Jones et al v. Scripps Media, Inc.

Filing 28

OPINION AND ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's 24 Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ODIS JONES et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 16-cv-12647
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
SCRIPPS MEDIA, INC.
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF #24)
Between April 28, 2016, and May 9, 2016, Detroit television station WXYZ1
broadcast three investigative reports about the Detroit Public Lighting Authority (the
“PLA”). The reports asserted that several PLA employees, including the PLA’s
former Chief Executive Officer Odis Jones (“Jones”), received lucrative severance
payments that were hidden from the public. In this action, Jones claims that the
reports defamed him and cost his business (co-Plaintiff MVP Capital Ventures, LLC
(“MVP”)) a multi-million dollar housing contract with Wayne State University. (See
First Am. Compl., ECF #20.) WXYZ has now filed a motion to dismiss. (See ECF

1

WXYZ is owned by Defendant Scripps Media, Inc., a Delaware corporation. (See
First Am. Compl. at ¶3, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 252.) For ease of reference, the Court
will refer to the Defendant throughout this Opinion and Order as “WXYZ.”
1

#24.) For the reasons set forth below, WXYZ’s motion is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART.
I2
A
In 2013, the City of Detroit formed the PLA in order to “improve, modernize,
and maintain the City’s street light infrastructure.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 9-10,
ECF #20 at Pg. ID 253.) Shortly after its formation, the PLA hired Jones as its first
Chief Executive Officer. (See id. at ¶¶ 13-15, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 254.) Among other
things, Jones “led the City of Detroit’s efforts” to install over 60,000 street lights
throughout the City. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 254.)
“During his tenure with the [] PLA, [] Jones became aware of some
opportunities for his private sector businesses.” (Id. at ¶27, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 257.)
Jones says that before he pursued any of these outside business opportunities, he
sought and received clearance from “the Detroit PLA Board of Directors, [the]
General Counsel and Ethics Officer for the City of Detroit PLA, the City of Detroit
Inspector General[,]” and others. (Id. at ¶29, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 257.) Despite these
approvals, at least two PLA employees, Sandra Hughes O’Brien (“O’Brien”) and
Dana Harvey (“Harvey”) objected to Jones’ outside business activities. (See id. at

2

The facts set forth in this section are drawn from the First Amended Complaint and
taken as true, as they must be in the context of the pending motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2

¶30, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 257.) They thereafter became “openly hostile to [] Jones.”
(Id. at ¶31, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 258.)
In September 2015, the PLA fired both O’Brien and Harvey. (See First Am.
Compl. at ¶32, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 258.) After their firing, O’Brien and Harvey
prepared draft whistleblower lawsuits in which they alleged that the PLA fired them
because they had “knowledge that [] Jones was conducting illegal activities” at the
PLA and were about to “expose” his behavior. (ECF #20-1 at 14, Pg. ID 308; see
also First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 33-34, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 258.) Among other things,
O’Brien and Harvey alleged that Jones had “engineered” a severance payment to the
PLA’s former Chief Operating Officer Adam Troy (“Troy”) “as payment for a
business debt owned by Jones to Troy.”3 (First Am. Compl. at ¶35, ECF #20 at Pg.
ID 258.)
O’Brien and Harvey sent drafts of their lawsuits to the PLA, and the PLA’s
general counsel Tiffany Sadek (“Sadek”) began investigating their claims. Sadek
ultimately concluded in a written report (the “Sadek Report”) that neither the PLA
Board of Directors (the “PLA Board”) nor Jones committed “any wrongdoing or
ethical violations.” (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 259; see also the Sadek
Report at ECF #20-1.) The PLA then settled its dispute with Harvey and O’Brien.
(See id. at ¶44, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 260.) As part of their settlement, “[b]oth O’Brien

3

The payment to Troy is described more fully below.
3

and Harvey received severance payments from the Detroit PLA. They also each
signed severance agreements and releases in which they [] pledged to keep the details
of their settlement and dispute confidential.” (Id. at ¶46, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 260.)
The First Amended Complaint does not allege that the PLA ever publicly discussed
or disclosed Harvey’s and O’Brien’s termination, the settlement of their potential
legal action, or the terms and conditions of their severance packages.
B
At around this same time, Troy also resigned. (See ECF #20-1 at 12, Pg. ID
306.) In connection with his resignation, Troy entered in a severance agreement
with the PLA (the “Troy Severance Agreement”).4 (See id. at 66, Pg. ID 360.) Under
the Troy Severance Agreement, the PLA agreed to pay Troy $58,000 in severance
pay, including “accrued vacation, personal, and sick time for which he was entitled
to receive as compensation.” (ECF id. at 13, Pg. ID 307; see also id. at 66, Pg. ID
360.)
Jones signed the Troy Severance Agreement on behalf of the PLA. (See id. at
66, Pg. ID 360.) Jones alleges that the PLA Board was “aware of” the “precise
terms” of the Troy Severance Agreement before he signed it and that the board
“agreed” with those terms. (First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 38, 106, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 259,

4

This appears to be the same severance agreement that O’Brien and Harvey
referenced in their draft legal complaints.
4

276.)

But Jones does not allege that he ever presented the Troy Severance

Agreement to the PLA Board for formal approval, that the agreement was ever on
an agenda at a board meeting, that the board ever publicly discussed Troy’s
separation from the PLA or disclosed the terms of the agreement, or that the board
ever took a formal vote on the agreement.
After Troy left the PLA, he worked as Jones’ “business partner” in co-Plaintiff
MVP.5 (See, e.g., id. at ¶131(I), ECF #20 at Pg. ID 285.)
C
Jones decided to leave the PLA in February 2016. (See id. at ¶48, ECF #20 at
Pg. ID 260.) Jones and the PLA then negotiated an agreement to end his employment
(the “Jones Separation Agreement”). (See id. at ¶49, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 261.) As
part of the Jones Separation Agreement, the PLA agreed to make a “severance”
payment to Jones. (Id.) Jones maintains “he was entitled to receive [such a payment]
upon termination of his Detroit PLA employment under his amended employment
agreement.” (Id.) The Jones Separation Agreement also required Jones and the PLA
Board to keep the “terms and conditions” of the agreement confidential. (Id. at ¶54,
ECF 20 at Pg. ID 262.)

5

It is not yet clear to the Court when Troy began working for MVP and/or became
Jones’ “business partner.”
5

After Jones and the PLA completed their negotiations of the Jones Separation
Agreement, “[t]he Detroit PLA sent out an advance public meeting notice and
conducted a Public Meeting in accordance with the Michigan Open Meetings Act
concerning the departure of [] Jones as the Detroit PLA CEO.” (Id. at ¶52, ECF #20
at Pg. ID 261.) Jones has not alleged that the meeting notice contained any details
about the terms of the Jones Separation Agreement nor that it identified the amount
of his severance payment. A PLA press release that announced Jones’ resignation
likewise did not include any details about the terms of his separation. (See ECF #87.)
On February 3, 2016, the PLA Board held the meeting that it had earlier
announced in the public notice. (See First Am. Compl. at ¶52, ECF #20 at Pg. ID
261; see also Meeting Minutes, ECF #8-8.) The minutes of that meeting indicate
that the PLA Board discussed the terms of Jones’ separation from the PLA during a
“closed session” that was not open to the public. (See Meeting Minutes, ECF #8-8.)
After the PLA Board concluded its “closed” session, it returned to open session and
“approve[d]” both Jones’ resignation and the terms of the Jones Separation
Agreement. (Id.) Jones has not alleged, and the public minutes of the PLA Board
meeting do not reflect, that the board publicly discussed or disclosed either the terms
of the Jones Separation Agreement or the specific amount of Jones’ severance. (See
id.)

6

D
In March 2016, soon after Jones left the PLA, WXYZ investigative reporter
Ronnie Dahl (“Dahl”) began working on a series of television reports about
severance payments the PLA made to its former employees, including Jones,
O’Brien, Harvey, and Troy.6 (See First Am. Compl. at ¶62, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 264.)
As part of her investigation, Dahl spoke with Jones and filed a Freedom of
Information Act request seeking records related to severance payments the PLA had
made. (See id. at ¶55, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 262.) The PLA produced 46 pages of
documents to Dahl, including certain press releases, the public notice of Jones’
departure from the PLA, Jones’ employment agreement, and “various other
documents evidencing the departure of a variety of Detroit PLA employees from
their employment with that entity.” (Id. at ¶57, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 262-63.) The
PLA also produced the Jones Separation Agreement to Dahl. (See id. at ¶58, ECF
#20 at Pg. ID 263.) After Dahl received those documents, she “confronted [] Jones
at a Detroit bar. In hostile tones, she angrily accused [] Jones of ‘lying to her’, got
‘in his face’ and wagged her finger at him while making these accusations.” (Id. at
¶64, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 264.)

6

Dahl also investigated a severance payment made to Katrina Crawley (“Crawley”),
who was the PLA’s Vice President of Construction and Engineering. As with the
payments to Troy, O’Brien, and Harvey, there are no allegations in the First
Amended Complaint that the PLA ever publicly discussed or disclosed the payment
to Crawley or the terms and conditions of her separation from the PLA.
7

E
WXYZ aired Dahl’s reports on April 28, 2016, April 29, 2016, and May 9,
2016. (See id. at ¶64, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 264.) WXYZ also published the reports on
its website. (See id. at ¶65, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 264.) The reports raised serious
questions about Jones’ tenure as PLA CEO and the PLA’s use of public funds to pay
severance packages. The reports repeatedly referred to these payments, both in onscreen graphics and spoken words, as “secret severances.” (See id. at ¶¶ 62, 74, ECF
#20 at Pg. ID 264, 266.) The Court summarizes the three reports below.7
1
The initial report aired on April 28, 2016. Dahl first introduced the PLA and
extolled its work for the City of Detroit. She called the PLA one of City’s “brightest”
stars and credited the organization with “replacing street lights at a blistering pace.”
Dahl then explained that the PLA financed its operations through a sale of public

7

“Because the allegations [in the First Amended Complaint] … are based upon and
reference” the three televised reports, and because the three reports are central to the
claims in the First Amended Complaint, “this Court may consider them on
[WXYZ’s] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without converting that motion into one
for summary judgment.” Hazime v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 2013 WL 4483485, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (considering video of televised news reports in ruling
on motion under Rule 12(b)(6)); see also DMC Plumbing & Remodeling, LLC v.
Fox News Network, LLC, 2012 WL 5906870, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2012)
(ruling in a defamation case that, because “the Complaint refers to the April 1, 2011
news broadcast, and the broadcast is central to Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation,”
the DVD of that broadcast would be considered by the Court in ruling on the
defendant's motion to dismiss). The Court’s summary of the reports is derived from
the Court’s review of the DVD containing the three reports. (See ECF #15).  
8

bonds, and she said that the bonds are to be paid back with funds that were originally
earmarked for police and safety. The report then showed Detroit Mayor Mike
Duggan (“Mayor Duggan”) describing the PLA as “a huge public trust.” Duggan
explained that the PLA was using “public safety money” and therefore had an
obligation to “make sure [its funds were] being used to the maximum benefit.”
Dahl then began to question whether the PLA was, in fact, using its funds “to
the maximum benefit.”

She informed viewers that WXYZ investigators had

“uncovered documents” that raised “disturbing questions” about the PLA’s use of
public funds. Specifically, Dahl said that “the PLA dished out more than a half
million dollars of severance payments” to five former employees – Jones, Troy,
O’Brien, Harvey, and Crawley – “who got the cash on one condition: go away, don’t
sue, and never talk.” Dahl later specified how much each employee received in
severance and told viewers that when WXYZ contacted some of the employees for
comment, the employees told the station that “confidentiality agreements prevented
them from talking.”
Dahl then introduced “noted labor lawyer” Deborah Gordon (“Gordon”).
Dahl said that Gordon had “reviewed Jones’ contract and everything about his
departure” from the PLA. Gordon then appeared on camera and said that “[t]he
statements being made publicly are very clear that he [Jones] has resigned. Under
his [employment] agreement, if [he] resigned, he doesn’t get any severance pay.”

9

Dahl then said that Jones nonetheless “incredibly” did get a severance payment – a
“goodbye present” of a “quarter-million tax-payer dollars and health care for a year.”
Dahl also said that Jones and the PLA Board agreed to keep the Jones Separation
Agreement a “secret.” Later in the report, Dahl told the audience that Jones and
Troy are now “business partners,” and MVP’s logo was shown on screen at that time.
The report concluded with Dahl interviewing PLA Board President Dr. Lorna
Thomas (“Dr. Thomas”). Dahl asked Dr. Thomas about the severance payments to
Jones and the other employees, where the money came from, and whether the
severance payments were an appropriate use of public funds. Dr. Thomas generally
refused to comment. She said only that the payments and severance agreements
were “personnel matter[s].”
2
The second report aired on April 29, 2016. Early in the report, Dahl reminded
viewers that Jones received a $250,000 payment “after resigning to pursue new
opportunities.” At this same moment, the report displayed an image of MVP’s logo.
Dahl also identified the severance payments that O’Brien, Troy, Harvey, and
Crawley received.
Dahl told viewers that Dr. Thomas refused to discuss why the payments were
made, and the report showed Dr. Thomas refusing to answer Dahl’s questions on
this issue. Shortly thereafter, 1:20 into the report, Dahl said that “noted employment

10

lawyer Deb Gordon, who reviewed the documents for [WXYZ], has a theory” about
the payments. Gordon appeared on camera and said that the departing employees
received the payments in “exchange for giving up [their] rights to file a lawsuit” and
for “remain[ing] quiet.”
Dahl then provided support for Gordon’s “theory.” She explained that before
O’Brien and Harvey left the PLA, they “threatened [to bring] whistleblower
lawsuits” in which they would have claimed that “they witnessed illegal activities at
the PLA.” The report did not identify those “illegal activities.” Dahl then asked Dr.
Thomas on camera whether O’Brien and Harvey were “paid to keep their mouths
shut,” and Dr. Thomas again responded that this was a “personnel matter” on which
she would not comment.
The report then cut back to Gordon and depicted her as saying “he [Jones]
violated the law, and other people got caught in the crossfire, bring those people
back, get rid of him, turn it over to the AG, and don’t waste any taxpayer money.”8
This depiction appears almost exactly one minute after the earlier reference to
Gordon having a “theory.”
Following Gordon’s statement, Dahl said that “more mystery” surrounded the
$58,000 severance payment that Troy received “after less than a year on the job.”

8

WXYZ insists that the report depicts Gordon as qualifying this statement with the
word “if.” As described below, the Court concludes that Jones has plausibly alleged
that the word “if” is not audible.
11

Dahl remarked that the payment was “signed by [Troy’s] boss, Odis Jones” and that
“months later, the two became partners in a company called MVP Capital.” The
MVP logo was again shown on the screen at that point. Dahl then said that
“curiously, the company was registered with the state one day before Jones signed
Troy’s severance deal.” The report concludes with Mayor Duggan saying that he
believed based on WXYZ’s reporting that “there was a lot else going on” at the PLA.
3
The third and final report aired on May 9, 2016. It was a “follow-up” to the
reports that aired in late April. Dahl informed viewers that “there’s been plenty of
outrage since we broke the story of how the Public Lighting Authority handed out
more than $500,000 to five top execs to buy their silence.” And the report included
interviews with various politicians criticizing the payments.
The report further indicated that Dahl attempted to find public records of the
severance payments. It explained that Dahl reviewed all of the available minutes
from PLA Board meetings and found only one reference to the resignation of Jones
and nothing with respect to Troy, Crawley, O’Brien, or Harvey.
Dahl also told viewers that the PLA had undertaken a “secret investigation …
into its executives as it was paying them to stay quiet.” That investigation was the
one described in the Sadek Report. Dahl said that Sadek’s investigation was
triggered by allegations that Jones “use[d] authority resources to get business for his

12

side company, MVP. [Sadek] also investigated Adam Troy … Jones’ now partner
at MVP.” After Dahl asked rhetorically “how did Troy get his gig at PLA,” the
report displayed a graphic of falling $100 bills and the figure “$58,000” in large red
letters, and Dahl asked: “why did Jones give [Troy] $58,000 severance after less
than a year on the job?”
Dahl did acknowledge Sadek’s conclusion that “Jones and Troy did nothing
wrong.”9 But Dahl then questioned Sadek’s impartiality and noted that “Troy and
MVP [had] been [Sadek’s] client when she was in private practice” and that they
were “paying her” before she joined the PLA. Dahl concluded the final report by
informing viewers that lawmakers were looking into how they could stop similar
severance payments in the future.
F
In the First Amended Complaint, Jones specifically identifies four classes of
statements from the televised reports that he alleges defamed him:
 “He Broke the Law.” First, Jones says that the manner in which WXYZ
used the footage of its interview with Gordon during the April 29, 2016,
broadcast defamed him. The report depicted Gordon as saying that “he
violated the law” and that the case should be “turn[ed] [] over to the AG
[Attorney General].” (See First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 66-78, ECF #20 at Pg. ID

9

WXYZ also posted the Sadek Report in full on its website.
13

265-68.)10 Jones contends that Gordon never actually said that he violated the
law, but instead suggested only that “if” he had violated the law, then there
should be consequences for those actions. (See id. at ¶69, ECF #20 at Pg. ID
265.) Jones insists that Dahl and WXYZ “obscure[ed]” the word “if’ and
“deceptive[ly] edit[ed]” Gordon’s statement “to give the impression … that
[it was] a flat declaration … without any context or clarification.” (Id. at ¶¶
66, 72, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 265-66.) Jones says that the “editing” was
“undertaken with the malicious intent to create the false impression[]” that he
was a “lawbreaker.” (Id. at ¶75, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 267.)
 “Secret Severances.” Next, Jones says that the reports falsely portrayed him
as participating in a “shadowy and illegal scheme” to keep “secret” the
severance payments he and other PLA employees received. (Id. at ¶¶ 83-89,
ECF #20 at Pg. ID 269-72.) Jones contends that the severances were not
“secret” and that he was not involved in any effort to hide anything from the
public.
 “Buying Silence.” Third, Jones alleges that the reports made “repeated
slanderous assertions that [he] is a corrupt man who can be bought.” (Id. at
¶90, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 272.) Specifically, Jones complains that the reports
implied that the PLA “purchased” his “silence” and “secrecy” through his
severance payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 91, 99, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 272-73, 275.) Jones
insists that his silence was not “purchased” and that his severance had nothing
to do with remaining “quiet.”

10

Jones has plausibly alleged that the “he” Gordon referred to was Jones himself.
(See First Am. Compl. at ¶68, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 265.) Moreover, WXYZ has not
contended that the “he” was someone else.
14

 “Jones Paying Off Troy.” Finally, Jones says that the following question
from the May 9 2016, report was defamatory: “Why did Jones give him
[Troy] $58,000 severance after less than a year on the job?” (Id. at ¶100, ECF
#20 at Pg. ID 275.) Jones says that WXYZ knew that (1) the PLA Board was
aware of and agreed with the terms of the Troy Severance Agreement and (2)
the PLA made the $58,000 payment to Troy. (See id. at ¶¶ 105-106, ECF #20
at Pg. ID 276.) Jones maintains that the question was phrased “in [an]
inflammatory fashion to create the false implication that Jones [was] by
himself secretly using PLA funds to pay off his business partner.” (Id. at ¶102,
ECF #20 at Pg. ID 276-77.)
MVP also says that it was defamed by the reports. It contends that the reports
repeatedly showed images of its logo and website while Dahl spoke about alleged
wrongdoing by Jones and/or Troy. (See, e.g., id. at ¶67, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 265.)
MVP insists that this editing “falsely associate[d]” it with the “incendiary
statement[s]” that Dahl made about Jones and Troy and falsely implied that MVP
“is run by persons who have violated the law.” (Id. at ¶¶ 67, 76, ECF #20 at Pg. ID
265, 267.)
Jones and MVP (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) further maintain that Dahl and
WXYZ timed the reports to cause “maximum damage” to their business prospects.
(Id. at ¶111, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 278.) Specifically, Plaintiffs say that Dahl and
WXYZ were “aware” that MVP “was one of three finalists under consideration to
receive a multi-million dollar housing contract from Wayne State University the

15

very week of the broadcasts. It was [therefore] critical that [WXYZ] get the
broadcasts out to impart the maximum damage to [MVP’s] prospect for that bid.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 111-112, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 278.) According to Plaintiffs, “within a day
or two of [WXYZ’s] initial report” Wayne State told Jones and MVP that “they
would not be awarded the contract due to the controversy ginned up by [WXYZ’s]
false reports.” (Id. at ¶ 113, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 278.)
G
Plaintiffs initially filed this action against WXYZ on July 15, 2016. (See
Compl., ECF #1.) WXYZ moved to dismiss the Complaint on September 1, 2016
(the “First Dismissal Motion”). (See ECF #8.) The Court held a hearing on the First
Dismissal Motion on December 5, 2016. (See Dkt.) During the hearing, counsel for
Plaintiffs told the Court that if Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the Complaint,
they would be able to plead additional facts with respect to their defamation claim.
Following a telephonic status conference on December 14, 2016, the Court entered
an Order in which it (1) terminated the First Dismissal Motion without prejudice, (2)
permitted Plaintiffs to file a First Amended Complaint, and (3) allowed WXYZ to
renew the First Dismissal Motion after Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint.
(See ECF #19.)

16

Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint on December 23, 2016. (See
First Am. Compl., ECF #20.) The First Amended Complaint contains four counts
against WXYZ, each brought under Michigan law:
 Defamation (both Plaintiffs) (see id. at ¶¶ 120-135, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 28187);
 Interference with Advantageous Business Relations (both Plaintiffs) (see id.
at ¶¶ 136-142, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 287-88);
 False Light Publicity Invasion of Privacy (both Plaintiffs) (see id. at ¶¶ 143148, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 288-89); and
 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Jones only) (see id. at ¶¶ 149154, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 289-90.)
WXYZ renewed the First Dismissal Motion on January 10, 2017 (the
“Renewed Motion to Dismiss”). (See ECF #24.) In the Renewed Motion to Dismiss,
WXYZ seeks dismissal of all four counts of the First Amended Complaint. (See id.)
II
WXYZ has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court
to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id.
17

When assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim, a district court must accept all
of a complaint's factual allegations as true. See Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249
F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2001). “Mere conclusions,” however, “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. A plaintiff
must therefore provide “more than labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III
A
Under Michigan law, a plaintiff must plead the following elements to state a
claim for defamation:
1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the
plaintiff, 2) an unprivileged communication to a third
party, 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the
part of the publisher, and 4) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by publication.
Nichols v. Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rouch v. Enquirer &
News, 487 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Mich. 1992)). A statement “is defamatory under
Michigan law ‘if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with
18

him.’” Falls v. Sporting News Pub. Co., 834 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Nuyen v. Slater, 127 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Mich. 1964)). Michigan law imposes
liability only for statements that are materially false. See Rouch, 487 N.W.2d at 208,
214-15. The test for materiality “look[s] to the sting of the [statement] to determine
its effect on the reader; if the literal truth produced the same effect, minor differences
[are] deemed immaterial.” Id. at 214-15.
In addition to satisfying the common-law requirements of defamation under
Michigan law, a plaintiff “must also satisfy the constitutional requirements of the
First Amendment.” Nichols, 477 F.3d at 399. Under the First Amendment, “a
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be
liability under state defamation law.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
19 (1990). Moreover, “if the plaintiff is a public figure, he must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the defamatory statements were made with ‘actual malice,’
that is, that [the statements were] made ‘with knowledge that [they were] false or
with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not.’” Nichols, 477 F.3d at
399 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
B
Before analyzing the allegedly defamatory statements at issue here, the Court
must determine whether Jones is a public figure and thus whether he must satisfy the
First Amendment’s “actual malice” standard. “Whether a plaintiff is a private or

19

public figure is a question of law.” Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 Fed. App’x 433, 444
(6th Cir. 2015).
Jones insists that he “is not a public figure or public official” because “[h]e
did not hold his position as a public official when the reports were published, had
only limited access to the press due to the confidentiality and non-disparagement
clauses in [the Jones Separation Agreement], and did not have the authority to make
the decisions or undertake the actions relating to the defamatory statements
published by [WXYZ].” (First Am. Compl. at ¶128, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 282.) WXYZ
counters that the actual malice requirement “applies to comments made about the
conduct of public officials even after they have left office” and that Jones thus
qualifies as a public official for purposes of this action. (First Dismissal Motion at
16, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 92; emphasis in original).
The Court agrees with WXYZ. WXYZ’s televised reports focused on Jones’
conduct while he was CEO of the PLA and aired in reasonably close temporal
proximity to the time Jones ended his employment with the PLA. The fact that Jones
was not a public official at the precise moment the reports aired does not insulate
Jones from having to plead actual malice. See Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228,
1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (“That the person defamed no longer holds the same position
does not by itself strip him of his status as a public official for constitutional

20

purposes.”).11 Indeed, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-87 (1966), the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff who left government employment six months before the
publication of an allegedly-defamatory newspaper article could qualify as “public
official” and could be required to plead and prove actual malice.12
In sum, even though Jones had left his high-ranking public office by the time
the reports aired, for purposes of this action he is a “public official,” and he must
plausibly allege both that WXYZ defamed him under Michigan law and that WXYZ
acted with actual malice. Requiring Jones to plead and prove actual malice here is
especially appropriate in light of the fact that WXYZ’s reports addressed matters of
substantial public interest. “Speech on matters of public concern … is at the heart
of the First Amendment’s protection.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011)
(quotation and citation omitted).

11

See also Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that law enforcement officials who had left their positions six years
prior to newspaper report about their in-office activities were still public officials for
purposes of libel action); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d
495, 510 n.67 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The passage of some three years between the time of
[plaintiff’s] departure from the Port Authority and the airing of the broadcast did not,
by itself, strip [plaintiff] of his status as a ‘public official’ for purposes of analyzing
this case”); Martz v. Bower, 2012 WL 11919376, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 27,
2012) (“[T]he fact that [plaintiff] was no longer the building and zoning
administrator at the time defendant made her statements does not affect his status as
a public official for purposes of analyzing defendant’s statements, which concerned
[plaintiff’s] involvement with the township board”).
12

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the state courts for a determination
of whether the nature of the plaintiff’s employment satisfied the “public official”
test.
21

IV
In the Renewed Motion to Dismiss, WXYZ argues that (1) the statements
made in the three televised reports were not materially false and defamatory and (2)
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that WXYZ acted with actual malice. The
Court focuses its analysis below on these issues as it evaluates the four allegedlydefamatory classes of statements from WXYZ’s reports. The Court will first analyze
the Renewed Motion to Dismiss with respect to Jones’ claims. It will then separately
address MVP’s claims.
A
WXYZ’s statements that the severances were “secret” and part of “secret”
deals were not materially false, and thus Jones’ defamation claim based on those
statements fails as a matter of law. The word “secret” generally means “kept from
knowledge or view.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged
(2017). Here, the terms and conditions of all of the severance agreements that were
the subject of WXYZ’s reports were “kept from knowledge or view” of the public.
Indeed, Jones has not alleged that the PLA Board held any public meetings
concerning, or publicly released the terms and conditions of, the severance
agreements for Troy, O’Brien, Harvey, and Crawley. And while the PLA Board
approved the Jones Separation Agreement at a public meeting, the board discussed
that agreement in a closed session and did not disclose the terms and conditions of

22

his severance (including the amount). Moreover, the severance agreements for
Jones, O’Brien, Harvey, and Crawley all contained confidentiality provisions that
prohibited the parties from disclosing their terms to the public. For all of these
reasons, WXYZ’s use of the term “secret” to describe the severances was not
materially false and cannot form the basis of a claim for defamation under Michigan
law.
B
Jones’ claim that he was defamed by WXYZ’s statements that his silence and
“secrecy” were “purchased” likewise fails because those statements were not
materially false. As part of the Jones Separation Agreement, the PLA paid Jones a
sum of money. In exchange, Jones agreed, among other things, to keep the terms
and conditions of the Jones Separation Agreement confidential. While Jones objects
to the characterization that his silence was “bought,” and while WXYZ’s description
of the Jones Separation Agreement used colorful, attention-grabbing language, that
language is not materially inaccurate or false.13 In fact, Jones acknowledged in his
response to the First Dismissal Motion that confidentiality provisions, like the one
in the Jones Separation Agreement, “provide” an important benefit that “parties …

13

As noted above, the Court does not believe that WXYZ’s description of the Jones
Separation Agreement as buying Jones’ silence was false. But even if the description
could be deemed somewhat inaccurate, at worst it is the kind of “rhetorical
hyperbole” that cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
17.
23

will pay value for.” (Jones Resp. Br. at 16, ECF #13 at Pg. ID 175.) Jones may not
proceed with a defamation claim based on WXYZ’s characterization that his
“secrecy” was “purchased.”
C
Jones has not stated a viable defamation claim with respect to the question in
the May 9, 2016, report: “Why did Jones give him [Troy] $58,000 severance after
less than a year on the job?” (First Am. Compl. at ¶100, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 275.)
Jones plausibly alleges that there is a factual assertion embedded in this question:
namely, that Jones alone caused the PLA to “give” Troy the $58,000 severance.14
But Jones has not plausibly alleged that that assertion is materially false. And even
if that assertion could be deemed materially false, Jones’ defamation claim based

14

WXYZ argues that a question may never form the basis of a defamation claim
because a question is not capable of being proven true or false. However, the
Michigan Supreme Court has suggested that at least some questions may be
defamatory. See Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 793 N.W.2d 533, 549 (Mich.
2010) (instructing courts to analyze allegedly defamatory statements “in their proper
context,” to avoid “elevat[ing] form over substance,” and not to “rely[] merely on
the use of a question mark as punctuation” when determining whether a statement
“is capable of a defamatory meaning”). Other courts have held that a question may
be defamatory. See, e.g., Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 812 F.Supp.2d 1220,
1225 (D. Ore. 2011) (recognizing that if a question “can be reasonably read as an
assertion of false fact, it may be actionable” in a defamation claim); Point Ruston,
LLC v. Pacific Northwest Regional Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, 2010 WL 3732984, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2010)
(“[U]sing a ‘?’ at the end of a statement does not automatically insulate [the
defendant] from liability for defamation”). The Court assumes without deciding that
the embedded factual assertion in the question at issue here may form the basis of a
defamation claim.
24

upon it would still fail because he has not plausibly alleged that WXYZ made the
assertion with actual malice.
1
Jones has not sufficiently alleged that the assertion that he alone caused the
PLA to “give” Troy $58,000 in severance is materially false. Jones signed the Troy
Severance Agreement, and it was that agreement that “gave” the $58,000 to Troy.
Critically, Jones has not alleged that any other person or entity actually made the
decision to enter into the Troy Severance Agreement and to pay the severance to
Troy. Of particular importance, he has not alleged that he sought PLA Board
approval before signing the Troy Severance Agreement or that the board ever
formally approved the agreement in advance. Instead, he alleges only that the PLA
Board was “aware of and agreed with the Troy severance package.” (Id. at ¶¶ 38,
106, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 259, 276.) But the PLA Board’s awareness of, and informal
agreement with, the Troy Severance Agreement is a far cry from the board actually
making the decision to enter into that agreement and/or to pay the $58,000 to Troy.
Simply put, the facts alleged by Jones do not show any material falsity in WXYZ’s
assertion that Jones alone caused the PLA to pay $58,000 in severance to Troy, and
Jones’ defamation claim based on that assertion therefore fails as a matter of law.

25

2
Even if WXYZ’s assertion that Jones alone caused the PLA to “give” Troy
$58,000 was materially false, Jones’ defamation claim based upon that assertion
would still fail because he has not plausibly alleged that WXYZ made the assertion
with actual malice. At the time WXYZ asked the question containing that assertion,
it had a copy of the Troy Severance Agreement. Jones alone signed that agreement
on behalf of the PLA, and his signature suggests (even though it may not
conclusively prove) that he was the one approving the payment to Troy and causing
the PLA to make the payment. Moreover, nothing in the Troy Severance Agreement
itself indicates that it was presented to the PLA Board for formal approval before it
was signed or that the board provided such approval. In fact, WXYZ explained in
the report that Dahl reviewed all of the available meeting minutes from PLA Board
meetings and found no records reflecting that the PLA Board ever considered, much
less approved or took any formal action related to, the Troy Severance Agreement
or the payment to Troy. And Jones has not alleged that the PLA Board’s minutes
reflect such action.
Jones insists that the Sadek Report – which WXYZ possessed at the time it
aired the report – shows that WXYZ’s assertion that Jones alone caused the PLA to
pay Troy $58,000 was false. The Court disagrees. The Sadek Report does not
unambiguously indicate that any person or entity other than Jones caused the PLA

26

to make the payment. Instead, as Jones highlights in the First Amended Complaint,
the Sadek Report says that the PLA Board “was aware of and agreed with the Troy
severance package.” (First Am. Compl. at ¶106, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 276) (citing the
Sadek Report).) But, as noted above, the PLA Board’s knowledge of and informal
agreement with the payment to Troy is not the same as the board formally approving
the payment or making the decision to pay Troy. Moreover, WXYZ reasonably
noted in its report that in light of the prior relationship between Sadek and Jones,
there was a valid reason to question the objectivity of the Sadek Report and its
findings and conclusion.
In sum, Jones has not alleged any specific facts showing that WXYZ knew,
or recklessly disregarded, the falsity of the assertion that Jones alone caused the PLA
to make the severance payment to Troy. Thus, Jones has failed to sufficiently allege
that WXYZ made the assertion with actual malice,15 and Jones’ defamation claim
based on that assertion accordingly fails as a matter of law.

15

Jones includes a laundry list of allegations in his First Amended Complaint to
support his contention that WXYZ acted with actual malice. (See First Am. Compl.
at ¶131, ECF #20 at Pg. ID 283-86.) But the bulk of these allegations say little, if
anything, about whether WXYZ knew, or recklessly disregarded, the falsity of the
specific assertion that Jones alone caused the PLA to make the severance payment
to Troy. Stated another way, Jones has not shown how any of the facts highlighted
in these allegations placed WXYZ on notice that its assertion that Jones alone caused
the PLA to pay Troy’s severance was false.
27

D
Jones may proceed with his defamation claim based on his allegation that
WXYZ falsely depicted Gordon as saying “he [Jones] violated the law, and other
people got caught in the crossfire, bring those people back, get rid of him, turn it
over to the AG, and don’t waste any taxpayer money.”
1
Jones has plausibly alleged that WXYZ’s depiction of Gordon’s statement
was “materially false” under Michigan defamation law. According to Jones, Gordon
did not say that he violated the law or should be referred to the Attorney General;
instead, she carefully avoided drawing that conclusion and made only the
hypothetical statement that Jones should be referred for prosecution “if” he broke
the law. Jones plausibly contends that WXYZ’s alleged editing of the Gordon
interview conveys a far different message to the viewers than what she actually said.
Indeed, there is a substantial difference between telling viewers that an employment
law expert suggested that Jones should be considered for prosecution “if” he broke
the law and telling viewers that such an expert has actually determined that Jones
broke the law and should be prosecuted. Thus, Jones has sufficiently alleged
material falsity. Cf. Rouch, 487 N.W.2d at 214-15 (explaining that a statement is not
materially false where the literal truth would have the “same effect” on a listener).

28

Jones has also plausibly alleged that WXYZ’s false depiction of Gordon’s
statement is “defamatory” under Michigan law. A statement by an esteemed
employment lawyer like Gordon that Jones violated the law and should be referred
to the Attorney General could tend to “harm [his] reputation … as to lower him in
the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him.’” Falls, 834 F.2d at 615 (quoting Nuyen, 127 N.W.2d at 374). Thus, the
depiction of Gordon’s statement is actionable under Michigan law.
WXYZ counters that it did not obscure Gordon’s use of the word “if,” that the
word was audible, and that the report accurately reflected Gordon’s statement. But
the Court has listened to Gordon’s statement in the report numerous times and
concludes that Jones’ characterization of the statement – as lacking an audible “if”
– is a plausible one.
WXYZ next insists that even if the word “if” is obscured, the report still did
not communicate that Gordon, in fact, concluded that Jones had violated the law.
WXYZ contends instead that the report merely presented Gordon as offering her
“theory” based on her review of the evidence. In support of this argument, WXYZ
highlights its statement in the report that Gordon “has a theory.” (See First Dismissal
Mot. at 9, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 85.) However, Jones has plausibly alleged that the April
29 report does not present Gordon’s “he violated the law” statement as part of her
“theory.” The reference to Gordon’s “theory” and Gordon’s statement that Jones

29

“violated the law” are separated by nearly a full minute of other material. Given that
separation, Jones plausibly alleges that a viewer would not regard Gordon’s
“violated the law” statement as part of her earlier-referenced “theory.”
Moreover, even if WXYZ presented only Gordon’s “theory,” Jones would
have a viable defamation claim for WXYZ’s alleged misrepresentation of that
theory. Jones has plausibly alleged that (1) Gordon did not theorize that he violated
the law but (2) WXYZ nonetheless presented her as offering that theory. This
alleged mischaracterization of Gordon’s “theory” satisfies the materially falsity
element of Jones’ defamation claim because there is a significant difference between
representing to viewers that a pre-eminent employment lawyer like Gordon actually
believes (i.e., “has a theory”) that Jones broke the law and indicating to viewers that
she was merely discussing what should happen “if” he did so. And, as noted above,
the allegedly-false depiction of Gordon’s theory is defamatory because it could harm
Jones’ reputation in the community and dissuade others from associating with him.
Thus, even if WXYZ presented Gordon’s statement as her “theory,” Jones has stated
a viable defamation claim under Michigan law with respect to that statement.
Finally, WXYZ says that Gordon’s statement cannot be deemed actionable
when considered “in the entire context of the broadcast,” as it must be under
Michigan law. (Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #24 at 8, Pg. ID 440.) To WXYZ,
“[t]he obvious import of the broadcast is not ‘here’s what happened: someone broke

30

the law’ but, to the contrary, ‘we don’t know what happened and we can’t find out.’”
(Id.)

The Court agrees that certain portions of the broadcasts did focus on

unanswered questions. But Jones has plausibly alleged that the Gordon statement,
as supposedly distorted by WXYZ, purported to answer the very question posed by
the stories: did someone break the law? Simply put, Jones has sufficiently alleged
that even if much of the reports concerned unanswered questions, a reasonable
viewer could nonetheless regard the purportedly-distorted Gordon statement as a
definitive claim that Jones did, indeed, break the law.
2
Jones has also plausibly alleged that WXYZ acted with “actual malice” with
respect to its depiction of Gordon’s statement. Jones has alleged that WXYZ knew
that Gordon did not say or theorize that he broke the law but that WXYZ nonetheless
presented her as saying or theorizing just that. In other words, Jones has alleged that
WXYZ acted with knowledge that its depiction of Gordon’s statement was false.
That is a sufficient allegation of “actual malice.” See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280
(“actual malice” requires “knowledge of falsity”). In fact, the Supreme Court has
held that the Sullivan “actual malice” standard is satisfied where a speaker
knowingly misquotes another in a manner that “results in a material change in the
meaning conveyed by the [original speaker’s] statement.” Masson v. New Yorker

31

Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). That is what Jones plausibly alleges here
with respect to WXYZ’s alleged false depiction of Gordon’s statement.
WXYZ counters that Jones has not plausibly alleged that WXYZ knowingly
and/or intentionally distorted Gordon’s statement:
Plaintiffs argue that it is difficult to hear Deborah Gordon utter the word
‘if’ and that this is so because Defendant intentionally made it difficult.
But Plaintiffs have alleged absolutely no facts in support of this
conclusion. Indeed, it is at least equally plausible that the word is
difficult to hear (assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is) because
Gordon did not say the word as loudly or as clearly as Plaintiffs would
like. As Twombly makes clear, when there is a plausible and benign
alternative explanation for the conduct that a plaintiff challenges, then
that plaintiff has not made out a plausible case in his pleadings.
(Renewed Mot. to Dismiss, ECF #24 at 7, Pg. ID 439; emphasis in original.) The
Court disagrees.
Under the facts alleged by Jones (which include the reports themselves), it is
not equally plausible that the word “if” is difficult to hear because Gordon did not
speak with sufficient volume or clarity. The reports contain several statements by
Gordon. During each statement, she speaks clearly and maintains her voice at an
audible volume. Gordon’s demonstrated and consistent speech pattern reasonably
supports the inference that she did not suddenly drop her voice or muffle her words
when saying “if.” Accordingly, Jones has shown “more than a sheer possibility”
that the word “if” is not missing due to Gordon’s manner of speaking and has thus

32

satisfied his requirements under Twombly. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556-57 and describing the Twombly standard.)
Moreover, Jones has alleged that Dahl had personal animus toward him and a
motive to do him harm (see, e.g., First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 131(H), 131(I), 131(L),
ECF #20 at Pg. ID 285-86), and these allegations lend further support to Jones’ claim
that the distortion of Gordon’s statement resulted from a knowing and intentional
act by WXYZ rather than some other cause. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, illwill and a motive to injure may be “circumstantial evidence, which, when combined
with other evidence, may amount to malice.” Perk v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 931
F.2d 408, 411 (6th Cir. 1991).16 Here, Dahl’s alleged dislike of Jones provides a
motive for WXYZ to injure his reputation, and that purported motive adds
plausibility to Jones’ assertion that WXYZ intentionally distorted Gordon’s
statement. Jones has cleared Sullivan’s actual malice hurdle with respect to the
depiction of Gordon’s statement.
E
In Count II of the First Amended Complaint, Jones alleges that WXYZ
tortiously interfered with his business relationships. WXYZ seeks dismissal of that

16

See also Young v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., 734 F.3d 544, 548
n.1 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 315
n.10 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Although we recognize that proof of ill will or animosity is
not required to show actual malice, evidence of ulterior motive can often bolster an
inference of actual malice”) (internal citation and emphasis removed). 
33

claim on one ground: that it fails because “it [is] based on the same speech as the
failed defamation claim.” (First Dismissal Mot. at 22, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 98.) The
Court agrees that Jones may not pursue a tortious interference claim based upon
statements from the broadcasts that are insufficient to support a defamation claim
(i.e., the statements that Jones was involved with “secret severances,” that his silence
and secrecy was “purchased,” and that he “gave” Troy $58,000). See, e.g., Hazime,
2013 WL 4483485, at *14 (“It is well-established in Michigan law that once a
defamation claim fails, all related tortious interference claims fall with it”) (citing
Lakeshore Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Perry, 538 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Mich. App. 1995)). But
the Court has concluded that Jones has stated a viable defamation claim with respect
to WXYZ’s depiction of Gordon’s statement. WXYZ offers no argument as to why
the Court should dismiss a tortious interference claim that rests upon a statement that
is sufficient to support a defamation claim. Therefore, the Court will therefore
permit Jones to proceed with his tortious interference claim with respect the Gordon
statement.
F
Jones brings a claim for “False Light Publicity Invasion of Privacy” in Count
III of the First Amended Complaint. WXYZ has moved to dismiss the false light
claim on only one ground: that it fails because Jones’ defamation claim fails. (See
First Dismissal Mot. at 23, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 99.) The Court agrees that Jones cannot

34

pursue a false light claim with respect to the three classes of statements that failed
to support a cognizable defamation claim (i.e., the statements that Jones was
involved with “secret severances,” that his silence and secrecy was “purchased,” and
that he “gave” Troy $58,000). These statements cannot form the basis of a false
light claim because, as explained above, they are not materially false. See, e.g.,
Dupuis v. City of Hamtramck, 502 F.Supp.2d 654, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
(dismissing false light claim “for same reasons that invalidate[d] [plaintiff’s]
defamation claim – namely that the defendants’ story is not false….”); Jones v.
Jennings, 2016 WL 4577352, at *5 (Mich. App. Aug. 30, 2016) (same). Moreover,
because the statements are not materially false, WXYZ could not have made them
with actual malice,17 and the lack of such actual malice further bars Jones’ false light
claim based upon these statements. See Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. For Pub. Policy,
680 N.W.2d 915, 920-21 (Mich. App. 2004) (holding that false light claims are
subject to the same First Amendment limitations as defamation claims and
dismissing false light claim against public figure for lack of actual malice);
Armstrong, 596 Fed. App’x at 444 n.3 (“The requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate
actual malice when he is a public figure also applies in the context of false light….”).

17

Actual malice exists only where a defendants acts with knowledge, or reckless
disregard, of falsity.  See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (actual malice requires
“knowledge that [a statement] was false” or “reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not”) (emphasis added). 
35

However, the Court will allow Jones to proceed with his false light claim with
respect to the alleged false depiction of Gordon’s statement. The Court held that
Jones stated a viable defamation claim with respect to that depiction. WXYZ offers
no argument as to why the Court should dismiss a false light claim that rests upon a
depiction that is sufficient to support a defamation claim. The Court will therefore
permit Jones to proceed with a false light claim with respect to the depiction of the
Gordon statement.
G
Finally, in Count IV of the First Amended Complaint, Jones brings a claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. “Under Michigan law, the
elements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme or
outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe
emotional distress.” Webster v. United Auto Workers, Local 51, 394 F.3d 436, 442
(6th Cir. 2005). “In ruling on such a claim, it is initially for the trial court to
determine whether the defendant's conduct reasonably may be regarded as so
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
In Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 1985), the
Michigan Supreme Court explained that:
The cases thus far decided have found liability [for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress] only where the
defendant’s conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It
has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an
36

intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his
conduct has been characterized by ‘malice’, or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive
damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’
Id. at 909; see also Webster, 394 F.3d at 442 (“Extreme or outrageous conduct is
that which goes beyond the bounds of decency and would be considered atrocious
and utterly intolerable in civilized society”).
Jones has not satisfied this exacting standard. WXYZ’s alleged actions with
respect to the reports were not “so outrageous in character” as to subject it to liability
for Jones’ alleged emotional distress. WXYZ asked a number of entirely appropriate
questions on a topic of legitimate public concern and then allegedly stepped over the
line and made certain allegedly-defamatory statements about Jones. While one of
those statements may be actionable through a defamation claim or other tort claims,
the statements are not so outrageous as to give rise to an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. Indeed, Jones has not identified a single case in which a
Michigan court or any court applying Michigan law has sustained an emotional

37

distress claim under circumstances like these.18 The Court therefore will dismiss
Jones’ claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
H
WXYZ has moved to dismiss the defamation, tortious interference, and false
light claims brought by MVP on a single ground: “the broadcasts say nothing even
arguably defamatory about [MVP].” (First Dismissal Motion at 1, ECF #8 at Pg. ID
77.)

MVP counters that the broadcasts defame it through three defamatory

statements: (1) that MVP “is owned and operated by persons who have broken the
law, who should be referred to the [Attorney General] and who illegally and
unethically manipulated a severance payment among the owners of MVP from the
Detroit PLA”; (2) that MVP “was formed through an illegal and unethical severance
payment engineered by Odis Jones to his business partner Adam Troy”; and (3) that
MVP “came into existence as a result of the purported ‘secret severances’” in which
its “founding partners” participated. (Def.s’ Resp. to Renewed Mot. to Dismiss at iiiii, ECF #25 at Pg. ID 445-46.)

18

In support of his emotional distress claim, Jones relies upon a single case: Graham
v. Ford, 604 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. App. 1999). But Graham merely states the relevant
standard for an emotional distress claim. And the court in Graham affirmed the
dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the
plaintiffs had failed to “demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct or a specific
intent … to inflict the alleged injury of emotional distress on plaintiffs.” Graham,
604 N.W.2d at 717. Thus, Graham is no help to Jones.
38

At this point, the Court declines to dismiss MVP’s claims on the sole basis
offered by WXYZ. The Court cannot now conclude that, as WXYZ contends, the
broadcasts say nothing even arguably defamatory about MVP. As explained above,
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that WXYZ’s depiction of Gordon as opining that
Jones violated the law is both materially false and capable of a defamatory meaning.
MVP has plausibly alleged that the reports connect it to this false depiction by,
among other things, displaying the MVP logo and website around the same time that
the Gordon depiction is shown and by linking MVP (and its formation) to the
payment that Gordon labeled as unlawful. There may be reasons why WXYZ’s
alleged linking of MVP to Gordon’s depiction is insufficient to support a defamation
claim, but WXYZ has not yet fully developed an argument to that effect.19 Thus, for
now, the Court will permit MVP to proceed with its defamation claim to the extent
that the claim rests upon the connection in the reports between MVP and the
depiction of Gordon as opining that Jones broke the law.

19

For instance, the above-quoted “statements” on which MVP rests its claims do not
appear verbatim in the reports. Rather, MVP’s quotations combine two aspects of
the reports: (1) the depiction of Gordon as saying that Jones violated the law in
connection with the severances and (2) the statements and images in the reports
connecting Jones and Troy to MVP and connecting the Troy severance payment to
MVP. There may, perhaps, be an argument that MVP may not pursue a defamation
claim by “putting the pieces together” in this manner. But WXYZ has not yet
developed such an argument. Again, WXYZ’s sole attack on MVP’s claims is its
assertion that the reports say nothing defamatory about MVP. The Court cannot yet
reach that conclusion as a matter of law based upon the current state of the briefing
and argument with respect to MVP’s claims.
39

The Court likewise declines to dismiss MVP’s tortious interference and false
light claims at this time. WXYZ seeks dismissal of these claims on the same basis
that it sought dismissal of MVP’s defamation claim: that the reports do not say
anything false and defamatory about MVP. But, as explained above, WXYZ has not
yet persuaded the Court that the reports do not plausibly allege a false and
defamatory statement concerning MVP. Thus, the Court declines to dismiss the
tortious interference and false light claims in their entirety at this point. MVP may
pursue these claims to the extent that they rest upon the connection in the reports
between MVP and the depiction of Gordon as opining that Jones broke the law.
WXYZ may launch any attack it deems fit on MVP’s claims at the summary
judgment stage of these proceedings. And the Court anticipates that at that stage,
the parties will develop in much greater detail their arguments with respect to MVP’s
claims.
V
For the reasons stated above, the Renewed Motion to Dismiss (ECF #24) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:
 The motion is GRANTED with respect to Jones’ and MVP’s defamation,
tortious interference, and false light claims to the extent that those claims are
based on (1) the use of the phrase “secret severances, (2) statements in the
reports that Jones’ “secrecy” and “silence” was “purchased,” and (3) the

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statement that Jones alone caused the PLA to “give” pay Troy $58,000 in
severance;
 The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Jones’ intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim; and
 The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2017

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on April 4, 2017, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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