Jackson v. Palmer
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying 17 Motion for Relief from Opinion and Order. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES JACKSON,
Petitioner,
Case No. 2:16-CV-13704
JUDGE PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
v.
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent,
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE MOTION (1) FOR RELIEF
FROM OPINION AND ORDER DUE TO CLERICAL MISTAKE,
OVERSIGHT OR OMISSION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), (2) TO
AMEND OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS PURSUANT TO FED. R.
CIV. P. 52(b), (3) TO ALTER OR AMEND OPINION AND ORDER
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), (4) FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b), AND (5) DENYING A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN
FORMA PAUPERIS
This Court denied petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus and
denied him a certificate of appealability or leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Jackson v. Palmer, No. 2:16-CV-13704, 2017 WL 4225446 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22,
2017).
Petitioner filed a motion, in which he seeks relief from the Court’s opinion
and order denying habeas relief. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court declines to issue a certificate of
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appealability or leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Petitioner asks this Court for amended or additional findings pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Petitioner also asks this Court to alter or amend judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Petitioner asks this Court to correct a clerical
error or mistake pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Lastly, petitioner seeks relief
from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In his combined motion,
petitioner contends that this Court made factual and legal errors in denying him
relief on his Confrontation Clause claim.
A Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend fact findings or conclusions of law is
essentially a motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s factual findings and
legal conclusions. See e.g. Shivers v. Grubbs, 747 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D. Ohio
1990). A motion to alter or amend judgment brought by a habeas petitioner
pursuant to Rule 59 (e) may likewise be analyzed as a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 of the Eastern District of Michigan. See Hence v. Smith,
49 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Finally, although petitioner also seeks
relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and (b), this portion of the
motion should likewise be construed as a motion for reconsideration. See e.g.
United States v. Moss, 189 F.R.D. 354, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
U.S. Dist.Ct. Rules, E.D. Mich. 7.1 (h) allows a party to file a motion for
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reconsideration. In order for a court to grant a motion for reconsideration, the
movant must show (1) a palpable defect; (2) that misled the court and the parties;
and (3) that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
Sigma Financial Corp. v. American Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp.
2d 710, 715 (E.D. Mich. 2002). A ‘palpable defect’ is a defect which is considered
“obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Id. As a general rule, a court
will not grant a motion for rehearing or reconsideration that merely presents the
same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.
Id.
Petitioner claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
violated when the trial court admitted into evidence a DNA analysis report
authored by a non-testifying forensic scientist, Jennifer Jones. Petitioner also
argued that his confrontation rights were violated when Ms. Jones’s supervisor,
Heather Vitta, was permitted to testify about the results of Ms. Jones’s report.
Petitioner contends that this Court erred in concluding that the Michigan Court of
Appeals reasonably rejected petitioner’s claim pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
plurality holding in Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 57-58 (2012), because Ms.
Vitta’s references to Ms. Jones’s report did not violate petitioner’s right to
confrontation because the DNA profiles that were acquired by Jones were the
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assumptions on which Vitta’s own independent opinion were based. Jackson v.
Palmer, 2017 WL 4225446, p. 6.
Petitioner claims that this Court’s factual findings that Ms. Vitta made her
own independent analysis of the DNA evidence is not supported by the record.
Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect. Heather Vitta testified at petitioner’s trial
that she was Ms. Jones’s supervisor. Ms. Vitta reviewed Ms. Jones’s report but
also performed her own independent analysis of the DNA evidence. Ms. Vitta
testified that she reviewed the actual DNA types obtained from each evidentiary
sample and then compared each of these samples against the reference DNA
profiles obtained from petitioner, the victim, and the women. Ms. Vitta determined
that a DNA profile obtained from a bloodstain recovered from an interior front
door trim matched petitioner’s DNA and a bloodstain from a left boot also matched
petitioner’s DNA. Ms. Vitta testified that DNA obtained from one end of the tree
branch matched petitioner’s DNA and the DNA from the other end matched the
victim’s DNA. (Tr. 10/23/13, pp. 138-46). Ms. Vitta emphasized that she
performed her own independent analysis of the DNA based on Ms. Jones’s report.
(Id., pp. 150-51). The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that Ms.
Vitta’s references to Ms. Jones’s report did not violate petitioner’s right to
confrontation because the DNA profiles that were acquired by Jones were used by
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Ms. Vitta in reaching her own independent opinion. Petitioner failed to show that
this Court’s factual or legal analysis of his claim was in error.
Moreover, this Court in the alternative rejected petitioner’s claim because
any error in admitting the DNA results from Ms. Jones’s report or Ms. Vitta’s
references to the report was harmless because three witnesses testified that
petitioner participated in the victim’s murder and petitioner himself admitted to
being present at the crime scene. Jackson v. Palmer, 2017 WL 4225446, p. 6.
In light of the foregoing, petitioner is not entitled to reconsideration of the
Court's opinion and order.
A certificate of appealability is required to appeal the denial of a motion for
reconsideration in a habeas case. See e.g. Amr v. U.S., 280 F. App’x. 480, 486 (6th
Cir. 2008). This Court denies petitioner a certificate of appealability, because
jurists of reason would not find this Court’s resolution of petitioner’s motions for
reconsideration to be debatable. The Court will also deny petitioner leave to
appeal in forma pauperis, because the appeal would be frivolous. Allen v. Stovall,
156 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITH PREJUDICE the “Motion for
Relief from Opinion and Order Due to Clerical Mistake, Oversight or Omission
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and Brief in Support; Motion to Amend and Make
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Additional Findings Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) and Brief in Support; Motion
to Alter Opinion and Order in Light of State Trial Court Transcripts Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) and Brief in Support; and Motion for Relief from Judgment
Denying Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and Brief in
Support” (Dkt. # 17).
The Court further DENIES a certificate of appealability and leave to appeal
in forma pauperis.
SO ORDERED.
s/Paul D. Borman
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge
Dated: October 31, 2017
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each
attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on October 31,
2017.
s/Deborah Tofil
Case Manager
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