Kirby v. Fitzgerald Public Schools District
ORDER Regarding Various Motions. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CASE NO. 16-13868
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
FITZGERALD PUBLIC SCHOOLS
ORDER REGARDING VARIOUS MOTIONS
On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff Darlene Kirby (“Kirby”) filed a Complaint
pro se against Defendant Fitzgerald Public Schools District (“Fitzgerald”). The
Complaint is difficult to understand but seems to allege an ERISA claim, a
procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a gender discrimination
claim under Title VII. (Doc # 1) Fitzgerald filed an Answer on December 15,
2016. (Doc # 12) On December 22, 2016, Fitzgerald filed a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. (Doc # 14) On January 9, 2017, Kirby filed a document titled
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleading Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(4)(f)” (Doc #
17), though it does not contain any argument related to a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. On February 13, 2017, Kirby filed a Motion for Judgment for
Relief. (Doc # 19) On February 15, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the
On February 24, 2017, Kirby filed another Motion for Judgment
Pleading of Relief. (Doc # 23) On June 22, 2017, Kirby filed another motion
titled Motion Pleading. (Doc # 27) On June 23, 2017, Fitzgerald filed a Motion to
Strike Kirby’s Motion Pleading. (Doc # 28) On July 26, 2017, Kirby filed a
Motion for Dispositive Order to Dismiss the Entirety of Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc # 34) On July 27, 2017, Fitzgerald filed a
Response and Motion that Plaintiff be Prohibited from Filing Further Documents
Without First Convening a Conference with the Court and Undersigned Counsel.
(Doc # 36)
Kirby began working for Fitzgerald as a bus driver on or about August 28,
2015. (Doc # 1, Pg ID 10) According to Fitzgerald, Kirby was hired as a
substitute bus driver (Doc # 14-3, Pg ID 74; Doc # 14-4, Pg ID 83), and it is not
clear from the Complaint whether Kirby disputes the substitute status. According
to Fitzgerald, substitute bus drivers are not members of a union and are not able to
bid on bus routes. Id. Substitute bus drivers are assigned based on the daily needs
of the school district when a union member is not able to complete a route. Id.
The Complaint does not allege that Kirby is a union member, and it alleges that
Kirby never received a “Transportation 1305 contract.” (Doc # 1, Pg ID 6) Kirby
alleges, however, that she requested union representation after a school bus
accident, and that she is a member of the Michigan Public Schools Employee
Retirement System. Id. at 4. It is unclear whether Kirby believes she is a union
Kirby alleges that she was involuntarily enrolled in the Office of Retirement
Service’s pension plan and the personal health care plan, both requiring employee
contributions without joint contributions from either the employer or the union. Id.
at 9. According to Kirby, Melanie Rainwater (“Rainwater”), Director of Human
Resources, Facilities, and Transportation, forced her to sign a New Hire Election
Form on December 7, 2015 making the aforementioned benefit elections in order
to prevent her from receiving the employee benefits available to union members.
Id. at 9-10, 13; Doc # 14-3, Pg ID 75.
Kirby alleges that Laura Victory (“Victory”), Transportation Supervisor,
discriminated against her and harassed her because of her gender. (Doc # 1, Pg ID
7; Doc # 14-3, Pg Id 75) Kirby alleges that Victory reassigned her bus route on
December 8, 2015 to co-worker Jerome Lyle (“Lyle”), a male substitute bus driver
who allegedly had “less seniority.” (Doc # 1, Pg ID 7; Doc # 14-4, Pg ID 83)
Kirby alleges that she completed the Fitzgerald School Bus Training Program
several weeks before Lyle. (Doc # 1, Pg ID 7-8) Kirby’s new bus route had fewer
stops, which resulted in less work hours per week. Id. at 8. According to the
Complaint, Victory also harassed Kirby by requiring her to do tasks that were not a
part of her job. Kirby alleges that Victory informed Kirby that she could work
additional hours per week by cleaning and fueling the fleet of school buses. Id. at
8. According to MDCR investigation records, documentation showed that these
extra tasks that were offered, but not required of Kirby, were indeed a part of
Kirby’s job description. (Doc # 14-4, Pg ID 80) Further, Kirby confirmed that she
did not report any alleged harassment to Fitzgerald. Id.
According to MDCR investigation records, Victory and Rainwater, both
women, are the same supervisors who hired Kirby in September 2015. (Doc # 144, Pg ID 79) Fitzgerald’s transportation department includes 11 female employees
and 6 male employees. Id.
According to the Complaint, Fitzgerald has not terminated Kirby’s
employment, though the Complaint also alleges that her last date of work was
January 5, 2016. Id. at 2, 15. On January 5, 2016, Kirby admittedly drove a
school bus into collision with a tree, which was captured on video. Id. at 2-3.
According to the Complaint, Kirby has been unable to obtain an answer from
Fitzgerald regarding whether she has been terminated. Id. at 10.
On January 22, 2016, Kirby filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) / MDCR alleging race 1 and
The sole mention of race discrimination in the Complaint is an allegation that Kirby’s Charge
of Discrimination filed with the EEOC/MDCR alleged both race and gender discrimination.
(Doc # 1, Pg ID 12) The MDCR investigation record shows that both Kirby and Lyle are
gender discrimination. (Doc # 14-2) Kirby alleges that EEOC/MDCR handled its
investigation in an improper manner. According to the Complaint, MDCR failed
to give Kirby an opportunity to provide evidence to substantiate her claims and
failed to investigate her allegations regarding being forced to make certain
employment benefit elections.
(Doc # 1, Pg ID 12)
Kirby’s Charge of
Discrimination alleges that her bus route was reassigned to a male co-worker who
had less seniority. (Doc # 14-2, Pg ID 72) It further alleges that Kirby was
subjected to harassment that created a hostile work environment when her
Caucasian supervisor asked her to perform tasks that were not a part of her job
description. Id. Kirby’s Charge was dismissed, and a Notice of Rights letter
issued on July 28, 2016. (Doc # 14-5)
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) authorizes parties to move for
judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not
to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are
African American, and that Kirby withdrew her race discrimination charge: “Claimant informed
this agency that she does not want to address her allegations in reference to race. Only sex will
be investigated by claimant’s request.” (Doc # 14-4, Pg ID 79, 81) The Complaint does not
contain any race discrimination allegations. In any event, the Court notes that because Kirby
withdrew the race discrimination charge, it was not exhausted and would have to be dismissed.
See Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 380 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he general rule in
this circuit . . . is that the judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC
investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”) (internal
analyzed under the same standard as motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir.
2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “For purposes of a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the
pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be
granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Id.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court
explained that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555. A
plaintiff’s factual allegations, while “assumed to be true, must do more than create
speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show
entitlement to relief.” LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis in original) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “To state a valid claim, a
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bredesen,
500 F.3d at 527 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562).
When deciding a 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, as a general
rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered unless the motion is
converted to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Weiner v.
Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court may, however, consider
“the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing
in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so
long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained
therein.” Id. at 89.
Federal courts hold pro se complaints to “less stringent standards” than those
drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, pro
se litigants are not excused from failing to follow basic procedural requirements.
Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Hendershott, 840
F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988).
A pro se litigant “must conduct enough
investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements of the federal rules.”
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984).
B. ERISA Claim
Fitzgerald argues that any ERISA claim should be dismissed because ERISA
does not apply to governmental plans maintained by the government of any state.
Kirby does not respond to this argument.
Under the plain language of the statute, ERISA “shall not apply to any
employee benefit plan if . . . such a plan is a governmental plan.” 29 U.S.C. §
“The term ‘governmental plan’ means a plan established or
maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the
government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing.” Id. at § 1002(32).
Kirby alleges that she is a member of the Michigan Public Schools
Employee Retirement System, which is maintained by the State of Michigan. As
such, it is a governmental plan, and ERISA’s provisions do not apply to it. The
Court dismisses any ERISA claim.
C. Due Process Claim
Fitzgerald argues that any procedural due process claim should be dismissed
because reassignment from one bus route to another does not trigger procedural
due process concerns. Fitzgerald further argues that Kirby has not pled that any
policy, practice, or custom of Fitzgerald caused any alleged constitutional
deprivation. Kirby does not respond to these arguments.
“The first step in determining whether procedural due process has been
denied is to ask whether there exists a liberty interest or property interest which has
been interfered with by the defendants. If the court determines that there has been
such a deprivation, the remaining question is what process is due.” Jackson v. City
of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 749 (6th Cir. 1999). Tenured public employees have a
property interest in continued employment, but suspension of a tenured public
employee with pay avoids due process problems entirely. Id. (citing Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)). In this case, Kirby does not allege
that she was a tenured employee, or that she was terminated or suspended without
pay. Rather, Kirby alleges that was reassigned to a different bus route involving
less work hours per week, and the record shows that she was offered, though not
mandated to do, other tasks included in her job description as a way to work
additional hours. The Court finds that, under these circumstances, no procedural
due process concerns are triggered.
In order for a municipality to be liable under Section 1983 there must be
some evidence that “the execution of [the] government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[T]he touchstone of the 1983 action against a government
body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 690. In this case, Fitzgerald correctly notes
that Kirby has not alleged that a policy, practice, or custom of the school district
caused her alleged constitutional deprivation—let alone identify any specific
policy, practice or custom of the school district.
For these reasons, the Court dismisses any due process claim against
D. Title VII Claim
Fitzgerald argues that Kirby has not adequately pled a disparate treatment
gender discrimination claim or a harassment claim. Kirby does not respond to
1. Disparate Treatment
An employee may prove gender discrimination using the familiar burdenshifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973): the employee has the initial burden of establishing her prima facie
case; if she does so, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions; finally, the employee has the burden of
rebutting the employer’s proffered reasons by showing them to be pretextual. See
Russell v. Univ. of Toledo, 537 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 2008).
To make out a prima facie of discrimination, the plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the competent evidence that:
(1) she is a member of the
protected group; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was
qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside of the
protected class. Id.
Drawing all inferences in favor of Kirby and accepting her allegations as
true, the Court finds that Kirby has sufficiently alleged a prima facie case of
gender discrimination. She is a woman—a member of a protected group. Her
work hours were reduced when she received a less desirable bus route
assignment—an adverse employment action. Kirby had been driving her previous
bus route for four months when she was reassigned, prior to her bus accident, and
there is nothing indicating any performance issues at the time of her reassignment
or that she was not qualified for the position. Lastly, Kirby was replaced by Lyle,
a male substitute bus driver—a person outside of the protected class.
Having decided that Kirby has sufficiently alleged a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to Fitzgerald to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
reassigning Kirby. Fitzgerald asserts that Kirby was reassigned because she is a
substitute bus driver, and the district re-routes substitute bus drivers on an asneeded basis, based on the changing needs of the district. Fitzgerald further asserts
that when Kirby was hired, there was significant road construction that had to be
accommodated. All drivers were advised repeatedly that the routes impacted by
the construction were temporary. When the construction ended, various routes
were changed and re-assigned, which impacted several drivers—not just Kirby.
Accordingly, the burden shifts back to Kirby to demonstrate that Fitzgerald’s
purported reasons for the reassignment are pretextual.
“Plaintiffs may show that an employer’s proffered reasons for an adverse
employment action are pretext for discrimination if the reasons ‘(1) have no basis
in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant
the action.’” Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419,
431 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285
(6th Cir. 2012)). In this case, Kirby would have to show that Fitzgerald’s proffered
reasons did not actually motivate her reassignment. Fitzgerald argues, and the
Court agrees, that on this point, Kirby does no more than state conclusions.
According to Kirby, she took over a male driver’s route when she was first hired
and assigned to the bus route. Her supervisor, Victory, is a woman and was the
administrator who hired Kirby and assigned her to that initial route.
Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An
individual who is willing to hire and promote a person of a certain class is unlikely
to fire them simply because they are a member of that class.”). The record shows
that approximately two thirds of Fitzgerald’s Transportation Department
employees are women and only one third are men. Kirby asserts that Lyle had less
seniority than she did, but according to the Complaint, Kirby and Lyle completed
the same training program within weeks of each other. The record indicates that
they were both substitute bus drivers at the same level. The Court finds that the
factual allegations in the Complaint are not enough to raise Kirby’s alleged right to
relief above the speculative level.
The Sixth Circuit has held that
in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie Title VII claim of
hostile environment sexual harassment by a coworker, she must
demonstrate that the following elements of the statutory tort are
present: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained
of was based upon sex; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered
with the plaintiff’s work performance or created a hostile or offensive
work environment that was severe and pervasive; and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment and
failed unreasonably to take prompt and appropriate corrective action.
Fenton v. HISAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1999).
In this case, even assuming arguendo that Kirby has established the first
three elements, drawing all inferences her favor, and accepting her allegations as
true, the Court finds that Kirby has not sufficiently alleged the fourth or fifth
elements. She does not allege facts showing that the reassignment to another bus
route and offer to work additional hours by cleaning and fueling school buses
unreasonably interfered with her work performance, or created a hostile or
offensive work environment that was severe and pervasive. Further, Kirby herself
confirmed that she did not report any alleged harassment to Fitzgerald. She does
not allege any facts from which the Court could infer that Fitzgerald should have
known of any harassment.
For these reasons, the Court dismisses any Title VII claim.
E. Kirby’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleading (Doc # 17)
Kirby cites “Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(4)(f)” in her Motion. (Doc # 17) The Court
notes that there is no such rule. Kirby titles her Motion a “Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.” The substance of her Motion is difficult to understand. Plaintiff
seems to assert that Defense Counsel used “scandalous lawyer tactics” in asking
Kirby to make a settlement offer and filing their Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings for the purpose of diverting Kirby from obtaining discovery. The Court
finds that nothing in the record suggests that Defense Counsel used inappropriate
tactics. Rather, Kirby attaches a letter from Defense Counsel, dated December 14,
2016, which states:
Thank you for speaking with me today. As I indicated, under the
Local Court Rules, I had to seek concurrence before filing a motion to
dismiss. I do intend on filing a motion asking for this matter to be
dismissed in the next 7 days. If you wanted to make a reasonable
settlement offer beforehand, which would be conditioned upon a
signed release and dismissal of the lawsuit, I am happy to discuss with
Id. at 101.
Plaintiff’s ultimate request is unclear. She seems to be asking the Court to
give her additional time to obtain discovery and submit additional evidence for the
Court’s consideration. Given that the Court finds that Kirby has failed to state any
viable claim in her Complaint, as discussed above, the Court denies this request, as
well as Kirby’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
F. Kirby’s Motion for Judgment for Relief (Doc # 19)
Kirby’s Motion for Judgment for Relief (Doc # 19) is difficult to understand
and consists of a recitation of facts and conclusions from Kirby’s point of view.
The Motion does not respond to any of the arguments discussed above nor does it
provide any legal authority or analysis that could entitle Kirby to relief. The Court
notes that this Motion does not comply with Local Rules 5.1 or 7.1. See E.D.
Mich. LR 5.1, 7.1.
The Motion includes mentions of age discrimination and focuses mostly on
allegations that Fitzgerald improperly enrolled Kirby in a pension plan. As noted
above, Kirby’s Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC/MDCR alleged only
race and gender discrimination, and she withdrew the race discrimination charge.
Any age discrimination claim or claim based on any adverse employment action
related to Kirby’s pension was not properly exhausted and is therefore dismissed.
See Weigel, 302 F.3d at 380.
Kirby repeatedly states that she was involuntarily and improperly enrolled in
the state pension system.
However, Fitzgerald correctly notes that, under
Michigan law, the state retirement system includes an automatic enrollment
feature. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.1431a. Further, Kirby signed a form from
the State of Michigan Office of Retirement Services, which she attaches to her
motion, acknowledging the automatic enrollment starting on her first day worked.
(Doc # 19, Pg ID 118) Fitzgerald also correctly notes that, to the extent Kirby’s
pension has been administered in any improper manner, the pension system is
maintained and administered by the State of Michigan and not by Fitzgerald.
Several of Kirby’s Motions also suggest that she is a member of Local
Union 1305; however, documentation attached to her own Motions indicates that
she was hired as an at-will, substitute bus driver. Fitzgerald represents that both
Fitzgerald and the union have repeatedly told Kirby that she was not and is not a
member of the union. If the Local Union 1305 Collective Bargaining Agreement
has been breached, Kirby is required to exhaust the grievance procedure outlined in
the Agreement before proceeding to the courts. 2 Kirby has not even alleged that
she has done so. Therefore, any claim regarding her union membership status
fails. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO Michigan Council 25
v. Highland Park Bd. of Educ., 214 Mich. App. 182, 187 (1995), aff’d, 457 Mich.
74 (1998); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
The Court denies Kirby’s Motion for Judgment for Relief (Doc # 19).
G. Kirby’s Motion for Judgment Pleading of Relief (Doc # 23)
Kirby’s Motion for Judgment Pleading of Relief (Doc # 23) is difficult to
understand and includes similar allegations of age discrimination and allegations
that Fitzgerald improperly administered Kirby’s pension plan. The Court notes
that this Motion does not comply with Local Rules 5.1 or 7.1. See E.D. Mich. LR
See Master Contract Between the Fitzgerald Board of Education and the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 25 Local Union 1305, available at
visited August 18, 2017) (outlining grievance procedure at pages 11-12).
5.1, 7.1. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court denies Kirby’s Motion
for Judgment Pleading of Relief (Doc # 23).
H. Kirby’s Motion Pleading (Doc # 27), and Fitzgerald’s Motion to Strike
(Doc # 28)
Kirby’s Motion Pleading (Doc # 27) is difficult to understand. It contains
many of the same allegations and conclusions as her other Motions including
allegations of gender discrimination, improper enrollment in the pension plan, and
improper administration of the pension plan. The Court notes that this Motion
does not comply with Local Rules 5.1 or 7.1. See E.D. Mich. LR 5.1, 7.1. For the
same reasons discussed above, the Court denies Kirby’s Motion Pleading (Doc #
27). To the extent Kirby cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 31 and moves to compel discovery,
the Court denies the Motion because, as discussed above, Kirby’s claims are
Accordingly, Fitzgerald’s Motion to Strike Kirby’s Motion
Pleading (Doc # 28) is moot.
I. Kirby’s Motion for Dispositive Order to Dismiss the Entirety of
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc # 34)
Kirby’s Motion for Dispositive Order to Dismiss the Entirety of Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc # 34) is difficult to understand. It
contains many of the same allegations and conclusions as her other Motions. The
Court notes that this Motion does not comply with Local Rules 5.1 or 7.1. See
E.D. Mich. LR 5.1, 7.1. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court denies
Kirby’s Motion for Dispositive Order to Dismiss (Doc # 34). Fitzgerald filed a
Response and Motion That Plaintiff Be Prohibited From Filing Further Documents
Without First Convening a Conference With the Court and Undersigned Counsel.
(Doc # 36) The Court notes that a party may not make a motion within its
response. E.D. Mich. Electronic Filing Policies and Procedures R 5(f). In any
event, because the Court will dismiss all claims and this action, Fitzgerald’s
request is moot.
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Fitzgerald Public Schools
District’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc # 14) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Darlene Kirby’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleading (Doc # 17) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Darlene Kirby’s Motion for
Judgment for Relief (Doc # 19) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Darlene Kirby’s Motion for
Judgment Pleading of Relief (Doc # 23) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Darlene Kirby’s Motion Pleading
(Doc # 27) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Fitzgerald Public Schools
District’s Motion to Strike (Doc # 28) is denied as MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Darlene Kirby’s Motion for
Dispositive Order to Dismiss the Entirety of Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (Doc # 34) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Fitzgerald Public Schools
District’s Motion That Plaintiff Be Prohibited From Filing Further Documents
Without First Convening a Conference With the Court and Undersigned Counsel
(Doc # 36) is denied as MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.
Dated: August 23, 2017
s/Denise Page Hood
Chief, U.S. District Court
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on August 23, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
Acting in the absence of LaShawn Saulsberry
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