Northington v. Abdellatif et al

Filing 243

OPINION & ORDER:(1) REJECTING PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS;(2) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE MAJZOUBS AUGUST 16, 2019 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 219 ;(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT f 153 173 ; and (4) ENJOINING PLAINTIFF FROM FILING ANY ADDITIONAL MOTIONS, PAPERS, OR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GARY NORTHINGTON,
Case No. 16-cv-12931
Plaintiff,
v.

Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

BADAWI M. ABDELLATIF, LISA ADRAY,
RASHED BASHIR, PATRICK J. GEML,
GARY KIRSTEIN, JEFFREY C. STIEVE,
EUNICE TAYLOR, HEIDI WASHINGTON,
and DANIEL HEYNS.
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER:
(1) REJECTING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS;
(2) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE MAJZOUB’S AUGUST 16, 2019
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF NO. 219);
(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(ECF NOS. 153, 173); and
(4) ENJOINING PLAINTIFF FROM FILING ANY ADDITIONAL MOTIONS,
PAPERS, OR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT
INTRODUCTION
In this pro se civil rights lawsuit, Plaintiff Gary Northington alleges that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 13, Amended Complaint, PgID 95–112.) On
August 16, 2019, Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R) addressing the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Lisa Adray, Dr. Jeffrey Steive, Eutrilla Taylor, Heidi Washington,

Daniel Heyns, and Dr. Gary Kirstein (MDOC Defendants), (ECF No. 173), as well
as the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Badawi Abdellatif, M.D.,
Patrick Geml, P.A., and Rasheed Bashir, M.D. (Corizon Defendants), (ECF No.
153). (ECF No. 219, R&R.) In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Majzoub recommended
that the Court grant both Motions for Summary Judgment and dismiss the case. (Id.)
Now before the Court are Plaintiff Northington’s Motion for Enlarged
Objections and his 29 objections to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s August 16, 2019
R&R. (ECF No. 232.) The Corizon Defendants timely filed a response (ECF No.
234), and Northington filed a reply (ECF No. 239). The Court denies Northington’s
Motion for Enlarged Objections because most of Northington’s objections are
improper. (ECF No. 232.) Some of his objections identify specific, cognizable issues
for review, however, and the Court considers those objections properly filed and
addresses them on their merits.
Regarding the proper, specific objections, the Court rejects them and finds
that Magistrate Judge Majzoub correctly resolved this case in her August 16, 2019
R&R. (ECF No. 219.) Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R, grants summary
judgment to all remaining defendants, and dismisses the case. The Court further
finds that Plaintiff Northington has repeatedly abused the judicial process by
overwhelming this and other courts with non-meritorious lawsuits and duplicative,
frivolous motions. The Court therefore enjoins Northington from filing further
2

motions in this action and from filing additional suits unless he satisfies the
conditions specified below.
BACKGROUND
The Court has reviewed the record and finds that Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s
summary of the factual background of this case in the August 16, 2019 R&R is
accurate. (ECF No. 219, R&R, PgID 3786–95.) Northington objects to many of
Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s factual findings, but, for the reasons stated in the
analysis section, the Court rejects his objections and adopts the factual background
as stated in the R&R. That section details Plaintiff Northington’s medical care from
November of 2012 through June of 2016. (Id.) During that time, Northington was
treated for respiratory complaints, COPD, asthma, hypertension, chest pain, heatrelated dizziness, recurring swelling in his lower legs, an infection in his left leg that
required hospitalization, low blood pressure, loss of vision in his right eye, postnasal drip, was tested for celiac disease, was treated by a dietician who prescribed a
low-sodium diet and vegetarian “snack bags,” and was ultimately hospitalized for a
coronary artery bypass graft. (Id.)
Magistrate Judge Majzoub also summarized the procedural background in the
R&R. (ECF No. 219, R&R, PgID 3795–96.) She noted that Northington’s claims
against Defendants Bobby Echols and Charles Allen were dismissed on May 22,
2017, and that his claims arising at the Kinross and Mound correctional facilities,
3

his claims against Corizon Health, Inc., Prison Health Services, and Correctional
Medical Services, his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment,
and RICO, and his claims for money damages against the MDOC Defendants in their
official capacities were all dismissed on August 3, 2018. (Id.)
Since the R&R was filed on August 16, 2019 Northington requested and
received three extensions of time to file objections, extending the deadline from
August 30 to November 15. (ECF No. 224.) Northington then requested a stay of the
case because he was scheduled to undergo surgery. (ECF No. 225.) The Court
granted the stay on November 6, 2019, and instructed Northington to “contact the
Court after his release from the hospital.” (Id.)
On January 6, 2020, Northington filed his Notice Regarding Stay and Surgery
(ECF No. 230), as well as a table of contents for his objections (ECF No. 231), his
Motion for Enlarged Objections (ECF No. 232), and his objections (ECF No. 232).
In the Notice Regarding Stay and Surgery, Northington informed the Court that his
surgery was postponed. (ECF No. 230.) Northington has since filed three additional
motions and two replies. (ECF Nos. 233, 236, 239, 240, 241.) The stay is lifted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
the Court conducts a de novo review of the portions of the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation to which a party has filed “specific written objections” in a
4

timely manner. Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich.
2004). A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. Only those
objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review under the statute. Mira
v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to pinpoint
those portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specially
consider.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A general objection, or one that
merely restates arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently identify
alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge. An “objection” that does nothing
more than disagree with a magistrate judge's determination “without explaining the
source of the error” is not a valid objection. Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” for purposes of a
summary judgment motion where proof of that fact “would have [the] effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense
asserted by the parties.” Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 503
F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174
(6th Cir. 1984)). A dispute over a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such
5

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial, the
court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See
Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the
non-moving party must produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find
in its favor by a preponderance of the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The
‘mere possibility’ of a factual dispute is not enough.” Martin v. Toledo Cardiology
Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo
Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or
is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Motion for Enlarged Objections (ECF No. 232)
Plaintiff Northington filed a Motion for Enlarged Objections along with a 68page document containing 29 enumerated objections and 119 pages of exhibits,
including an index, for a total of 192 pages. (ECF Nos. 232; 232-1.) In the Eastern
District of Michigan, objections must conform with the requirements of Local Rule
7.1, which sets a 25-page limit. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(5) (“LR 7.1 governs the form
of objections, responses, and replies.”); E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(d)(3)(A). Northington
6

therefore seeks permission to file 43 extra pages of objections and 119 pages of
exhibits in support of those objections. The Court denies Northington’s request
because the majority of his objections are improper.
Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R are necessarily limited to the facts
and legal conclusions made in that particular report—a party may not request
reconsideration of prior rulings, provide new evidence without leave of court, or
raise new claims by filing objections. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 allows
parties to file “specific written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (emphasis added). Further, under Local
Rule 72.1, those specific written objections must “specify the part of the order,
proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which a person objects.” E.D.
Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1)(A). These rules reflect the purpose of the Magistrate’s Act,
which is “to improve access to the federal courts and aid in the efficient
administration of justice,” by narrowing the focus of the district court to the issues
“at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Howard, 932 F.2d at 509 (internal citations
omitted). Thus, objections should be used to pinpoint any crucial errors made by the
Magistrate Judge, not to lodge a general objection to the entire report or past rulings.
See id. (“A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same
effects as would a failure to object.”)

7

The majority of Northington’s objections are improper because they: (a) make
unfounded accusations of bias, ex parte contact, bribe-taking, and fraud against
Magistrate Judge Majzoub; (b) contest prior rulings not relevant to the motions at
issue; or (c) raise new claims. In Objection 1, Northington accuses Magistrate Judge
Majzoub of “intrinsic bias,” “extrajudicial bias,” and “EXPARTE contact with
Defense Attorney(s).” (ECF No. 232, Objections, PgID 3859–66.) Northington
frequently refers back to this accusation of bias, and, throughout the remaining
objections, argues that Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s factual findings and legal
conclusions were fraudulent or abusive, rather than simply erroneous. (See id. at
3867, 3871–72, 3875–77, 3879–80, 3882, 3884, 3886–87, 3890–93, 3896, 3898–
3907, 3909, 3912–13, 3915–16, 3919, 3923–25.) For example, in Objection 14,
Northington wrote, “[t]his is classic judicial abuse of manipulating the record for
excuses to dismiss but ignoring evidence favorable to Plaintiff (Objection #1).” (Id.
at PgID 3898.) In Objection 15, Northington goes so far as to accuse Magistrate
Judge Majzoub as acting as an agent for the defendants, using “an Olinsky
Communist tactic,” and compared this case to a “Stalin-show trial.” (Id. at PgID
3901.) He repeats the allegation that Magistrate Judge Majzoub acted as an agent for
the defendants several more times, accuses the entire judiciary of participating in
“Nazi-like behavior” and states that Magistrate Judge Majzoub accepted bribes. (Id.
at PgID 3903, 3905, 3907, 3915–16, 3919.) He rounds out his accusations with the
8

statement, “[d]ismissal is Majzoub literally imposing SHARIA LAW DEATH
PENALTY on Plaintiff by fraud.” (Id. at PgID 3924.) These unfounded accusations
are not proper objections, are inappropriate, and represent abuses of the judicial
process. The Court will not countenance them.
Northington also objects to prior rulings not at issue in the Motions for
Summary Judgment and argues that the process resulting in the R&R was unfair. In
Objection 28, Northington challenges this Court’s August 3, 2018 Opinion and
Order adopting a prior R&R dismissing Northington’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. (Id. at 3923–24.) He accuses Magistrate Judge Majzoub of
dismissing those claims “with malicious and wanton intent to more easily
manipulate fraudulent dismissals,” and reiterates his accusation of bias. (Id.) Those
claims had already been dismissed and were therefore not the subject of the August
16, 2019 R&R now at issue. Therefore, this objection is improper.
The same is true of Northington’s other objections regarding the way this
litigation has proceeded. His objections regarding his failure to receive a paginated
copy of one of the motions for summary judgment, the use of some incorrect
citations to the record in the R&R, and his contention that Defendants Kirstein and
Washington failed to provide certain discovery documents1 do not address the

1

Defendants stated that the requested documents do not exist. (ECF No. 2321, Interrogatory Response, PgID 3967.)
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factual findings or legal conclusions in the R&R and are therefore improper. (Id. at
PgID 3776, 3902–03, 3909–11.)
One of his procedural objections requires additional explanation. Northington
argues, in Objection 20, that the failure to provide certain discovery documents
denied him the opportunity to show essential facts so the Court should, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)(1), deny the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 173) and allow more time for discovery. (ECF No.
232, Objections, PgID 3909–11.) In support of this argument, he states, “[t]his entire
OBJECTION (pp. 1 to end) and the MOTION FOR STAY (ECF #162) are each a
DECLARATION.” (Id. at 3910.) This is a reference to his assertion, in the Motion
for Enlarged Objections, that “the OBJECTIONS are also a series of affidavits that
normally would be attached but are included therein because that is the only way
Plaintiff can write and understand.” (ECF No. 232, Motion for Enlarged Objections,
PgID 3856.)
Northington’s objections are not valid affidavits. An affidavit “must be made
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show
that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56 (c)(4). As described throughout this opinion, most of what Northington
writes in his objections are unfounded accusations or assertions about things of
which he has no personal knowledge. For instance, Northington does not have
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personal knowledge that the requested documents, which Defendants said do not
exist, actually do exist. He cannot transform his objections, which are based on
conjecture, into evidence by signing the document under penalty of perjury. See
Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009) (sworn document
containing “conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts [was]
insufficient to establish a factual dispute”). The Court does not consider the
objections a series of affidavits, and therefore will not address Objection 20 further.
Finally, Northington uses one of his objections to raise an entirely new claim.
In Objection 2, Northington argues that, throughout the litigation of this case, he was
“excluded from participation in and/or denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of the Court” based on his disabilities and in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. (ECF No. 232, Objections, PgID 3866–67.) This is a separate
cause of action that was not included in his complaint and was not at issue in the
R&R. Therefore, Objection 2 is improper.
These improper objections consume the majority of Northington’s 68 pages,
so the Court denies his Motion for Enlarged Objections. (ECF 232.) Rather than
strike Northington’s entire set of 29 objections, as encouraged by the Corizon
Defendants, (ECF No. 234, Corizon Response, PgID 4094), however, the Court
addresses the portions of Northington’s objections that can be read to raise valid
challenges to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s R&R. See Spotts v. United States, 429
11

F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) for
rule that pro se filings should be construed liberally).
Objections
Magistrate Judge Majzoub recommended granting both sets of defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment for four reasons: (1) Northington failed to exhaust
his claims against Defendant Geml; (2) Northington failed to produce enough
evidence to meet the high standard of proof for a claim of deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need on his claims against Defendants Abdellatif, Bashir, and
Adray; (3) Defendants Stieve, Kirstein, Washington, and Heyns were not
deliberately indifferent and had no direct, personal involvement in Northington’s
care, as required for a § 1983 claim; and (4) Northington’s claims against Defendant
Taylor are grounded in the First and Fourteenth Amendments and were therefore
dismissed on August 3, 2018. (ECF No. 219, R&R, PgID 3798–3811.)
Northington objects to these conclusions by arguing that the factual basis for
them is flawed because Defendants fraudulently concealed evidence and falsified his
medical records, (ECF No. 232, Objections, PgID 3860–64, 3871, 3880–81, 3884,
3886–89, 3892–93, 3918–19, 3921), and because Magistrate Judge Majzoub failed
to view the facts in the light most favorable to Northington, the non-moving party,
(Id. at PgID 3863, 3884, 3886, 3890, 3892, 3898, 3900–01, 3914–15, 3918).

12

First, Northington’s allegations that Defendants fraudulently concealed
evidence or falsified his medical records are primarily complaints that the defendants
who treated him failed to document every symptom he ever reported or that they
recorded his symptoms in different terms than those he used to describe them. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 232, Objection 9, PgID 3882–48) (“Abdellatif’s nondescript terms are
meaningless dribble for purposes of diagnosis and relevant treatment, like saying
‘abdominal pain,’ for a deadly gangrenous inguinal hernia.”) He also contends that
the format of the medical records kept by Defendant Abdellatif made the records
fraudulent because he used a cut and paste tool. (ECF No. 232, Objection 11, PgID
3888–90.) There is no requirement that medical providers record every single
reported symptom or self-diagnosis or that they use the exact language used by the
patient, and there is certainly no requirement that medical providers manually type
every word used in a medical record. These allegations do not amount to falsification
of records or fraudulent concealment and they do not cast doubt on the factual
findings in the R&R.
Northington’s more inflammatory allegations of falsification of his medical
records by deleting diagnoses of COPD and IBS lack probative evidentiary support.
(ECF No. 13, Amended Complaint, PgID 105–106; ECF No. 232, Objections 7 &
8, PgID 3880–82.) The primary evidence Northington relies on for these allegations
is his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13). He argues that Magistrate Judge Majzoub
13

erred by failing to treat the allegations in it as true for purposes of summary judgment
even though it is verified. (ECF No. 232, Objection 24, PgID 3914–15.)
Northington is correct that, because he signed the Amended Complaint under
penalty of perjury, it is verified and “therefore carries the same weight as would an
affidavit for the purposes of summary judgment.” El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414
(6th Cir. 2008). However, Magistrate Judge Majzoub did not err by failing to take
every fact alleged in it as true. The force and effect of an affidavit depends on
whether it was “made on personal knowledge, set[s] out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show[s] that the affiant or declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). A verified complaint
containing only conclusory assertions without supporting facts or a showing of
personal knowledge cannot, on its own, create an issue of material fact. See Devbrow
v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding conclusory allegations in
verified complaint insufficient to survive motion for summary judgment).
Here, Northington’s accusations of falsification and deletion of past diagnoses
from medical records are conclusory and fail to make a showing of personal
knowledge. He does not explain the basis for his assertion that Defendant Geml
changed his medical records to hide symptoms of COPD or that he bragged about
the cost savings from the deletion. (ECF No. 13, Amended Complaint, PgID 105–
106; ECF No. 232, Objections 7 & 8, PgID 3880–82.) Magistrate Judge Majzoub
14

did not err in disregarding these accusations when making factual findings in the
R&R because Northington’s bare accusations do not establish an issue of material
fact on fraudulent concealment or falsification of medical records.
Similarly, Magistrate Judge Majzoub did not fail to view the facts in the light
most favorable to Northington, as he argues throughout his objections. (See ECF No.
232, Objections, PgID 3863, 3884, 3886, 3890, 3892, 3898, 3900–01, 3914–15,
3918). The requirement, at summary judgment, that the Court view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party does not alter the non-moving
party’s duty “to support the party’s factual assertions with admissible evidence.”
Arucan v. Cambridge E. Healthcare/Save SeniorCare LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 318,
336 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The non-moving party must still produce enough evidence
that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248.
Here, the evidence Northington produced consists of his annotated medical
records, grievances he filed relating to his medical treatment, his verified complaint
(ECF No. 13), and several of his own affidavits. (See ECF Nos. 180, 180-1, 180-2,
181, 181-1, 182, 182-1.) Northington contends that Magistrate Judge Majzoub
improperly ignored this evidence when she summarized his claims as based on a
refusal to order diagnostic tests to determine the cause of chest pains and allergic
reactions. (ECF No. 232, Objection 3, PgID 3867.) He argues that the evidence, if
15

viewed in the light most favorable to him, shows that he suffered from a plethora of
untreated maladies, from “life-threatening RESPIRATORY FAILURE, and severe
lung and heart INJURY(S) caused” by his unidentified allergy, to COPD, to allergycaused frequent hypotensive emergencies, to an unidentified food allergy, to heart
failure, to myocardial infarctions, to the ongoing swelling in his leg, and more. (See
id. at 3867–79.)
There are three problems with Northington’s argument. First, Magistrate
Judge Majzoub did make several of the factual findings that Northington argues she
omitted. (ECF No. 219, R&R, PgID 3786–95.) She found that he was diagnosed
with mild COPD in 2012 (id. at PgID 3786–87), she found that he frequently
reported to health care with numerous symptoms of cardiovascular and respiratory
problems (id. at PgID 3787–95), she documented his initial leg infection as well as
his complaints of recurring problems with it (id. at PgID 3788–89, 3792–94), she
documented his complaints of allergic reactions to various foods, including wheat,
and allergic reactions to skin lotions, (id. at PgID 3788–92, 3794), she recorded his
complaints of ear pain and loss of vision (id. at PgID 3791, 3793), and otherwise
documented the majority of his complaints. Thus, she did not ignore Northington’s
evidence and did not fail to view the facts in the light most favorable to him.
Second, Northington relies heavily on his proposed supplemental complaint
(ECF No. 100) in arguing that there is “substantially more to the claims than what
16

[Magistrate Judge] Majzoub stated.” (ECF No. 232, Objections, PgID 3867.) The
Court, however, denied his request to file that supplemental complaint, which made
the allegations therein irrelevant. (ECF No. 128, Opinion and Order, PgID 1336–37
n.3.) Third, and finally, much of Northington’s proffered evidence is not sufficiently
probative on the question of his ultimate diagnoses. Northington’s affidavits,
grievances, and the notes he added to his medical records are powerful evidence on
his subjective symptoms and experiences, but they do not establish the fact of a
diagnosis. Northington is not a medical professional and he did not establish any
foundation upon which it could be concluded that he is competent to testify on a
matter such as whether the ear pain he was experiencing is a chronic infection or
something else. (See ECF No. 232, Objection 18, PgID 3905–07); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). Therefore, Magistrate Judge Majzoub did not err by omitting many of
Northington’s self-diagnoses from the factual findings of the R&R.
Northington also attempted to file objections to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s
legal conclusions that: (1) he failed to exhaust his claims against Defendant Geml
(ECF No. 232, Objection 22, PgID 3912–13); (2) he failed to produce enough
evidence to meet the high standard of proof for a claim of deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need on his claims against Defendant Adray (ECF No. 232,
Objection 26, PgID 3916–19); (3) Defendant Kirstein was not deliberately
indifferent (ECF No. 232, Objection 19, PgID 3907–09); and (4) Northington’s
17

claims against Defendant Taylor are grounded in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and were therefore dismissed on August 3, 2018 (ECF No. 232,
Objection 27, PgID 3919–23).
These objections are flawed in two ways. First, all four of them are tainted
with the accusations of bias and fraud against Magistrate Judge Majzoub that the
Court refuses to countenance. (See, e.g., ECF No. 232, Objection 27, PgID 3919
(“This dismissal was abuse by Magistrate MAJZOUB . . . after her exparte [sic] and
extrajudicial contact that she hid until caught with Defense Counsel in 2019.”).)
Second, Northington does not address the application of the relevant legal standard
to the facts in these objections.
For instance, in Objection 26 Northington lists the “wrongful acts” he alleged
against Defendant Adray without explaining how any of those acts meets the high
standard of proof for a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
(ECF No. 232, Objection 26, PgID 3916–19.) He also does not explain where
Magistrate Judge Majzoub erred in her careful analysis of each of the eight alleged
instances of denial of care, and, upon review, the Court does not find any such
error—none of the alleged maladies that Defendant Adray refused to document or
treat were sufficiently serious to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim. See
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895, 899–900 (6th Cir. 2004)

18

(requiring obvious need for urgent medical attention or delay in care causing
significant harm to establish serious medical need).
Northington also fails to acknowledge that he must show both the objective
denial of care for “a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need;” and the subjective
“sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care” to show an Eighth
Amendment violation2 in his objections regarding Defendants Kirstein. Blackmore,
390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994), Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), and Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d
863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)). Northington argues that Defendant Kirstein’s approval of
tinted lenses for one year, instead of indefinite approval, was deliberate indifference
to his medical need caused by retinopathy. (ECF No. 232, Objection 19, PgID 3907–
09.) Assuming that there was factual support for the allegation of retinopathy,
Northington still does not point to any evidence in the record showing that Defendant
Kirstein “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to
[Northington], that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he disregarded that
risk.” Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court is unable
to find any such evidence and therefore concludes that Magistrate Judge Majzoub

2

These requirements ensure that “[m]edical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106.
19

correctly found that Defendant Kirstein was not deliberately indifferent. (See ECF
No. 219, R&R, PgID 3806.)
Northington’s objections regarding Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s conclusions
on his claims against Defendants Geml and Taylor also fail to apply the relevant
legal analysis. Northington relies on the filing date of his proposed supplemental
complaint to contest the conclusion that his grievances against Defendant Geml were
not properly exhausted, disregarding, again, this Court’s denial of his Motion to File
Supplemental Complaint. (ECF No. 128, Opinion and Order, PgID 1336–37 n.3.)
The supplemental complaint is not an operative complaint and therefore
Northington’s claims against Defendant Geml were not properly exhausted. Finally,
Northington wholly ignores Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s correct conclusion that his
claims against Defendant Taylor, who he says improperly rejected several of his
grievances, are First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. (ECF NO. 219, R&R, PgID
3811.) Instead, Northington lists the grievances at issue and offers the conclusory
assertion that the denial of the grievances delayed his medical care. (ECF No. 232,
Objection 27, PgID 3919–23.) This is not a persuasive argument.
The Court finds that none of Northington’s objections to the R&R identify
any erroneous factual findings or legal conclusions. Accordingly, the Court adopts
Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s August 16, 2019 R&R in its entirety.

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Injunction
Federal courts have the “inherent power and a constitutional obligation to
protect [their] jurisdiction from conduct which impairs [their] ability to carry out
Article III functions.” In re Gravitt, No. 86-1617, 1987 WL 36293, *1 (6th Cir. Feb.
10, 1987) (citing In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2nd Cir.1984)). Courts may
use this power to enjoin prolific filers of frivolous and abusive lawsuits whose
litigation conduct demonstrates “an egregious misuse of the judicial system” from
continuing to abuse the judicial process by filing frivolous motions and lawsuits.
Bennett v. Thorburn, Nos. 87–2169, 88–1156, & 88–1219, 1988 WL 128097 (6th
Cir. Dec. 1, 1988).
The Court finds that Northington is a prolific filer of frivolous lawsuits in
which he absorbs an enormous amount of judicial resources with repetitive,
vexatious, and meritless motions. In his Amended Complaint, Northington wrote
that “this new lawsuit amends and supplements 1:10-cv-00424,” one of his prior
civil rights cases in the Western District of Michigan. (ECF No. 13, Amended
Complaint, PgID 91.) That case was dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) “for Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with th[e] [c]ourt’s
orders.” Northington v. Armstrong, No. 10-cv-424, 2013 WL 5435490, *1 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 27, 2013). While dismissing that case, Judge Neff wrote:

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Over the course of nearly three-and-a-half years, Plaintiff has refused
to accept the Court’s rulings, consuming an inordinate amount of the
Court’s time and resources in addressing repeated and duplicative
appeals, objections, and motions for rehearing or reconsideration, a
tactic well-familiar to both the Magistrate Judge and the undersigned.
Of even greater concern, Plaintiff’s focus has diverged from substantive
legal claims to outrageous and offensive accusations and behavior in
defiance of the Court.
Id. She noted that Northington denied failing to follow court orders and attributed
the recommendation of dismissal “to possibly undue bias against him or retaliation,
characterizing the Court’s failure to grant him relief . . . as the Court ‘becom[ing] a
knowing accomplice to DEFENDANTS and DEFENSE COUNSEL in
PREMEDITATED MURDER.” Id. Judge Neff also found unavailing his attempt to
explain his conduct, which included “alleged threats of biblical retribution” and
“numerous assertions that the case history and facts set forth by the Magistrate Judge
are false or patently fraudulent,” as the result of cognitive dysfunction. Id.
Despite this dismissal, Northington did not change his approach to litigation.
In this case, for nearly four years, Northington has filed an inordinate number of
frivolous motions, has repeatedly asked the Court to reconsider even its least
consequential procedural rulings, and, just as he did in the case before Judge Neff,
has shifted his focus “from substantive legal claims to outrageous and offensive
accusations.” Id. Instead of contending with Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s factual

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findings and legal conclusions, Northington resorted to accusations of bias, fraud,
and complicity in criminal conduct. This is an egregious abuse of the judicial system.
Northington’s abusive litigation conduct has not been limited to this case and
the prior case before Judge Neff. While this case has been pending, Northington filed
a separate suit based on the same conduct at issue here. See Northington v. Abdellatif,
No. 19-cv-12329, 2019 WL 5102972 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2019). That suit was
dismissed under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. This
Court found that Plaintiff Northington has “previously been notified of his threestrike status and been denied leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee,” and
that “on May 19, 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Plaintiff had
repeatedly abused the Court’s process and directed the Clerk of the Court not to
accept any further petitions from Plaintiff in noncriminal cases unless he paid the
full filing fee.” Id. (citing Northington v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 538 U.S. 919
(2003)). Northington is unquestionably a prolific filer of frivolous and abusive
lawsuits.
Accordingly, Northington is enjoined from filing, instituting, continuing or
prosecuting any civil action in this court without first obtaining leave. In seeking
leave to file, Northington must certify that the claim or claims he wishes to present
are new claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal
court. He must certify that the claim or claims are not frivolous or malicious, or taken
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in bad faith. The motion for leave must be captioned “Application Pursuant to Court
Order Seeking Leave to File” and must contain a copy of this opinion and order.
Failure to strictly comply with these terms will be sufficient grounds for summarily
denying leave to file. See Sassower v. Thompson, Hine & Flory, 986 F.2d 1422 (6th
Cir. 1993).
CONCLUSION
For those reasons, the Court hereby: (1) REJECTS Defendant’s Objections
(ECF No. 232); (2) ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Majzoub (ECF No. 219); (3) GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary
Judgment (ECF Nos. 153, 173); (4) ENJOINS Plaintiff Northington from filing any
additional motions, papers, or subsequent actions without leave of court; and (5)
DISMISSES the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 9, 2020

s/Paul D. Borman
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

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