Mikron Digital Imaging, Inc. v. Omega Medical Imaging, Inc.
ORDER Granting 11 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MIKRON DIGITAL IMAGING, INC.,
CASE NO. 16-13134
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
OMEGA MEDICAL IMAGING, INC.,
OMEGA MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [#11]
Plaintiff Mikron Digital Imaging, Inc. (“Mikron”) commenced this action on
August 30, 2016.
On September 27, 2016, Mikron filed a First Amended
Complaint against Defendants Omega Medical Imaging, Inc. (“Omega Inc.”) and
Omega Medical Imaging, LLC (“Omega LLC”) (collectively “Omega”), which
Mikron alleges are alter egos of one another, alleging breach of contract (Count I),
tortious interference with business relationships and expectancies (Count II), unjust
enrichment (Count III), fraud by misrepresentation and concealment (Count IV),
statutory and common-law conversion (Count V), and successor liability / de facto
merger / fraudulent transfer (Count VI).
(Doc # 6)
On October 25, 2016,
Defendant Omega LLC filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc # 11). Mikron filed a
Response on November 18, 2016. (Doc # 14)
The facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint are as follows. Mikron is
a Michigan corporation that sells, installs, and services medical imaging equipment
in the Midwest. (Doc # 6, Pg ID 29) Omega Inc. is a now defunct Florida
corporation that manufactured and distributed medical imaging equipment. Id. at
26-27. In 2010, Mikron and Omega Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement
(“Agreement”), identifying Mikron as the Dealer, under which Mikron would sell
Omega products in Michigan and northern Illinois. Id. at 26; Doc # 9, Pg ID 47.
The Agreement provides: “This agreement shall automatically terminate exactly
one year from the date of the last person or entity to sign this agreement. At the
termination of the Agreement and every year following the termination, DEALER
may opt for a one-year extension if all sales goals are met and their account is
current.” (Doc # 9, Pg ID 47) The Agreement assigned Mikron a particular
territory and stated: “OMEGA agrees not to appoint any other dealer in the
territory as long as DEALER meets or exceeds the minimum annual sales
performance of complete systems as detailed below.” Id. The Agreement required
Mikron to sell one system in the first year, two systems in the second year, and two
systems in the third year. Id. The Complaint alleges that the Agreement was
perpetually renewable each year on the condition that Mikron met or exceeded
sales goals, and that Omega Inc. could not unilaterally terminate the Agreement at
its discretion. Id. at 30.
Omega LLC is a Florida company that manufactures, markets, and sells its
medical imaging equipment in the United States and abroad. (Doc # 6, Pg ID 27)
The Complaint alleges that some months after the execution of the Agreement
between Mikron and Omega Inc., the officers of Omega Inc. voluntarily dissolved
the company and transferred all of its business interests, including the Agreement
with Mikron, to Omega LLC. Omega LLC administered the Agreement and
enjoyed the benefits of the Agreement for approximately five years. Id. at 26-27.
The operations of Omega Inc. and Omega LLC were carried out at the same
address in Florida, “and there was a complete continuity of enterprise between the
two entities.” Id. at 29.
Omega LLC allegedly failed to disclose to Mikron the
transfer of the Agreement from Omega Inc. to Omega LLC until after the filing of
this lawsuit. Id. at 35.
In 2015, Omega LLC allegedly demanded that Mikron enter into a new
agreement under which Mikron would pay substantial additional fees to Omega
LLC in contravention of the 2010 Agreement. Id. at 31. Mikron refused to enter
into the new proposed agreement.
By this point, Mikron had allegedly
invested heavily in the development of a substantial customer base for Omega
products. Id. at 30. Omega LLC allegedly has access to Mikron’s customer lists
and confidential business processes and methods. Id. at 37. The Complaint alleges
that after Mikron refused to enter into the new proposed agreement, Omega LLC
threatened to call customers directly and to interfere with Mikron’s ongoing
business relationships and service contracts with Mikron’s customers. Id. at 31.
Omega LLC has allegedly “converted at least one account in Illinois, and possibly
others.” Id. On August 4, 2016, Omega LLC issued a letter of termination of the
Agreement allegedly failing to cite any valid justification. Id. Omega LLC has
also allegedly worked with another dealer to sell products inside Mikron’s
exclusive territory. Id. The Complaint alleges that “Mikron fully performed its
obligations under the Dealership Agreement.” Id. at 32.
The Complaint alleges that Omega played a corporate shell game in order to
insulate themselves from liability under the Agreement.
Id. at 30.
allegedly concealed from Mikron that Omega Inc. was dissolved and insolvent, and
Omega LLC carried on performance under the Agreement for years until it
wrongfully terminated the Agreement in bad faith, and then disavowed
responsibility under the Agreement. Id. at 36. Mikron alleges that Omega usurped
the fruits of Mikron’s performance with the intention to squeeze Mikron out of the
marketplace and withhold the consideration that Mikron was owed under the
Agreement. Id. at 28, 32.
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This type of motion tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
complaint. Davey v. Tomlinson, 627 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv Inc. v.
Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). A court, however, need not accept as
true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v.
Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)).
masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Edison v. State of Tenn.
Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). As the Supreme
Court has explained, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level… .” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted); see LULAC v.
Bresdesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive dismissal, the plaintiff
must offer sufficient factual allegations to make the asserted claim plausible on its
face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The court primarily considers the allegations in
the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the
record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint may also be taken into
account. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).
B. Breach of Contract Claim (Count I)
Omega LLC argues that Count I should be dismissed because Omega did not
have a valid contract with Mikron, and Omega did not breach the contract with
Mikron. Omega LLC argues that Mikron had not actually met its sales goals or
opted to extend the Agreement, and Mikron’s sole allegation that it “fully
performed its obligations” without a valid explanation is not sufficient to survive a
Motion to Dismiss. Omega LLC further argues that it did not wrongfully terminate
the Agreement because there was no valid agreement between the parties at the
time that Omega LLC terminated its relationship with Mikron.
Mikron argues that its allegations of the existence of a valid and binding
contract and of Mikron fully performing its obligations under the contract are
enough to state a valid breach of contract claim. Mikron asserts that Omega
breached the valid Agreement when it wrongfully terminated the Agreement
without valid justification.
To state a claim for breach of contract in Michigan, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) the terms of the contract, (3) breach of the
contract, and (4) an injury caused by the breach. See Webster v. Edward D. Jones
& Co., L.P., 197 F.3d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1999). In Michigan, the paramount goal
when interpreting a contract is to give effect to the intent of the contracting parties.
Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App. 57, 63-64 (2000). The court is to read
the agreement as a whole and attempt to apply the plain language of the contract
itself. Id. If the intent is clear from the language of the contract itself, there is no
place for further construction or interpretation of the agreement. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nikkel, 460 Mich. 558, 566 (1999). A contract provision that is
clear and unambiguous must be “taken and understood in [its] plain, ordinary, and
popular sense.” Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dowell, 204 Mich. App. 81, 87 (1994).
“Express provisions for termination govern a contract and courts cannot create a
contractual liability where the express intent of the parties was to terminate the
agreement upon a given condition.” E3A v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 13-10277,
2013 WL 1499560, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2013).
Turning to the Agreement in this case, attached to the Complaint, Section
1.1 expressly states that the Agreement automatically terminated exactly one year
from the date of the last person or entity to sign the Agreement. (Doc # 9, Pg ID
47). The date appearing on the signature page is “10/5/10.” Id. at 51. Under the
aforementioned clear and unambiguous provision, the Agreement automatically
terminated one year later, on 10/5/11. Section 1.1 of the Agreement then expressly
provides that “[a]t the termination of the Agreement and every year following the
termination, [Mikron] may opt for a one-year extension if all sales goals are met
and their account is current.”
Id. at 47.
Under this clear and unambiguous
provision, Mikron had the option of extending the Agreement each year if all sales
goals were met and Mikron’s account was current. The Complaint does not allege
that Mikron met the unambiguous contractual conditions, namely that Mikron met
all sales goals and that Mikron’s account was current. Mikron has failed to allege
any facts from which the Court may infer that Mikron was entitled to another oneyear extension. It follows that the Court cannot infer the existence of a valid
contract between Mikron and Omega at the time of the termination, or that Omega
breached a valid contract by wrongfully terminating it.
Mikron’s naked assertion that it “fully performed its obligations under the
Dealership Agreement” without any further factual enhancement is not sufficient to
raise Mikron’s right to relief above the speculative level, as required to survive a
Motion to Dismiss. The Court concludes that Mikron has failed to state a claim for
breach of contract. The Court dismisses Count I.
C. Tortious Interference with Business Relationships and Expectancies
Claim (Count II)
Omega LLC argues that Count II should be dismissed because Omega did
not have a valid contract with Mikron, so Mikron did not have exclusive control of
a geographic market at the time that Omega terminated its relationship with
Mikron. Omega LLC further argues that Mikron has not alleged this claim with
sufficient specificity and has merely provided a formulaic recitation of the
elements of tortious interference.
Mikron argues that that the Complaint alleges each element of tortious
interference with sufficient specificity, including alleging unethical conduct on
Omega’s part in the form of wrongful termination of the Agreement followed by
Omega’s use of Mikron’s established customer relationships for Omega’s own
To establish a claim for tortious interference of a business relationship in
Michigan, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship
or expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
defendant; (3) the defendant intentionally causing or inducing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant actual damage to
the plaintiff. BPS Clinical Labs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 217 Mich.
App. 687, 698-99 (1997). A plaintiff is required to allege that a defendant acted
with malice and the actions were unjustified in law for the purpose of invading the
contractual rights or business relationship of another. Feldman v. Green, 138
Mich. App. 360, 369 (1984).
A plaintiff must demonstrate, with specificity,
affirmative acts by the defendant that corroborate the improper motive or
interference. BPS Clinical, 217 Mich. App. at 699. Where the defendant’s actions
were motivated by legitimate business reasons, its actions would not constitute
improper motive or interference. Id.
The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Mikron had valid business
relationships and expectancies given the allegations that Mikron had been selling
Omega products in Michigan and Illinois for five years and had invested heavily in
the development of a substantial customer base for Omega products.
Complaint sufficiently alleges knowledge of the valid business relationships and
expectancies given the allegation that Omega had access to Mikron’s customer
lists. Regarding the third element of tortious interference, the Complaint alleges
that after Mikron refused to enter into the new proposed agreement, Omega
threatened to call customers directly and to interfere with Mikron’s ongoing
business relationships and service contracts with Mikron’s customers.
Complaint also alleges that Omega “converted” at least one account in Illinois.
Mikron argues that Omega used the breach of the Agreement to cut out Mikron and
move in on the customer base that Mikron had developed over the years. Mikron
also alleges that Omega’s conduct was unethical because Omega wrongfully
terminated the Agreement. However, as discussed above, the allegations in the
Complaint cannot establish that Omega wrongfully terminated the Agreement or
that there was a valid agreement in place granting Mikron an exclusive territory at
the time that Omega terminated its relationship with Mikron. The Court finds that
Mikron has not alleged with sufficient specificity affirmative acts by Omega that
corroborate an improper motive or interference. The Complaint lacks any specific
allegation that Omega resorted to unlawful methods of competition or used means
that were unjustified in law for the purpose of invading Mikron’s customer base.
While Mikron’s allegation may be consistent with Omega’s liability, the
allegations have fallen short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief. The Court concludes that Mikron has failed to state a claim
for tortious interference with business relationships and expectancies. The Court
dismisses Count II.
D. Unjust Enrichment Claim (Count III)
Omega LLC argues that Count III should be dismissed because there are no
allegations in the Complaint addressing how Omega “usurped a substantial amount
of revenue (both present and prospective)” from Mikron by merely terminating a
relationship with one of its dealers, which it was authorized to terminate. Omega
LLC further argues that Mikron fails to identify any “ill-gotten and converted
gains” allegedly retained by Omega.
Mikron argues that it properly alleged that Omega received an unearned
benefit through Mikron’s investments in developing its customer base.
To establish a claim for unjust enrichment in Michigan, a plaintiff must
show: (1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff, and (2) an
inequity resulting to the plaintiff because of the defendant’s retention of the
benefit. Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. Detroit, 256 Mich. App. 463, 478 (2003). “If
both elements are established, Michigan courts will then imply a contract to
prevent unjust enrichment. However, a contract will not be implied where an
express contract governing the same subject matter exists.” Joseph v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 12-12777, 2013 WL 228010 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22,
2013). “Where a contract governs the relationship of the parties, a cause of action
for unjust enrichment will not be recognized.” E3A, 2013 WL 1499560, at *4.
Despite Mikron pleading a benefit upon Omega and a corresponding
inequity resulting from the conferral of this benefit, Mikron’s unjust enrichment
claim fails as a matter of law. The relationship between Mikron and Omega,
including their rights and obligations, was governed by the Dealership Agreement.
Under the Agreement’s express provisions for termination, the Agreement
automatically terminated on 10/5/11, and then Mikron had the option of extending
the Agreement each year if all sales goals were met and Mikron’s account was
current. After a five-year relationship between the parties, Omega terminated the
Agreement in 2016. As discussed above, Mikron has failed to allege any facts
from which the Court may infer that Mikron was entitled to another one-year
extension of the Agreement. Omega’s access to Mikron’s customer list and the
exclusivity of Mikron’s sales territory were all part of the subject matter governed
by the express Agreement. The Court declines to imply another contract between
Mikron and Omega under an unjust enrichment theory, as that would circumvent
the express intent of the parties to terminate Mikron’s ability to opt for an
extension of the Agreement if Mikron did not meet certain express conditions,
which as discussed above, Mikron has not alleged it met.
The Court concludes that Mikron has failed to state a claim for unjust
enrichment. The Court dismisses Count III.
E. Fraud by Misrepresentation and Concealment (Count IV)
Omega LLC argues that Count IV should be dismissed because the
allegations in the Complaint do not meet the particularity requirements of Rule
9(b). Mikron argues that that the Complaint alleges each element of fraud by
misrepresentation and concealment with sufficient particularity.
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as requiring a plaintiff to allege the time, place, and content of the
alleged misrepresentation on which they relied; the fraudulent scheme; the
fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud. See
Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2003).
Mikron alleges that the fraudulent misrepresentation in this case was the
affirmative conduct of Omega in the form of silent fraud. The Complaint identifies
the speaker as Omega, and the time as the entire five-year relationship between
Omega and Mikron beginning when Omega Inc. was dissolved a few months after
the execution of the agreement, allegedly unbeknownst to Mikron. The Complaint
alleges, without any additional details, that Omega’s agents “misrepresented by
words an affirmative conduct that the Dealership Agreement was between Plaintiff
and an active and solvent corporation,” Omega Inc. The Complaint further alleges
that Omega LLC concealed that it caused Omega Inc., the contracting party, to be
dissolved and insolvent. Mikron alleges that Omega LLC had a duty to disclose
this information because it was a fiduciary of Mikron. The Complaint alleges that
Omega engaged in this fraudulent scheme and corporate shell game in order to
disavow responsibility under the Agreement after wrongfully terminating it.
Mikron alleges that it “reasonably relied on all of Omega’s various frauds and
proximately incurred damages as a result thereof.”
The Court finds that the Complaint is short on specifics. While it alleges the
content of the misrepresentation and concealment, as well as a fraudulent scheme
and intent, the Complaint only generally identifies Omega as the speaker and very
generally alleges that the misrepresentation and concealment “permeated
throughout the entire five-year relationship” with Mikron.
alleges that the alleged fraud induced Mikron to erroneously believe that it had a
valid agreement with a functioning business entity. However, the Complaint does
not specifically allege how Mikron reasonably relied on the alleged fraud or how
the alleged fraud proximately caused any alleged injury to Mikron. Mikron’s
obligation to provide the grounds of its entitlement to relief requires more than a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
The Court concludes that Mikron has failed to state a claim for fraud by
misrepresentation and concealment. The Court dismisses Count IV.
F. Statutory and Common-Law Conversion Claim (Count V)
Omega LLC argues that Count V should be dismissed because Mikron fails
to provide any factual support to its allegations of conversion, failing to even
identify which accounts were allegedly converted by Omega. Mikron argues that it
properly alleged that Omega converted at least one account belonging to Mikron,
using Mikron’s trade secrets and other information.
“Common-law conversion consists of any distinct act of domain wrongfully
exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights
therein.” Pollard v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 50 F. Supp. 3d 829, 834-35
(E.D. Mich. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
Statutory conversion under
Michigan law consists of “[a]nother person’s stealing or embezzling property or
converting property to the other person’s use.” M.C.L. § 600.2919a.
The Complaint alleges that Omega LLC has “converted and retained various
accounts of Mikron in Illinois,” and that Omega LLC has “exercised dominion and
control over these specific revenues and diverted them to their own use and benefit
without the consent of Mikron.” Mikron asserts that it has ownership over and
right to “these specific funds and assets that were, or should have been, payable to
Mikron,” and that Omega has “an obligation to return to Mikron the specific funds
Mikron has not offered sufficient factual allegations to make the conversion
claim plausible on its face, as this would require more than more than legal
conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the elements. The Complaint does not
identify which specific revenues, assets, and Illinois accounts, over which Mikron
has ownership, have been converted. The Complaint does not identify which
“trade secrets” were used to allegedly convert any personal property of Mikron.
Even if the Court inferred that Omega LLC had knowledge of Mikron’s customers
and directly solicited these customers after terminating the Agreement with
Mikron, the act of soliciting cannot be construed as an act of dominion.
“‘Dominion’ is a primary feature of ownership.
Soliciting involves asking
potential clients if they are interested in the company's services. The permissive
aspect of soliciting is inconsistent with the concept of ownership.” Primary Ins.
Agency Grp., LLC v. Nofar, No. 320039, 2015 WL 1227767, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Mar. 17, 2015).
The Court concludes that Mikron has failed to state a claim for statutory or
common-law conversion. The Court dismisses Count V.
G. Successor Liability / De Facto Merger / Fraudulent Transfer Claim
Omega LLC argues that Count VI should be dismissed because Mikron fails
to allege this claim with the required particularities. Mikron argues that it properly
alleged that Mikron did not receive notification that Omega Inc. was transferring
all operations and assets to Omega LLC.
Michigan follows the traditional rule of nonliability for corporate successors
who acquire a predecessor through the purchase of assets.
Foster v. Cone-
Blanchard Mach. Co., 460 Mich. 696, 702 (1999).
However, Michigan recognizes five narrow exceptions to the
traditional rule of nonliability: (1) where there is an express or
implied assumption of liability; (2) where the transaction
amounts to a
consolidation or merger; (3) where the transaction was
where some elements of a purchase in good faith
were lacking, or
where the transfer was without consideration and
the creditors of the
transferor were not provided for; or (5)
where the transferee
corporation was a mere continuation
or reincarnation of the old
Stramaglia v. United States, 377 Fed. App’x 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Complaint alleges that there was a continuity of enterprise between
Omega Inc. and Omega LLC.
To determine whether a successor corporation is a mere continuation
of its predecessor, Michigan courts examine the totality of the
circumstances and engage in a multi-factor analysis. The
indispensable prerequisites to application of the
exception appear to
be common ownership and a transfer of
substantially all assets.
Besides these two factors, the most
important consideration appears to
be the nature of the business
performed by the successor
whether its main corporate purpose was to
conduct the same
business as its predecessor. Several other factors
also bear upon
‘mere continuation’ analysis: the new corporation’s
the old corporation’s officers and employees; the new
corporation’s occupancy of the old corporation’s place of business;
and the new corporation’s selective repayment of the old
Id. at 475-76.
Taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, all operations and assets of
Omega Inc. were transferred to Omega LLC. Both Omega Inc. and Omega LLC
were owned, managed, and controlled by the same persons. The owners and
executives of Omega LLC retained possession and control of all assets of Omega
Omega LLC retained Omega Inc.’s employees, officers, executives and
various other agents. There was complete continuity of enterprise between Omega
Inc. and Omega LLC, including continuity of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business operations. The main purpose of Omega
LLC is to conduct the same business as its predecessor, Omega Inc.
Although the Complaint may establish that Omega LLC is a mere
continuation of Omega Inc. and could be liable under a theory of successor
liability, the Court dismisses Count VI. Successor liability is an equitable doctrine
that “serves as an alternative theory of liability and not an additional means to
impose judgment.” Morris v. Schnoor, No. 315006, 2014 WL 2355705, at *44
(Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2014). As discussed above, each of Mikron’s underlying
claims against Omega fail, and the successor liability claim cannot survive as a
separate cause of action.
Lastly, although in its Response Mikron requests “leave to amend the
Complaint to conform to the Court’s requirements,” the Court notes that a party
may not make a motion within its response. E.D. Mich. Electronic Filing Policies
and Procedures R 5(f).
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Omega Medical Imaging, LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc # 11) is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff Mikron Digital Imaging, Inc.
seeks to amend the Complaint, such a motion to amend must be filed within
fourteen days of the entry of this Order. E.D. Mich. LR 15.1.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: January 26, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on January 26, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
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