Shine v. Deangelo-Kipp

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability, and Granting Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

FERDARIUS S. SHINE,
Petitioner,
Case No. 2:16-cv-12774
v.
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
JODI DEANGELO-KIPP,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Ferdarius Shine is incarcerated in a Michigan prison and petitions the Court for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Shine's imprisonment stems from
convictions for three counts of first-degree, premeditated murder, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.316(1)(a), two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.83, and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony
("felony firearm"), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. Shine's sole ground for relief alleges
that there was insufficient evidence at trial to overcome his insanity defense. There was
conflicting expert testimony regarding Shine's alleged insanity, but the state appellate
court ruled that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support Shine's
convictions and to overcome his insanity defense. The appellate court's decision was not
unreasonable and therefore, under the "doubly deferential" standard for reviewing habeas

claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Shine's habeas petition must be
denied.
BACKGROUND
Shine's charges arose from multiple shootings at a home on Winthrop Street in
Detroit, Michigan on February 15, 2013. The state court described the incident as follows:
Defendant was present for a family gathering that evening at the home he
shared with his grandmother and his seven-year-old daughter. Defendant
went upstairs, and when he returned, he had a gun and opened fire on all
six family members present in the home. He shot and killed his aunt and
grandmother, and mortally wounded his daughter, who died in the hospital
33 days after the shooting. He beat his mother with his fists and chased his
16-year-old cousin down the street before she managed to find safety with
neighbors.
People v. Shine, No. 321763, 2015 WL 5314879, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App., Sept. 10, 2015).
Shine was tried before a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court, where his defense
was that he was legally insane at the time of the crimes. He did not testify at trial, but
forensic psychologist Steven Miller testified on Shine's behalf. In Miller's opinion, Shine
suffered from one or more mental disorders and was legally insane at the time of the
crimes. But the prosecution's rebuttal witness, Dr. Donna Rinnas, reached the opposite
conclusion. She testified that, in her opinion, Shine was neither mentally ill, nor legally
insane.
The trial court instructed the jurors that they could find Shine not guilty, not guilty
by reason of insanity, guilty as charged, or guilty, but mentally ill. On the first-degree
murder charges, the jurors were given the additional option of finding Shine guilty of the
lesser offense of second-degree murder. On April 7, 2014, the jury acquitted Shine of one

count of assault with intent to commit murder,1 but found him guilty of the other two counts
of assault with intent to commit murder, and likewise found him guilty of the three counts
of first-degree murder and one count of felony-firearm.
The trial court sentenced Shine to mandatory life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for the murder convictions, concurrent terms of 225 months (eighteen
years, nine months) to seventy-five years in prison for the two assault convictions, and a
consecutive term of two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. The Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed Shine's convictions in an unpublished decision, see Shine,
2015 WL 5314879, and on March 29, 2016, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal, see People v. Shine, 499 Mich. 882 (2016). On July 25, 2016, Shine filed his
habeas corpus petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires
habeas petitioners who challenge "a matter adjudicated on the merits in State court to
show that the relevant state court decision (1) was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, or (2) was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceedings." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)) (quotation marks omitted). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

1

The prosecutor conceded that the evidence did not support the count of assault with
intent to murder Shine's mother. See 4/4/14 Trial Tr., pp. 56-57.

that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).
Consequently, AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard that demands state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's
decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on his or her claim "was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103.
ANALYSIS
Shine alleges that his convictions violate due process of law and must be vacated
because there was insufficient evidence to overcome his insanity defense. He claims that
he proved the defense by a preponderance of the evidence and that the prosecution failed
to rebut the defense. Accordingly, he seeks a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.
I.

Clearly Established Supreme Court Precedent
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution "protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Accordingly, the Court considers "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979).

Ordinarily, this standard "must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive
elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Id. at 324 n.16. Here, however,
Shine does not deny committing the crimes, and he has not alleged that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of the charged offenses. Rather, the question is whether the
prosecution adequately rebutted Shine's defense of legal insanity.
The Supreme Court has said that allocating the burden of proving an affirmative
defense to a defendant does not violate the Due Process Clause. See Smith v. United
States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013). Although the state may not shift the burden of proof to
a defendant when the affirmative defense negates an element of the crime, the state need
not overcome an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt when the defense
"excuses conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but does not controvert any of the
elements of the offense itself[.]" Id. (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Shine seeks to excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable;
specifically, by asserting that he was insane at the time he committed the offense. In
Michigan, "sanity is not an element of substantive criminal charges," including first-degree
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and felony firearm. Whitlow v. Palmer, No.
1:17-cv-1010, 2018 WL 521458, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2018) (crimes generally);
People v. Mette, 243 Mich. App. 318, 330 (2000) (first-degree murder); Allen v. Redman,
858 F.2d 1194, 1199 (6th Cir. 1988) (assault with intent to commit murder); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.227b(1); People v. Avant, 235 Mich. App. 499, 505 (1999) (felony firearm).
Because sanity is not an element of the crimes for which Shine was convicted, his claim
fails to raise a federal constitutional issue and is therefore not cognizable on habeas
review. See Duffy v. Foltz, 804 F.2d 50, 54 (6th Cir. 1986).

II.

The Merits
Even if Shine's claim were cognizable here, the Supreme Court has "made clear

that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are
subject to two layers of judicial deference." Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651
(2012). First, it is the responsibility of the jury to decide what conclusions should be drawn
from the evidence admitted at trial. Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)).
"And second, on habeas review, 'a federal court may not overturn a state court decision
rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court
disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court
decision was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Id. (quoting Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2).
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded on review of Shine's claim that there
was sufficient evidence at trial to overcome Shine's insanity defense and to support the
jury's conclusion that Shine was sane during his commission of the crimes. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that, in Michigan criminal law, "a person is presumed to be sane,"
People v. Walker, 142 Mich. App. 523, 525 (1985), and that a defendant has the burden
of proving an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 768.21a(3).
Legal insanity requires "proof that, as a result of mental illness or being mentally
retarded as defined in the mental health code, the defendant lacked 'substantial capacity
either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.'" People v. Carpenter, 464
Mich. 223, 230–31 (2001) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.21a(1)). Michigan law
defined mental illness as "a substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly

impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the
ordinary demands of life." Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1400(g).
A.

Testimony suggesting that Shine was insane

Shine's expert witness, forensic psychologist Steven Miller, interviewed Shine for
competency to stand trial and for a criminal responsibility evaluation. He conducted two
interviews with Shine and opined at trial that Shine had a mental disorder and was legally
insane at the time of the crimes. Although Shine informed Miller that he did not remember
everything that happened, Miller did not think Shine was malingering. In reaching his
conclusions, Miller pointed out Shine's psychiatric history, which included hospitalizations
for depression, bipolar disorder, and suicidal ideation at ages ten and twenty years old.
For several years, Shine went untreated, but then he voluntarily returned to a treatment
center for help.
At the hospital where Shine was taken after the shootings, he reported hearing
voices. He also asked the police officers to shoot him, and he had delusional ideas that
he was a rock star and was going to be rich and famous. The medical diagnosis for Shine
upon his admission to the hospital was acute psychosis, and the discharge diagnosis was
schizoaffective disorder, which Miller said was a type of schizophrenia. Medical staff at
the hospital gave Shine Seroquel and Haldol, which are antipsychotic medications. The
Seroquel dosage was tripled when Shine went to the Wayne County Jail. ECF 9-6, PgID
730–72 (4/3/14 Trial Tr., pp. 130–72); ECF 9-7, PgID 790–810 (4/4/14 Trial Tr., pp. 12–
32).
Other witness testimony supported Dr. Miller's observations. For example, Shine's
mother testified to Shine's psychiatric history, his abnormal confusion and inability to find

his way home from his daughter's school shortly before the shootings, and his state of
mind at the time of the shootings. ECF 9-5, PgID 466–67, 486–90, 496–99, 511–19
(4/2/14 Trial Tr., pp. 33–34, 53–57, 63–66, 78–86). Shine's cousin testified that, as he
was chasing her during the crime, he said that the devil made him do it. Id. at 579 (Trial
Tr. p. 146). And Shine's friend testified that, after the shootings, Shine rode a bicycle to
her home in pajama pants and a tee shirt, despite it being mid-February. ECF 9-6, PgID
616–17 (4/3/14 Trial Tr., pp. 16–17). She further testified that Shine was totally different
from his usual self at the time, that his voice, attitude, and facial expression were unusual
for him, and that he did not remember what he had done, although he said that he was a
bad person and wanted to kill himself. Id. at 618–20.
B. Testimony suggesting that Shine was not insane
The prosecution's expert witness was Dr. Donna Rinnas who was a consultant and
forensic examiner at the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. She maintained that Shine was
not legally insane, or even mentally ill, when he committed the charged offenses. The
state court summarized her trial testimony as follows:
Dr. Rinnas had an opportunity to meet with defendant on two separate
occasions and review his medical records. While Dr. Rinnas acknowledged
that defendant had a history of mental illness, she noted that it involved
anxiety and depression, and that there was never any indication that those
conditions, or anything else, had significantly impaired defendant's
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the
ordinary demands of life. In fact, there was significant evidence that
defendant was functioning normally up until the very moment he committed
these crimes, including the fact that he had represented himself in a court
proceeding earlier that day. Rinnas believed that defendant's actions of
fleeing the scene, selectively remembering what he had done, carrying out
a plan to visit a friend, and providing a false name at the hospital suggested
that he not only appreciated the nature of his actions, but had been able to
think clearly and cohesively at the time of the incident.

Shine, 2015 WL 5314879, at *2.
This summary of the evidence is supported by the record before the Court. See
ECF 9-6, PgID 649–728 (4/3/14 Trial Tr., pp. 49–128), ECF 9-7, PgID 811–17 (4/4/14
Trial Tr., pp. 33–39). Dr. Rinnas conceded that Seroquel was an antipsychotic medication,
but she said that Shine was given a low dosage and that it was used for non-psychotic
reasons, that is, to treat agitation or serious anxiety. ECF 9-6, PgID 686 (4/3/14 Trial Tr.,
p. 86). Although Shine reported hearing voices at the hospital, Dr. Rinnas noted that he
was able to provide relevant personal information about himself, id. at 90, and the medical
staff was concerned or skeptical about the genuineness of his presentation given the
nature of the situation and certain inconsistencies in his presentation. Id. at 691, 694.
Dr. Rinnas also stated that there were no readily apparent psychological symptoms
when she saw Shine and that he was not functionally impacted by his symptoms
according to his own account and treatment records. Id. at 661, 672. In fact, he had been
"engage[d] in pretty full and normal daily [activities], taking care of his daughter, going to
school, helping his grandmother, preparing meals for the family, sometimes [being a] DJ
at parties at night, playing [on] the computer, going for walks, [and] spending time with
his girlfriend." Id. at 672. According to Dr. Rinnas, "[t]hose kind of things [were] not
consistent with someone who's . . . functionally, negatively, impacted by a significant
mental illness." Id.
Continuing, Dr. Rinnas stated that there was nothing to indicate that Shine had
been out of touch with reality earlier on the day of the shootings. Id. at 674. In fact, he
indicated to her that it was a normal day and that he became agitated after he smoked
marijuana and had a paranoid reaction to the drug. Id. at 673–74. Although Dr. Rinnas

acknowledged that high doses of marijuana can cause psychosis, she accurately pointed
out that voluntary intoxication is not a basis for legal insanity. Id. at 707.2 She also noted
that, after the shootings, Shine fled the scene, rode a bicycle across town, and made
several phone calls to people he knew. She claimed that these activities suggested an
appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct, his resourcefulness, and his control of
his behavior. Id. at 680–81.
Other witnesses corroborated aspects of Dr. Rinnas's testimony. Kelly Jones, for
example, testified that, during the court proceeding on the morning of the shootings, Shine
appeared to be normal and his usual self. ECF 9-4, PgID 400–01, 406–407 (4/1/14 Trial
Tr., pp. 171–72, 177–78). Santangela Williams testified that Shine was cooking and
talking with his relatives immediately before the shootings. ECF 9-5, PgID 559–67 (4/2/14
Trial Tr., pp. 126–34).
In sum, there were reasons to believe either expert. Although a reasonable juror
could have accepted Shine's theory of insanity, there was sufficient evidence to support
the prosecution's theory that Shine was sane. The state appellate court's finding that the
evidence was sufficient to overcome Shine's insanity defense was therefore objectively
reasonable. It certainly was not so lacking in justification that there was an error beyond

2

See Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.21a(2) (stating that "[a]n individual who was under the
influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol or controlled substances at the time
of his or her alleged offense is not considered to have been legally insane solely because
of being under the influence of the alcohol or controlled substances").

any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Accordingly, Shine's claim lacks merit, and
the habeas petition must be denied.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED because
reasonable jurists would not disagree with the Court's assessment of Shine's claim, nor
conclude that the issue deserves encouragement to proceed further. Shine is free to
request a certificate of appealability from the Sixth Circuit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shine may proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
without further authorization because he was already granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and an appeal could be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A).
SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2018

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on June 29, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/David P. Parker
Case Manager