Rines v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 22

OPINION and ORDER (1) Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Plaintiff's 19 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's 18 Report and Recommendation, (2) Granting in Part Plaintiff's 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment, (3) Denying Defendant's 16 MOTION for Summary Judgment, and (4) Remanding for Further Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HAROLD A. RINES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-13887
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING
IN PART PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #19) TO THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #18), (2)
GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #13), (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #16), AND (4) REMANDING FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
In this action, Plaintiff Harold Rines challenges the denial of his application
for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment, and the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report
and Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment and (2) deny
Rines’ motion for summary judgment (the “R&R”). (See ECF #18) Rines has filed
objections to the R&R (the “Objections”). (See ECF #19). The Court has carefully
reviewed the R&R and appreciates the Magistrate Judge’s careful and thorough

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consideration of the issues presented. However, as explained below, the Court
respectfully disagrees with certain aspects of the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and
recommended disposition. Accordingly, as set forth below, the Court SUSTAINS
IN PART AND OVERRULES IN PART Rines’ objections, GRANTS IN PART
Rines’ motion for summary judgment, DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment, and REMANDS this action for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion and Order.
I
A1
On February 19, 2014, Rines filed his application for disability insurance
benefits (the “Application”). (See Admin. R., ECF #11-5 at Pg. ID 204-10.) In the
Application, Rines alleged that he became disabled on September 23, 2012. (See id.
at Pg. ID 204.) Rines maintained that he suffered from, among other things, bilateral
shoulder pain, a bulging disc, left ankle pain, depression, and anxiety. (See Admin
R., ECF #11-6 at Pg. ID 234.) The Social Security Administration (the “SSA”)
denied the Application because it found that Rines was not disabled. (See Admin.
R., ECF #11-4 at Pg. ID 122-25.)

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The Court recites only the facts relevant to the Objections. A full description of
the facts is available in the R&R. (See R&R, ECF #18 at Pg. ID 458-61.)
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Rines thereafter requested and received a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (the “ALJ”). The ALJ held that hearing on October 16,
2015. Rines and an impartial vocational expert testified at the hearing. Rines
testified that the bulging discs in his back “make it hard to sit, stand, and walk,” that
he “lay[s] down ten hours of the day” in part because he cannot sleep at night, and
that his wife, who is on oxygen and suffers from Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (“COPD”), does all of the grocery shopping and most of the chores around
his home. (Admin R., ECF #11-2 at Pg. ID 86-88.)
Rines also submitted medical records from his treating physician, Dr. Kenneth
Price. In August 2014, Dr. Price found that Rines had “no strength in either
shoulder,” and he was “unable to do any standing or walking for any length of time
due to ankle pain.” (Admin R., ECF #11-7 at Pg. ID 357.) Dr. Price also noted that
Rines suffered from “low back pain from time to time” due to a “herniated lumbar
disc.” (Id.) Dr. Price concluded that as a result of Rines’ shoulder, ankle, and back
problems, Rines had “permanent physical limitations” that made him “unable to
work.” (Id.) In January 2015, Dr. Price drafted a medical source statement which
stated that Rines was “unable to lift or carry more than 5 [pounds]” and could not
“bring [his] shoulders above chest level.” (Id. at Pg. ID 364-67.)
On November 13, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he
affirmed the SSA’s denial of benefits. (See Admin. R., ECF #11-2 at Pg. ID 47-55.)
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The ALJ found that Rines suffered from the following severe impairments: “Status
post bilateral shoulder surgeries, lumbar herniated disc, [and] affective and anxiety
disorders.” (Id. at Pg. ID 49.) The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Rines was not
disabled and that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that Rines could perform. (See id. at Pg. ID 54-55.)
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Price’s opinions.
(Id. at Pg. ID 53.) The ALJ summarized Dr. Price’s opinions, and then rejected them
in four sentences:
These opinions are not consistent with or supported by the
record as a whole. In addition, these opinions are after
claimant’s date last insured. Furthermore, Dr. Price is not
a specialist and the issue of disability is reserved for the
commissioner. Therefore, I give [Dr. Price’s] opinions no
weight.
(Id.)
The ALJ also rejected Rines’ testimony that his symptoms rendered him
disabled and unable to work. The ALJ concluded that Rines’ “statements concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [his] symptoms [were] not entirely
credible.” (Id. at Pg. ID 52.)
B
On November 2, 2016, Rines filed this action in which he challenges the
SSA’s denial of benefits. (See Compl., ECF #1.) Rines and the Commissioner then

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filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (See Rines’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF #13;
Commissioner’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #16.)
The Court referred the cross-motions to the assigned Magistrate Judge. On
September 6, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R in which he carefully
analyzed the arguments that parties made in their motions for summary judgment.
(See R&R, ECF #18.) The Magistrate Judge first reviewed whether the ALJ
“properly evaluated the opinions of Rines’ treating physician Dr. Price.” (Id. at Pg.
ID 462-67.) The Magistrate Judge ultimately concluded that “the ALJ’s decision to
discount Dr. Price’s opinions [was] supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at Pg.
ID 467.) Next, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the ALJ’s “assessment of Rines’
subjective complaints.” (Id. at Pg. ID 468-71.) Here too, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that the ALJ’s credibility determination was “supported by substantial
evidence.” (Id. at Pg. ID 471.) As a result of these conclusions, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the Court grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Rines’
motion.
On September 19, 2017, Rines filed the Objections. (See ECF #19.)

Rines

argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to recognize and grant relief based upon three
errors committed by the ALJ. First, Rines contends that the ALJ failed to provide
good reasons for his decision to accord no weight to the opinions of Rines’ treating
physician, Dr. Price. (See id. at Pg. ID 473-74.) Second, Rines asserts that the ALJ
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wrongly dismissed Dr. Price’s opinions on the ground that Dr. Price failed to link
his opinions to the relevant time frame. (See id. at Pg. ID 474.) Finally, Rines insists
that the ALJ wrongly found that Rines lacked credibility. (See id. at Pg. ID 478.)
The Court will address each alleged error in turn below.
II
A
When a party objects to a portion of a Magistrate Judge’s R&R, the Court
reviews that portion de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Lyons v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to
conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which a party has not
objected. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
B
In reviewing the disputed findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to
determining whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of
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Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “An ALJ's failure to
follow agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even
where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
III
A
Rines first argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when he concluded that the
ALJ sufficiently explained his basis for assigning “no weight” to the opinions
offered by Rines’ longtime treating physician, Dr. Price. (See R&R, ECF #18 at Pg.
ID 464-67.) The Court agrees.
Under the so-called “treating physician rule,” a treating physician’s opinion
must be given “controlling weight” if “(1) the opinion ‘is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques’; and (2) the opinion
‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’” Gayheart
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2)). “The Commissioner is required to provide ‘good reasons’ for
discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2)). “These reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the

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reasons for that weight.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “This procedural
requirement ‘ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits
meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The ALJ rejected Dr. Price’s opinions in four perfunctory sentences:
These opinions are not consistent with or supported by the
record as a whole. In addition, these opinions are after
claimant’s date last insured. Furthermore, Dr. Price is not
a specialist and the issue of disability is reserved for the
commissioner. Therefore, I give [Dr. Price’s] opinions no
weight.
(Admin R., ECF #11-2 at Pg. ID 53.)
This dismissal of Dr. Price’s opinions falls far short of the required “specific”
explanation for discounting a treating source’s opinions. The ALJ’s statement that
Dr. Price’s opinions “are not consistent with or supported by the record as a whole”
is unhelpful boilerplate that sheds no light on precisely which portions of the record
undermine Dr. Price’s opinions. Nor does the ALJ explain how or why the record is
incompatible with Dr. Price’s opinions. Indeed, the ALJ’s general statement that the
record, as a whole, warrants rejection of Dr. Price’s opinions is the opposite of the
specific explanation required when an ALJ provides a treating physician’s opinion
less than controlling weight. Because the ALJ offered no meaningful discussion or
analysis of Dr. Price’s opinions, the Court is unable to provide a “meaningful
review” of the ALJ’s decision to reject those opinions. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376.
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The Commissioner counters that the ALJ did identify the parts of the record
that led him to reject Dr. Price’s opinions. The Commissioner directs the Court to
the paragraph of the ALJ’s written decision that immediately follows the paragraph
about Dr. Price block-quoted above. (See Resp. to Obj., ECF #20 at Pg. ID 486.)
But that paragraph does not explain why the ALJ decided not to credit Dr. Price’s
opinions. Instead, that paragraph identifies evidence that the ALJ did credit and sets
forth Rines’ Residual Functional Capacity (the “RFC”) as supported by that
evidence. The ALJ’s explanation as to how the evidence he did credit supports the
RFC says nothing about why the ALJ rejected other evidence, including Dr. Price’s
opinions.
Moreover, the Commissioner ignores the structure of the relevant section of
the ALJ’s opinion (the section containing the four sentences related to Dr. Price’s
opinion). (See Admin R., ECF #11-2 at Pg. ID 53.) In that section, the ALJ
separately addresses medical opinions from different doctors in a series of
standalone paragraphs. Each of those paragraphs concludes exactly (or almost
exactly) as follows: “Therefore, I give this opinion __ weight.” (Id.; emphasis
added.) In this context, the ALJ’s use of the word “therefore” means “for the reasons
stated above.” By devoting one paragraph to each medical opinion and ending each
paragraph with the “therefore” sentences, the ALJ clearly indicated that his
assessment of each medical opinion was confined to the paragraph addressing the
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opinion.

Under these circumstances, it is not reasonable to conclude, as the

Commissioner argues, that the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Price’s opinions continued
beyond the one paragraph dedicated to those opinions.
Finally, the Commissioner insists that the ALJ’s failure to specifically identify
the evidence that led him to reject Dr. Price’s opinions was, at most, a harmless error
that does not entitle Rines to relief. The Court disagrees. It is true, as the
Commissioner argues, that an ALJ’s violation of the treating physician rule could
conceivably amount to a harmless error “where the Commissioner has met the goal
of § 1527(d)(2)[2] —the provision of the procedural safeguard of reasons—even
though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at
547. Stated another way, in some limited circumstances, “the procedural protections
at the heart of the rule may be met when the ‘supportability’ of a doctor’s opinion,
or its consistency with other evidence in the record, is indirectly attacked via an
ALJ’s analysis of a physician's other opinions or his analysis of the claimant's
ailments.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 Fed. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added). Simply put, “[i]f the ALJ's opinion permits the claimant and a
reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for the weight given a treating

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The procedural safeguard is presently found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), which
provides that the Commissioner “will always give good reasons in our notice of
determination or decision for the weight we give [the claimant’s] treating source's
medical opinion.”
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physician's opinion, strict compliance with the rule may sometimes be excused.” Id.
(emphasis added).
However, “even when an ALJ correctly reaches a determination that a
treating source's medical opinion is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence
in the record, such a determination means only that the opinion is not entitled to
‘controlling weight,’ not that the opinion should be rejected.” Id. (emphasis in
original) (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, “[e]ven when inconsistent with
other evidence, a treating source's medical opinions remain entitled to deference and
must be weighed using the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and
416.927.” Id.3 Thus, “it is not enough to dismiss a treating physician's opinion as
‘incompatible’ with other evidence of record; there must be some effort to identify
the specific discrepancies and to explain why it is the treating physician's conclusion
that gets the short end of the stick.” Id.
In this case, even if the ALJ’s failure to specify the reasons supporting his
decision not to give Dr. Price’s opinions controlling weight could be dismissed as
harmless error (and the Court does not believe that that error was harmless), the

3

“If the Commissioner does not give a treating-source opinion controlling weight,
then the opinion is weighed based on the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the
treatment relationship . . . as well as the treating source's area of specialty and the
degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported
by relevant evidence.” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927.
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Court could not excuse the ALJ’s failure to explain why, under the factors set forth
in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927, he chose to give Dr. Price’s opinions no
weight. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Friend, the ALJ’s statement that Dr.
Price’s opinions were inconsistent the other medical evidence in the record is not a
sufficient substitute for a careful analysis of Dr. Price’s opinions and an explanation
as to why, under the applicable factors, the opinions are entitled to zero weight.
For these reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Rines’ first objection to the R&R,
and it will remand Rines’ application for benefits to the Commissioner for further
proceedings.4
B
Rines next argues that the ALJ made a factual error when he wrote that Dr.
Price’s opinions were “after [Rines’] date last insured.” (Admin R., ECF #11-2 at
Pg. ID 53.) The Court agrees. While Dr. Price wrote his opinion after the date Rines
was last insured, the opinion expressly addressed Rines’ condition and capabilities
during the time that Rines was insured. (Admin R., ECF #11-7 at Pg. ID 364-67.)
Thus, the ALJ should not discount Dr. Price’s opinions on the ground that it
addresses the wrong time period.

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Nothing in this Opinion and Order precludes the ALJ from according no weight to
Dr. Price’s opinions on remand. The Court expresses no view of the merits of Dr.
Price’s opinions. The purpose of the remand is to permit the ALJ to provide a clear
and specific explanation concerning the basis of his decision as to how much weight
to accord Dr. Price’s opinions.
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The Commissioner argues that “any error is . . . harmless” because “regardless
of whether the ALJ was aware of the retrospective nature of Dr. Price’s opinion, he
still conclusively established that the evidence from the relevant period contradicted
that opinion.” (Resp. to Obj., ECF #20 at 489-90.) But, as explained in Section
III(A) supra, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain why he concluded that Dr. Price’s
opinions were contradicted by other evidence in the record. The error here is not
harmless; the ALJ’s factual error further undermines the sufficiency of the ALJ’s
reasons for according Dr. Price’s opinions no weight.
The Court SUSTAINS Rines’ second objection to the R&R.
C
Finally, Rines objects that (1) the ALJ did not provide adequate reasons to
support his determination that Rines’ testimony about his alleged symptoms was not
credible and (2) the R&R improperly “bootstrap[ped]” other irrelevant evidence to
support the ALJ’s credibility determination. (Obj., ECF #19 at Pg. ID 480.) The
Court disagrees.
“Notably, an ALJ's credibility determinations about the claimant are to be
given great weight, particularly since the ALJ is charged with observing the
claimant's demeanor and credibility.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532,
542 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted). “’The claimant's credibility
[regarding the intensity and persistence of symptoms] may be properly discounted
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to a certain degree . . . where an [ALJ] finds contradictions among the medical
reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence.’” Keeton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
583 Fed. App’x 515, 532 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004)). A court may not disturb an ALJ’s credibility
determination “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th
Cir. 2001).
Here, the ALJ provided a number of reasons to support his conclusion that
Rines’ testimony regarding his symptoms was not credible. The ALJ concluded,
among other things, that Rines’ “alleged limitations are not supported by or
consistent with the medical reports and function report.” (Admin R., ECF #11-2 at
Pg. ID 52.) The ALJ further noted that even though Rines stated that his wife does
most of the household chores, that testimony was not credible because his wife
suffers from serious medical conditions, including COPD, and because she requires
the use of an oxygen tank. (See id.) The ALJ also discussed how Rines’ recent
statements conflicted with his prior reports of his activity level. (See id.) Finally,
the ALJ considered Rines’ “sporadic work history.” (Id.) Rines has not identified a
“compelling reason” to disturb the ALJ’s determination that Rines’ testimony
regarding his symptoms was not credible. Smith, 307 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, the
Court OVERRULES this objection.

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IV
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that



Rines’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #13) is GRANTED IN
PART;



The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #16) is
DENIED; and



Rines’ Objections to the R&R (ECF #19) are SUSTAINED IN PART
AND OVERRULED IN PART;

The case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion and Order.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: October 24, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on October 24, 2017, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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