Beauvais v. City of Inkster et al
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT CITY OF INKSTER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 31 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Case No. 16-cv-12814
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
CITY OF INKSTER and BOOKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
CITY OF INKSTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff Susan Beauvais (“Plaintiff” or “Beauvais”) filed
a Complaint against the City of Inkster, Michigan (“Defendant” or “Inkster”) and
former Inkster Police Officer Booker Snow. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff amended her
Complaint on February 3, 2017. See Dkt. No. 18. There, she alleges violations of
the following state and federal laws: violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) (Count I); violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
(Count II); violations of Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on sexual harassment, (Count III);
and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on retaliation (Count
IV). See id.
Presently before the Court is Defendant Inkster’s Motion for Summary
Judgment . For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT IN PART
and DENY IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment . The Court
GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion as to Counts I, II and III, and DENIES
Defendant’s Motion as to Count IV.
Plaintiff Susan Beauvais worked as a police officer for the City of Inkster,
Michigan during various periods from November 2007 until May 2017. Dkt. No.
18, p. 2 (Pg. ID 130); Dkt. 32, p. 22 (Pg. ID 1223).
Sexual Harassment Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that her former co-worker, Defendant Booker Snow, sexually
harassed her on several occasions. Dkt. No. 32, p. 14–15 (Pg. ID 1215–16). On April
12, 2014 Officer Snow approached her and whispered in her ear “[y]ou’re feeling
frisky aren’t you?” Dkt. No. 32-25, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1396). He continued “I can take
care of that, yes I can.” Id. Four days later, on April 16, 2014, Snow approached her
as she “was sitting with [her] hands behind [her] head,” and began “taking pictures
of her chest” with his cell phone. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 32-24, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1394).
Uncomfortable with Snow’s actions, Beauvais crossed her arms to block her chest.
Dkt. No. 18, p. 12 (Pg. ID 140). Snow, however, told Beauvais to lift up her arms.
On another occasion, Snow showed Beauvais a picture of his girlfriend and
said “[m]y girl loves black cock and white pussy, you know we really both could take
care of you. Yeah, we could make you feel good and totally relax.” Id. Beauvais
also frequently overheard Snow refer to women with whom he lived as “ho’s” and
heard him telling these women “to get naked before he got home because he wanted
to ‘be sucked.” Id.
Report to Supervisors and Inkster’s Response
Beauvais orally notified her supervisors of Snow’s actions on April 16, 2014,
and on April 24, 2014, she gave them a written complaint detailing Snow’s actions.1
Dkt. No. 32-45, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1456); Dkt. No. 18, p. 2–3 (Pg. ID 130–31).
Immediately after Beauvais reported Snow’s actions, Inkster pledged to
separate Beauvais and Snow. Dkt. No. 32, p. 16–17 (Pg. IDs 1217–18). The day
following Beauvais’s complaint, however, Snow remained on the same shift as
Beauvais. Id. This shift was the last one Beauvais and Snow would work together.
See Dkt. No. 32-2, p. 12 (Pg. ID 1249); see also Dkt. No. 31, p. 16 (Pg. ID 234).
Inkster held an internal disciplinary hearing regarding Beauvais’s complaints.
Dkt. No. 31, p. 36–37 (Pg. ID 254–55); Dkt. No. 32-47, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1476). The then
Nine months later, in January 2015, Beauvais filed a written complaint with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) asserting that
the Inkster Police Department harbored a hostile work environment and that she had
been retaliated against because of her complaints regarding sexual harassment. Dkt.
No. 32, p. 18 (Pg. ID 1219); Dkt. No. 32-30, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1418).
Chief of the Inkster Police Department, Vicki Yost, conducted the hearing and
concluded that Snow violated Inkster’s sexual harassment policies. Dkt. No. 32-47,
p. 2 (Pg. ID 1476). Because of this finding, Yost imposed on Snow a three-day
suspension: he was to pay back one day in salary, serve one day immediately, and
then serve another day if accused or found culpable of similar conduct. Dkt. No. 315, p. 2 (Pg. ID 371).
Additionally, Inkster hired an independent law firm to investigate Beauvais’s
allegations regarding Snow and whether gender or sexual harassment issues
permeated the Inkster Police Department. Dkt. No. 31-4, p. 2 (Pg. ID 348). The law
firm interviewed Beauvais, Snow and other officers relevant to Beauvais’s
allegations, and also reviewed videotape of interactions between Beauvais and Snow.
Id. It concluded that Snow’s comments to Beauvais “were inappropriate, and could
be considered sexual harassment, warranting disciplinary action.” Id. at p. 3 (Pg. ID
Human Resources Director LaZonja Smith ordered sexual harassment
training for the Police Department and also other Inkster City Departments. Dkt. No.
32, p. 28–29 (Pg. ID 1229–30). Smith testified that the training was motivated by
two considerations: (1) the City, including the police department, had not had sexual
harassment training in several years; and (2) complaints of sexual harassment,
including Plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. No. 31-7, p. 37 (Pg. ID 424).
Request for Personal Leave
On September 10, 2014, writing to Chief Yost, Beauvais requested “an
extended personal leave from work to handle some personal issues.” Dkt. No. 329, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1319). Beauvais requested leave from September 24, 2014 through
November 9, 2014. Id. She wrote that she would be willing to take this leave as
unpaid and that her “request is solely based for the purpose to handle pertinent
personal issues/matters.” Id.
Beauvais supported her request for leave with letters from two of her doctors,
Dr. Robert Klotz and Dr. George Nicoloff. Dkt. No. 31-13. Dr. Klotz’s letter is
dated September 8, 2014, and addressed to Chief Yost. Id. at p. 2 (Pg. ID 587).
Klotz wrote that he examined Beauvais “for signs and symptoms of acute work
related stress,” and that “[a]s a result of this stress, she is suffering from a number
of physical and emotional signs and symptoms that are typical reactions consistent
with issues of personal safety, work-related problems.” Id. Klotz explained that her
“issues are not related to being a patrol officer on the streets”; rather, “[s]he is
stressed about Departmental issues affecting duty performance.” Id. Likewise, Dr.
Nicoloff also addressed his letter to Chief Yost and explained that Beauvais was
“suffering from work related stress with symptoms of anxiety, panic attacks, and
other stress related symptoms.” Id. at p. 3 (Pg. ID 588).
Chief Yost granted Beauvais’s request for leave. See Dkt. No. 31-14, p. 33
(Pg. ID 621).
Inkster classified Beauvais’s temporary departure as worker’s
compensation leave because Beauvais “cited it as job-related.” Id.
On December 29 and December 30 of 2014, Beauvais’s doctors cleared her
to return to work without restrictions. See Dkt. No. 31-17, p. 2–3 (Pg. ID 749–50).
Dr. Klotz observed that “[Beauvais’s] signs and symptoms of Acute Work-Related
Stress have evolved, and are no longer present.” Id. at 2 (Pg. ID 749). Similarly,
Dr. Nicoloff determined that “[Beauvais] has recovered fully and is medically
cleared to return to work full time.” Id. at 3 (Pg. ID 750).
Beauvais did not immediately return to work, however, as Chief Yost required
that Beauvais undergo an independent medical evaluation in advance of her return.
Dkt. No. 31-14, p. 35, 42–43 (Pg. ID 623, 631–32). Yost testified that she required
Plaintiff to undergo an independent medical exam based on a concern “as to whether
[Beauvais] was capable of performing her duties.” Id. at p. 35 (Pg. ID 623).
Specifically, Yost testified that she was concerned for two reasons: Beauvais’s
September 2014 doctors’ notes and “Inkster’s liability.” Id.
Beauvais underwent an independent medical evaluation and, on April 21,
2015, obtained independent medical clearance to return to work without restrictions.
Dkt. No. 31-18, p. 15–16 (Pg. ID 765–66). Yet she did not return to work until May
12, 2015. Dkt. No. 32, p. 9, 31 (Pg. ID 1210, 1232). Human Resources Director
Smith testified that she did not know why Beauvais did not return to work before
May 12, 2015. Dkt. No. 32-12, p. 13 (Pg. ID 1342). Smith said that although the
doctor’s letter clearing Beauvais is dated April 21, 2015, she does not recall when
Inkster received the letter. Id. Smith said that Inkster may not have returned
Beauvais to work earlier because Inkster was busy defending a lawsuit, may have
encountered scheduling issues, or may have had difficulty contacting Beauvais. Id.
Plaintiff requested FMLA leave on December 10, 2015. Dkt. No. 31-35, p. 2
(Pg. ID 1181). Human Resources Director Smith initially denied Beauvais’s request
because Smith did not believe that Beauvais had worked the requisite number of
hours for leave under the FMLA. Dkt. No. 32-37, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1435). On December
11, 2015, Beauvais gave Smith evidence that she had worked the necessary number
of hours. Id. Beauvais received approval of her FMLA leave on December 16, 2015.
Dkt. No. 31-35, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1181).
On July 4, 2016, Beauvais was promoted to acting Sergeant. Dkt. No. 31, p.
22 (Pg. ID 240). Because of this promotion, she received an increase in pay. Dkt.
No. 31-21, p. 72 (Pg. ID 849). This was only a temporary position, however. Dkt.
No. 31-6, p. 14 (Pg. ID 386). Moreover, Beauvais’s promotion was partly motivated
by an injury to the then Sergeant, Linda Davidson. Id. Davidson was placed on
leave, and therefore, could not fulfill her duties. Id.
Beauvais was demoted back to police officer in December 2016 or January
2017, and she learned of this demotion in a wide-spread email distribution. Dkt. No.
32, p. 19–20 (Pg. ID 1220–21). At the time of Beauvais’s demotion, Sergeant
Davidson had not returned to full duty, but was back to work completing
administrative tasks. Dkt. No. 31-6, p. 14 (Pg. ID 386).
Inkster asserts that it demoted Beauvais because of budgetary constraints.
Dkt. No. 31, p. 22 (Pg. ID 240). Inkster had exceeded its budget for overtime
expenses, however, and had paid certain officers overtime for tutoring individuals
in the police academy. See Dkt. No. 32-7, p. 6 (Pg. ID 1311); see also Dkt. No. 3228, p. 5 (Pg. ID 1414).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “directs that summary judgment shall
be granted if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 1998). The court must view the facts,
and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). No
genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The essential inquiry
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
Defendant City of Inkster asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s claims. See Dkt. No. 31, p. 1–2 (Pg. ID 219–20). Inkster argues that the
Plaintiff does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
Defendant Inkster (1) “regarded” Plaintiff as disabled under the ADA (Count I); (2)
engaged in conduct that satisfies a prima facie case of FMLA interference (Count
II); (3) committed acts proving a prima facie case of sexual discrimination under
Title VII or the ELCRA (Count III); and (4) retaliated against Plaintiff in violation
of Title VII (Count IV). For Counts I, II and III, the Court finds that the Plaintiff
fails to raise a genuine dispute regarding a material fact, and therefore, the Court will
grant summary judgment as to those Counts. For Count IV, however, the Court finds
that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that prevents summary judgment as to
The Court will first consider Beauvais’s claim that the City of Inkster regarded
her as disabled because the City required her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation
and delayed her return to work. The Court finds that Beauvais’s claim fails as a
matter of law.
The ADA forbids “discrimination by a covered entity ‘against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Spees v.
James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 395 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a)). Where plaintiffs allege discrimination based on circumstantial evidence,
courts apply the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, “[t]o make out a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that she or he is an individual with a disability,
(2) who was otherwise qualified to perform a job’s requirements, with or without
reasonable accommodation; and (3) who was discriminated against solely because
of the disability.’” Spees, 617 F.3d at 395 (quoting Talley v. Family Dollar Stores
of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The third element requires that
the plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Talley, 542 F.3d at
If Beauvais makes this prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas framework
next requires that Inkster provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
conduct. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 1999).
Finally, “[i]f defendant does so, the burden shifts back to [Beauvais] to show that
the proffered reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Johnson v. Univ. Hosps.
Physician Servs., 617 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Sullivan, 197 F.3d
Plaintiff argues that she was an individual with a “disability” under the ADA
because Inkster regarded her as disabled. Dkt. No. 32, p. 23 (Pg. ID 1224). Under
the ADA, a ‘disability’ is “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in
paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Beauvais’s assertion requires her to raise a
genuine dispute about whether Inkster regarded her as having “an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived
to limit a major life activity,” and that the impairment was in fact or perceived to last
longer than six months. Id. at § 12102(3)(B).
She first alleges that reasonable minds may disagree about whether Inkster
regarded her as disabled because the City requested that she undergo an independent
fitness-for-duty examination. Dkt. No. 32, p. 23, (Pg. 1224). The Court disagrees.
“An employer’s request that an employee undergo a medical exam ‘may
signal that an employee’s job performance is suffering, but that cannot itself prove
a perception of a disability because it [alone] does not prove that the employer
perceives the employee to have an impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the employee’s major life activities.’” Johnson, 617 F. App’x at 491 (quoting
Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 810). A request for a fitness examination cannot prove
disability because ‘“[d]eteriorating [employee] performance may be linked to
motivation or other reasons unrelated to disability.”’ Id. (quoting Sullivan, 197 F.3d
The City of Inkster contends it demanded that Beauvais undergo an
independent fitness-for-duty examination because Beauvais requested leave based
on work-related issues, as detailed in the doctors’ notes that Beauvais offered to
support her leave request. Dkt. 31-14, p. 29–31 (Pg. ID 617–19). In these notes,
Beauvais’s personal doctors observed that she was having “issues of personal safety,
work-related problems,” and that although “[h]er issues are not related to being a
patrol officer on the streets,” “[s]he is stressed about Departmental issues affecting
duty performance.” Id.; Dkt. 31-13, p. 2 (Pg. ID 587). The doctors concluded that
Beauvais was suffering from “symptoms of anxiety, panic attacks, and other stress
related symptoms.” Dkt. 31-13, p. 3 (Pg. ID 588).
These issues specifically relate to Beauvais’s capacity to do her job. For
example, in Johnson, an examination referral was directly related to a plaintiff’s job
where the referral included language that the plaintiff “was falling asleep at work,
and generally had a difficult relationship with her manager.” 617 F. App’x at 491
(internal citations omitted). Similarly, Beauvais’s difficult interactions with coworkers on the job caused her stress, and this stress culminated in her request for
Unlike in Johnson, Inkster has not shown that Beauvais’s work performance
was deteriorating. Beauvais’s symptoms of “anxiety” and “panic attacks” because
of relationships with co-workers, however, provided Inkster with a sufficient basis
for inquiring about whether she could capably perform her job. Indeed, Chief Yost
testified that she required Beauvais to undergo an independent medical evaluation
because of a concern “as to whether [Beauvais] was capable of performing her
duties.” Dkt. No. 31-14, p. 35 (Pg. ID 623). This concern stemmed from the doctors’
notes and a concern about Inkster’s liability. Id. There is no evidence that Chief
Yost or anyone in the Inkster Police Department viewed Beauvais’s medical issues
as extending beyond her ability to discharge her duties as a police officer. Therefore,
reasonable minds would all agree that Inkster required Beauvais to undergo a fitnessfor-duty examination because of a concern about her ability to do her job, not any
perception of disability.
Beauvais also argues the Defendant regarded her as disabled because it
improperly delayed her return to work. Specifically, Beauvais argues that Inkster
prevented her from scheduling an independent medical examination—a condition of
her return to work—and that its initial justification for this action was pretext. Dkt.
No. 32, p. 13 (Pg. ID 1214). Beauvais alleges Inkster’s initial justification was that
she first had to withdraw a pending worker’s compensation claim. Id. Even
assuming this was Inkster’s initial justification, however, this allegation does not
raise a genuine dispute about whether Inkster regarded Beauvais as disabled. The
record reflects that the City categorized Beauvais’s absence as worker’s
compensation leave based on Beauvais’s description of her absence as “job-related.”
Dkt. No. 31-14, p. 32–33 (Pg. ID 620–21). Consequently, there is no evidence that
Inkster regarded her as disabled through this alleged initial justification.
Further, Beauvais asserts that she raises a genuine dispute of material fact
about whether Inkster regarded her as having a disability because Inkster knew that
she was having medical problems and, in contravention of the ADA, still requested
that she undergo an independent medical evaluation. The Sixth Circuit has already
rejected this argument. See Pena v. City of Flushing, 651 F. App’x 415 (6th Cir.
In Pena, the court held that Sixth Circuit precedent “recognize[s] the policy
choice Congress made by permitting employers to request fitness for duty
examinations as long as they are ‘job-related and consistent with business
necessity.”’ Id. at 420 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)). The court “decline[d]
to impose per se liability under the ‘regarded as’ provision,” reasoning that
“[o]therwise, [it] would be reading § 12112(d)(4)(A) out of the ADA.”
Likewise, in this case, Plaintiff’s claim that Inkster regarded her as having a
disability must fail as a matter of law because Inkster’s request for an independent
medical evaluation was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
Finally, Beauvais asserts that reasonable minds may disagree about whether
Inkster regarded her as disabled because Inkster did not rely on the medical opinions
of Beauvais’s doctors, and instead requested that she see an independent doctor.
This argument is unavailing. See Pena, 651 F. App’x at 422 (observing that “an
employee ‘may not dictate the terms of his medical examination.’ In other words,
that Pena’s doctors cleared him for duty does not excuse him for failing to see Dr.
Forsberg.” (quoting Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 809 n.2)).
Accordingly, the Court will grant Inkster summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
It is undisputed that the (1) Plaintiff requested FMLA leave on December 10,
2015; (2) Defendant requested additional evidence regarding Beauvais’s
employment hours and Beauvais provided this information on December 11, 2015;
and (3) the Defendant granted Plaintiff leave on December 16, 2015. See Dkt. No.
31-35, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1181); Dkt. No. 32-37, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1435).
Plaintiff argues that Inkster violated the FMLA by improperly delaying its
grant of Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave. Id. Inkster contends, and the Court
agrees, that it complied with all regulatory and statutory requirements in granting
Plaintiff FMLA leave. Dkt. No. 31, p. 3 (Pg. ID 221). Thus, reasonable minds would
all agree that Plaintiff has not established an FMLA claim.
Under the FMLA, an employer must not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided [by the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1). Prohibited interference includes “refusing to authorize FMLA leave”
or “discouraging an employee from using such leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). To
establish a prima facie case of FMLA interference, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he
was an eligible employee; (2) the defendant was a covered employer under the
FMLA; (3) he was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) he notified his
employer of his intent to take leave; and (5) the employer denied him benefits or
rights to which he was entitled under the FMLA.” Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating
& Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 427 (6th Cir. 2014).
“Interference occurs when an employer ‘shortchange[s] [an employee’s] leave
time, den[ies] reinstatement, or otherwise interfere[s] with [an employee’s]
substantive FMLA rights.’” Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 384
(6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 283
(6th Cir. 2012)). Under the interference theory then, an employer’s intent is
irrelevant. Id. (quoting Seeger, 681 F.3d at 282).
Here, the parties do not dispute that the (1) Plaintiff was an eligible employee;
(2) Inkster was a covered employer under the FMLA; (3) Plaintiff was entitled to
take leave under the FMLA; and (4) Plaintiff notified Inkster of her intent to take
On the fifth element, Plaintiff concedes the Defendant granted her FMLA
leave. Thus, there is no genuine dispute about whether the Defendant violated the
FMLA. Human Resources Director Smith initially denied Beauvais’s request for
leave; yet Smith’s denial was based on a misunderstanding of how many hours
Beauvais had worked. Dkt. No. 32-37, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1435). Beauvais was granted
leave once she clarified this misunderstanding, and thereby confirmed that she was
entitled to FMLA leave. Id. Inkster did not “shortchange” Beauvais’s leave, deny
her reinstatement, or otherwise interfere with her FMLA rights.
Beauvais’s FMLA claim must fail as a matter of law.
Sexual Harassment under Title VII
Plaintiff next argues reasonable minds may disagree about whether she was
subject to a hostile work environment in contravention of Title VII and the ELCRA.
The Court finds this argument unavailing.
“Primarily, ‘[c]ases brought pursuant to the ELCRA are analyzed under the
same evidentiary framework used in Title VII cases.”’ Ondricko v. MGM Grand
Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 652–53 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Rodriguez, 487
F.3d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 2007)). Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework,
discussed above, to claims brought under Title VII or the ELCRA. Specifically, the
Sixth Circuit has held that:
[u]nder Title VII, in order to make out a hostile-work-environment
claim based on sexual harassment, an employee must show that: (1) she
was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex;
(4) the charged sexual harassment created a hostile work environment;
and (5) the employer is liable.
Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t. of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Inkster does not contest that Beauvais was a member of a protected class; was
subjected to unwanted sexual harassment; and complained of harassment based on
sex. Therefore, Plaintiff has established the first three elements of her hostile work
environment claim. Inkster does contest, however, whether a genuine dispute exists
about the remaining two elements.
Hostile Work Environment
Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the sexual
harassment alleged by Beauvais was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding this element.
A hostile work environment exists where “the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 309 (6th Cir.
2016) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). “Both an
objective and subjective test must be met; in other words, the conduct must be so
severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile or abusive working environment both
to the reasonable person and the actual victim.” Randolph, 453 F.3d at 733 (citing
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22).
In applying this objective and subjective test, courts evaluate the totality of
the circumstances. Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir.
2011) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). In particular, courts examine “the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. “[S]imple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount
to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Psychological harm to the employee may also be a relevant consideration.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
Here, Beauvais does not allege that she was subject to physical harassment.
See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 333–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 1999)) (observing “that
harassment involving an ‘element of physical invasion’ is more severe than
harassing comments alone”). Rather, Beauvais’s allegations principally relate to
comments and conduct by her co-worker at the time, Defendant Snow.2 See Dkt.
No. 18, p. 11–13 (Pg. ID 139–141); see also Dkt. No. 32, p. 14–15 (Pg. 1215–16).
She complains of conduct by Defendant Snow directed at her, including:
(1) Snow saying “you’re feeling frisky aren’t you?” and “I can take care
of that, yes, I can.”;
(2) Several days after that incident, Snow “taking pictures of her chest,”
and when she objected and crossed her arms to block her chest, Snow
telling her to raise her arms;
(3) Snow telling Beauvais that “[his] girl loves black cock and white
pussy, you know we really both could take care of you. Yeah, we could
make you feel good and totally relax.”
Beauvais acknowledges that Officer Snow did not supervise her during the time
period when he allegedly harassed her. Dkt. No. 32, p. 9 (Pg. ID 1210). Therefore,
Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment by only a co-worker.
Dkt. No. 18, p. 11–13 (Pg. ID 139–141). Snow made these comments over a span
of several weeks. See Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 253 (6th
Cir. 1998) (explaining harassment that is “commonplace, ongoing, and continual” is
more likely to be pervasive or severe); see Dkt. No. 32-25, p. 2–4 (Pg. ID 1396–98).
Additionally, Beauvais alleges that Snow made inappropriate comments not
directed at her, but in her presence, such as referring to women as “hos,” discussing
his “sexual activities with the two women with whom he lived,” and “telling [the
women with whom he lived] to get naked before he got home because he wanted to
‘be sucked.”’ Dkt. No. 18, p. 12 (Pg. ID 140); see Knox v. Neaton Auto Prods. Mfg.,
Inc., 375 F.3d 451, 459 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that comments not directed at victim
supported conclusion that harassment was not sufficiently severe to create hostile
Therefore, although Snow’s actions were distasteful and reprehensible,
Beauvais fails to show reasonable minds may disagree about whether Snow’s actions
were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile environment.
The Court concludes that Beauvais fails to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact about whether Inkster should be liable for the alleged hostile work environment.
“Where an employee is the victim of sexual harassment, including harassment
in the form of a hostile work environment, by non-supervisory co-workers, an
employer’s vicarious liability depends on the plaintiff showing that the employer
knew (or reasonably should have known) about the harassment but failed to take
appropriate remedial action.” Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567
F.3d 263, 274 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789). In other words,
an employer may be held liable where its “response manifests indifference or
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.”
Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 338 (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d
868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997)) (observing that the holding in Blankenship that “mere
negligence” is insufficient to warrant employer liability was abrogated, and now
mere negligence is sufficient to establish employer liability and negligence).
Inkster was aware of Beauvais’s allegations of harassment. Dkt. No. 32-25,
p. 2–4 (Pg. IDs 1396–98). Plaintiff asserts there is a genuine dispute regarding
whether Inkster took appropriate remedial action because, according to Beauvais:
(1) Snow’s disciplinary hearing was a farce, his punishment was de
minimis, and in any event, any sanctioned punishment might not have
(2) Snow was not removed from Beauvais’s shift the day after she
submitted a formal complaint to Inkster;
(3) The Inkster Police Department’s sexual harassment training was not
a response to her allegations (and was not effective). Rather, the
training was given to various City agencies, as these agencies had not
undergone sexual harassment training in some time.
See Dkt. No. 32, p. 16–17, 27–30 (Pg. IDs 1217–18, 1228–31). Inkster counters
asserting that it hired an independent law firm to investigate Plaintiff’s allegations
and the environment at the Inkster Police Department generally. Dkt. No. 31-4, p. 2
(Pg. ID 348). Defendant further argues that it conducted a prompt, fair internal
hearing regarding Plaintiff’s allegations and removed Snow from Beauvais’s shift in
a timely manner. Dkt. No. 31, p. 36–37 (Pg. ID 254–55).
In Hawkins, the Sixth Circuit explained that:
[c]ompanies that take affirmative steps reasonably calculated to prevent
and put an end to a pattern of harassment—such as personally
counseling harassers, sending them letters emphasizing the company’s
policies and the seriousness of the allegations against them, and
threatening harassers with serious discipline if future allegations are
substantiated—are more likely to be deemed to have responded
517 F.3d at 342–43; see also Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 831 (6th
Cir. 1999) (holding that employer responded adequately where, after the first
complaint regarding an employee, the employer separated the victim and
employee, threatened the employee with punishment if he failed to comply,
and warned him of continuing such behavior).
Inkster’s response did not manifest indifference or unreasonableness as
a matter of law. Inkster conducted an internal disciplinary hearing and
punished Snow for violating departmental policies. Dkt. No. 32-47, p. 2 (Pg.
The City hired an independent law firm to investigate her
complaints and whether the police department had issues with gender or
sexual harassment. Dkt. No. 31-4, p. 2 (Pg. ID 348). Beauvais concedes that
although she shared a shift with Snow the day after her complaint, Inkster
thereafter separated the two so that they never shared a shift again. Dkt. No.
31-1, p. 52 (Pg. ID 309). Inkster also conducted sexual harassment training.
Dkt. No. 31-7, p. 37 (Pg. ID 424). Human Resources Director Smith testified
that this training was in part motivated by Beauvais’s allegations.
Inkster’s responses are not negligent given that Snow’s personnel file did not
contain prior allegations of sexual harassment or gender discrimination. Dkt.
No. 31-4, p. 2 (Pg. ID 348).
Therefore, as a matter of law Inkster took appropriate remedial
measures in response to Beauvais’s sexual harassment allegations.
Retaliation under Title VII
Beauvais asserts, and the Court agrees, that the Defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment on her claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII.
As Plaintiff alleges a claim of Title VII retaliation based on circumstantial
evidence, the aforementioned McDonnell Douglas framework also governs this
claim. See Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 2013),
abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. –––
–, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Under this framework,
[t]he prima facie case consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff
engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s exercise of
her protected rights was known to defendant; (3) an adverse
employment action was subsequently taken against the employee or the
employee was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment
by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action or harassment.
Id. (citing Garner v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 624, 639 (6th Cir.
2009)). If a plaintiff succeeds with this showing, “the burden of production shifts to
Defendant to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its action].’”
Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 492 (6th Cir. 2010) (alteration in
original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Where a defendant
presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, “the burden shifts
back to [p]laintiff to demonstrate that [d]efendant’s ‘proffered reason was not the
true reason for the employment decision.”’ Id. (quoting Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 320 (6th Cir. 2007)). “Throughout the entire McDonnell
Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion.” Abbott v. Crown
Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
It is undisputed that Beauvais engaged in activity protected under Title VII
and that the Defendant knew Beauvais had exercised her rights.
established the first element as she notified her supervisors of an apparent Title VII
violation, which is “classic opposition activity,” and filed a claim with the EEOC.
Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Johnson v.
Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000)). Beauvais has also satisfied
the second element. She reported her complaint to the Chief of the Inkster Police
Department, and thus, Inkster knew that she had exercised her rights. See id. at 470.
Therefore, Beauvais has raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding elements
one and two of this claim. The remaining elements, however, are in dispute.
Adverse Employment Action
Beauvais asserts a reasonable jury could conclude that she suffered an adverse
employment action when (1) after she had received medical clearance from the
City’s independent doctor, Inkster delayed her return to work for three weeks; (2)
she was demoted from acting Sergeant once Sergeant Linda Davidson returned to
work, although not at full capacity; (3) Inkster removed her police powers during
her fall 2014 leave; and (4) she was required to submit written questions following
an incident, but an officer also on the scene was not. Plaintiff has persuaded the
Court on allegations one through three, but not four.
To establish this element, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context
means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (C.A.D.C.
Materially adverse actions include “a termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a
material loss of benefits, [or] significantly diminished material responsibilities.”
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2000). They also
include actions which “significantly impact an employee’s wages or professional
advancement.” Halfacre v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 221 F. App’x 424, 433 (6th Cir.
As to the first allegation, Plaintiff had satisfied Inkster’s requirement that she
undergo an independent fitness-for-duty evaluation, yet she was not permitted to
return to work until three weeks after being cleared. Dkt. No. 32, p. 31 (Pg. ID
Because “excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that
contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination,” not allowing
an employee to work for three weeks must raise a genuine dispute about the
satisfaction of this element here. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69.
Second, although Plaintiff was promoted to acting Sergeant in July 2016
(when Sergeant Linda Davidson took leave), Beauvais was demoted without
explanation in December 2016 or January 2017. Dkt. No. 32, p. 19–20 (Pg. ID
1220–21). Indeed, she learned of her demotion in a wide-spread email distribution.
Id. Even if this position was temporary, as Defendant contends, Sergeant Davidson
had not yet resumed her full duties. Dkt. No. 32-4, p. 8 (Pg. ID 1271); Dkt. No. 327, p. 6 (Pg. ID 1311). There is a genuine dispute of material fact then regarding
whether this demotion, including the accompanying loss of title and wages, is a
materially adverse action. Dkt. No. 32, p. 32 (Pg. ID 1233); see Dkt. No. 31-21, p.
72 (Pg. ID 849).
Third, reasonable jurors may differ as to whether Chief Yost’s removal of
Beauvais’s police powers during her fall 2014 leave was a material adverse action.
Specifically, on December 4, 2014, Chief Yost required Beauvais to relinquish her
service weapon. Dkt. No. 18, p. 5 (Pg. ID 133). This requirement affected the
material benefits of Beauvais’s employment and could deter a reasonable person
from raising sexual harassment allegations. Consequently, there is a genuine dispute
whether this was a material adverse action.
Unlike the above-discussed allegations, Plaintiff’s fourth example of
retaliation—submission of written questions only to her, despite another officer’s
involvement in an incident—is not an adverse action as a matter of law. Plaintiff
offers no evidence that this action impacted her wages, professional advancement,
or otherwise meets this threshold. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi–Care Mgmt. Inc., 97
F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) (“This court has held that reassignments without salary
or work hour changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in
employment discrimination claims.” (quoting Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,
638 (6th Cir. 1987))).
Causation Regarding Retaliation
Beauvais has made the required prima facie showing for the first three
elements of her retaliation claim. Her prima facie case then hinges on whether a
reasonable juror could conclude that there is a causal connection between her report
of sexual harassment and the three week delay in her return to work, her demotion
from acting Sergeant, or her surrender of police powers. The Court finds that
Beauvais makes this showing for all three allegations.
“To establish the causal connection that the fourth prong requires, the plaintiff
must produce sufficient evidence from which one could draw an inference that the
employer would not have taken the adverse action against the plaintiff had the
plaintiff not engaged in activity that Title VII protects.” Abbott v. Crown Motor Co.,
Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has
not adopted a uniform approach in examining whether the temporal proximity
between protected activity and materially adverse actions establishes a causal
connection. See Krumheuer v. GAB Robins N. Am., Inc., 484 F. App’x 1, 5–6 (6th
Cir. 2012). Yet the Sixth Circuit has held that “[w]here an adverse employment
action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such
temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence
of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of
retaliation.” Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 650 (6th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir.
2008)). Conversely, “where some time elapses’ between the employee’s protected
activity and the adverse employment action, ‘the employee must couple temporal
proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Id.
(citing Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525; Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th
Here, Plaintiff first complained to her supervisors of Snow’s harassment on
April 16, 2014, and submitted a written complaint on April 24, 2014. Dkt. No. 3245, p. 2 (Pg. ID 1456); Dkt. No. 18, p. 2–3 (Pg. ID 130–31). In January 2015,
Plaintiff filed a written complaint with the EEOC alleging that she was subject to a
hostile work environment and had suffered retaliation in response to her complaints
of sexual harassment. Dkt. No. 32, p. 18 (Pg. ID 1219); Dkt. No. 32-30, p. 2 (Pg.
Consequently, in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, less than one year
elapsed between Plaintiff’s first protected activity and the first allegedly materially
adverse action, the removal of her police powers in December 2014. This time
period, standing alone, does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether there is a causal connection between the protected activity and Defendant’s
alleged retaliation. See, e.g., Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525 (acknowledging that plaintiffs
are not prevented “from ever using a temporal proximity closer than four months to
establish an inference of retaliation”). Yet Beauvais offers additional evidence of
retaliatory conduct, namely Inkster’s delay in returning her to work and her
demotion from acting Sergeant. This delay and demotion, and the accompanying
loss of salary and benefits, provides sufficient additional facts. See Dkt. No. 31-21,
p. 72 (Pg. ID 849) (noting that Beauvais was paid more as acting Sergeant than as a
As Plaintiff has produced enough evidence to raise a genuine dispute
regarding a prima facie retaliation claim, “the burden of production of evidence
shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for
its actions.” Hunter v. Sec’y of U.S. Army, 565 F.3d 986, 996 (quoting Canitia v.
Yellow Freight Sys., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court finds that
Inkster does not provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for delaying
Plaintiff’s return to work, but does for demoting Plaintiff from acting Sergeant and
stripping Plaintiff of her police powers.
First, Inkster does not respond to the allegation that it improperly delayed
Beauvais’s return to work after she had obtained clearance from the independent
doctor. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 31, p. 21 (Pg. ID 239) (only addressing delay with respect
to Beauvais’s medical clearance from her doctors). Inkster’s only discussion of this
issue in the record comes from Human Resources Director Smith. Smith testified
that she does not know when Inkster received the independent doctor’s clearance
letter, which was dated April 21, 2015. Dkt. No. 32-12, p. 13 (Pg. ID 1342). And
when asked why Beauvais was not returned to work for three weeks, Smith replied
“I can’t answer that.” Id. Smith did offer reasons why the City might have delayed
Beauvais’s return, but cautioned that she was speculating. Dkt. No. 32-12, p. 13 (Pg.
ID 1342). She explained that Inkster may have delayed Plaintiff’s return to work
because it was preoccupied with a lawsuit, had encountered scheduling issues, or
had difficulty reaching Beauvais. Id. Yet because Inkster offers only speculation as
to why it delayed Beauvais’s return to work, Inkster has not offered a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory for its delay.
Second, Defendant alleges Beauvais was demoted because Sergeant Davidson
returned to work; thus, she “could resume her administrative duties and the
Lieutenants could perform the tasks that Davidson still could not.” Dkt. No. 31, p.
22 (Pg. ID 240). Defendant asserts that this “arrangement was worked out for
financial reasons as Inkster had not budgeted for an additional Sergeant.” Id. at p.
22–23 (Pg. ID 240–41). The Court concludes that these financial considerations are
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting Beauvais.
As for removing Beauvais’s police powers, Inkster contends that officers
taking personal leave were ordinarily required to turn in their service weapons and
relinquish their police powers. Dkt. No. 31, p. 20 (Pg. ID 238); see also Dkt. No.
31-14, p. 34–36 (Pg. ID 622–24). Indeed, Chief Yost testified that this requirement
was consistent with recommendations from police associations, and in Beauvais’s
case, it was also prompted by a concern about Inkster’s liability. Dkt. No. 31-14, p.
34–36 (Pg. ID 622–24). The Court finds that these reasons are legitimate and
nondiscriminatory, and therefore, Beauvais must show that these reasons were
Beauvais has shown a reasonable juror could conclude that Inkster’s reasons
for delaying her return to work, demoting her from Sergeant, and removing her
police powers were pretext.
At this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “must
demonstrate ‘that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision.’” Hunter, 565 F.3d at 996 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Specifically, to survive a motion for summary judgment
on the issue of pretext, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence “to rebut, but not
to disprove, the defendant’s proffered rationale.” Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt.,
Ltd., 744 F.3d 948, 957 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584,
593 (6th Cir. 2012)). A plaintiff may present sufficient evidence of pretext by
showing “(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered
reasons did not actually motivate [the adverse actions], or (3) that they were
insufficient to motivate [the adverse actions].” Chattman v. Toho Tenax America,
Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Beauvais argues that Inkster’s proffered reasons for delaying her return have
no basis in fact. Dkt. No. 32, p. 14 (Pg. ID 33). The Court agrees based on the same
reason that the Court found Inkster failed to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for delaying Beauvais’s return—Inkster has not offered an explanation for its
On the other hand, Beauvais asserts that Inkster’s justification for demoting
her from Sergeant, financial considerations, did not actually motivate her demotion.
Dkt. No. 32, p. 20 (Pg. ID 1221). She alleges that at the time of her demotion, Inkster
was not cutting expenses in other ways. Id. at p. 20 n.6 (Pg. ID 1221). Beauvais
cites as an example the City’s payment of overtime to another Sergeant for tutoring
individuals in the police academy. Id. at p. 20 (Pg. ID 1221); see also Dkt. No. 3228, p. 5 (Pg. ID 1414). She also references testimony from another officer that the
Inkster Police Department had greatly exceeded its budget regarding the payment of
overtime. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 32-7, p. 6 (Pg. ID 1311). Based on this evidence, the
Court finds that Beauvais has rebutted Inkster’s contention that financial
considerations warranted her demotion. Although exceeding its overtime budget
could have made the City more cautious in expending salary, Plaintiff provides
evidence that the City continued to expend resources on overtime despite its
financial concerns. As a result, Beauvais has raised a genuine dispute on this issue.
Finally, Beauvais has rebutted Inkster’s reasons for removing her police
powers. In particular, Beauvais has presented evidence that, in practice, officers on
leave were generally allowed to keep their police powers, including their service
weapons. Dkt. No. 32-11, p. 6 (Pg. ID 1329). Indeed, another Inkster police officer
testified that officers on leave would not have to surrender their gun “[u]nless they’re
separating from the Department or suspended.” Dkt. No. 32-11, p. 6 (Pg. ID 1329).
Neither of these circumstances, of course, applied to Beauvais.
Moreover, the timing of Inkster’s removal of Beauvais’s police powers rebuts
Inkster’s explanation. Inkster mandated that Beauvais relinquish her weapon in
December 2014, four months after she took leave. If the removal of police powers
was typically required for persons taking leave, Inkster should have forced Beauvais
to give up her weapon much earlier. As a result, Beauvais has raised a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding whether Inkster’s justifications are pretext.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY
IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment . The Court grants the
Defendant summary judgment as to Counts I, II and III. The Court denies the
Defendant summary judgment as to Count IV.
Dated: November 9, 2017
s/Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their
respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of
Electronic Filing on November 9, 2017.
s/Tanya R. Bankston
Case Manager & Deputy Clerk
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