Gregory v. Colvin

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Overruling Defendant's 31 Objection to the Magistrate Judge's 30 Report and Recommendation, (2) Adopting Recommended Disposition of 30 Report and Recommendation, (3) Denying Defendant's 23 Motion for Summary Judgment, (4) Granting in Part Plaintiff's 29 Motion for Summary Judgment, and (5) Remanding Application for Benefits for Further Administrative Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SANDRA R. GREGORY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-12572
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION
(ECF #31) TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (ECF #30), (2) ADOPTING RECOMMENDED
DISPOSITION OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, (3) DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #23), (4)
GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #29), AND (5) REMANDING APPLICATION FOR
BENEFITS FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In this action, Plaintiff Sandra R. Gregory challenges the denial of her
application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). After the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) deny Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment and (2) grant
Gregory’s motion for summary judgment to the extent that Gregory requests her
application for benefits be remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative
proceedings (the “R&R”). (See ECF #30.)
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The Commissioner filed a timely

objection to the R&R (the “Objection”). (See ECF #31.) The Court has conducted a
de novo review of the portions of the R&R to which the Commissioner has objected.
For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES the Objection, ADOPTS the
recommended disposition of the R&R, GRANTS Gregory’s motion for summary
judgment in part, DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and
REMANDS this action for further administrative proceedings.
I
A1
On July 29, 2013, Gregory filed her application for SSI (the “Application”).
(See Admin. R., ECF #10-5 at Pg. ID 149-54.) In the Application, Gregory alleged
that she became disabled on July 31, 2011. (See id.) She later amended the onset
date of disability to July 29, 2013. (See id. at Pg. ID 176.) Gregory said in the
Application that she suffered from, among other things, bilateral knee pain,
hypertension, and back pain. (See Admin R., ECF #10-6 at Pg. ID 182.) The Social
Security Administration (the “SSA”) denied the Application because it found that
Gregory was not disabled. (See Admin. R., ECF #10-4 at Pg. ID 96-99.)
Gregory thereafter requested and received a de novo hearing before
administrative law judge Dennis M. Matulewicz (the “ALJ”). The ALJ held that

1

The Court recites only the facts relevant to the Commsisioner’s Objection. A full
description of the facts is available in the R&R.
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hearing on January 16, 2015. Gregory and an impartial vocational expert testified
at the hearing. In addition, Gregory submitted treatment notes from her treating
physician, Dr. Rose Ibrahim of the Romulus Medical Clinic. (See Admin R., ECF
#10-7 at Pg. ID 263, 270-80.) Gregory saw Dr. Ibrahim on at least nine occasions
between July 2013 and June 2014. (See id.) Dr. Ibrahim diagnosed Gregory with
osteoarthritis and scoliosis, and at various times she prescribed Gregory pain
medication and physical therapy, referred Gregory to a bone doctor, and restricted
Gregory from the physical activities of lifting, pulling, and/or pushing. (See id.)
On March 6, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he affirmed the
SSA’s denial of benefits. (See Admin. R., ECF #10-2 at Pg. ID 41-48.) In the ALJ’s
decision, he found that Gregory suffered from the following severe impairments:
“Moderate Joint Effusion of the Right Knee with mild size Baker’s Cyst, Mild
Spondylosis, Hypertension, and Left Knee Meniscus Tear.” (Id. at Pg. ID 43.) The
ALJ nonetheless concluded that Gregory was not disabled and that there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Gregory could
perform. (See id. at Pg. ID 47-48.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ gave “no
weight” to Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion. (Id. at Pg. ID 46.) The ALJ’s analysis of Dr.
Ibrahim’s opinion, in full, was three sentences:
During treatment at the Romulus Medical Clinic, the
claimant was instructed against lifting, pushing, or pulling,
to attend physical therapy twice a week, to lose weight,
diet, and exercise. However, these instructions are vague,
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as they do not specify the particulars of the claimant’s
functionality, and they are non-durational. Accordingly,
the undersigned assigns no weight to this opinion.
(Id.; internal citation omitted).
B
On July 8, 2016, Gregory filed this action in which she challenges the SSA’s
denial of benefits. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Gregory and the Commissioner then filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Gregory’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #29;
Commissioner’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #23.)
The Court referred the cross-motions to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On
August 16, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R in which he recommended
that the Court deny the Commissioner’s motion and grant Gregory’s motion to the
extent she seeks a remand of the Application to the Commissioner for further
administrative proceedings. (See R&R, ECF #20.)

In arriving at this

recommendation, the Magistrate Judge carefully analyzed the arguments that the
Commissioner made in her motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge
ultimately concluded that the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for according
“no weight” to the opinion of Gregory’s treating physician, Dr. Ibrahim, and that
this failure “require[d] a remand for further proceedings.” (Id. at Pg. ID 462-65.)
On August 24, 2017, the Commissioner filed the Objection. (See ECF #21.)
In the Objection, the Commissioner argues that the Magistrate Judge “incorrectly
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applied the treating source rule to the opinion of Dr. Rose Ibrahim.” (Id. at Pg. ID
471.) The Commissioner insists that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Ibrahim’s
opinion and that a remand is therefore unwarranted. (See id.)
II
A
Where a party objects to a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court
reviews that portion de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to conduct
an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party has not objected.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of an ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “[A] court is obligated
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to remand for further administrative proceedings if there are any unresolved essential
factual issues.” Meehleder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 3154968, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 2, 2012) (citing Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (6th Cir. 1994)).
III
In the Commissioner’s sole objection to the R&R, she insists that the
Magistrate Judge “incorrectly applied the treating source rule to the opinion of Dr.
Rose Ibrahim, impermissibly reweighed the evidence [with respect to Dr. Ibrahim’s
opinion], and misapplied the substantial evidence standard of review” when the
Magistrate Judge rejected the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion. (Objection,
ECF #31 at Pg. ID 471.) The Court disagrees.
“In assessing the medical evidence supporting a claim for disability benefits,
the ALJ must adhere to certain standards. One such standard, known as the treating
physician rule, requires the ALJ to generally give greater deference to the opinions
of treating physicians than to the opinions of non-treating physicians.” Blakely v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009). Treating physicians are
typically accorded additional weight because “these sources are likely to be the
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the
claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone
or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or
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brief hospitalizations.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, “the ALJ ‘must’ give a treating source opinion
controlling weight if the treating source opinion is ‘well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and is ‘not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Id. (quoting Wilson, 378
F.3d at 544).
“If the ALJ does not accord controlling weight to a treating physician, the ALJ
must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of
factors, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of
the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any
specialization of the treating physician.” Id. Indeed, even if an “ALJ correctly
reache[s] [the] determination that [a treating physician’s opinion] should be
discredited,” that “means only that the opinion is not entitled to ‘controlling weight,’
not that the opinion should be rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors [described above].”
Id. at 408 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Finally, where an ALJ
discounts a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “good reasons” for
doing so. “Those good reasons must be ‘supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
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the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the
reasons for that weight.’” Id. at 406-07 (quoting Soc. Sec. Rule 96-2p, 1996 WL
374188, at *5). And an ALJ must specifically articulate these “good reasons” even
if ALJ’s ultimate conclusion with respect to the claimant’s disability can be
supported by other evidence in the record:
Because the reason-giving requirement exists to ‘ensur[e]
that each denied claimant receives fair process,’ we have
held that an ALJ’s ‘failure to follow the procedural
requirement of identifying the reasons for discounting the
opinions and for explaining precisely how those reasons
affected the weight’ given “denotes a lack of substantial
evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be
justified based upon the record.’”
Id. (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007))
(emphasis in Blakely).
It is undisputed that Dr. Ibrahim was Gregory’s treating physician. As quoted
above, the ALJ rejected Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion with respect to Gregory’s diagnosis,
treatment regimen, and physical restrictions in just three sentences. The first
sentence described Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion, the second sentence explained that the
opinion was “vague,” did “not specify the particulars of claimant’s functionality,”
and the restrictions Dr. Ibrahim prescribed were “non-durational,” and the final
sentence concluded that Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion was entitled to “no weight.” (Admin
R., ECF #10-2 at Pg. ID 46.)

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The ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion was inadequate and failed to
comply with the treating source rule. Indeed, in rejecting Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion, it
appears that the ALJ considered none of the factors that an ALJ “must” evaluate
when reviewing the opinion of a treating physician, such as the “length of the
treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with
the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.” Blakely, 581
F.3d at 406.
Nor did the ALJ provide sufficient “good reasons” for rejecting Dr. Ibrahim’s
opinion. Indeed, the ALJ’s one sentence of actual analysis included no citations to,
or analysis of, Dr. Ibrahim’s treatment notes. Because the ALJ’s perfunctory
rejection of Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion does not “permit[] meaningful review of the
ALJ’s application of the [treating physician] rule,” it is both insufficient and
inadequate. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
Finally, even if the ALJ believed that Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion was not entitled
to controlling weight, the ALJ further erred by summarily assigning that opinion “no
weight” without sufficiently explaining the basis for that conclusion. See id. at 408
(concluding that ALJ erred where ALJ “summar[ily] rejected” treating physician’s
opinion and provided it no weight). The ALJ therefore failed to comply with the

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treating physician rule, and a remand of Gregory’s application for benefits is
appropriate.
None of the Commissioner’s arguments against remand are persuasive. The
Commissioner first takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “the ALJ did
not identify Dr. Ibrahim by name or title” and that it was therefore “unclear whether
[the ALJ] recognized that [] Dr. Ibrahim was a treating source and that her opinions
were entitled to deference.” (R&R at Pg. ID 464.) According to the Commissioner,
“the ALJ’s failure to identify Dr. Ibrahim name is not, alone, enough to deprive the
decision of substantial evidentiary support.” (Objection at Pg. ID 472.) That is
surely correct. But the Magistrate Judge did not recommend a remand based solely
on the ALJ’s failure to identify Dr. Ibrahim by name. Instead, the Magistrate Judge
explained that that failure was just one of many deficiencies in the ALJ’s
consideration of Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion; it was not dispositive.
Second, the Commissioner argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when he
concluded that the restrictions Dr. Ibrahim placed on Gregory’s pushing, pulling,
and lifting were “ongoing for a period of at least one year.” (Objection at Pg. ID
473.) Relatedly, the Commissioner says that the Magistrate Judge “impermissibly
reweighed the evidence” when he suggested that “the more reasonable interpretation
of the evidence was that Dr. Ibrahim intended the limitations to be continuous for at
least one year.” (Id.; internal quotation marks and emphasis removed.) The Court
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agrees with the Commissioner that Dr. Ibrahim’s treatment recommendations
included different restrictions at different periods of time. But even if the Magistrate
Judge misinterpreted the medical records from Dr. Ibrahim, the Commissioner has
not explained how or why that excuses either the ALJ’s failure to provide “good
reasons” for discounting Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion or the ALJ’s decision to accord that
opinion “no weight.” Indeed, the Commissioner’s examination of Dr. Ibrahim’s
treatment notes in this portion of the Objection goes far beyond the one-sentence
perfunctory review included in the ALJ’s ruling and provides an example of the kind
of analysis that is conspicuously absent from that decision.
Third, the Commissioner maintains that “the ALJ may implicitly provide good
reasons for rejecting Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion.” (Objection at Pg. ID 475.) The
Commissioner insists that “the ALJ discussed evidence that conflicted with the
limitations Dr. Ibrahim suggested, and thereby provided a supportable reason to
discount those limitations.” (Id.) In support of this argument, the ALJ relies upon
the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 Fed.
App’x 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2006). In Nelson, the Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ in
that case had “adequately” addressed a treating source’s opinions by “indirectly
attacking both the consistency of those opinions with the other record evidence and
their supportability.” Id. Thus, the Commissioner says that Nelson supports her

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position that the ALJ did not need to directly address Dr. Ibrahim’s conclusions in
detail before rejecting them.
Nelson is the exception, not the rule, and it is therefore no help to the
Commissioner. In fact, in the Nelson ruling itself, the Sixth Circuit went out of its
way to “note” that Nelson was a “rare case of the ALJ’s analysis meeting the goal
of the rule even if not meeting its letter. The Commissioner’s own regulations and
our case law state that the Commissioner must provide good reasons for rejecting
the medical opinion of a treating source.” Id. (emphasis added).
This is not the “rare” case in which an ALJ’s complete rejection of a treating
physician’s opinion is sufficient despite not confirming to the “letter” of the treating
physician rule. The ALJ’s bare analysis here does not come close to qualifying for
a special exception to the general rule. Indeed, in published decisions issued both
before and after Nelson, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly remanded actions where,
as here, the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for discounting a treating
physicians’ opinion. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546 (reversing judgment in favor of
Commissioner and remanding for further administrative proceedings where “the
ALJ failed to clarify whether [the treating physician’s] opinion was not ‘wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ or
was ‘inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record,’ 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2), did not identify the evidence supporting such a finding, and did
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not explain its application of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) to
determine the weight given to [the treating physician’s] opinion”); Blakely, 581 F.3d
at 407 (reversing and remanding for further administrative proceedings where “the
ALJ violated Agency regulations by failing to adequately explain the weight given
to the treating physicians in her decision”).2
Finally, the Commissioner argues that there was “substantial evidence” in the
record that supported both the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Ibrahim’s opinion and
his conclusion that Gregory was not disabled. (Objection at Pg. ID 476-77.) But the
Sixth Circuit has made clear in published decisions – not addressed by the
Commissioner – that courts “cannot excuse a denial of a mandatory procedural
protection,” such as the treating physician rule, “simply because, as the
Commissioner urges, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to
discount the treating source’s opinion, and thus, a different outcome on remand is
unlikely.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546. The ALJ’s failure here warrants a remand – even
if there is other evidence in the record that supported his final conclusion that
Gregory was not disabled. On remand, the ALJ may again reject Dr. Ibrahim’s

2

See also Halloran v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We do
not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for
the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion and we will continue remanding
when we encounter opinions from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively set forth the
reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician's opinion”).
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opinion, but if he does so, he must explain in substantially more detail the “good
reasons” for doing so.
IV
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
 The Commissioner’s Objection to the R&R (ECF #31) is OVERRULED;
 The Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition in the R&R (ECF #30) is
ADOPTED;
 Gregory’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #29) is GRANTED to the
extent it seeks a remand for further administrative proceedings;
 The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #23) is DENIED;
and
 Gregory’s application for SSI is REMANDED to the Commissioner for
further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order and the R&R.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 15, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on September 15, 2017, by electronic means
and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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