Hogan v. Rivard
Filing
10
OPINION and ORDER Denying the 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability and Granting Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TMcg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PAUL HOGAN,
Petitioner,
Case No. 16-cv-13295
JUDGE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
v.
STEVEN RIVARD,
Respondent.
_____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION,
DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This matter has come before the Court on petitioner Paul Hogan’s pro se
Habeas Corpus Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his Wayne
County conviction for carjacking, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529a, on the basis that
there was insufficient evidence at his trial to sustain the conviction. The warden
urges the Court to deny the petition because the state appellate court’s adjudication
of Petitioner’s claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court law. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Petition will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. He waived his right to a jury trial and
was tried before a judge in Wayne County Circuit Court where the trial testimony
established that,
[o]n October 20, 2013, Jinni Terry arrived at a gas station in Detroit,
Michigan. As soon as she exited her car, defendant and Steven Heard
approached her and asked if they could pump her gas. Terry informed
the men that she was not getting gas, and proceeded to enter the gas
station to make a purchase. As Terry exited and walked away from
the gas station, she saw defendant standing by the gas station door,
and saw Heard standing near her car by the gas pump. Terry testified
that as she approached her car, she stopped walking because she was
afraid. Heard then pulled out a gun, stated, “Don’t run, don’t move,
don’t scream,” and demanded Terry’s keys. Terry refused and began
running toward the gas station with Heard in pursuit. Terry testified
that as she opened the gas station door, she felt defendant grab her
arm, but she was able to break free and enter the building. Once
inside the gas station, Terry saw defendant and Heard running
together from the scene.
People v. Heard, No. 321214, 2015 WL 1214502, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 17,
2015), (unpublished).
Terry and one of the officers involved in arresting Petitioner and Heard
shortly after the crime were the only prosecution witnesses. Petitioner did not
testify or present any witnesses. His defense was that he was merely present
during the incident at the gas station and that he lent no assistance to Heard.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court acquitted Petitioner of the
robbery and firearm charges and found him guilty of carjacking. On March 26,
2
2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to prison for ten to twenty-five years with
157 days of credit for time served.
Petitioner challenged his conviction in an appeal of right, but the Michigan
Court of Appeals rejected his arguments and affirmed his conviction. See id. On
October 28, 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it
was not persuaded to review the issue. See People v. Hogan, 498 Mich. 906; 870
N.W.2d 905 (2015). On September 13, 2016, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus
petition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
requires habeas petitioners who challenge “a matter ‘adjudicated on the merits in
State court’ to show that the relevant state court ‘decision’ (1) ‘was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’ or (2)
‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceedings.’” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,
1192 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). “[A] federal habeas court may not
issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v.
3
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n.
7 (1997), and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt,’ Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam).” Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the
state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To obtain a writ of habeas
corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling
on his or her claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s sole ground for relief is that there was insufficient evidence at
trial to support his carjacking conviction. Petitioner contends that he did not know
Heard had a gun and planned to commit a robbery or carjacking. Petitioner also
contends that, according to Terry, he never asked her for anything, and he never
chased her, blocked her path, or tried to grab her. He asserts that he ran from the
4
scene for fear of being blamed for the crime due to his association with Heard.
The Michigan Court of Appeals adjudicated Petitioner’s claim on the merits and
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction
under an aiding and abetting theory.
A. Clearly Established Federal Law
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution “protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Following Winship, the critical inquiry on review of a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is
whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not
require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the
evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard
gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (internal citations and footnote
omitted) (emphases in original).
“Circumstantial evidence may support a
conviction, McKenzie v. Smith, 326 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2003), and such
5
evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Walker
v. Russell, 57 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1995).” Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460,
488 (6th Cir. 2006).
Under AEDPA, moreover, the Court’s “review of a state-court conviction
for sufficiency of the evidence is very limited.” Thomas v. Stephenson, 898 F.3d
693, 698 (6th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has “made clear that Jackson claims
face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers
of judicial deference.”
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per
curiam).
First, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to decide what conclusions
should be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial. Id. “And second, on habeas
review, ‘a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees
with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court
decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ” Id.
“[T]his standard is difficult to meet,” no doubt, but “that is because it
was meant to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S. Ct.
770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). “[H]abeas corpus is a guard against
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a
substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102-03,
131 S. Ct. 770 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thomas, 898 F.3d at 698.
6
B. Application
The Jackson “standard must be applied with explicit reference to the
substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law,” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 324 n.16, and, in Michigan,
[a] person who in the course of committing a larceny of a motor
vehicle uses force or violence or the threat of force or violence, or
who puts in fear any operator, passenger, or person in lawful
possession of the motor vehicle, or any person lawfully attempting to
recover the motor vehicle, is guilty of carjacking.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529a(1). The phrase “ ‘in the course of committing a
larceny of a motor vehicle’ includes acts that occur in an attempt to commit the
larceny, or during commission of the larceny, or in flight or attempted flight after
the commission of the larceny, or in an attempt to retain possession of the motor
vehicle.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529a(2).
Terry identified Petitioner at trial as being one of the two men involved in
the incident at the gas station on October 20, 2013. She also identified Petitioner
in a photo array shown to her a few days after the incident. Her trial testimony –
that Heard pulled out a gun, demanded her car keys, and frightened her – was proof
that Heard used the threat of force or violence and placed her in fear while she was
in lawful possession of a motor vehicle. Although Heard did not take her car, his
attempt to take the vehicle qualified as conduct taken in the course of committing a
7
larceny of a motor vehicle. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529a(2). As such, Heard’s
conduct satisfied the statutory definition of carjacking. The critical question is
whether Petitioner aided and abetted Heard.
Aiding and abetting is “any type of assistance given to the perpetrator of a
crime by words or deeds that are intended to encourage, support, or incite the
commission of that crime.” People v. Moore, 470 Mich. 56, 63; 679 N.W.2d 41,
46 (2004). “Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be
committed or is being committed, is insufficient to show that a person is an aider
and abettor.” People v. Wilson, 196 Mich. App. 604, 614; 493 N.W.2d 471, 476
(1992). To show that an individual actually aided and abetted the commission of a
crime, the prosecution must establish
that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some
other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement
that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant
intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the
principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and
encouragement. An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred
from all the facts and circumstances. Factors that may be considered
include a close association between the defendant and the principal,
the defendant's participation in the planning or execution of the crime,
and evidence of flight after the crime.
People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 757-58; 597 N.W.2d 130, 135 (1999) (quoting
People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 568-69; 540 N.W.2d 728, 733-34 (1995)).
8
Heard committed a carjacking, as defined by state law. Furthermore, the
evidence at trial established that Petitioner assisted Heard in committing the
carjacking. As correctly noted by the state appellate court,
Defendant and Heard approached the victim together and each asked
to pump her gas. When the victim refused their offers and entered the
gas station, defendant stood at the door of the gas station where he
could act as a lookout and prevent the victim from fleeing. Terry
testified that after she exited the building and saw Heard produce a
gun, defendant grabbed her arm as she tried to retreat back into the
gas station. Defendant and Heard then fled the scene together.
Hogan, 2015 WL 1214502, at *2. In short, Petitioner aided and abetted Heard in
committing the carjacking by “approach[ing] the victim with Heard, [standing] by
the door while the victim entered the gas station, grabb[ing] the victim’s arm as she
tried to retreat from Heard, and [fleeing] the scene with Heard.” Id.
Although Petitioner implicitly challenges Terry’s testimony that he grabbed
her, “ ‘attacks on witness credibility are simply challenges to the quality of the
government’s evidence and not to the sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” Martin v.
Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 618 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Adamo, 742
F.2d 927, 935 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Furthermore, an assessment of a witness’s
credibility generally is “beyond the scope of federal habeas review of sufficiency
of evidence claims.” Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003).
9
“A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of
the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court.” Id.
Petitioner also contends that he did not know Heard had a gun or planned to
commit a robbery or carjacking. Terry, however, testified that both Petitioner and
Heard initially approached her. Petitioner also helped Heard execute the crime by
standing guard at the door to the gas station, and he fled the scene with Heard after
Heard was unsuccessful in acquiring Terry’s vehicle. The trial court could have
inferred from the circumstantial evidence that Petitioner knew Heard intended to
commit a carjacking, using some type of force or threat of force.
A rational trier of fact could have concluded from all the evidence, taken in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, that Petitioner aided and abetted Heard
in committing a carjacking. Thus, the prosecution proved the essential elements of
carjacking beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the state appellate court’s
conclusion – that the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction
under an aiding and abetting theory – was objectively reasonable. Petitioner has
no right to relief on the basis of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
10
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The state appellate court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s claim on the merits
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson. The state court’s
decision also did not result in an unreasonable application of the facts.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Dkt. No. 1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is
DENIED because Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Additionally, reasonable jurists
could not disagree with the Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s constitutional claim,
nor conclude that the issue is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Nevertheless,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner may proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal because an appeal could be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 5, 2019
s/Gershwin A. Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys
of record on this date, April 5, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Teresa McGovern
Case Manager
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?