Thames v. City of Westland et al

Filing 49

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 36 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY THAMES
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 16-CV-14130
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
CITY OF WESTLAND, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (Doc. 35) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 36)

I. Overview
Plaintiff Kimberly Thames, a 57-year old pro-life advocate, brought
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit arising out of her arrest and weekend detention
at a Westland police station holding cell, after an abortion clinic’s security
guard accused her of stating, “I prophesy bombs, I prophesy bombs. There
is going to be a bombing in the near future.” Thames denies making any
statement involving the word, “bombs.” Thames brought suit against
Defendants the City of Westland, the Westland Chief of Police, four
Westland police officers involved in her arrest, the Northland Family
Planning Clinic, Inc. (“Northland”) and its Chief Executive Officer, Renee
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Chelian, its employee Mary Guilbernat, and John Doe, the clinic’s security
guard. By prior order of the court, Northland, Chelian, and Guilbernat have
been dismissed. Now before the court is a motion for summary judgment
brought by the remaining Defendants as to the federal claims, and a crossmotion for partial summary judgment as to liability brought by Thames for
most of the same claims. Oral argument was heard on March 15, 2018
and informs this court’s decision. Also, in rendering its decision here, the
court has reviewed the audiotape of the 9-1-1 call and various video
recordings of Thames’ arrest.
For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment shall enter for the
City of Westland and Police Chief Jedrusik because there is no basis for
Monell or supervisory liability. However, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment for the arresting Defendants on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
wrongful arrest claim shall be denied. Also, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment shall be denied as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
as to Defendants Officer Gatti and Sergeant Brooks, but shall be granted
as to Officers Soulliere and Tardif. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment as to liability shall be denied.

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II. Factual Background
On Saturday, August 27, 2016, Thames, a Roman Catholic and prolife supporter, stood on a public sidewalk outside the Northland abortion
clinic holding a rosary and a sign in defense of the unborn. Thames was
known to the Northland clinic as a frequent protestor. At the same time, a
religious sister was also peacefully protesting near Thames. Thames
engaged the security guard, Robert Parsley, standing outside the clinic in
conversation and informed him that she was praying for him and hoped he
could find a new position. She alleges that he then informed her that there
have been bomb threats against abortion clinics, to which she claims she
responded that she was not aware of any bombings in Michigan. After their
conversation, Thames left in her car to use a nearby restroom.
Parsley’s version of their conversation is quite different. In two
different accounts, he claims that Thames threatened that bombs would
fall. He reported these allegations to employees of the clinic. One of the
clinic’s employees, defendant Guilbernat, placed a 9-1-1 call to the police.
In that call, Guilbernat stated, “We have protestors outside and one of them
just made a statement that there’s going to be a bombing.” (Doc. 35, Ex. B
at 00:04:09). The 9-1-1 operator asks her, “What exactly did they say?” Id.
at 00:09:12, and Guilbernat repeats, “There’s going to be a bombing.” Id.
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at 00:12-14. The operator sought a second time to clarify the threat,
asking, “That’s all they said is there’s going to be a bombing? That’s what
they said, word for word?” Id. at 00:14-18. To which Guilbernat, replied,
“Yes.” Id. at 00:18-19. The operator then sought a third time to clarify the
threat, to which Guilbernat accused Thames of stating “there’s going to be
a bombing.” Id. at 01:57-58.
Guilbernat then gave the operator a description of the woman in
question, describing her as dark complexioned, with dark hair in a bun,
wearing a light blue short-sleeved top, a long blue skirt and flip-flops. Id. at
00:30-33, 1:01-11. In response to the 9-1-1 call, four Westland police
officers responded to the clinic: Officers Jason Soulliere, John Gatti, Adam
Tardif, and Sergeant Norman Brooks. These officers are named
Defendants. Officer Halaas appeared later on the scene, and he has not
been named in the lawsuit.
Thames returned to the location to continue protesting and saw
several police vehicles and officers speaking to Parsley. Officer Gatti
arrived on the scene first and interviewed Parsley and Guilbernat. Both
identified Thames to him as the person who had made the statement.
(Doc. 36, Ex. B at 8:50:19-25, 08:51:41-2, 08:52:01-03). Parsley told
Officer Gatti that Thames stated, “I prophesy bombs are going to fall and
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they’re going to fall in the near future.” (Doc. 36, Ex. B at 8:51:31-8:52:53,
Ex. K at 53:5-23). Parsley also accused Thames of stating, “I prophesy
bombs are going to fall and they’re going to fall on you people.” (Doc. 40,
Ex. E at 08:52:46-52). But when Parsley gave his written statement to
Defendant Tardif a few minutes later, his story changed and he accused
Thames of stating, “bombs, bombs, on America, and bombs will blow up
this building.” (Doc. 36, Ex. E, Ex. M at 18:22-25 and 19:1-3).
Officer Soulliere asked Thames if she had made a bomb threat, and
she denied it. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 40:23-25-51:1-20; Ex. B at 8:51:218:15:36). But she never specifically answered Officer Soulliere’s questions
about what exactly she did say to the guard, merely reiterating that she did
not make a bomb threat, did not know what she had said to him that could
have been misconstrued, and mentioned that he was the one who brought
up alleged bombings at abortion clinics. Id. at 08:51:41-2, 08:51:4308:52:31; Doc 36-3, 57:24-25 to 58:1-17. She also relayed her
conversation with Parsley in which he told her about bombings for which
she responded she was unaware of that activity. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 57:2425-58:1-17, Ex. B at 8:53:47-8:55:07; Ex. I at 42:18-25; 51:1-4; Ex. 1 at
¶18).

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The senior officer on the scene, Sergeant Brooks, ordered Thames’
arrest for making a terrorist threat. (Doc. 35, Ex. C at 30). Specifically, she
was arrested for violating Michigan’s anti-terrorism statute, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.543m. Thames has not challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. Officer Soulliere then handcuffed Thames. (Doc. 35, Ex. D at 30).
After her arrest, Thames pleaded with the religious sister to come to her
aid. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 68:14-15). The religious sister told Officer Soulliere
that she did not hear Thames make a bomb threat, implored him to
question Thames and Parsley together so he could determine who was
lying, and insisted that the ones that should be arrested were the clinic’s
owner and staff who were the ones “killing God’s children.” (Doc. 36, Ex. J
at 69:12-71:22). Officer Gatti told the religious sister that she was a
“disgrace.” (Doc. 36, Ex. K at 19:23-25-20:1-5). The officers did not take a
written statement from the sister or from two other persons who were
outside the clinic when the alleged threat was made. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at
59:13-25-60:1-13; Ex. L at 23:24-25 – 24:1-5).
After Thames’ arrest, she was placed in the back of Officer Halaas’
patrol vehicle, but when he was called away to respond to another incident,
she was moved to Officer Soulliere’s patrol vehicle. (Doc. 35, Ex. E at
08:57:35-09:01:49; Ex. F at 75-5). At the time she was placed in Officer
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Halaas’ vehicle, Thames told him, “You got the wrong person,” to which he
replied, “Ma’am, I don’t give a shit! I got to go!” (Doc. 36, Ex. O at 46:1825 to 47:1-10). After her arrest, Officers Soulliere and Halaas searched her
vehicle, but did not find any explosives or any other contraband. (Doc. 35,
Ex. E at 08:57:36-09:02:50; Ex. F at 72-3.) The officers did not search the
clinic, the adjacent parking lot, or nearby dumpster, nor did they use any
bomb sniffing dogs. In fact, the Westland police department does not have
any bomb sniffing dogs, but would have to call the state police for such a
search. The officers did not impound Thames’ vehicle.
Officers Gatti and Soulliere testified at their depositions that the City
of Westland did not train them to distinguish between true threats and
protected speech. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 36:16-19, Ex. K at 117:4-7). Sergeant
Brooks testified:
I don’t know the exact verbiage that — that he said to
Officer Gatti. My — there’s only one word that concerns
me in this whole thing and that’s bombs. Just like you can’t
yell fire in a crowded theater, you can’t say anything about
bombs near a facility that performs abortions.
(Doc. 36, Ex. at 29:20-25). At his deposition, Sergeant Brooks was asked
why the officers did not search the surrounding vicinity of the abortion clinic
for a bomb, and he responded:
At that — at that point we were not concerned about a
bomb being physically there at that particular time because
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of the amount of protesters and employees and patients of
the clinic. The reason we were sent there was because of
the threat.
(Doc. 36, Ex. L at 28:9-13). Sergeant Brooks was then asked, if the threat
was credible, why did they not evacuate the clinic, and he responded, the
“threat doesn’t have to be credible according to the law.” Id. at 16-17. In
addition, at the scene of the arrest, Sergeant Brooks also said, “Anybody
who has anything to do with this whole thing, [they’re] fanatics.” (Doc. 36,
Ex. C at PgID 597).
Soulliere drove Thames to the Westland police station, booked and
placed her in a holding cell where she remained over the weekend. (Doc.
36, Ex. O at 63:1-10). She was released Monday morning at 10:14 a.m.
Thus, she was in police custody for a little over 49 hours. Thames did not
eat or sleep during that time, although she was offered food. (Doc. 36, Ex.
1 at ¶¶ 25-40). The holding cell had a cement slab for sleeping and a toilet
which was visible to all. (Doc. 36, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 25-40, Ex. G).
Officer Soulliere’s report regarding Thames’ arrest would not have
come to the attention of the on-call detective that weekend, Detective Jerry
Farrar, until Sunday because the report was not approved by a sergeant
until after Detective Farrar’s shift ended on Saturday. (Doc. 45, Ex. J at 1821). Detective Farrar was handling a homicide investigation which began
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on Sunday morning, and thus, was not able to address Thames’ case until
Monday morning. (Doc. 45, Ex. I at 65:22-25-66:1-13; Ex. J at 19-21, 2228, 39). Thames was unable to attend Mass on Sunday or receive the
Eucharist. (Doc. 36, Ex. 1 at ¶ 34). Upon reviewing the case, Detective
Farrar made the decision to release Thames finding that “though there was
probable cause to arrest Kimberley, I find at this time there is insufficient
evidence to charge her with a crime.” (Doc. 45, Ex. J at 27:8-12).
Detective Farrar did not talk to the prosecutor before making his
decision. Id. at 25:9-12. In his incident report, Detective Farrar wrote that
he read Robert’s written statement accusing Thames of stating “bombs,
bombs, bombs on America. And bombs will blow up this building,” and
determined that “I do not see a direct threat where Kimberly threatened to
bomb the clinic.” (Doc. 36-3 at PgID 611). After her release, the police
denied Thames’ request that they take her to her car so she walked about
a mile to her vehicle. (Doc. 36, Ex. 1 at ¶ 44).
After Thames’ release, the City police department conducted an
internal investigation, and concluded that Thames’ arrest was reasonable
and justified and was consistent with its policies, practices, and procedures.
(Doc. 36, Ex. O at 49:5-10, 91:5-22, Ex. C). However, Officer Gatti
received a verbal reprimand for telling the religious sister that she was a
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disgrace. (Doc. 36, Ex. O at 47:17-48:2). The Chief of Police, Jeff
Jedrusik, reviewed the report of the internal investigation and accepted its
findings. (Doc. 36, Ex. O at 44:6-25-45:1-3). Deputy Chief Brian Miller, the
witness designated by the City pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6), testified Thames’ arrest and detention were consistent with the
policies and practices of the police department. (Doc. 36, Ex. O at 86:110). However, Officers Gatti and Sergeant Brooks were cautioned to
refrain from “[e]ngaging in political or religious/morality discussions with
bystanders.” (Doc. 36, Ex. C at 18).
Thames filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the City of
Westland; Police Chief Jeff Jedrusik; Officers Soulliere, Gatti, Tardif, and
Brooks; Northland, Northland’s CEO Chelian, Northland’s employee
Guilbernat, and John Doe, Northland’s security guard. Northland, Chelian,
and Guilbernat have been dismissed by prior order of the court. Thames’
Complaint alleges violations of her Fourth, First, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and two related state law claims.
III. Standard of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render
summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
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show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Redding v. St.
Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has
affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair
and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored
procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986);
see also Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.
1995).
The standard for determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate is "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.'" Amway Distributors Benefits Ass’n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The evidence and all
reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding, 241 F.3d at 532 (6th Cir. 2001). "[T]he
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson
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v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original);
see also National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907
(6th Cir. 2001).
If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule
56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968); see also McLean v.
988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). Mere allegations
or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden, nor will
a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248, 252. Rather, there must be evidence on which a jury
could reasonably find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
IV. Analysis
A.

Arresting Officers
1. Qualified Immunity
Defendant officers argue qualified immunity shields them from liability

under § 1983. Qualified immunity “’protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 4–5 (2013) (quoting
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). It protects all officers
except “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his
accommodation for reasonable error exists because ‘officials should not err
always on the side of caution’ because they fear being sued.” Id. (citation
omitted). Indeed, qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments. . . .” Stanton, 571 U.S.
at 5 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quotation marks
omitted)).
The court employs a two-step inquiry in deciding qualified immunity
questions. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2015). “‘First,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, has the plaintiff
shown that a constitutional violation has occurred? Second, was the right
clearly established at the time of the violation? These prongs need not be
considered sequentially.’” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted). Where there is no showing of a constitutional violation, the officer
is cloaked with qualified immunity and the court need not address the
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second prong. Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 992
(6th Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232).
The court first considers the question of qualified immunity as to the
four responding officers. Thames alleges five constitutional violations: (1)
wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (2) retaliatory arrest in
violation of the First Amendment, (3) violation of free exercise of religion in
violation of the First Amendment, (4) violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (5) conspiracy to violate
constitutional rights. The court considers each alleged violation below.
2. Wrongful Arrest Claim under the Fourth Amendment
The court first considers whether the officers had probable cause to
arrest Thames. If so, Defendant Officers are entitled to summary judgment
on Thames’ Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim. “Probable cause to
make an arrest exists if the facts and circumstances within the arresting
officer's knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.” Hoover v.
Walsh, 682 F.3d 481, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has defined probable cause as
“reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but
more than mere suspicion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted). “The inquiry is an objective one; the existence of probable cause
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known
to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest regardless of the arresting
officer's subjective state of mind.” Id. at 500 n. 52 (internal quotations
marks and citations omitted). “In general, the existence of probable cause
in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one
reasonable determination possible.” Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872
(6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.
1995)).
Having set forth the standard of law for determining probable cause,
the court turns now to the specific facts of this case to determine whether
probable cause existed for the arrest. For the reasons set forth below, an
issue of fact exists as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest
Thames which precludes the entry of summary judgment for the arresting
officers. The security guard accused Thames of making the following
statement before her arrest: “I prophesy bombs are going to fall and they’re
going to fall in the near future.” After her arrest, he reported she said,
“bombs, bombs, on America, and bombs will blow up this building.” The
fact that the security guard arguably changed his story may call into
question his credibility. Also, the religious sister present at the scene
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denied that Thames had made the statement. Thus, a reasonably prudent
officer on the scene might doubt the security guard’s story. Whether or not
the security guard provided reasonably trustworthy information is a
question of fact for the jury.
Nevertheless, assuming that a reasonably prudent officer would
accept the security guard’s version of events as true, the court considers
whether these two statements give rise to probable cause for her arrest.
Thames was arrested for violating Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.543m which
provides in pertinent part:
(1)

A person is guilty of making a terrorist threat or of
making a false report of terrorism if the person does
either of the following:

(a) Threatens to commit an act of terrorism and
communicates the threat to any other person.
(b)

Knowingly makes a false report of an act of terrorism
and communicates the false report to any other
person, knowing the report is false.

(2)

It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section
that the defendant did not have the intent or
capability of committing the act of terrorism.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.543m(1)(a) criminalizes the “making [of] a terrorist
threat” by threatening to “commit an act of terrorism” and the
communication of that “threat to any other person.” An “act of terrorism” is
defined as a “willful and deliberate act” that would comprise a “violent
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felony,” known to be “dangerous to human life,” and that “is intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence or affect the conduct
of government ... through intimidation or coercion.” Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.543b(a). The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that:
Given the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms, we
are satisfied that the statutory provisions, when read
together, prohibit only “true threats,” as they encompass
the communication of a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.... Further, because the statutes
require the existence of an intent to “intimidate or coerce,”
they extend beyond the type of speech or expressive
conduct that is afforded protection by the First Amendment.
People v. Osantowski, 274 Mich.App 593, 603; rev'd in part on other
grounds, 481 Mich. 103 (2008); see also People v. Bally, No. 320838, 2015
WL 4169244, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 9, 2015).
The Supreme Court also has addressed what distinguishes “true
threats” from political hyperbole which is constitutionally protected speech.
In Watts v. United States, a student at a public rally declared, “[a]nd now I
have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report
for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” 394 U.S. 705,
706 (1969). The Court held that the student was wrongfully convicted for
allegedly threatening the President, because only a contextually credible
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threat to kill, injure, or kidnap the President constitutes a “true threat”
punishable under the law. Id. at 708. Similarly, in Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003), the Court struck down a statute banning cross-burning
with the intent to intimidate, where a provision of the law, as interpreted by
the State’s model jury instructions, provided that burning of a cross in
public view “shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.” Id. at
363-64. The Court held that the prima facie evidence provision of the
cross-burning ban was unconstitutional under the First Amendment,
because it effectively prohibited all cross-burning regardless of whether that
conduct was intended to intimidate or merely constituted protected
expression. Id. at 367. The Court explained that “[t]rue threats”
encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. at 359.
Based on the above discussed Supreme Court precedent, and
because Michigan law is clear that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.543m only
criminalizes “true threats” which involve a “serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence,” the court considers whether the
statements allegedly attributable to Thames meet this threshold. First, the
court considers her pre-arrest statement, “I prophesy bombs are going to
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fall and they’re going to fall in the near future.” In considering this
statement, the court gives the term “prophesy” its ordinary meaning.
According to Merriam-Webster, prophesy means, “to utter by or as if by
divine inspiration,” “to predict with assurance or on the basis of mystic
knowledge,” or to “prefigure.” An example of the word in its ordinary usage
is Mark Twain’s text in A Connecticut Yankee, “every time he prophesied
fair weather it rained.” In essence, to “prophesy” means to prognosticate,
but it does not suggest willful conduct or that the speaker will be
responsible for carrying out the prediction. In the vague context allegedly
used by Thames, at least a jury question exists as to whether it amounts to
a true threat.
The evidence suggests that Defendant Officers did not consider the
statement to be a true threat as they did not direct evacuation of the clinic,
did not request the assistance of a bomb squad, did not request the
assistance of a bomb sniffing dog, did not search the clinic for a bomb, did
not search the surrounding area for a bomb, did not search the adjacent
parking lot for a bomb, did not search the dumpster for a bomb, and did not
impound Thames’ vehicle for fear that a bomb might be planted in it.
The security guard did not make his written statement until after
Thames was arrested. Even so, the court considers whether that
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statement amounts to a “true threat” which would give rise to probable
cause for arrest. That statement was, “bombs, bombs, on America, and
bombs will blow up this building.” This statement presents a closer
question than the first, but like the “prophesy” statement, it is a vague
prediction about the future and does not suggest any present intention on
the part of Thames to carry out a crime of violence against the clinic. Once
again, the officers’ failure to make any attempt to locate a bomb or vacate
the clinic or surrounding vicinity suggests that an objectively reasonable
officer on the scene might not view the statement as a true threat.
Having found that a jury question exists as to whether the security
guard’s allegations against Thames gave probable cause for her arrest, the
court next considers whether the arresting officers are still entitled to
qualified immunity. “[U]nder § 1983, an arresting agent is entitled to
qualified immunity if he or she could reasonably (even if erroneously) have
believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established law and
the information possessed at the time by the arresting agent.” Everson v.
Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 499 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “[E]ven if a
factual dispute exists about the objective reasonableness of the officer's
actions, a court should grant the officer qualified immunity if, viewing the
facts favorably to the plaintiff, an officer reasonably could have believed
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that the arrest was lawful.” Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, Ky., 635 F.3d 210,
214 (6th Cir. 2011).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Thames, a jury
question exists as to whether a reasonable officer on the scene could have
believed that her arrest was lawful. Also, all four of the arresting officers
are potentially liable for the arrest. Sergeant Brooks ordered the arrest.
Officer Gatti investigated the complaint at the scene. Officer Soulliere
questioned Thames, placed her in handcuffs, searched her vehicle,
transported her to the police station and initiated her booking. Officer
Tardif took the security guard’s written statement. Under Sixth Circuit
precedent, those police officers present at the scene of a wrongful arrest
who have the opportunity and means to prevent the harm from occurring,
may be liable under § 1983 for failing to intervene to prevent the wrongful
arrest. See Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 784 (6th Cir. 2006); Jacobs v.
Village of Ottawa Hills, 5 F. App’x 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2001). Based on the
foregoing discussion, Defendant officers are not entitled to summary
judgment on the wrongful arrest claim. A jury question remains as to
whether there was probable cause for the arrest.
3.

Retaliatory Arrest Pursuant to the First Amendment

Because Thames groups her First Amendment violations of freedom
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of speech and the right to free exercise of her religion together in her
motion for partial summary judgment, the court likewise does so. As the
Sixth Circuit has observed, “[f]ree exercise claims are often considered in
tandem with free speech claims and may rely entirely on the same set of
facts.” Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 256 (6th Cir. 2015).
First, the court considers whether Thames has raised a genuine issue of
material fact that Officers Soulliere, Gatti, Tardif, and Brooks violated her
right to freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Thames alleges
that she was engaging in protected speech when she protested outside an
abortion clinic based on her sincerely held religious beliefs.
Unlike wrongful arrest claims brought under the Fourth Amendment,
motive is relevant to Thames’ claim that Defendant officers arrested her in
retaliation for her exercise of her First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit
has identified three elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a
retaliatory arrest claim: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2)
an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person
of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3)
there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the
adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected
conduct.” City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d at 217.
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An issue of law exists as to whether Thames must also prove a fourth
element — that there was an absence of probable cause for her arrest — in
order to prevail on her retaliatory arrest claim under the First Amendment.
Although not identified by the parties, the issue is now before the Supreme
Court. Lozman v. City of Riveria Beach, 681 F. App’x 746, cert. granted,
138 S. Ct. 447 (2017). Circuit courts are split on this question with the
majority holding that the existence of probable cause bars a First
Amendment retaliation claim. See Peggy v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112,
119 (4th Cir. 2017) (existence of probable cause bars First Amendment
retaliation claim); Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002)
(same); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); but
see Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013) (an arrest
motivated by retaliatory animus is unlawful even if supported by probable
cause).
The Sixth Circuit has “defer[red resolution” of the question of whether
the absence of probable cause is an element of an ordinary retaliatory
arrest claim. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d at 217, n.4.1 The Supreme Court
has ruled that probable cause is an element of a retaliatory prosecution

1

But see Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 717-20 (6th Cir. 2006) (requiring absence of probable cause as
an element of retaliatory arrest claim where arresting agents initiated grand jury proceedings and only
arrested the plaintiff after the grand jury had indicted him.)

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claim, Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), but has not yet ruled on
whether the reasoning of Hartman extends to retaliatory arrest claims. The
Court addressed the issue of whether Hartman extends to retaliatory arrest
claims in Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012) and noted critical
differences between the two constitutional torts, as the former involves
decision-making by prosecutors who are entitled to absolute immunity, and
the prosecutor’s alleged animus is attenuated because in the ordinary case
the key defendant is not the prosecutor who made the charging decision,
while the latter typically involves only the arresting officer who bears the
alleged animus. Id. at 667-69. While observing differences in rationale
which might justify treating retaliatory arrest claims differently than
retaliatory prosecution claims, the Court did not reach the issue because it
found that the arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity because
at the time the defendant was arrested “it was not clearly established that
an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First
Amendment violation.” Id. at 670.
Having already determined that there is a jury question as to whether
the Defendant officers had probable cause to arrest Thames, the court
must consider the remaining elements of a retaliatory arrest claim to
determine if the Defendant officers are entitled to summary judgment.
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The first two elements are easily established. First, Thames engaged in
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983) (“speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”)
(citations omitted); Capitol Square Rev. & Adv. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 760 (1995) (“private religious speech, far from being a First
Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as
secular private expression.”) (citations omitted). Thames was protesting on
a public sidewalk which the Supreme Court has recognized as “traditional
public fora.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988). There is no
exception for public sidewalks adjacent to abortion clinics. McDullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). Second, her arrest and 49-hour
detention in a holding cell would deter a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that conduct.
The only question then is whether there is a causal connection
between her pro-life activities and her arrest—that is, whether her arrest
was motivated at least in part by her protected conduct. In support of her
claim that the Defendant officers had retaliatory animus, Thames relies on
the following evidence: (1) Sergeant Brooks who ordered the arrest,
testified that “you can’t say anything about bombs near a facility that
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performs abortions,” (Doc. 36. Ex. L at 29:20-25); (2) Defendant Brooks
referred to people who protest on behalf of the unborn as “fanatics,” (Doc.
36, Ex. C at 10) (3) Defendant Gatti told the religious sister who was
protesting alongside Thames that “You should not be in the position you
are in, you’re a disgrace, (Doc. 36, Ex. K at 19:23-25 to 20:1-5) and (4)
Defendant Gatti testified, “the comments that were made by her, it’s a very
politically religiously charged issue.” (Doc. 36, Ex. K at 34:11-12, 35:1822). Also, the court considers the fact that the arresting officers did not
evacuate the clinic or make any serious efforts to locate a bomb. Based on
this evidence of animus against pro-lifers, Thames has raised a genuine
issue of material fact in support of her First Amendment retaliatory arrest
claim. As previously discussed, the right to be free from retaliation for
expressive religious activity is clearly established; thus, Officer Gatti and
Sergeant Brooks are not entitled to qualified immunity on Thames’ First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. Because there is no evidence of
retaliatory animus on the part of Defendant Officers Tardif and Soulliere;
however, they are entitled to summary judgment on the retaliatory arrest
claim.
Thames argues that the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in Bible
Believers supports her First Amendment claim. In that case, Bible
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Believers had been proselytizing their religious message peacefully at an
international Arab festival, but nevertheless, their signs and banners had
led to a violent reaction from a group of adolescents at the festival who
began hurling water bottles and other objects at them. 805 F.3d at 239-40.
As a result, the police officers threatened to arrest the Bible Believers for
disorderly conduct, if they refused to leave the festival. 805 F.3d at 256.
The Sixth Circuit found the officer’s threats to arrest the demonstrators
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 256. Thames argues, in this case
Defendant Officers acted more egregiously, as they did not merely threaten
to arrest her, but actually did so. Bible Believers supports Thames’ theory
of liability because there is a question of fact as to whether Defendant
officers lacked probable cause to arrest her.
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Officer Gatti and Sergeant Brooks violated Thames’ First Amendment
rights, the next question is whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged injury. The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[t]he key
determination is whether a defendant moving for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds was on notice that his alleged actions were
unconstitutional.” Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 313 (6th Cir. 2009). The
Sixth Circuit has emphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
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“‘contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Stamm v.
Miller, 657 F. App’x 492, 496 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The specific action in question need
not have been previously held to be unlawful, but the unlawfulness of the
act must be apparent in light of pre-existing law. Id. Under Bible Believers,
and Supreme Court precedent previously discussed, the law is clearly
established that the police cannot arrest a person because of their
objectionable protected free speech activity; thus, the arresting officers are
not entitled to qualified immunity on Thames’ retaliatory arrest claim
brought under the First Amendment.
Lastly, the court considers Thames’ claim that Defendant Officers
violated her right to the free exercise of her religion because her weekend
detention in the holding cell prevented her from attending Mass and
receiving the Eucharist. This is not a separate constitutional tort, but
relates to damages for her wrongful arrest and retaliatory arrest claims.2

22

For a lawful incarceration, a free exercise of religion claim requires than an inmate show that a
condition of incarceration places a “substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or
practice,” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Living Water of Church of God v. Charter Twp.
of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007), Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir.
2010), and missing one religious service does not constitute a “substantial burden” on an inmate’s right to
the free exercise of her religion. Gill v. DeFrank, 8 F. App’x 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2001).

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4.

Equal Protection Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

Thames also seeks to recover for alleged violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that “no state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
must adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately
as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate
treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or
has no rational basis.’” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648
F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Because the
freedom of speech is a fundamental right, Defendants’ conduct is subject to
strict scrutiny review. Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 675 F.3d
974, 986 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[f]undamentally, the Clause protects
against invidious discrimination among similarly-situated individuals or
implicating fundamental rights.” Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). In order to prevail on her equal
protection claim, Thames must prove intentional discrimination on the basis
of her protected speech. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
- 29 -

Unlike a Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim which does not allow
consideration of an officer’s subjective intent but is governed solely by the
objective inquiry of whether or not probable cause existed, an equal
protection claim considers whether an officer had discriminatory
motivations. Farm Labor Org. Comm. V. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308
F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2002).
Here, Thames seeks to prove her equal protection claim on the basis
that Defendant Officers allegedly singled her out for arrest because she
was engaging in pro-life speech activity. In support of this claim, she relies
primarily on the same evidence summarized above in support of her
retaliatory arrest claim, namely (1) Officer Gatti’s testimony that the arrest
was justified because of the “very politically, religiously charged” issue of
abortion and that the “threats that she made have been carried out in the
past,” (Doc. 36, Ex. K at 34:11-18), (2) Officer Gatti called the religious
sister a “disgrace,” (Doc. K at 19:23-25 to 20:1-5), (3) Sergeant Brooks’
statement that those involved in the abortion debate are “fanatics,” (Doc.
36, Ex. C at 10); (4) the Internal Investigation report statement that,
“[f]amily planning centers across the country and across the world operate
on a consistent heightened state of security. This is common knowledge
amongst law enforcement agencies across the country and, based on this
- 30 -

violent history, has lent itself to be a contributing factor when establishing
enforcement actions in and around family planning centers,” (Doc. 36, Ex.
C at 15), and (5) Defendant Officers relied solely on the security guard’s
statements which were not credible because his statements varied.
Based on this record, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Officers Gatti and Sergeant Brooks arrested Thames for her prolife activity, and not because she made a “true threat.” Significantly,
Defendants failed to evacuate the abortion clinic or make any meaningful
attempt to locate a bomb. As there is no evidence of discriminatory animus
on the part of Tardif and Soulliere; however, they are entitled to summary
judgment on Thames’ equal protection claim.
Having found a question of fact exists as to whether Officer Gatti and
Sergeant Brooks violated Thames’ equal protection rights, the next
question is whether a constitutional right was clearly established. If not, as
described above, Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
Just as with Thames’ First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, the law was
clearly established that the police could not arrest a peaceful speaker
engaged in protected speech on a public sidewalk. See Bible Believers,
805 F.3d at 258-60. Accordingly, the arresting officers are not entitled to
qualified immunity on Thames’ equal protection claim.
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5.

Conspiracy Count

Count five of the Complaint alleges that the Westland Defendants
conspired with the Northland Defendants to violate Thames’ First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983. Defendants seek
summary judgment on this claim. Thames has not responded to the
argument in her response brief, nor addressed the issue in her own motion
for partial summary judgment. It appears that Thames has abandoned the
claim. Even if not, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to
Thames’ conspiracy claim, and Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
B.

Municipal Liability
The court next considers whether the City of Westland may be liable

for alleged violations of Thames’ Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, and thus, the
City of Westland may be liable for alleged violations of Thames’ Fourth,
First, and Fourteenth Amendment rights if Thames can prove liability under
Monell. Thames argues that that the arresting officers lacked probable
cause to arrest her, and that the City’s failure to train the officers on what
constitutes a “true threat” was the motivating force behind the arrest, or that
the City was liable because the Chief of Police ratified the conduct by

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approving an investigation of the incident which concluded that the arrest
was reasonable and justified. Thames’ municipal liability claim fails under
either theory.
“To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish
that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom
of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d
556, 573 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978)). Systematically failing to adequately train police officers can
constitute a custom or policy that leads to municipal liability. Miller v.
Sanilac Cty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010).
However, “[t]he inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis
for § 1983 liability ‘where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Most importantly, “’[t]o
establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff ‘must show prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [City] has ignored a history
of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area
was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Brown, 844 F.3d at 573 (quoting
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Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005)). To succeed on a
failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training
was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result
of the municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was
closely related to or actually caused the injury. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Harris,
489 U.S. at 387)).
The standard for finding a municipality liable essentially amounts to
the judicial determination that “the city itself [decided] to violate the
Constitution.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011). “‘A pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to
train,’ although there are rare circumstances in which ‘the unconstitutional
consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city
could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
violations.’” Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62, 64 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has held that for police officers, it
does not:
suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been
avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient
to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.
Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter
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resulting in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the
program to enable officers to respond properly to the usual and
recurring situations with which they must deal.
Harris, 489 U.S. at 391.
Thames argues that the City of Westland may be liable for her
alleged constitutional deprivations because the City failed to train officers to
distinguish “true threats” from political hyperbole, and ratified and
sanctioned the arresting officers’ alleged misconduct. Under the above
precedent, the City of Westland cannot be liable under the failure to train
theory of liability because Thames has not shown any pattern of alleged
similar constitutional violations, or that this case is the rare case where the
failure to train is so obvious that liability should be imposed even in the
absence of such a history.
As to her claim that the City ratified the allegedly unlawful arrest and
detention because the Chief of Police accepted an investigation finding that
the arresting officers acted reasonably and in compliance with department
policy, a similar argument was recently rejected by the Sixth Circuit in
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). In that case, the plaintiff
sued the Greene County Board of Commissioners on the theory, among
others, that the municipality could be liable based on allegations of
excessive force on the part of its deputy sheriffs where the Sheriff had

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approved an investigation which exonerated his subordinate officers’ use of
force. Id. at 479. The Sixth Circuit rejected this theory of liability, stressing
that respondeat superior liability is not available under Monell, and holding
that the sheriff’s “after-the-fact approval of the investigation, which did not
itself continue cause or continue a harm against [plaintiff], was insufficient
to establish the Monell claim.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit explained that in order to establish Monell liability
under a single-act theory, the plaintiff must prove that a “deliberate choice
to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the
official . . . responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 483 (6th Cir. 1986)). And furthermore, the course of action must
be the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s harm, as for example where the
final decision maker directed the destruction of material evidence or
ordered the takedown in question. Id. Here, even if the arresting officers
lacked probable cause to arrest Thames, Thames has not introduced any
evidence to suggest that the Police Chief’s alleged approval of the
investigation of the officers was the moving force behind her alleged
constitutional violations. Accordingly, the City of Westland is not liable
under Monell.
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C.

Supervisory Liability
Thames argues that Chief Jedrusik is liable as he ratified and

sanctioned the alleged police misconduct and failed to adequately train and
supervise these officers with regard to distinguishing between a “true
threat” and protected speech. The doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply, however, in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory
personnel. Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005). To
plausibly find supervisory personnel liable, the Sixth Circuit has explained
the standard as follows:
[T]he § 1983 liability of supervisory personnel must be
based on more than the right to control employees. Section
1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of
respondeat superior. There must be a showing that the
supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct
or in some other way directly participated in it. At a
minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory
official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinate.
Id. at 643 (internal citations omitted). In Turner, plaintiff sought to hold the
police Commander responsible for excessive force and other constitutional
violations, arising from plaintiff’s alleged beatings and mistreatment in
prison, under the theory of supervisory liability because the Commander
investigated plaintiff’s complaints and concluded there was no evidence to
support his claims. Id. at 635. The Sixth Circuit ruled this was an
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inadequate basis for imposing supervisory liability because allegations that
the Commander conducted an inadequate investigation and reached the
wrong conclusion does not amount to a constitutional tort but merely
sounds in negligence. Id. at 649; see also Heyerman v. County of
Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012). The acts of one’s
subordinates or the mere failure to act standing alone are not enough to
hold a supervisor liable. Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.
2004). Also, Thames’ efforts to recover against Chief Jedrusik on the basis
that he failed to properly train his subordinates is not actionable under §
1983 under the circumstances presented here. The Sixth Circuit has held
that “a supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the
offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor ‘either
encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way
directly participated in it.’” McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460,
470 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
D.

John Doe Defendant
In her Complaint, Thames names as a John Doe defendant, the

security guard who alleges she made the bomb threat. Although the
officer’s name is now known, and Thames refers to the officer by his name
in her motion for partial summary judgment, Thames never sought to
- 38 -

amend her Complaint to add him as a party, and failed to serve him as
required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The Sixth Circuit has
held that a civil action against a Doe defendant never commences where
they were not identified by their real names or served with process. Cox v.
Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Bufalino v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968)). Until a plaintiff amends her
complaint to identify a John Doe defendant by his true name, “the John
Doe allegations in the complaint are mere surplusage.” Smith v. City of
Chattanooga, No. 1:08-cv-63, 2009 WL 3762961, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4,
2009) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the John Doe defendant shall be
DISMISSED.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set
forth below:
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim (count three) is DENIED as to the arresting
officers, Defendants Soulliere, Gatti, Tardif, and Brooks.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest claim in violation of the First Amendment (counts
- 39 -

one and two) as to Defendants Officer Gatti and Sergeant Brooks as
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Thames’ constitutional
rights to engage in protected speech and to the free exercise of her
religious beliefs were violated. However, summary judgment is GRANTED
as to Defendant Officers Soulliere and Tardif on Plaintiff’s retaliatory arrest
claim (counts one and two) as there is no evidence of animus on the basis
of Plaintiff’s pro-life advocacy.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Officer Gatti and Sergeant Brooks
denied her equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(count four) because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
these Defendants arrested her based on her pro-life advocacy. However,
because there is no evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of
Defendant Officers Soulliere or Tardif, summary judgment is GRANTED as
to these officers on the equal protection claim (count four).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim (count five) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that summary judgment is
GRANTED as to all claims against Police Chief Jeff Jedrusik as there is no
basis for supervisory liability.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED as to all claims against the City of Westland as
there is no basis for Monell liability.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment (Doc. 36) as to liability only is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John Doe is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 20, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
April 20, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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