Johnson v. Corley et al
Filing
7
OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiff's 5 Motion to Amend but Dismissing His Civil Rights Complaint and Concluding that an Appeal Cannot Be Taken In Good Faith. Signed by District Judge Gerald E. Rosen. (JOwe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TERRANCE D. JOHNSON, #317128,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 2:16-CV-13045
HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN
v.
TAMMARA CORLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO AMEND BUT DISMISSING HIS CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL
CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
I.
INTRODUCTION
Michigan prisoner Terrance D. Johnson (“Plaintiff”) has filed a pro se civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the validity of his 2012
probation revocation. In 2009, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to first-degree home invasion
and aggravated stalking in the Saginaw County Circuit Court and was sentenced to
five years probation. In 2012, Plaintiff was found guilty of violating the terms of his
probation by engaging in assaultive behavior and re-sentenced to 15 to 30 years
imprisonment. Plaintiff appealed that decision in the state courts, but was denied
relief. People v. Johnson, No. 315577 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2013); People v.
Johnson, 495 Mich. 994, 845 N.W.2d 125 (2014). He also sought federal habeas
review, but was denied relief. Johnson v. Woods, No. 2:14-CV-14319 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 5, 2016).
In his current complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated by the use of false/fraudulent information during his
probation revocation proceedings. Plaintiff names probation officers, supervisors,
and the Saginaw County Circuit Court Probation Department as the defendants in this
action and sues them in their personal and official capacities. He seeks monetary
damages for his alleged unconstitutional imprisonment. The Court has granted
Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of the fees and costs for this action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Amend
As an initial matter, Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add an additional
probation officer as a defendant and to identify a previously-named John/Jane Doe
defendant. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend his or her
pleadings once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it or within 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Since service has
not yet been effectuated and a responsive pleading has not yet been filed in this case,
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Plaintiff has the right to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s motion to amend and shall consider the complaint as amended.
B.
Complaint
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is
required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a
defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against
government entities, officers, and employees which is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice
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of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading
standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than the
bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations
and footnote omitted).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a
person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57
(1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal. As noted, Plaintiff challenges his
probation revocation in his complaint – essentially asserting that his constitutional
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rights were violated because one of the charging documents indicated that he had also
been criminally charged for the actions underlying the probation revocation, See
Complaint, Attach. A, when he had not been so charged. At the probation revocation
hearing, however, the trial court specifically found that no criminal charges were
pending. See Complaint, Attach. B.
A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a prisoner
challenging a condition of imprisonment. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973). Since Plaintiff contests the probation revocation decision, however,
he actually seeks habeas corpus relief because such a claim concerns the validity of
confinement. Ruling on the claims raised would necessarily imply the invalidity of
the probation revocation decision and Plaintiff’s confinement in prison. Such claims
are not properly brought under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim
challenging his conviction or imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily
render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his
continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been called into question by a federal
court’s issuance or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true
regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that “a state prisoner’s § 1983
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action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to
conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). The Heck doctrine applies to claims challenging
state probation revocation proceedings. See Noel v. Grzesiak. 96 F. App’x 353, 354
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Crow, infra); Norwood v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.
App’x 286, 287 (6th Cir. 2003); accord Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d
Cir. 2006); Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[Heck] applies to
proceedings that call into question the fact or duration of parole or probation.”);
Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
In this case, the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint go to the propriety of the
parole revocation decision itself such that ruling in his favor would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of his incarceration. Such claims are barred by Heck.
Because Plaintiff’s challenge to his probation revocation would necessarily imply the
impropriety of his confinement, and since that decision has not been overturned or
otherwise declared invalid, his civil rights complaint contesting that decision must be
dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend his
civil rights complaint, but DISMISSES without prejudice that complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. The Court also concludes that an appeal from
this order cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Gerald E. Rosen
United States District Judge
Dated: September 27, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 27, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens
Case Manager, (313) 234-5135
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