Staples v. United States of America et al

Filing 5

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION NEEDED TO EFFECTUATE SERVICE UPON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM STAPLES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-12367

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS

Defendants.
/

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL AND ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE
THE COURT WITH THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION NEEDED TO
EFFECTUATE SERVICE UPON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff William Staples’ pro se civil rights
complaint. Plaintiff is a federal prisoner currently confined at the United States
Prison-Hazelton, located in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia. Plaintiff has filed a
lawsuit against seven defendants. The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and
now dismisses it in part. The Court will further order plaintiff to provide four (4)
additional copies of the complaint to the Court and to specifically identify the
remaining “John Doe” defendant within one hundred and twenty (120) days of this
order, so that the Court can properly effectuate service upon the remaining

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defendants.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff may file suit in federal court for damages arising from a violation
of plaintiff’s constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal law.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 395 (1971). Because plaintiff is alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated by persons acting under color of federal law, plaintiff’s complaint is
properly construed as a Bivens action. See, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,
298 (6th Cir. 1999).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), district courts are
required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners. See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). If a complaint fails to pass
muster under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A, the “district court should sua
sponte dismiss the complaint.” Id. at 612. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and § 1915(e)(2)(A), a district court must sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint before service on the defendant if satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious, that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant or defendants who are immune from such
relief. McLittle v. O=Brien, 974 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1997). The

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screening provisions of the PLRA are applicable to Bivens actions brought by
federal inmates. See, e.g., Diaz v. Van Norman, 351 F. Supp. 2d 679, 680–81 (E.D.
Mich. 2005).

III. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he was previously incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan (“FCI-Milan”). Plaintiff claims he was
being treated for several chronic medical conditions. Plaintiff claims that each time
he received treatment for these illnesses, he was charged a co-pay of $2.00. In
total, plaintiff was required to pay $12.00 in co-payments. Plaintiff appealed these
co-payments to defendant Dr. Charles Samuel, Jr., the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, and Defendant Harrella Watts, the Administrator of National
Inmate Appeals, but his appeals were denied.
Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Stone, the Unit Manager at FCI-Milan,
failed to provide postage to plaintiff to enable him to mail out various
administrative appeals. Plaintiff alleges that Stone’s failure to provide him postage
caused one of his civil cases to be dismissed for failure to comply with a court
date.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Murphy, Bowman, and “John Doe” forced

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him to work in the prison kitchen, even though plaintiff’s medical conditions
prevented him from being able to work. Plaintiff claims that the defendants
threatened to place him in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) if he did not work.
Plaintiff claims that he suffered a heart attack as a result of being forced to work
and was rushed to the hospital.
Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s action against the United States of America must be dismissed.
Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its
agencies from being sued. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1996). A
Bivens cause of action therefore cannot be brought against the federal government
or a federal agency. Id. at 483-86. A plaintiff who wishes to bring a lawsuit against
the United States must identify a waiver of sovereign immunity in order to
proceed, and if he cannot identify such a waiver, the claim must be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds. See Reetz v. U.S., 224 F.3d 794, 795 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953)). Plaintiff has not identified any
waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government with regards to his cause
of action, thus, any claim against the federal government must be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the United States of America is thus barred by the

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doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 924 (6th
Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff’s action against Defendants Samuel and Watts for refusing to
relieve him of his co-payments fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. “It is constitutional to charge inmates a small fee for health care where
indigent inmates are guaranteed service regardless of ability to pay.” White v. Corr.
Med. Servs. Inc., 94 F. App’x 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Reynolds v. Wagner,
128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied
medical treatment because of his inability to pay, thus, the imposition of a
co-payment each time plaintiff received medical treatment did not violate
plaintiff’s right to due process. Id.
The Court believes that Plaintiff may have stated a colorable claim against
the four remaining defendants. Plaintiff, however, has not provided the Court with
sufficient copies of the complaint for service to be made upon the remaining
defendants. Plaintiff has also failed to specifically identify the “John Doe”
defendant whom he wishes to file suit against.
“An inmate who brings a civil rights complaint must specifically identify
each defendant against whom relief is sought and must give each defendant notice
of the action by serving upon him a summons and copy of the complaint.” Reed–

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Bey v. Pramstaller, No. 06–10934, 2007 WL 2421422 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23,
2007) (citing Feliciano v. DuBois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1048 (D. Mass. 1994)).
Where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, as is the case here, the district
court must bear the responsibility for issuing the plaintiff’s process to a United
States Marshal’s Office, who must effect service upon the defendants once the
plaintiff has properly identified the defendants in the complaint. See Byrd v. Stone,
94 F. 3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The
Court will therefore order Plaintiff to submit four additional copies of the
complaint for service upon each of the defendants whom he wishes to sue. Plaintiff
will be given 120 days to provide the additional copies. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
In addition, although courts generally do not favor use of “John Doe” to
identify defendants, where the identify of a party is unknown prior to the filing of a
complaint, courts generally allow a plaintiff to identify the unknown defendant
through discovery, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities
of the defendants. Haney v. 5th E. Dist. Police Dep’t, No. 12-CV-14684, 2012 WL
5389914, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2012) (citing Yates v. Young, 772 F.2d 909
(Table), 1985 WL 13614, *2 (6th Cir. Aug.28, 1985)). Accordingly, the Court will
grant plaintiff 120 days from the date of this order to obtain and provide to this
Court the name of the “John Doe” defendant who he claims participated in the

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deprivation of his constitutional rights.
V. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED IN
PART WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(A) as to defendants United States of America, Dr. Charles Samuel Jr., and
Harrella Watts.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit four additional
copies of the complaint to the Court within one hundred and twenty (120) days
of the date of this order so that service may be effectuated upon each of the
defendants. The Court shall provide Plaintiff with one copy of the complaint to
assist him in this endeavor. This copy should be returned to the Court with the
additional copies. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s Order may result in
dismissal of the complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall provide the name and
identity of the “John Doe” defendant named in this complaint to this Court within
one hundred and twenty (120) days of this order or the complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice against this defendant.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2016
Detroit, Michigan

s/Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their
respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing on July 6, 2016.
s/Tanya R. Bankston
TANYA R.BANKSTON
Case Manager & Deputy Clerk

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