McInnis v. West Bloomfield, Township of et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Denying 19 MOTION to Vacate 4 Order on Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (WBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
LARENZ MCINNIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 16-13525
TOWNSHIP OF WEST
BLOOMFIELD, et al.,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE
Plaintiff Larenz McInnis sued the Township of West Bloomfield, the West
Bloomfield Police Department, the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office, “Officer
Frederick,” “Detective Medham,” “Officer John Doe,” Assistant Prosecutor Nicole Soma,
and his former defense attorneys Karen Cook and Lanita Haith, seeking $5,000,000 in
damages related to his arrest, detention, and prosecution. (Dkt. # 1.) Plaintiff also filed
an application to proceed in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); (Dkt. # 2),
which the court granted. (Dkt. # 4.) In the same opinion and order the court dismissed
this action as against Defendants Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office, Township of
West Bloomfield, West Bloomfield Police Department, Nicole Soma, Karen Cook, and
Lanita Haith, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), because the complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted against these Defendants. (Dkt. # 4.) Plaintiff has
since filed a purported “motion to vacate” in which he asks this court to reconsider its
order dismissing these Defendants. (Dkt. # 19.) The court therefore construes Plaintiff’s
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filing as a motion for reconsideration to which neither a response nor oral argument is
permitted absent a court order. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(2). The court will deny the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint alleges seven separate counts against various
municipal entities and officials both in their individual and official capacities as well as
several attorneys and two unnamed John Does (supervisors to named officers). Plaintiff
was a minor during the alleged conduct, which generally involves his wrongful arrest,
detention, and prosecution before the case against him was ultimately dismissed.
Of particular relevance to the present motion are Plaintiff’s allegations against
Assistant Prosecutor Nicole Soma and the Township of West Bloomfield. Plaintiff
alleges that on January 17, 2015, Assistant Prosecutor Nicole Soma knowingly “used
false/and/or unlawful means in a legal court proceeding” and pursued an untimely
action—beyond the 180-day jurisdictional limit—in violation of Plaintiff’s Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial and Michigan Court Rule 6.004. (Dkt. # 1, Pg. ID 8.) In
Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 he includes the “City of West Bloomfield”,
presumably meaning the Township of West Bloomfield, though he does not make clear
what objectionable conduct this Defendant performed. Plaintiff additionally alleges that
the Township is liable for falsely detaining him following his arrest under Section 1986.
The court reviewed the complaint in detail in its prior order and concluded that, in
general, it contains allegations of “ulterior motives and conspiracies motivating the
complained-of conduct” and lacks “substantial additional detail.” (Dkt. # 4, at Pg. ID 31.)
The court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Assistant Prosecutor Nicole Soma, the
Oakland County Prosecutor Office, the West Bloomfield Police Department, the
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Township of West Bloomfield, and defense attorneys Karen Cook and Lanita Haith.
Plaintiff now moves the court for reconsideration of that dismissal order, specifically the
dismissal of claims against Soma and the Township of West Bloomfield. (Dkt. # 19, Pg.
ID 78, 85.)
II. STANDARD
In the Eastern District of Michigan, a party filing a motion for reconsideration
must “demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties . . . have been
misled” and “show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the
case.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3); see also In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567,
574 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the district’s local rules regarding motions for
reconsideration are the applicable standard rather than Rule 59(e) which governs
motions to amend the judgment). Generally, “the court will not grant motions for
rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the
court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). “A motion
for reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and
dispose[d] of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the [c]ourt
and the litigant.” Lyles v. Jackson, No. 05-70146, 2006 WL 3106204, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 31, 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, it is also not a
vehicle to raise new issues for the first time. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell
Properties, LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Arguments raised for the first time
in a motion for reconsideration are untimely and forfeited on appeal.”). Instead, a party
must identify a “palpable defect,” that is one which “is ‘obvious, clear, unmistakable,
manifest or plain.’” Buchanan v. Metz, 6 F. Supp. 3d 730, 752 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
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(quoting United States v. Lockett, 328 F. Supp. 2d 682, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2004)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Assistant Prosecutor Soma
In the dismissal order, the court held that the claims against Soma and the
Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office are subject to absolute immunity, where “the critical
inquiry is how closely related is the prosecutor’s challenged activity to his role as an
advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” See
Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The court
concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations “all fall under the role of a prosecutor as an
advocate as opposed to an administrative or investigatory role.” (Dkt. # 4) (citing Rouse
v. Stacy, 478 Fed. App’x. 945 (6th Cir. 2012)). Consequently, the court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims against Soma.
Plaintiff, while quoting extensively from Michigan state law, insists that the court
erred when it determined that Soma’s complained-of conduct is subject to absolute
immunity. (Dkt. # 19, Pg. ID 75.) Plaintiff complains about the delay in dismissing his
case and about alleged discovery violations. (Id. at 77-78.) Plaintiff alleges that Soma
committed a Brady violation by purportedly withholding video evidence, but he does not
identify or describe the video evidence nor explain how it is exculpatory. (Id. at 82.) He
asserts that the court erred in finding that Soma’s bad faith conduct is subject to
absolute immunity.
The court did not err; the purported discovery issues identified by Plaintiff are
part of the judicial process and directly related to Soma’s role as an advocate in the
criminal process. Plaintiff has provided no factual basis to find that Soma’s conduct was
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unauthorized or in bad faith. Conclusory statements do not suffice. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, evidence is material, and thus must be
disclosed under Brady, only when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 620 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995)). Plaintiff recognizes that the case against him
was ultimately dismissed and provides no explanation how this result would have been
different or more favorable to him had he received the unknown video. (Dkt. # 19, Pg. ID
77.) Plaintiff has failed to identify a palpable defect in the court’s order.
B. The Township of West Bloomfield
In its dismissal order, the court stated that municipal entities are not subject to
respondeat superior liability under Monell unless the complained-of conduct embodies
official policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694, (1978).
The court concluded that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that the
complained-of conduct was a government policy, and therefore to the extent that
Plaintiff’s theory relied on acts by the officers employed by the Township, he could not
succeed on his claims against the Township.
To assert a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to show that he suffered a
constitutional violation and that a municipal policy or custom directly caused the
violation. See Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017). More
specifically, the Sixth Circuit has explained
[A] municipality is liable under § 1983 only if the challenged conduct
occurs pursuant to a municipality's “official policy,” such that the
municipality's promulgation or adoption of the policy can be said to have
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“cause[d]” one of its employees to violate the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.
D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
692). To make a showing of an illegal policy or custom a plaintiff must demonstrate one
of the following
(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2)
that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions;
(3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4)
the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). When a plaintiff relies on “the
existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision,” as Plaintiff seems to do
here, he must show “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the
municipality had ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in
this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478
(quoting Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir.2010)).
Plaintiff recites the elements of a Monell claim without the factual basis to support
the claim. (Dkt. # 19, Pg. ID 92-93) (quoting Plaintiff’s complaint). He has not provided
any factual allegations regarding a “history of abuse” by the Township’s police force or
any facts to suggest that the Township “was clearly on notice” of deficient training.
Plaintiff complains about the conduct of Soma and the Police Department only in
conclusory fashion and fails to set forth facts showing a policy or custom. (Id. at Pg. ID
92.) He argues that “the mere fact that plaintiff filed this action against multiple officers”
establishes that the policies of the Township of West Bloomfield are directly “related to
the abuse Plaintiff received during his arrest.” (Dkt. # 19, Pg. ID 94.)
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Plaintiff is incorrect. Iqbal demands more than unadorned, he-hurt-me
accusations and recitations of law. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s complaint and
motion contain only boilerplate, meandering statements of law. Plaintiff has failed to
identify a palpable defect in the court’s order. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to vacate (Dkt. # 19) is DENIED.
S/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 25, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon all
parties of record on this date, September 25, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/William Barkholz for Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(810) 292-6523
S:\Cleland\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\16-13525.MCINNIS.Vacate.Reconsideration.AJU.docx
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