Heard et al v. Snyder et al
Filing
70
ORDER denying 58 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 60 , 61 , and 62 Motions for Relief from Judgment; and denying 64 Motion for an Emergency Hearing - Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LAMONT HEARD, RICHARD BALDWIN,
and JEROME SMITH,
Case No. 16-14367
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICK SNYDER, HEIDI WASHINGTON, and
MICHAEL EAGEN,
Defendants.
/
ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[58], DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT [60, 61, 62]
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN EMERGENCY HEARING [64]
Plaintiffs Lamont Heard, Richard Baldwin, and Jerome Smith ("Plaintiffs") are state
prisoners who were each convicted under Michigan's first-degree murder statute, M.C.L.
§750.316, for offenses they committed when they were eighteen and nineteen years old
and each given sentences without the opportunity of parole. (Pl. Amend. Compl., Dkt. 26,
at 1; PgID 98.) Plaintiffs filed their Complaint seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Defendants, Rick Snyder, Heidi Washing, and Michael Eagen ("Defendants")
on December 6, 2016. (Dkt. 26.) Plaintiffs claim in part that the Michigan parole exclusion
procedure under M.C.L. § 791.234(6) which states a prisoner sentenced under the firstdegree murder statute is not eligible for parole, is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' claim the law
fails to take into account their background, youthfulness at the time of the offense1, and
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The Plaintiffs' age at the time of the offense is a factor in that Michigan's current
statutory scheme in M.C.L. § 750.316 now excepts youth offenders, meaning M.C.L.
possibility of rehabilitation, in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. (Pl. Amend.
Compl., Dkt. 26, at 2-4; PgID 99-102.)
Defendants jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer on May 30, 2017.
(Dkt. 36.) Plaintiffs filed a Response on June 28, 2017 (Dkt. 43), and a Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction on July 5, 2016 (Dkt. 46). On July 17, 2017, Magistrate Judge Morris
provided a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
be granted and that Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. Magistrate
Judge Morris stated,
Plaintiffs contend that there is no principled reason to distinguish
seventeen year-olds from eighteen and nineteen year-olds when
scientific evidence shows individuals younger than twenty suffer from
the same brain development issues as seventeen year-olds.
However, federal case law has drawn the line and defined a juvenile
as a person under the age of eighteen. Every court of which this
judicial officer is aware that has considered this issue has maintained
that definitive line. . . .Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiffs'
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
(Report & Recommendation, Dkt. 47 at 7; PgID 257) (citations omitted)
This Court issued its opinion and order addressing Plaintiffs' objections, accepting and
adopting, with modifications, the Magistrate Judge's R&R on September 5, 2017, and
dismissing the case. (Dkt. 55.) The Court stated "[h]aving reviewed the pleadings, the
underlying motions, and the R&R, the Court finds that the R&R correctly applies the law to
Plaintiffs' claims. For the reasons set forth in the R&R, Plaintiffs have not set forth facts
establishing a deprivation of constitutional rights. . . .the cases that Plaintiffs cite do not
§791.234(6) would not apply to Plaintiffs had they been under the age of eighteen at the
time they committed the offense.
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show that they have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Ct. Adopt R&R, Dkt.
56 at 5; PgID 329.)
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' pro se motion for reconsideration of the Court's
September 5, 2017 order granting the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 58.) Also before the Court
are three identical motions for relief from judgment, which each of the three Plaintiffs filed
separately. (Dkt. 60; Dkt. 61; Dkt. 62.) Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and Plaintiffs'
motions for relief from judgment make similar arguments. In both instances, Plaintiffs claim
previously undiscussed recent cases have determined sentencing schemes that
differentiate between those under the age of eighteen and people like Plaintiffs, who were
eighteen and nineteen at the time they committed their crimes, are unconstitutional.
Relying on these cases, Plaintiffs move for relief from judgment and / or reconsideration.
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and motions for relief from
judgment are DENIED.
I.
Motion for Reconsideration
U.S. Dist.Ct. Rules, E.D. Mich. 7.1 (h) allows a party to file a motion for
reconsideration.
A motion for reconsideration should be granted if the movant
demonstrates a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled and
that a different disposition of the case must result form a correction thereof. Ward v.
Wolfenbarger, 340 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Hence v. Smith, 49 F. Supp.
2d 547, 550-51 (E.D. Mich. 1999). A palpable defect is a defect that is obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest, or plain. See Witzke v. Hiller, 972 F.Supp. 426, 427 (E.D. Mich.
1997). A motion for reconsideration which merely presents "the same issues ruled upon
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by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable implication," shall be denied. Ward, 340
F. Supp. 2d at 774.
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration relies exclusively on a case from the district court
of Connecticut, Cruz v. United States, 2018 WL 1541898 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018), which
extends the Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to
defendants over the age of eighteen. Plaintiffs did not raise this Connecticut case prior to
this Court granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Here, Plaintiffs offer the same
arguments that they made in their earlier objections to the R&R, adding only this additional
case, from a non-binding court, to re-assert their earlier arguments. Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration presents issues which this Court already ruled upon, either expressly or
by reasonable implication. Hence, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 553; (Dkt. 56.)
The Court correctly determined the Plaintiffs have not established a deprivation of
constitutional rights and the new non-binding case out of the district court of Connecticut
does not change this determination. The federal courts, now save one, have drawn a
bright line and refused to extend to defendants over the age of eighteen, the Supreme
Court's holding in Miller, which held that mandatory life without parole for defendants under
eighteen at the time of their crimes violated the Eight Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit in 2013 considered whether to extend Miller to persons over the age
of eighteen. In United States v. Marshall, the Sixth Circuit stated "[u]nder the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence concerning juveniles and the Eighth Amendment, the only type of
"age" that matters is chronological age. The Supreme Court's decision [in Miller] limiting
the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a juvenile
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is an individual with a chronological age under 18." United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d
492, 498 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit went on to state, "[t]he reasons for according
special protections to offenders under 18 cannot be used to extend the same protections
to offenders over 18." Id. The court found that "[c]onsideration of efficiency and certainty
require a bright line separating adults from juveniles" and that "[f]or purposes of the Eighth
Amendment, an individual's eighteenth birthday marks that bright line." Id. at 500.
Plaintiffs newest argument asks this Court to disregard the Sixth Circuit's Marshall
opinion and extend the district court of Connecticut's reasoning to their case.
The
Connecticut district court in question has issued two opinions, both of which counter this
bright line rule previously recognized by the Sixth Circuit. Cruz v. United States, 2017 WL
3638176, at *13 (D. Conn. Apr. 3, 2017); Cruz v. United States, 2018 WL 1541898 at *20
(D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (stating " 'the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole' for offenders who were 19 years
old at the time of their crimes." (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479)). The fact that a Connecticut
district court issued these opinions does not demonstrate a palpable defect which will result
in a different disposition here in the Sixth Circuit as required under U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules,
E.D. Mich. 7.1(h). The Connecticut court's holding is a lone outlier, and does not change
the Sixth Circuit's binding precedent on this Court, to treat chronological age and the
eighteenth birthday as the bright line. Marshall, 736 F.3d at 498-500.
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, because Plaintiffs are
presenting issues which have already been correctly determined according to the legally
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binding Sixth Circuit precedent. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration [58] is DENIED.
Plaintiffs' motion for an expedited ruling [64] is DENIED.
II.
Motion for Relief from Judgment
Plaintiffs seek a relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). This is a
catch-all provision for obtaining relief from a judgment only in exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances where principles of equity mandate relief. Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698
(6th Cir. 2018) (citing West v. Carpenter, 790 F.3d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 2015)). Rule
60(b)(6) motions necessitate a fact based inquiry in which the district court intensively
balances numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments,
risk of injustice to the parties, as well as the risk of undermining the public's confidence in
the judicial process. Id. A district court should grant relief from operation of a judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) when it determines, in its sound discretion, that substantial
justice would be served. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1998).
In their three identical motions, Plaintiffs ask the Court to vacate the earlier dismissal
of the case. Plaintiffs' state "since the filing of the R&R, a significant court ruling has take[n]
place, that directly effects this Court's challenged judgment and order." (Pl's Mot. Relief
from Judgment, Dkt. 60 at 2; PgID 344.) Plaintiffs then cite to a non-binding Kentucky state
case out of the Fayette County Circuit court. In Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR161 (Fayette Co. Aug. 1, 2017) the Kentucky court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional when applied against defendants charged with offenses they committed
when they were under the age of twenty-one. The decision extends the U.S. Supreme
Court's 2005 holding in Roper v. Simmons, which held that the Eighth Amendment
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Proscription against cruel and unusual punishments prohibited states from using the death
penalty against offenders who were younger than 18 when the crime occurred. 125 S.Ct.
1183 (2005). The Kentucy court reasoned, based scientific research on brain development
and behavior, that 18-21 year olds are categorically less culpable.
The Court is not bound by the Kentucky state case. Moreover the facts of the case
refer to a death penalty sentence which is not at issue here. Even applying the logic of the
Kentucky case however, and even pre-supposing all the scientific evidence cited is true,
Plaintiffs' case continues to suffer from the same fundamental defect originally addressed
in the magistrate judge's R&R and then further addressed in this Court's decision
dismissing the case. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012), that "mandatary life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'
" Id. at 465. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit held that "[c]onsideration of efficiency and certainty
require a bright line separating adults from juveniles" and that "[f]or purposes of the Eighth
Amendment, an individual's eighteenth birthday marks that bright line." Marshall, 736 F.3d
at 500. This is the binding law on this Court. Plaintiffs have not established a deprivation
of constitutional rights and thus have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
[58], DENIES Plaintiffs' three identical motions for relief from judgment [60, 61, 62], and
DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for an emergency hearing [64].
So ordered.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
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Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: June 4, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on June 4, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Bartlett
Case Manager
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