. They would have to avoid
concentrated exposure to environmental irritants such as
fumes, odors, dust, and gases. They would have to avoid
all exposure to excessive vibration, all use of hazardous
moving machinery, all exposure to unprotected heights.
Additionally, this work would be limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks, performed in a work environment
free of fast-paced production requirements, involving only
simple work-related decisions and routine workplace
changes.
(Id. at Pg. ID 114-15.) The vocational expert testified that the above-described
hypothetical individual could not perform Hampton’s past relevant work as a
salesperson, but could perform the sedentary, unskilled work of an information clerk,
general office clerk, and hand packer. (See id. at Pg. ID 115-116.)
The vocational expert also testified that an individual would be unable to
perform any jobs in the national economy if the above hypothetical was amended to
add any one of the following functional limitations:
 the need to be “off task 20 percent of the day in addition to []
regularly scheduled breaks”;
5

 the need to be “absent from work two workdays per month”;
 “the need to nap twice a day for an hour and a half due to pain
and fatigue”; or
 a limit of only “occasional fingering and handling” (rather
than “frequent fingering and handling”).
(Id. at Pg. ID 116-17.)
On December 22, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Hampton’s
claim for benefits (the “ALJ’s Decision”). (See ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 43-61.) In that
decision, the ALJ applied the SSA’s required five-step sequential analysis to
determine whether Hampton was disabled. (See id.) The five steps are as follows:
Step One: Has claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity? If not, move to Step Two.
Step Two: Does claimant suffer from one or more severe
impairments? If so, move to Step Three.
Step Three: Does claimant’s impairments or combination
of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an
impairment listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
If so, claimant is disabled. If not, move to Step Four.
Step Four: Considering claimant’s residual functional
capacity, can the claimant perform his or her past relevant
work. If not, move to Step Five.
Step Five: Considering claimant’s age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity, can the
claimant perform other work available in the national
economy. If not, claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

6

At Step One, the ALJ found that Hampton had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since her claimed onset date of disability. (See ALJ’s Decision, ECF
#6-2 at Pg. ID 45.) At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Hampton suffered from
the following severe impairments:











fibromyalgia;
obesity;
multi-level degenerative disc disease of the spine;
degenerative joint disease and osteoarthritis of the shoulders,
hands, feet and hips;
bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome;
gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”);
a heart murmur;
Barrett’s esophagus;
a hiatal hernia; and
a depressive disorder.

(Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Hampton did “not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that [met] or medically equal[ed] the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,” which would
have required a finding that Hampton was disabled. (Id. at Pg. ID 48-50.) The ALJ
concluded, as relevant here, that Hampton’s claimed limited ability to use her hands
and wrists failed to satisfy the requirements of Listing 1.02, which concerns major
dysfunction of a joint or joints. In support of that determination, the ALJ noted that
“[p]hysical examinations regularly cite her retention of full extremity strength and

7

her ability to walk and climb stairs independently, as well as the unimpaired use
[sic] arms for gripping and handling small objects (see, e.g., Exhibits 2F/7 and 5F).”
(Id. at Pg. ID 48; emphasis added.)
At Step Four, the ALJ found the Hampton had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following restrictions:
[S]he must be permitted to alternate between a seated and
standing position, provided she is not off-task for more
than 10% of the workday. She can never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, and can only occasionally push, pull,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and
stairs. In addition, the claimant is limited to the occasional
operation of bilateral foot controls, occasional overhead
reaching, and no more than frequent bilateral handling of
objects and fingering. Moreover, she must avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold,
humidity, and environmental irritants such as fumes,
odors, dusts, and gases, and all exposure to excessive
vibration, all use of hazardous moving machinery, and
unprotected heights. The claimant is further . . . limited to
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and simple work
related decisions in an environment free from fast-paced
production requirements that require only routine
workplace changes.
(Id. at Pg. ID 50-51.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Hampton was
unable to perform any of her past relevant work as a salesperson. (See id. at Pg. ID
59.)
Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ relied upon the vocational expert’s testimony at
the hearing to find that Hampton has the RFC to work as an information clerk,
general office clerk, and hand packer and that these jobs existed in significant
8

numbers in the national economy. (See id. at Pg. ID 60-61.) Thus, the ALJ found
that Hampton was not disabled. (See id.)
At Steps Four and Five, the ALJ did not purport to apply Social Security
Ruling 12-2p (“SSR 12-2p”), the Social Security Ruling that addresses how to
analyze fibromyalgia. SSR 12-2p, in part, requires that an administrative law judge
consider “widespread pain and other symptoms associated with [fibromyalgia], such
as fatigue . . . .” 2012 WL 3104869, at *6 (July 25, 2012). In the ALJ’s Decision,
the ALJ did not expressly address the effect of Hampton’s fibromyalgia-related
fatigue on her ability to function.
B
On June 10, 2016, Hampton filed this action challenging the SSA’s denial of
benefits. (See Compl., ECF #1.) The case was referred to the assigned Magistrate
Judge. (See ECF #3.) Hampton and the Commissioner then filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. (See Hampton’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #10; Commissioner’s
Mot. Summ. J., ECF #14.)
Hampton made three arguments in her motion for summary judgment: (1) the
ALJ’s RFC assessment did not comport with the requirements of SSR 12-2p despite
the ALJ’s finding that Hampton has fibromyalgia; (2) the ALJ’s RFC failed to
account for evidence of Hampton’s limitations with her hands and wrists; and (3)

9

the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the opinion of Hampton’s primary care
physician, Dr. Delia Ebuen-Mercado. (See Hampton’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #10.)  
On July 24, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, in which he
recommended that the Court grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Hampton’s
motion. (See ECF #18.) The Magistrate Judge considered and rejected all three of
Hampton’s arguments challenging the ALJ’s Decision.
First, the Magistrate Judge concluded the ALJ offered “good reasons” for
discounting Dr. Ebuen-Mercado’s opinion. (See id. at Pg. ID 833.) Second, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ’s failure to cite SSR 12-2p was, at most, a
harmless error because the ALJ effectively considered the effect of Hampton’s
claimed lack of sleep on her ability to function. (See id. at Pg. ID 834-35.) Finally,
the Magistrate Judge determined that the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported
by substantial evidence. (See id. at Pg. ID 836-37.)
Hampton has now timely filed the Objections to the R&R. Hampton first
objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the ALJ’s failure to cite or apply
SSR 12-2p in his RFC assessment was harmless error. (See Objections, ECF #19 at
Pg. ID 842-46.) Second, Hampton challenges the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
the ALJ adequately considered her limitations with her hands and wrists in his RFC
assessment and appropriately rejected Dr. Ebuen-Mercado’s opinion concerning
these limitations. (See id. at Pg. ID 840-42.)

10

II
A
When a party objects to a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court
reviews that portion de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Lyons v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to
conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party has not
objected. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “An ALJ's failure to
follow agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even
where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted).

11

III
A
The Court SUSTAINS Hampton’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that the ALJ’s failure to apply SSR 12-2p was a harmless error.
SSR 12-2p describes how an ALJ should “evaluate [fibromyalgia] in
disability claims.” 2012 WL 3104869, at *1 (July 25, 2012). Among other things,
SSR 12-2p requires the ALJ to consider whether “[w]idespread pain and other
symptoms associated with [fibromyalgia], such as fatigue, [] result in exertional
limitations that prevent [the claimant] from doing the full range of unskilled work in
one or more of the exertional categories.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
The ALJ should have expressly applied SSR 12-2p – and should have
considered the effect of Hampton’s fatigue on her functional capacity – because it is
undisputed that Hampton has fibromyalgia. (See Commissioner’s Mot., ECF #14 at
Pg. ID 799.) Indeed, the ALJ found that:
Documentary confirmation of the claimant’s fibromyalgia
appears of record prior to her alleged onset date, with a
formal assessment in January 2010 accompanying
negative laboratory testing that ruled out other factors for
her complaints of widespread joint paint. March 2010
rheumatology notes indicated the presence of multiple
tender points in her joints and soft tissues consistent with
such a diagnosis, along with additional blood work ruling
out the presence of rheumatoid arthritis or other causes.
(ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 45; citations omitted.)

12

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ’s failure to expressly apply SSR
12-2p was, at most, a harmless error because the ALJ (1) considered the entire record
and (2) cited evidence in the record that was inconsistent with the notion that
Hampton suffered from disabling fatigue. (R&R at Pg. ID 834-35.) The Magistrate
Judge highlighted the ALJ’s finding that Hampton was performing a number of
“regular activities [such as] cooking on a daily basis, driving, and household chores.”
(Id. at Pg. ID 834.) The Magistrate Judge appeared to conclude that because the
ALJ found that Hampton retained so much of her normal functioning capacity, the
ALJ effectively found that her claimed fatigue was not disabling. Stated another
way, the Magistrate Judge seems to have treated the ALJ’s finding that Hampton
was able to complete so many basic life functions as the rough equivalent of a finding
under SSR 12-2p that she was not disabled by fatigue. The Court respectfully
disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and conclusion.
As described below, the ALJ’s finding that Hampton retained the ability to
complete so many life activities rested upon the ALJ’s materially erroneous
characterization of the record. And because that finding was flawed, it was not an
adequate substitute for the ALJ’s failure to consider, as expressly required by SSR12-2p, whether Hampton’s claimed fatigue was disabling.
The ALJ cited Hampton’s own testimony and a “Function Report” that
Hampton completed in May 2013 as support for his finding that Hampton continued

13

to engage in “a wide array of ongoing activities”. (ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg.
ID 54-55.) But Hampton’s testimony and the Function Report do not support that
finding; on the contrary, they paint a picture of a person would could not readily and
regularly perform basic life functions. Indeed, in at least the following ways, the
ALJ materially overstated Hampton’s self-reported ability to perform basic
activities:
(1) The ALJ stated that Hampton “continues to operate a
vehicle … with regularity.” (ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at
Pg. ID 55.) But Hampton testified that she does “not”
drive “very often” – roughly “once a week.” (Hearing Tr.,
ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 74-75.) Hampton further testified that
she “[doesn’t] drive unless [she] really [has] to.” (Id.) She
added that the furthest she drives is “fifteen minutes,” and
that during those fifteen minutes she experiences a number
of health problems. (Id.) In addition, in the Function
Report, Hampton reported that it is “very painful” to drive.
(Function Report, ECF #6-6 at Pg. ID 224.)
(2) The ALJ stated that Hampton “shops several times per
month.” (ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 54.) But
Hampton testified that she “very rarely” shops alone
because she “ha[s] to take breaks” and needs help from her
son or daughter. (Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 94-95.)
Hampton further testified that “[s]ometimes they’ll just
have to sit me down, and go get whatever, and then come
back, and check on me, or whatever.” (Id.) In the Function
Report, she likewise stated that “[has] a hard time being
out in public” and she “[doesn’t] last long” when she
shops. (Function Report, ECF #6-6 at Pg. ID 217, 220.)
(3) The ALJ stated that “[Hampton] continued to engage in a
wide array of cooking, cleaning, and other household
chores ‘everyday’ for her husband.’” (ALJ’s Decision,
ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 55.) As support for that finding, he
14

cited the Function Report, which Hampton completed in
May 2013. (See id.) However, the ALJ did not
acknowledge Hampton’s statements in that report that the
chores take her “a long time to get done” because “the pain
is terrible.” (Function Report, ECF #6-6 at Pg. ID 218.)
Much more importantly, the ALJ did not acknowledge
Hampton’s October 2014 hearing testimony in which
Hampton testified that she lost the ability to perform
chores around October 2013 – five months after she
completed the Function Report on which the ALJ relied.
(See Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID. 109.) Moreover,
Hampton testified that she “very rarely” does dishes or
laundry and that she does not vacuum, mop, sweep, or do
any outside chores. (Id. at Pg. ID. 96.)
(4) The ALJ stated that Hampton “travels with regularity” and
stressed that she took “two vacations in the last year
alone.” (ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 55.) The
ALJ omitted that one of those “vacations” was a day-trip
to check on property located in Pinconning, Michigan –
roughly a one-hour drive from Hampton’s residence. (See
Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID. 101-02.) The ALJ also
failed to note that during short rides like the one to
Pinconning, Hampton’s husband “usually stops a couple
of times” to accommodate her condition. (Id. at Pg. ID
102.) Hampton’s second “vacation” was attendance at an
in-state family wedding. (See id. at Pg. ID 101.)
(5) The ALJ said that Hampton “continued to prepare meals.”
(ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 54.) But Hampton
testified that her cooking is limited to placing food in the
oven or crockpot where the food can “cook itself.”
(Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID. 93-94.) She further
testified that she is unable to prepare meals that require
her to “stand there and stir.” (Id.)
As the above examples make clear, the ALJ’s finding that Hampton retained
the ability to perform regular activities was based upon a material overstatement of

15

Hampton’s self-report of her functional abilities. The Court cannot treat that flawed
finding as a fair substitute for an express application of SSR 12-2p. Indeed, the
ALJ’s failure to expressly consider the effect of Hampton’s claimed fatigue and need
for naps, as required by SSR 12-2p, was an especially consequential error because
the vocational expert testified that if Hampton “need[ed] to nap twice a day for an
hour and a half,” that (along with her other limitations) would preclude her from
finding any employment in the national economy. (See Hearing Tr., ECF #6-2 at Pg.
ID 116-17.)
Simply put, on this record the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s failure to
apply SSR 12-2p was a harmless error.2 Instead, the Court concludes that the effect
of Hampton’s fibromyalgia-related-fatigue constitutes an important unresolved
essential factual issue that warrants remand.

2

The Magistrate Judge found this case to be analogous to Luukkonen v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 653 Fed. App’x 393 (6th Cir. 2016). In
Luukkonen, the ALJ failed to cite SSR 12-2p in his decision denying benefits to a
claimant who suffered from fibromyalgia. The Sixth Circuit held that this error was
harmless because the ALJ had considered the claimant’s testimony regarding her
fatigue and other fibromyalgia-related symptoms but had found that testimony not
credible given the other evidence in the record. See Luukkonen, 653 Fed. App’x at
399-400. This case stands in contrast to Luukkonen because the ALJ here did not
accurately describe Hampton’s testimony. Luukkonen does not suggest that this type
of error is harmless.
16

B
On remand, the ALJ is certainly not required to credit Hampton’s testimony
about her fatigue, nor is he required to find that her fatigue is disabling. He may
find, for example, that her testimony about her fatigue is not credible when judged
against other evidence or is, for some other legitimate reason, not entitled to much
weight. Or he may find that her testimony, even if entitled to some weight, is
otherwise insufficient, when considered in the context of the entire record, to support
a finding of disability. But he may not overstate Hampton’s self-reported ability to
perform basic functions and then use that overstatement to support a finding of nondisability, as he did in his original ruling.
IV
The Court OVERRULES Hampton’s second objection that Magistrate Judge
erred when he concluded that Hampton’s RFC was appropriate even though it did
not appear to take into account Hampton’s claimed limitations with her hands and
wrists.
A
Hampton argues that when the Magistrate Judge approved the RFC, he
ignored important medical evidence that supported Hampton’s claim that she had an
extremely limited ability to engage in handling and fingering due to issues with her
hands and wrists. (Objections, ECF #19 at Pg. ID 841.) More specifically, Hampton

17

contends that Magistrate Judge did not mention, among other things, that she had
been diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome or that an MRI revealed a bulging disc.
(Id.) But most of the evidence cited by Hampton relates to the results of medical
tests or to diagnoses and says little, if anything, about how the conditions or test
results actually affected her ability to complete handling and fingering. See Higgs v.
Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The mere diagnosis of arthritis, of
course, says nothing about the severity of the condition.”); Kennedy v. Astrue, 247
F. App’x 761, 767 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] mere diagnosis of obesity does not establish
either the condition's severity or its effect on [plaintiff’s] functional limitations.”)
Moreover, the ALJ did cite and weigh some of the evidence identified by Hampton
(see ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 46, 54), and thus there is no reason to
believe that the determination of the RFC omitted a consideration of that evidence.
Furthermore, when the ALJ formulated the RFC, he cited and relied upon
evidence concerning Hampton’s ability to perform handling and fingering, including
physical examinations of her hands and wrists that “repeatedly cite[d] the stability
of her joints, her retention of full grip strength, the absence of atrophy, and her ability
to pick up small items and write ‘without difficulty.’” (Id. at Pg. ID 54; citations
omitted.)

This evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s determination that

Hampton’s claimed limitations did not prohibit her from performing tasks that
involved frequent handling and fingering.

18

B
Hampton also criticizes the ALJ for according “little weight” to the opinion
of Dr. Ebuen-Mercado, Hampton’s treating physician, that Hampton suffered from
serious functional limitations with respect to her hands and wrists that would have
prevented her from handling and fingering. (See Medical Source Statement, ECF #68 at Pg. ID 704.)
A treating physician’s opinion must be given “controlling weight” if “(1) the
opinion ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic
techniques’; and (2) the opinion ‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the case record.’” Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). “The Commissioner is
required to provide ‘good reasons’ for discounting the weight given to a treatingsource opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). “These reasons must be
supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Id. (citations and
quotations omitted).
The Magistrate Judge properly concluded that the ALJ offered “good reasons”
for discounting Dr. Ebuen-Mercado’s opinion. (See R&R, ECF #18 at Pg. ID 833.)
The ALJ explained that he accorded Dr. Ebuen-Mercado’s “extreme”

19

recommendations “little weight” because they were “starkly at odds with the
remaining proposals of record.” (ALJ’s Decision, ECF #6-2 at Pg. ID 58.) The ALJ
highlighted that other physicians’ assessments directly contradicted Dr. EbuenMercado’s findings; that Dr. Ebuen-Mercado was not a specialist in the areas at
issue, such as rheumatology and orthopedics; and that Dr. Ebuen-Mercado’s
opinions conflicted with her own notes from her appointments with Hampton. (See
id. at Pg. ID 58-59.) As the ALJ explained, “Dr. Mercado’s ‘checkbox’ form stands
without any plausible explanation for restrictions so severe that, if accurate, would
essentially leave the claimant bedridden and in need of around-the-clock assistive
care.” (Id. at Pg. ID 59.)
In sum, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that ALJ did not err by
adopting an RFC that called for Hampton to perform frequent handling and fingering
despite her claimed limitations with respect to her hands and wrists.
V
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that


Hampton’s Objections to the R&R (ECF #19) are SUSTAINED IN
PART AND OVERRULED IN PART.



Hampton’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #10) is GRANTED
IN PART;



The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #14) is
DENIED; and

20



The case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion and Order.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 25, 2017

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 25, 2017, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

21