Scott v. Trott Law, P.C.

Filing 57

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 56 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN SCOTT,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16-13734
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

v.
TROTT LAW, P.C.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [#56]
I.

BACKGROUND
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff Kevin Scott’s (“Scott”) pro

se Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 6, 2017. (Doc # 56) On June 22,
2017, the Court entered an Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment/Dismissal (Doc # 18) and mooting various motions. (Doc # 54) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court denies Scott’s Motion for Reconsideration.
II.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review
The Local Rules of the Eastern District of Michigan provide that any motion
for reconsideration must be filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment or
order. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(1). No response to the motion and no oral argument
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thereon are permitted unless the Court orders otherwise. Id. at 7.1(h)(2). Scott’s
Motion is timely filed.
Local Rule 7.1 further states:
(3) Grounds. Generally, and without restricting the court’s
discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or
reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the
court, either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must
not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the
parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been
misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a
different disposition of the case.
Id. at 7.1(h)(3).

“A ‘palpable defect’ is a defect which is obvious, clear,

unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Fleck v. Titan Tire Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 605,
624 (E.D. Mich. 2001). A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to re-hash
old arguments, or to proffer new arguments or evidence that the movant could have
brought up earlier. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.
1998) (motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) “are aimed at re consideration, not
initial consideration”) (citing FDIC v. World Universal Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st
Cir. 1992)).
B. Palpable Defect
Scott argues that the Court made a palpable error by concluding that
Defendant Trott Law, P.C. (“Trott”) did not violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) because Trott fraudulently claimed to act on behalf of
Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) to initiate foreclosure proceedings on Scott’s
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property. (Doc # 56, Pg ID 7-8) Scott provides three reasons why he believes the
Court erred.
First, Scott argues that the court ignored evidence which indicates that
BANA never sent Trott a referral to foreclose on Scott’s home. This argument is
contrary to Plaintiff’s own document submitted before the court on February 10,
2017, which states, “Plaintiff learned for the first time that Bank of America did
send Defendant a Referral message to foreclosure[sic] on Plaintiff[sic] home . . . .”
(Doc # 24) (emphasis added)

Scott has not submitted any evidence that is

inconsistent with his own statement or the findings of the Court.
Second, Scott argues that Trott’s refusal to provide Scott with requested
discovery documents is evidence that Trott was never retained by BANA. While
Trott did refuse to provide certain discovery material, asserting several privileges,
Trott indicated an intention to call both current and former employees and
representatives of BANA on its proposed witness list. (Doc # 25) Scott has not
provided additional evidence to support his conclusory statement.
Third, Scott adds that BANA provided a sworn affidavit declaring that
BANA does not have an interest in this case. (Doc # 56, Pg ID 11) That evidence,
however, does not address whether Trott was retained by BANA to handle debt
collection efforts related to Scott’s mortgage with BANA.

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Scott also attempts to have the Court reevaluate whether Trott stopped its
debt collection efforts by November 4, 2017, after Scott filed for bankruptcy.
Scott, however, has provided no evidence which indicates that the Court erred in
its initial determination that Trott ended its debt collection efforts against Scott.
Scott has failed to provide evidence that the Court erred in finding that Trott did
not violate the FDCPA.
The Court finds that Scott has not met his burden on a motion for
reconsideration, as he has not  demonstrated a palpable defect by which the court
has been misled. Additionally, the Court notes that Scott has attempted to advance
new arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration. The Court declines to consider
these new arguments as they are substantively-related to the FDCPA claim, but fail
to raise a defect committed by the Court.

Additionally, a motion for

reconsideration is “aimed at re consideration, not initial consideration.” Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe, 146 F.3d at 374 (citing FDIC, 978 F.2d at 16). Scott’s Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Kevin Scott’s Motion for

Reconsideration (Doc # 56) is DENIED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: December 18, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on December 18, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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