Wood v. EquityExperts.Org, LLC

Filing 24

OPINION and ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part Defendant's 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAMAKA WOOD,
Case No. 2:16-cv-13276
Plaintiff,
HON. STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
v.
EQUITYEXPERTS.ORG, LLC,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19]
In this debt-collection-practices case, Defendant attempted to collect debt that
Plaintiff owed to her condominium association, but Defendant's collection practices
allegedly violated federal and state law. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court reviewed the briefs and finds that a hearing is
unnecessary. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant
in part and deny in part Defendant's motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
fact is material for purposes of summary judgment if its resolution would establish or
refute an "essential element[] of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties[.]"
Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Stiles ex rel.

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D.S. v. Grainger Cty., Tenn., 819 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2016). The Court must then
determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). And although the
Court may not make credibility judgments or weigh the evidence, Moran v. Al Basit LLC,
788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015), a mere "scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to survive
summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's collection practices violated: (1) the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"); (2) Michigan's Occupational Code; and (3) the
Michigan Collection Practices Act. ECF 1. Defendant moved for summary judgment on
all counts. ECF 19. The Court will address each claim in turn.
I.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The FDCPA imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain prohibited debt

collection practices. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.
573, 576 (2010). One prohibited practice is the false representation of the amount of a
debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). There is an allegation and some evidence that
Defendant may have committed that prohibited act. Defendant, for example, filed a lien
on June 21, 2012 indicating that Plaintiff owed $718.50. ECF 20-7, PgID 176. But
Plaintiff's "occupant ledger" indicated that she actually owed $203.50. ECF 22-3, PgID
230. About a year later, Defendant filed a second lien indicating Plaintiff owed $815.00.
And again Plaintiff's occupant ledger suggested she owed a lesser amount. ECF 22-5,
PgID 232. Although Defendant could ultimately avoid liability if, for example, the
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violations were unintentional, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), Defendant failed to make a
showing on intent. The claim therefore must survive summary judgment.
II.

Michigan's Occupational Code
Michigan's Occupational Code prohibits making inaccurate statements to collect

a debt. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 339.915(e). As described in Section I, the
discrepancies between the liens filed by Defendant and the occupant ledgers suggest
that Defendant may have made inaccurate statements to collect a debt. Consequently,
the Court will not enter summary judgment in Defendant's favor.
III.

Michigan Collection Practices Act
Defendant argues that it is not regulated by the Michigan Collection Practices

Act, but failed to cite any law in support. ECF 19, PgID 79. Defendant's bald assertion
appears to be true. The Michigan Collection Practices Act prohibits a "regulated person"
from committing certain acts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.252. Persons regulated by the
Michigan Occupational Code are not regulated persons for purposes of the Michigan
Collections Practices Act. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.251(b) and (g). Plaintiff does
not dispute that Defendant is licensed under the Michigan Occupational Code.
Consequently, Defendant is exempt from liability under the Michigan Collection
Practices Act. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor on
the MCPA claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's FDCPA and Michigan Occupational Code claims survive summary
judgment. Rather than proceed to trial, the Court finds that facilitative mediation would

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be in the best interest of justice, efficiency, and judicial economy. The Court will
therefore refer the parties to Judge Daniel P. Ryan for facilitative mediation.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment [19] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court REFERS the case to Judge Daniel P.
Ryan for facilitative mediation. The facilitation shall proceed in compliance with Local
Rules 16.3 and 16.4.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than April 13, 2018, the parties shall
jointly FILE a notice of facilitation that indicates the date and location of facilitation as
well as any other relevant information.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon the completion of facilitation, the parties
shall jointly FILE a notice of completed facilitation that indicates when the facilitation
was completed and whether a settlement was reached. If a settlement is reached, then
the parties shall file a stipulated order of dismissal within 21 days of the completion of
facilitation.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: March 29, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on March 29, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ David Parker
Case Manager

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