Friske v. Bonnier Corporation

Filing 80

ORDER Granting 76 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (SPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REBECCA FRISKE,
Plaintiff,

Case Number 16-12799
Honorable David M. Lawson

v.
BONNIER CORPORATION,
Defendant.
/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
On September 26, 2019, the Court granted final approval of a class-wide settlement. One
component of that settlement was the authorization for class counsel to file a motion requesting
the Court to authorize payment of up to $623,500, or 29 percent of the settlement fund, for
attorney’s fees and costs associated with the action. Counsel filed their motion under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(d), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1), and later supplemented it with additional
documentation.
“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable
costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). “‘When
awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must make sure that counsel is fairly
compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved.’” Gascho v. Global
Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 279 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache
Properties, Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993)). “These two measures of the fairness of an
attorney’s award — work done and results achieved — can be in tension with each other.” Ibid.
“The lodestar method of calculating fees better accounts for the amount of work done, whereas the
percentage of the fund method more accurately reflects the results achieved.” Ibid. (citations and
quotations omitted in this and following citations except as otherwise noted). “To determine the

lodestar figure, the court multiplies the number of hours ‘reasonably expended’ on the litigation
by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ibid. “The court may then, within limits, adjust the lodestar to reflect
relevant considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” Ibid. “In contrast, to employ the
percentage of the fund method, the court determines a percentage of the settlement to award to
class counsel.” Ibid.
“As the two methods measure the fairness of the fee with respect to different desired
outcomes, it is necessary that district courts be permitted to select the more appropriate method for
calculating attorney’s fees in light of the unique characteristics of class actions in general, and of
the unique circumstances of the actual cases before them.” Ibid. The Court also may elect to
“employ[] the lodestar method to determine the fairness of the fee, then . . . cross-check it with the
percentage-of-the-fund calculation.” Id. at 280. “District courts have the discretion to select the
particular method of calculation, but must articulate the ‘reasons for adopting a particular
methodology and the factors considered in arriving at the fee.’” Ibid. (quoting Moulton v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009)). “Moulton set out the germane factors,” which
include, “‘(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the services
on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society’s
stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others;
(5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved
on both sides.’” Ibid. (quoting 581 F.3d at 352).
The percentage of the fund method is appropriate here for evaluating the reasonableness of
the attorney fee since the result achieved for the class in terms of the cash payments to be made
from the fund was substantial, and class counsel undertook the representation on a contingent fee
basis and advanced significant labor and expenses to litigate the case. And the percentage award

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requested is appropriate to compensate class counsel adequately for the risk inherent in that
contingent fee representation. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 747
(2018) (“Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the requested fee was equal to 25% of the
settlement fund [which] was commensurate with the risk posed by the action and the time and skill
required to secure a successful result for the class, given that class counsel faced three motions to
dismiss and participated in extensive settlement negotiations.”)
“When conducting a percentage of the fund analysis, courts must calculate the ratio
between attorney’s fees and benefit to the class.” Gascho, 822 F.3d at 282. “Attorney’s fees are
the numerator and the denominator is the dollar amount of the Total Benefit to the class.” Ibid.
However, when calculating the ratio, the Gascho court, in a parenthetical remark, included “the
attorney’s fees and . . . costs of administration” in addition to the payout to class members. Ibid.
That calculation method departs from traditional norms in non-class-action contingent fee cases,
where the fee is determined by a percentage of the net recovery. See Hunt v. Hadden, No. 1410713, 2015 WL 3473680, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2015), order vacated in part on
reconsideration, No. 14-10713, 2015 WL 13048812 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2015). But in class
cases, considerable amounts of litigation expenses must be advanced by class counsel on behalf of
absent potential plaintiffs too numerous to consult. Therefore, whereas in individual cases, a client
can agree to share in the risk of litigation by agreeing to pay a share of the expenses from a potential
recovery — or perhaps all of them if there is no recovery — class counsel does not have that option
and must bear the costs alone on behalf of the class in general. Those advancement of costs
therefore truly benefit the class and are part of the “Total Benefit.”
In this case, there is no reverter authorized by the settlement agreement; all of the net
common fund will be distributed to claimants on a pro rata basis. The settlement also provides

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that Bonnier will send every settlement class member a voucher for a free, one-year subscription
to the Bonnier magazine of his or her choice — even if the class member did not submit a claim
form — and Bonnier will include disclosure language in informational materials so that the
disclosure is available to consumers before subscribing to any Bonnier publication. This relief is
difficult to value, but has value nonetheless. That aside, the total benefit to the class members is
the full amount of the common fund, or $2,150,000.
The requested attorney’s fee is $623,500. The attorney’s fee thus represents 29% of that
denominator, which is within the range of percentage fees that have been approved in other
Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act (“VPRA”) cases. E.g., Moeller v. American Media, Inc., No.
16-11367, ECF No. 42 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2017) (awarding 35% of fund as attorney’s fees);
Halaburda v. Bauer Publishing Company, LP, No. 12-12831, ECF No. 54 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26,
2013) (awarding 30% of fund as attorney’s fees); Coulter-Owens v. Rodale, Incorporated, No. 1412688, ECF No. 55 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2016) (awarding 25% of fund as attorney’s fees); Kinder
v. Meredith Corporation, No. 14-11284, ECF No. 81 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2014) (awarding 35%
of fund as attorney’s fees). Twenty-nine percent is both a reasonable and appropriate attorney’s
share of the common fund.
The requested fee is also less than the full lodestar amount that the plaintiffs’ counsel could
charge. The plaintiffs’ counsel seek to recover an aggregate amount of $623,500 based on a total
of 1,209.9 hours billed by its attorneys at various hourly rates. The plaintiff submitted itemized
billing records indicating billings by the primary attorneys who worked on the case that are
summarized as follows:


Gary F. Lynch, partner. 30 years experience. $675.00 per hour. 323.4 hours.
$218.295.00 in attorney’s fees. ECF no. 76-1, PageID.987.

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

Jamisen A. Etzel, associate. 7 years experience. $425.00 per hour. 120.6 hours.
$51,255.00 in attorney’s fees. Ibid.



Kevin Abramowicz, associate. 3 years experience. $350.00 per hour. 115.8 hours.
$40,530.00 in attorney’s fees. Ibid.



Derek Markle, associate. 1 year experience. $250.00 per hour. 49.2 hours.
$12,300.00 in attorney’s fees. Ibid.



Daniel O. Myers, partner. 26 years experience. $600.00 per hour. 244.4 hours.
$146,640 in attorney’s fees. ECF No 76-2, PageID.991.



Robert S. Wood, member. 20 years experience. $700.00 per hour. 292.9 hours.
$204,540.00 in attorney’s fees. ECF No. 76-3, PageID.994.



D. Charles Dukes, associate. $450.00 per hour. 40.6 hours. $18,270 in attorney’s
fees. Ibid.



William King, paralegal. $150.00 per hour. 23 hours. $3,450 in attorney’s fees.
Ibid.

The hourly rates billed by each of the plaintiffs’ attorneys are reasonable for a consumer
protection and class action type practice and their years of experience. The rates charged by all
the attorneys range from $250 to $700 per hour, with a blended rate of about $574.66. Courts have
approved similar rates for similar VRPA class action settlements. See Moeller, No. 16-11367,
ECF No. 42 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2017) (approving rates ranging between $215 to $750);
Halaburda., No. 12-12831, ECF No. 54 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2013) (approving rates ranging
between $215 to $685); Coulter-Owens, No. 14-12688, ECF No. 55 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2016)
(approving rates ranging between $270 to $725); Kinder, No. 14-11284, ECF No. 81 (E.D. Mich.
May 18, 2014) (approving blended rate of about $456.77). Considering the complexity of the case
and the experience of the several attorneys who worked on the case, the Court finds that the
adjusted rate is reasonable.
The level of experience of counsel ranges from paralegals and newly admitted attorneys
with 1 to 2 years to experienced counsel with over 30 years of experience with consumer protection
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and class action litigation, and the rates vary proportionally with that experience. The plaintiffs’
counsel avers that they have spent over 1,209 hours litigating the action, equaling roughly
$623,500 at a lodestar. The requested fee is approximately 10% below that lodestar, which crosschecks within a reasonable range of the requested fee determined by the percentage of the fund
method.
The Court also finds that the Moulton factors favor approval of the fee. The value of the
benefit rendered by plaintiffs’ counsel is substantial and likely will result in payments of between
$76 to $79 to more than 17,000 class members, which represents a respectable middle ground
within the range of statutory damages that they could have hoped to secure through a favorable
verdict. The value of the services was high, since counsel secured a favorable settlement including
damages to claimants and magazine subscriptions to non-claimant class members, while also
assuring that Bonnier’s informational materials include disclosure language for new customers.
Class counsel was retained on a contingent fee basis and assumed the risk of advancing substantial
costs and expenses of the litigation throughout its course. This case involved several complex
legal issues, including contract formation, whether Bonnier sells magazines “at retail,” whether
Bonnier sufficiently notified its customers about its data practices, and whether Bonner disclosed
information for marketing purposes or for other reasons. Class counsel also investigated the
alleged privacy violations as the practices were not advertised or publicly disclosed. Society would
do well to reward those attorneys who engage in such practice to defend the rights of thousands of
Michigan magazine subscribers who unwittingly had their private information disclosed for
commercial purposes. Finally, the attorneys are experienced and well-regarded consumer class
action counsel, deserving of the contingent fee compensation for which they have applied.

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Objector William LeTarte asserts that the final settlement should be disapproved for other
reasons, but he has not objected to the substance of the attorney’s fee request. For the reasons
stated, the Court finds the attorney’s fees reasonable and adequate.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 76)
is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that payments from the settlement fund are approved as follows:


Class counsel shall receive $623,500, which includes compensation for attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses; and



The settlement administrator may be paid up to $100,000 (and no more) in actual
expenses incurred in the course of administering the class and settlement, which
sum includes all payments made to date.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge

Date: October 17, 2019
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was
served upon each attorney or party of record herein by
electronic means or first-class U.S. mail on October 17, 2019.
s/Susan K. Pinkowski
SUSAN K. PINKOWSKI

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