Sanders v. Michigan Supreme Court et al
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 126 Motion to Disqualify Judge. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (MVer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Case No. 16-12959
HON. AVERN COHN
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, MICHIGAN
JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DR. NORMAN L. MILLER,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, MICHIGAN
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION,
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BOARD,
CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal Corporation,
LAIDLER & ZIELINSKI, PLLC, CYRIL HALL,
COLLINS, EINHORN, FARRELL, PC.,
and the 36TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
On August 15, 2016, plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a
complaint against the above named defendants. As best as can be gleaned, plaintiff
claims violations of state and federal law relating to proceedings before the Michigan
Supreme Court and Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission which resulted in her
removal from the bench upon a finding that she is “mentally unfit.” She also claims
violations of federal law during her employment as a state district court judge, including
Title VII (race, religion, and gender discrimination) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The matter has been referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial proceedings, Doc.
85, before whom several motions are pending. See Docs. 80, 81, 82, 91, 92, 110, 112,
123, 125, 142, 144, 149.
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the undersigned. For the
reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Disqualification under either 28 U.S.C. § 455 or § 144 must be predicated “upon
extrajudicial conduct rather than on judicial conduct,” and upon “a personal bias as
distinguished from judicial one, arising out of the judge's background and association
and not from the judge's view of the law.” Id. at 1303-04 (quotations and citations
omitted). Section 455 provides that a judge must disqualify himself “in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). It is
well-settled that adverse rulings during the course of proceedings are not by themselves
sufficient to establish bias or prejudice which will disqualify the presiding judge. See
Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir. 1956); see also City of Cleveland v.
Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir. 1980).
Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated any of the factors requiring disqualification.
Construed in the most liberal light, plaintiff argues that the undersigned must be
disqualified because she disagrees with the Court’s ruling on her motion for a TRO and
preliminary injunction and cannot be impartial because of an alleged, but not explained,
relationship with some of the defendants. Plaintiff has not shown that the undersigned
harbors “any personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding....” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
Plaintiff has not referred to any extrajudicial conduct arising out of the undersigned’s
background and associations. Therefore, plaintiff has not presented a factual basis to
support a motion under Section 455. The motion is without merit.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 11, 2017
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?