Fidelity Life Association v Amstutz et al
Filing
23
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 16 Plaintiff's Motion for Interpleader, Dismissal, and attorneys' fees and costs. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FIDELITY LIFE
ASSOCIATION,
CASE NO. 16-CV-12618
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
Plaintiff,
v.
LOGAN AMSTUTZ and PAUL
KOLOSCI, as personal
representative for the Estate
of Janet L. Amstutz,
Defendants.
________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR INTERPLEADER, DISMISSAL,
AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS (Doc. 16)
This interpleader action arises out of a dispute between a named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy, defendant Logan Amstutz, and the estate of
the insured, over who is entitled to death benefits where Logan Amstutz killed the
insured, but was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Now before the court is
plaintiff Fidelity Life Association’s motion for interpleader, dismissal, and
attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 16). Defendants Logan Amstutz and Paul Kolosci,
personal representative of the Estate of Janet Amstutz (the “Estate”), have
responded to the motion and both agree to interpleader and dismissal of plaintiff,
upon the deposit of funds into the Registry of the Court, but object to an award of
attorneys’ fees. Because plaintiff is an insurance company operating in the
ordinary course of business, the court shall exercise its equitable discretion to
deny attorneys’ fees for the policy reasons set forth below.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 15, 2013, Janet Amstutz purchased a $500,000 accidental
death policy in Indiana where she resided at the time, naming her two nephews,
Garret Amstutz and Logan Amstutz, as beneficiaries, each to receive an equal
share of the proceeds upon her death. Both nephews reside in Michigan. On
November 23, 2014, Logan stabbed and killed Janet Amstutz, who was also living
in Michigan at the time. Plaintiff paid Garrett Amstutz his $250,000 share, but did
not pay the other nephew who was the killer. Logan Amstutz was tried for first
degree murder, but was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Plaintiff did not
pay death benefits to Logan Amstutz because Indiana has a “slayer statute,”
which prohibits a named beneficiary from recovering death benefits when he kills
the insured decedent, even where he is guilty, but mentally ill. Ind. Code Ann. §
29‐1‐2‐12.1.
2
Under Michigan law, however, the issue of whether a person who kills an
insured, but is found not guilty by reason of insanity, may recover benefits is
unclear, as the statute provides that the murderer must have acted “feloniously
and intentionally.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803(1). Although no Michigan court
has squarely addressed the issue, the plain language of the statute suggests that
where a killer is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he may still recover death
benefits. To determine whether Logan Amstutz or the Estate should recover the
remaining policy proceeds, the court must first decide whether Indiana or
Michigan law applies. The Estate has filed a claim for benefits that were
designated for Logan Amstutz based on the claim that he is ineligible to receive
benefits because he killed the insured.
On March 23, 2016, the Porter County Superior Probate Court in Indiana
(“Probate Court”) entered an order establishing a constructive trust for the
purpose of receiving all assets that Logan Amstutz might receive as a result of
Janet Amstutz’s death. On June 16, 2016, Janet Amstutz’s estate filed a verified
petition for turnover, seeking to recover from defendant Logan Amstutz’s share of
the policy proceeds. Plaintiff was not a named party to the Indiana probate
matter. On July 13, 2016, plaintiff filed this interpleader action to determine who
3
is entitled to the remaining insurance proceeds in light of the apparent conflict
between Indiana and Michigan law.
Now before the court is plaintiff insurance company’s motion for
interpleader and its dismissal from this action, as well as an award of attorneys’
fees and costs in the amount of $13,970. Plaintiff’s counsel relies on her affidavit
as to the fees and costs sought, but has not attached an itemized list of the fees
billed to her client. Plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit states that fees reflect work
performed in this interpleader action as well as work done in the Probate Court to
set aside two turnover orders. Defendants do not oppose interpleader, the
deposit of funds with the court, and the dismissal of plaintiff from this action.
Accordingly, an order shall enter forthwith to this effect. Defendants do oppose,
however, an award of attorneys’ fees.
Logan Amstutz responds that he previously consented to plaintiff’s request
for $5,968 for reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, but objects to the increase of
an additional $8,000 which plaintiff has added since August, 2016, for fees
incurred in defending against the Estate’s claims in the Probate Court. Logan
Amstutz argues that the fees should be limited to those incurred in this
interpleader action only.
4
The Estate, on the other hand, objects to the award of any attorneys’ fees
on the grounds that plaintiff is an insurance company, and the proceeds have
arisen in the ordinary course of its business, and secondly, plaintiff has failed to
provide detailed record support for the fees sought.
Il. Analysis
Although not authorized by statute, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a
disinterested stakeholder may recover attorney fees in an interpleader action
where the fees sought are reasonable. Holmes v. Artists Rights Enforcement
Corp., 148 F. App’x 252, 259 (6th Cir. 2005). An award of attorney fees in an
interpleader action is a matter within the district court’s discretion. Id. An award
of attorneys’ fees may be granted in equity where the interpleading party is “(1) a
disinterested stakeholder, (2) who has conceded liability, (3) has deposited the
disputed funds into court, and (4) has sought a discharge from liability.” Id. at
259. Although plaintiff arguably meets the elements above and falls within the
general rule for recovery of attorneys’ fees, numerous courts have declined an
attorneys’ fee award to an insurance company, taking the view that the costs of
an interpleader action to resolve competing claims for insurance proceeds is an
expense that arises in the ordinary course of business that should not be passed
5
along to the ultimate beneficiary. See Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kelling, 170 F.
Supp. 2d 792, 794‐96 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (collecting cases denying attorneys’ fees
to insurance companies in interpleader actions); Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v.
Shcindeldecker, No. 3:15‐00543, 2016 WL 699151 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2016)
(same).
In Unum, the district court outlined three policy reasons for declining to
award attorneys’ fees to insurance companies in interpleader actions. First,
courts have ruled that “insurance companies should not be compensated merely
because conflicting claims to proceeds have arisen during the normal course of
business.” 170 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (citing Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v.
Thomas, 735 F. Supp. 730, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1990)). Second, strictly speaking,
insurance companies are not disinterested stakeholders, as interpleader allows
them to avoid vexatious litigation and immunizes them from liability under the
contested policy. Id. Third, some courts have denied an award of attorneys’ fees
where an insurance company is the plaintiff on the theory that it is unfair to the
insured to invade the benefits where an award of fees is disproportional to the
insured’s ultimate recovery or would sharply decrease available insurance
6
proceeds. Id. at 795‐96 (declining to award attorneys’ fees where amount sought
would consume over 60 percent of the benefits due).
Applying these three justifications for denying attorneys’ fees to insurance
companies bringing interpleader actions here leads to the conclusion that
plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees should be denied. This is a straightforward
interpleader action and arises in the course of plaintiff’s ordinary business of
paying death benefits. Next, plaintiff profits by bringing this interpleader action
as it allows the insurance company to avoid further litigating this matter in
Probate Court, and allows plaintiff to avoid paying proceeds to the wrong
beneficiary and being subjected to subsequent litigation. The third consideration
is not so relevant here as the fees sought in the amount of $13,970 do not
significantly invade the $250,000 benefits at stake.
Nevertheless, the first two theories supporting the denial of attorneys’ fees
to insurance companies favor disallowing those fees here. In addition, it would
not be equitable to require defendants to pay attorneys’ fees for plaintiff’s work
in the Probate Court as those fees were not incurred in this interpleader action.
Having found that principles of equity weigh against awarding attorneys’ fees to
plaintiff insurance company, the court does not reach defendant Kolosci’s
7
argument that plaintiff failed to adequately document attorneys’ fees sought. For
the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for interpleader, dismissal, and
attorneys’ fees and costs (Doc. 16) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as
set forth below:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Fidelity Life Association is
permitted to interplead the policy proceeds at issue, and shall deposit the
remaining accidental death insurance benefits in the amount of $250,000, plus
any applicable interest, into the Court’s Registry in accordance with Local Rule
67.1.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk accept for deposit into the Registry
of the Court the deposit to be made by plaintiff Fidelity Life Association in the
amount of $250,000, plus any applicable interest, and the Clerk shall promptly
invest those funds into an interest bearing account in accordance with Local Rule
67.1.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Fidelity Life Association is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE upon fulfillment of this court’s orders, and plaintiff is fully
relieved of and discharged from any and all liability with respect to payment of
8
the proceeds of the accidental death insurance policy on the life of Janet L.
Amstutz (policy no. 0100461011);
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk may deduct from the account any
fee authorized by the Judicial Conference of the United States;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Logan Amstutz and Paul D.
Kolosci, as personal representative for the Estate of Janet L. Amstutz, are
permanently enjoined from commencing any other actions or proceedings
seeking payment of the policy proceeds at issue or otherwise related to the
accidental death insurance policy (policy no. 0100461011).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 22, 2016
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
November 22, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?