Webasto Thermo & Comfort North America, Inc. et al v. BesTop, Inc.

Filing 92

OPINION AND ORDER granting 46 Plaintiffs' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WEBASTO THERMO & COMFORT
NORTH AMERICA, INC. and
WEBASTO-EDSCHA CABRIO USA, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 16-cv-13456
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge

v.
BESTOP, INC.,
Defendant.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS BESTOP’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND
TO STRIKE BESTOP’S SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (ECF NO. 46)
This action involves Plaintiffs Webasto Thermo & Comfort North America, Inc.
and Webasto-Edscha Cabrio USA, Inc.’s (collectively “Webasto”) claim that
Defendant Bestop, Inc. (“BesTop”) infringes Webasto’s U.S. Patent No. 9,346,342
(“the ‘342 Patent”), entitled “Vehicle Roof and Roof Opening Mechanism.” BesTop
asserts that the claims of the ‘342 Patent were disclosed in prior art and are therefore
unpatentable. BesTop has filed its First Amended Counterclaim, adding a claim of
inequitable conduct and an affirmative defense of unclean hands based on that same
alleged inequitable conduct. Webasto now moves to dismiss the inequitable conduct
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claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and to strike the unclean
hands affirmative defense pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The Court concludes that
a hearing is not necessary to resolve the issues raised in Webasto’s motion and will
determine the matter on the parties’ written submissions. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).
I.

BACKGROUND
Webasto alleges that on May 24, 2016, the United States Patent and Trademark

Office (“USPTO”) issued the ‘342 Patent and that Webasto holds all right, title and
interest in the ‘342 Patent with rights to enforce the '342 Patent and to sue for
infringement. (ECF No. 1, Complaint ¶ 8; Ex. A, U.S. Patent No. 9,346,342.) The
‘342 Patent claims technology related to a vehicle roof and roof opening mechanism
that Webasto claims to have introduced to the public on March 27, 2015, at the Easter
Jeep Safari event in Moab, Utah. (Compl. ¶ 10-11.) Webasto alleges that the
Webasto roof opening mechanism provides an innovative and effective way to cover
and selectively uncover a roof opening. (Compl. ¶ 12.)
Webasto alleges that BesTop manufactures a roof opening mechanism under
the name “Sunrider For Hardtop” (“Sunrider”) that incorporates Webasto’s patented
roof opening mechanism and infringes one or more claims of the ‘342 Patent, either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Webasto alleges that representatives of
BesTop were present at the 2015 Moab, Utah Jeep event and that, at that time, BesTop
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did not offer a roof opening mechanism similar to or in-line with its current Sunrider.
(Compl. ¶¶ 13-18.)
Webasto alleges that BesTop’s Sunrider infringes at least claims 1 and 6 of the
‘342 Patent. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Claim 6 of the ‘342 Patent recites:
A roof opening mechanism, being designed as an interchangeable insert,
for unlockable fixation at a roof structure of a vehicle roof, and
comprising:
a base frame, which can be placed upon an edge region of
the roof structure, said edge region for limiting a roof
opening, further comprising a fabric covering element,
which, by at least one tensioning bow fixedly pivotable
with respect to the base frame, is displaceable between a
closed position for covering the roof opening and an
uncovering position for uncovering the roof opening,
wherein the tensioning bow is coupled to an auxiliary
tensioning bow fixedly pivotal to the base frame, and
wherein the tensioning bow, in relation to a vertical
longitudinal center plane of the roof, is on each of its two
sides connected to the auxiliary tensioning bow via a
coupling rod,
the coupling rod being articulated to the auxiliary
tensioning bow and to the main tensioning bow via
intermediately positioned hinge points.
(Compl. ¶ 26, Ex. A, United States Patent No. 9,346,342, claim 6, PgID 38.) Webasto
alleges that BesTop’s Sunrider mechanism satisfies all of the limitations of claim 6 of
the ‘342 Patent. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-33.)
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Claim 1 of the ‘342 Patent recites “A vehicle roof having a roof structure with
a roof opening, which, by a roof opening mechanism, can be closed or at least
partially uncovered as desired, said roof opening mechanism being designed as an
interchangeable insert. . . .” (Compl. ¶ 34. Ex. A, ‘342 Patent, claim 1, PgID 37.)
Claim 1 then recites the structural elements of the interchangeable insert which are
similar to those set forth connection with claim 6. (Id.) Webasto alleges that each of
the limitations of claim 1 of the ‘342 Patent are found in BesTop’s Sunrider
mechanism. (Compl. ¶ 35.)
Webasto alleges that BesTop adopted the Webasto patented design after having
seen Webasto’s design in at least March 2015 and was or should have been aware that
Webasto’s design incorporated patentable subject matter. Webasto alleges that
BesTop’s infringement has caused and continues to cause damage to Webasto and that
Webasto is entitled to recover damages at trial, including treble damages, pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 284 and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. (Compl. ¶¶ 42-43.)
This Court previously granted Webasto’s motion to dismiss BesTop’s original
counterclaim in its entirety for failure to meet the pleading requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Webasto Thermo & Comfort North America, Inc., No. 16-13456,
2017 WL 4535290 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2017). The Court also granted BesTop leave
to file an amended counterclaim, which BesTop did on October 25, 2017. (ECF No.
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42, Amended Answer and First Amended Counterclaim.) Webasto now moves for
partial dismissal of BesTop’s First Amended Counterclaim, specifically for dismissal
of BesTop’s Inequitable Conduct Counterclaim (Count III), and moves to strike
BesTop’s Seventh Affirmative Defense. For the reasons that follow the Court
GRANTS the motion, DISMISSES Count III of BesTop’s First Amended
Counterclaim, and STRIKES BesTop’s Seventh Affirmative Defense (Unclean
Hands), which expressly incorporates Count III of its Counterclaim.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must

“‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’”
Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Directv
Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). The court “need not accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, or an unwarranted factual
inference.” Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 539 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631,
634 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual allegations will not suffice.”).

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In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court
explained that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (alteration in original). “To state a valid claim, a complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to
sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court clarified the concept of “plausibilty” in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), explaining that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678.” Thus, “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, a litigant must allege enough facts to make it plausible that the
defendant bears legal liability. The facts cannot make it merely possible that the
defendant is liable; they must make it plausible. Bare assertions of legal liability
absent some corresponding facts are insufficient to state a claim.” Agema v. City of
Allegan, 826 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)).
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In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the complaint as well
as (1) documents that are referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint and that are central
to plaintiff’s claims, (2) matters of which a court may take judicial notice (3)
documents that are a matter of public record, and (4) letters that constitute decisions
of a governmental agency. Thomas v. Noder-Love, 621 F. App’x 825, 829 (6th Cir.
2015) (“Documents outside of the pleadings that may typically be incorporated
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment are
public records, matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions
of governmental agencies.”) (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App’x 336, 344 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We have taken a liberal
view of what matters fall within the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). If
referred to in a complaint and central to the claim, documents attached to a motion to
dismiss form part of the pleadings. . . . [C]ourts may also consider public records,
matters of which a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions of governmental
agencies.”).
The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard applies in the case of a Rule 12(b)(6)
challenge in a patent case. Webasto, 2017 WL 4535290, at *4-5 (“courts have almost
unanimously held that all patent claims and counterclaims are subject to the pleading
requirements of Iqbal and Twombly”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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In addition, the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) apply to
claims of inequitable conduct. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d
1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than
fraud, must be pled with particularity’ under Rule 9(b).”).
III.

ANALYSIS
The question presented in Webasto’s motion is whether BesTop has pleaded

inequitable conduct with the specificity required by Rule 9(b) and whether the
allegations of Count III state a plausible claim of inequitable conduct under Rule
12(b)(6). The Federal Circuit has taken aim at what it has labeled a gross misuse and
overuse of the inequitable conduct claim in patent actions, stemming in large part
from the Federal Circuit’s own relaxation of the standards for a showing of the intent
and materiality elements of the claim:
This court embraced [] reduced standards for intent and materiality to
foster full disclosure to the PTO. This new focus on encouraging
disclosure has had numerous unforeseen and unintended consequences.
Most prominently, inequitable conduct has become a significant
litigation strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct conveniently expands
discovery into corporate practices before patent filing and disqualifies
the prosecuting attorney from the patentee's litigation team. Moreover,
inequitable conduct charges cast a dark cloud over the patent's validity
and paint the patentee as a bad actor. Because the doctrine focuses on the
moral turpitude of the patentee with ruinous consequences for the
reputation of his patent attorney, it discourages settlement and deflects
attention from the merits of validity and infringement issues.

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*

*

*

With these far-reaching consequences, it is no wonder that charging
inequitable conduct has become a common litigation tactic. One study
estimated that eighty percent of patent infringement cases included
allegations of inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct has been
overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up
the patent system. [T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost
every major patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other
reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's
interests adequately, perhaps.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In response to this unintended
consequence, the Federal Circuit has “tighten[ed] the standards for finding both intent
and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment
of the public.” Id. at 1290. The Federal Circuit has enunciated the following new
standard:
To prevail on a claim of inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must
prove that the patentee acted with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.
A finding that the misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross
negligence or negligence under a “should have known” standard does not
satisfy this intent requirement. In a case involving nondisclosure of
information, clear and convincing evidence must show that the applicant
made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference. In
other words, the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it.
649 F.3d at 1290 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Webasto argues that BesTop has failed to allege a prima facie case of
inequitable conduct and seeks dismissal of Count III of BesTop’s First Amended
Counterclaim alleging Unenforceability of the ‘342 Patent. The Federal Circuit
“applies [its] own law, not the law of the regional circuit, to the question of whether
inequitable conduct has been pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b).” Exergen,
575 F.3d at 1326. “‘[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must
be pled with particularity’ under Rule 9(b).”

Id. at 1326 (quoting Ferguson

Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Resources, Inc. v. Mega Sys. LLC, 350
F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b). The Federal Circuit has expressly held that “in pleading inequitable conduct in
patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where,
and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.”
Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. Rule 9(b) standards for pleading state of mind also apply
in the patent context:
Rule 9(b) also states that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally.” The relevant
“conditions of mind” for inequitable conduct include: (1) knowledge of
the withheld material information or of the falsity of the material
misrepresentation, and (2) specific intent to deceive the PTO. Although
“knowledge” and “intent” may be averred generally, our precedent, like
that of several regional circuits, requires that the pleadings allege
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sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that
a party acted with the requisite state of mind.
575 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). The
Federal Circuit summarized the inequitable pleading requirements as follows:
In sum, to plead the “circumstances” of inequitable conduct with the
requisite “particularity” under Rule 9(b), the pleading must identify the
specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material
misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO. Moreover,
although “knowledge” and “intent” may be averred generally, a pleading
of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient
allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer
that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information
or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or
misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the
PTO.
575 F.3d at 1328-29 (footnote omitted).
“The substantive elements of inequitable conduct are: (1) an individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application made an affirmative
misrepresentation of a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or
submitted false material information; and (2) the individual did so with a specific
intent to deceive the PTO.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 n. 3. “A pleading that simply
avers the substantive elements of inequitable conduct, without setting forth the
particularized factual bases for the allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b).” Id. at 132627.

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A.

BesTop Fails to Sufficiently Plead the “Who”

By generically naming the “inventor, his law firm, and/or the prosecution
attorney” as the actors in its inequitable conduct claim, BesTop has failed to
adequately plead the “who” under established Federal Circuit law. The essence of
BesTop’s claim of inequitable conduct is that someone associated with Webasto failed
to bring to the attention of the PTO examiner the existence of prior art. BesTop
identifies the prior art as Webasto’s U.S. Patent No. 8,042,858 B2 (“Webasto’s ‘858
Patent”). BesTop identifies the “material term” as “intermediately positioned hinge
points” for “a coupling rod” between the side legs of two tensioning bows.
(Counterclaim ¶ 32.) BesTop alleges that “[t]he inventor, his law firm, and/or the
prosecution attorney failed to bring this to the attention of the Patent Office contrary
to their duty of disclosure, particularly at the time of the telephonic interview of
February 24, 2016.” (Counterclaim ¶ 34.) This tells us that BesTop is actually unsure
who committed the material omission:
These allegations fail because they do not adequately identify the “who,”
the specific “individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application [who] ... failed to disclose material information....”
Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 n. 3. By alleging that “[the inventor], [his law
firm], and/or [the prosecution attorney]” (emphasis added) committed a
particular act, [BesTop] has not alleged that any one of those individuals
necessarily committed the particular act, nor has [BesTop] clearly
pleaded any joint concert of action. Indeed, it appears from the pleading
in the alternative that [BesTop] is uncertain who actually committed the
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act. The following factual scenarios could all fit within the allegations:
[the inventor] committed the act, but [his law firm] and [the prosecution
attorney] did not; [the inventor’s law firm] committed the act, but [the
inventor] and [the prosecution attorney] did not; neither [the inventor]
nor [his law firm] committed the act, but [the prosecution attorney] did;
[the inventor] and [the prosecution attorney] committed the act, but [the
inventor’s law firm] did not; [the inventor’s law firm] and [the
prosecution attorney] committed the act, but [the inventor] did not; and
[the inventor] and [his law firm] committed the act, but [the prosecution
attorney] did not. This is insufficient as it does not identify the “who”:
the person or persons who committed the acts constituting the elements
of the defense.
Drew Technologies, Inc. v. Robert Bosch, L.L.C., No. 12-15622, 2014 WL 562458,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2014) (citing Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec.
Co., No. 10-cv-812, 2012 WL 831525, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2012) (“Through the
“and” part of the conjunction, GE has managed to lump the named inventors,
attorneys, and agents together under the title “Applicants,” and through the “or”
portion GE has disjoined them; the result is that GE has failed to specifically identify
who is guilty of misconduct.”)). Far from singling out the individual with specific
intent, such allegations indiscriminately accuse and/or absolve them all.
BesTop’s inequitable conduct counterclaim does not permit a plausible
inference that “a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or
of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented this
information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328-29.

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“The pleading . . . provides no factual basis to infer that any specific individual, who
owed a duty of disclosure in prosecuting the [‘342] patent, knew of the specific
information in the [‘858] patent that is alleged to be material to the claims of the
[‘342] patent.” Id. at 1329.
BesTop’s generic pleading is exactly the sort at which the Federal Circuit has
taken aim in cases like Therasense and Exergen. BesTop suggests that because it
identifies the prior art in its pleading, and specifically identifies which claim
limitations that prior art is relevant to, it has “on balance” satisfied Exergen and Rule
9(b). But nothing in Exergen suggests that intent, materiality, and the “who, what,
where, when, and how” of the alleged misrepresentations are factors to be balanced
against one another. They are necessary elements, each of which must be pleaded
with sufficient particularity.
B.

BesTop Fails to Allege Facts That Plausibly Suggest a Specific
Intent to Deceive or the Materiality of Prior Art Reference

“Although ‘knowledge’ and ‘intent’ may be averred generally, [Federal Circuit]
precedent, like that of several regional circuits, requires that the pleadings allege
sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a party acted
with the requisite state of mind.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. As discussed supra,
BesTop’s allegations fail to plausibly suggest that a specific individual actually knew

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of material information or knew of false information that was being presented to the
PTO and withheld or misrepresented that information with a specific intent to deceive
to the PTO. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328-29. Without identification of the individual
responsible for the alleged misrepresentation it is of course impossible for the Court
to plausibly infer his or her specific intent to deceive.
Not only does BesTop fail to identify the “who,” and to plausibly suggest the
“who’s” specific intent, but BesTop also fails to identify what knowledge the “who”
possessed about the prior art that satisfies the “but-for” materiality element of a claim
of inequitable conduct. “When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that
prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been
aware of the undisclosed prior art.” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. BesTop simply
states that the claim term “immediately positioned hinge points,” for “a coupling rod”
between the side legs of tensioning bows was “material.”

(First Amended

Counterclaim ¶ 32.) BesTop refers to Exhibit 1 of its Answer and First Amended
Counterclaim at pages 107-08 and 122-23 (First Amended Counterclaim ¶¶ 32-33)
(presumably BesTop means PgID 107-08 and 122-23), and refers generically to
“Webasto’s ‘858 patent” as the source of the prior art, but fails to allege that the PTO
would have rejected the claims of the ‘342 patent had it known of the ‘858 patent.
(Counterclaim ¶¶ 33-34.) BesTop has failed to allege the “how” – “how the USPTO
15

would have used this material information in assessing patentability.” Recticel
Automobilesysteme GMBH v. Automotive Components Holdings, LLC, No. 10-14097,
2011 WL 5307797, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2011). This type of pleading does not
suffice under Therasense and Exergen.1
BesTop’s inequitable conduct counterclaim is an example of the very formulaic
“knee jerk” filing that has been expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit as a litigation
tactic that, when unwound, is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief and lacks
merit to proceed further. BesTop suggests that Webasto has “ignored” more recent
Federal Circuit precedent, Amercian Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
768 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2014), in attacking BesTop’s inequitable conduct
counterclaim. But American Calcar simply applied Therasense in determining
whether inequitable conduct was proven on the fully developed record before the
court. It was not a case analyzing the pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) or the
sufficiency of the pleadings under Rule 12 (b)(6). The inequitable conduct ruling in

1

Nor has BesTop pleaded any facts that would suggest that they are relieved of the
obligation to plead but-for materiality based upon “egregious misconduct.” See
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292 (“When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of
egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the
misconduct is material.”). But “neither mere nondisclosure of prior art references to
the PTO nor failure to mention prior art references constitutes egregious misconduct
. . . .” Id. The egregious misconduct exception to pleading but-for materiality is not
in play here.
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American Calcar was made on a fully developed record, indeed after a jury had
returned its verdict and the case had been remanded for reconsideration of the
inequitable conduct rulings in light of Therasense. Neither the district court nor the
Federal Circuit in American Calcar had occasion to, and indeed did not, discuss the
issue of sufficiency of the pleadings under the Therasense framework. As an
important note of distinction, the “who” was clearly identified in American Calcar –
a Mr. Obradovich – and the factual record had been fully developed through discovery
and a trial, ultimately supporting the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct
under Therasense based on factual findings of materiality and based on the district
court’s finding of Mr. Obradovich’s specific intent and his lack of credibility.
American Calcar does not speak to the pleading insufficiencies at issue here.
C.

BesTop’s Seventh Affirmative Defense is Stricken.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “the court may strike from
a pleading an insufficient defense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike
affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 12(f) are generally disfavored, but granting such
motions is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Fields v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 11-15296, 2012 WL 1119520, at *4 (E.D. Mich. April 3, 2012)
(Borman, J.) (citing Ameriwood Indus. Int'l Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 961 F.
Supp. 1078, 1083 (W.D. Mich. 1997)). “An affirmative defense is insufficient if, as
17

a matter of law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances. A motion to
strike under Rule 12(f) is proper where it will eliminate spurious issues before trial
and streamline the litigation.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See
also Drew Technologies, 2014 WL 562458, at *2 (“A motion to strike an affirmative
defense under Rule 12(f) will be granted if the defense is insufficient, if ‘as a matter
of law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances.’” (quoting Ameriwood,
961 F. Supp. at 1083); Federal Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n v. Emperian at Riverfront, LLC,
No. 11-14119, 2013 WL 5500027, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2013) (“A motion to
strike an affirmative defense under Rule 12(f) is proper if ‘as a matter of law, the
defense cannot succeed under any circumstances.’”) (quoting Ameriwood, 961 F.
Supp. at 1083). “Striking an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 12(f) is also proper
‘if it aids in eliminating spurious issues before trial, thereby streamlining the
litigation.’” Emperian, 2013 WL 5500027, at *7 (quoting Specialized Pharmacy
Servs., LLC v. Magnum Health and Rehab of Adrian, LLC, No. 12–12785, 2013 WL
1431722 (E.D. Mich., Apr. 9, 2013)).
Because the Court finds that BesTop’s inequitable conduct counterclaim fails
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and fails to satisfy the particularity requirements
of Rule 9(b), it follows that BesTop cannot succeed on its Seventh Affirmative
Defense, which expressly incorporates by reference the allegations of Count III of its
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First Amended Counterclaim. Striking BesTop’s Seventh Affirmative Defense will
also aid in eliminating a “spurious issue” before trial, keeping these parties focused
throughout discovery on the infringement and invalidity issues in this patent action,
and streamlining this litigation. Accordingly, BesTop’s Seventh Affirmative defense
is STRICKEN.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit sent a clear message in Therasense, Exergent, and their

progeny: in order to assert a claim of inequitable conduct, which levels an accusation
of “moral turpitude” and necessarily “casts a dark cloud over the patent’s validity and
paints the patentee as a bad actor,” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288, the pleader must
specifically identify a bad actor, and plead with particularity exactly what he or she
knew, what he or she failed to do with that knowledge, and how disclosing that
knowledge would have resulted in a rejection of the patent claim by the PTO. BesTop
has pleaded none of these necessary facts here with sufficient particularity to merit
advancing its inequitable conduct counterclaim (Count III of its First Amended
Counterclaim) or its Seventh Affirmative Defense to the discovery phase.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion to Dismiss
BesTop’s First Amended Counterclaim, DISMISSES Count III of BesTop’s First
Amended Counterclaim WITH PREJUDICE and STRIKES BesTop’s Seventh
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Affirmative Defense.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Paul D. Borman
PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 3, 2018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each
attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on July
3, 2018.

s/Deborah Tofil
Case Manager

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