Owens v. Woods
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Denying Petitioner's 1 Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying a Certificate of Appealability, and Denying Leave to Proceed Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (JCur)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARONN JERMAINE OWENS,
#851904,
Petitioner,
vs.
Civil Action No. 17-CV-10323
HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
JEFFREY WOODS,
Respondent.
___________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This matter is presently before the Court on petitioner’s pro se application for a writ
of habeas corpus. Petitioner challenges his convictions for torture, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.85,
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, assault
with intent to maim, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.86, unlawful imprisonment, Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.349b, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.227b. Petitioner raises a single claim for relief: he received ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Respondent has filed an answer arguing that the
claim is meritless. For the reasons explained below, the Court shall deny the petition. The Court
shall also deny a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
I. Background
The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying petitioner’s
convictions as follows:
On February 1, 2012, the victim, Daivon Williams, went to defendant’s
house to purchase marijuana. While there, defendant asked Williams
questions about a stolen truck. When Williams claimed to not know
anything about it, an unidentified male who was at defendant’s house with
defendant placed a gun in his lap. Williams was ordered to strip naked.
Both defendant and the unidentified male aggressively asked Williams
questions about the truck, and Williams continued to deny knowing
anything. At some point, defendant got a metal spatula, heated it, and used
it to burn Williams’s arm. When Williams tried to defend himself, the
unidentified male struck him repeatedly in the back of the head with the
gun. Williams testified that while he was being hit, defendant threw boiling
water on his chest. The questions about the truck continued. Williams
attempted to call the individual who apparently stole the truck, but there was
no answer. Defendant then went back to the kitchen and returned with the
heated spatula, which he used to burn both of Williams’s legs. All the while,
the unidentified male with the gun stood over Williams.
Defendant then retrieved a metal hammer and struck the top of Williams’s
left foot four times. Williams felt the bones in his foot break. Defendant
continued to ask about the truck and then, apparently unsatisfied with
Williams’s answers, struck Williams’s right foot with the hammer three
times.
Williams was then ordered to go into the basement, where he was made to
sit on the floor, still naked, with his knees up. Defendant hit him again with
the hammer. Then defendant went upstairs and returned with a can of
kerosene and a lighter. He poured the kerosene over Williams, who said
that it ran down his face, back, chest, and legs. The next thing he knew he
felt heat all over his body and saw flames on his face and arm. He jumped
up and ran into a wall. Defendant doused the flames with a pot of water and
told Williams they were going for a ride.
Defendant and his accomplice drove Williams from the west side of Detroit
to the east side. They stopped the vehicle in front of an alley and ordered
Williams to get out and walk away. Williams made it about five steps
before he heard a gunshot. The bullet hit him in his right hip. Williams
walked to the nearest house and asked for help.
Detroit City Police Officer Dean Muczynski, the first officer on the scene,
testified that when he arrived he saw Williams standing naked on the porch.
He explained that as he approached Williams:
I started to see skin hanging off of him so I called for medics
before I even talked to him. I saw blood around his waist
and his feet were deformed, kind of like in angles. So before
I did anything, I called for EMS. I didn’t want to touch him
. . . The lady of the house was kind enough to give us a
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blanket just to wrap him around, didn’t want to squeeze him
too tight, he was just screaming.
Williams identified his attacker as “Aaronn” before he was taken by
ambulance to the hospital. He stayed at the hospital for 21 days, during
which he was able to identify defendant as his attacker from a photo lineup.
People v. Owens, No. 315046, 2014 WL 2600738, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 10, 2014), rev’d
in part, appeal denied in part, 870 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. 2015).
Petitioner was convicted by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury on the charges
listed above. He was sentenced as follows: 285 months to 46 years’ imprisonment for the torture
conviction, 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less
than murder conviction, 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to maim conviction,
and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the unlawful imprisonment conviction. These sentences are
to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively to two years’ imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, claiming that
the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, the prosecutor committed misconduct,
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct and in incorrectly
advising petitioner during plea negotiations, and the sentence violated Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s convictions and
sentences. Owens, 2014 WL 2600738, at *1. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in
the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court
remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether the court would have imposed a
materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in People v. Lockridge, 870
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N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015).1 See People v. Owens, 870 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. 2015). In all other
respects, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal “because we are not persuaded that
the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” Id. On remand, the trial
court found resentencing was not necessary under Lockridge.
Petitioner filed the instant petition and later moved for a stay to allow him to
exhaust additional claims in state court. The Court granted a stay [docket entry 6]. Petitioner filed
a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court raising five claims for relief. The trial court
denied the motion. Petitioner did not seek leave to appeal the trial court’s decision in the Michigan
Court of Appeals. Instead, he filed a motion in this Court to lift the stay, but he did not seek leave
to amend his petition to include any of the claims raised in his motion for relief from judgment
[docket entry 9]. After the stay was lifted and the case was reopened [docket entry 10], respondent
filed an answer and the relevant state court record. Petitioner has not filed a reply.
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In People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015), the Michigan Supreme Court
held that the Michigan guidelines scheme violated defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights under Alleyne [v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)],
because it was all but mandatory and incorporated judge-found facts to
increase minimum sentences. See 870 N.W.2d at 513-14. . . . Lockridge . .
. made the Michigan guidelines for minimum sentences akin to the federal
guidelines—advisory, but “a highly relevant consideration in a trial court’s
exercise of sentencing discretion.” 870 N.W.2d at 520. Thus, Lockridge
did not change how the guidelines ranges for minimum sentences were
computed; the only change was that they were no longer binding on the
sentencing judge. To provide guidance to Michigan appellate courts, the
Michigan Supreme Court instructed that “in cases in which a defendant’s
minimum sentence was established by application of the sentencing
guidelines in a manner that violated the Sixth Amendment, the case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether that court would have
imposed a materially different sentence but for the constitutional error.” Id.
at 523.
Reign v. Gidley, 929 F.3d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).
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II. Legal Standard
To obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, habeas petitioners who challenge
a matter “adjudicated on the merits in State court” [must] show that the
relevant state-court “decision” (1) “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or (2) “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.”
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (alteration added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
“The question . . . is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was
incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410
(2000)). Section 2254 “thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings . . . and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
664 (2004)). Also, a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas
review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and review under § 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
181 (2011).
III. Discussion
Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. He argues that defense counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations because
counsel incorrectly informed him about his potential sentence exposure. Petitioner maintains that
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he was informed that the sentencing guidelines range was eleven to eighteen years when the
guidelines range determined at sentencing was fourteen to twenty-three years.
At a final pretrial conference on July 6, 2012, petitioner rejected a plea offer
described on the record as follows:
MS. WALSH [prosecutor]: The People had extended an offer. The
guidelines are 11 to 18. He is charged with assault with intent to
murder, torture, assault with intent to maim, unlawful imprisonment
and felony firearm. For a plea of guilt to Count One, AWIM, Count
Two, torture, Count Three, FF, the People would do an agreement
to 10 to 18 plus two.
THE COURT: Mr. Winters?
MR. WINTERS [defense counsel]: I’ve conveyed that offer to Mr.
Owens, your Honor, and it’s rejected.
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. He has rejected the offer?
MR. WINTERS: That’s correct.
Mr. Owens, did I tell you what that generous offer was from the
Wayne County prosecutor’s office?
DEFENDANT OWENS: Yes, he did, Ms. Parker.
THE COURT: We will be going forward with a jury trial.
DEFENDANT OWENS: Correct.
Final Conference Tr. at 3-4 (docket entry12-5, PageID.158-59).
Section 2254 “erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners
whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 16 (2013). The
standard for obtaining relief is “difficult to meet.” Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 358 (2013).
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), the standard is “all the more difficult” because “[t]he standards created by
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Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential . . . and when the two apply in tandem, review
is doubly so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components. The first is that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and the second is that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To establish deficient representation, a petitioner must
demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Id. at 688.
“When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were
reasonable” but whether “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.
In order to establish the prejudice component, a petitioner must show that, but for
the constitutionally deficient representation, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the Strickland standard applies to a claim that
counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. The Court explained how a petitioner satisfies
Strickland’s prejudice prong where counsel’s ineffective advice caused a petitioner to reject a plea
offer:
[A] defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there
is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to
the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the
prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been
less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.
Id. at 164.
In the present case, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied the same ineffective
assistance of counsel claim regarding plea negotiations that petitioner asserts at this time: that
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counsel misinformed him about his sentence exposure by telling him “that the sentencing
guidelines range was 11 to 18 years when, in fact, the guidelines range was 14 to 23 years.” Owens,
2014 WL 2600738, at *6. Finding the record “scant on the matter of plea negotiations” because
petitioner did not seek an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
court found no evidence in the record that petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, even if
he had received inaccurate information. Id. at *7. The court noted that petitioner’s “rejection of
the offer appears to have been based on his claim of innocence.” Id. The court therefore concluded
that petitioner had “failed in his burden of showing that he would have accepted the offer if he had
been aware of the proper sentencing guidelines.” Id.
Petitioner does not show that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. First, the record does not establish
that defense counsel incorrectly calculated the guidelines. It was the prosecutor, not defense
counsel, who set forth the guidelines during the final pretrial conference. It is clear from the record
that the scoring of the prior record variables and offense variables was debated extensively at
sentencing. The original sentencing hearing was adjourned to resolve a disagreement over whether
petitioner was on probation at the time he committed the offenses because he contended he was
not. Sentencing Hr’g 9/19/2012 at 5-8 (docket entry 12-9, PageID.558-61). When the trial court
reconvened for sentencing, the prosecutor established that petitioner was on probation at the time
of the offenses, which increased his prior record variables scoring. Sentencing Hr’g 10/10/2012
at 21-23 (docket entry 12-10, PageID.585-87). The guidelines also increased at least in part as a
result of the testimony that was elicited during trial regarding the cruelty of the crimes. At
sentencing, the trial court judge described the case as “horrific,” stated that she had “never seen
anything like this,” and commented on the “level of brutality” and “level of pain” in this case. Id.
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at 35-37 (PageID.599-601). The trial testimony, which clearly impacted sentencing, would not
have been in the record if petitioner had entered a plea.
Second, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that petitioner failed to show
that he would have accepted the plea offer even if he had known about the higher guidelines range
was not unreasonable. Defense counsel described the plea offer as “generous,” and petitioner
nevertheless rejected it. Owens, 2014 WL 2600738, at *7. While petitioner would have reaped
substantial benefit from entering a plea, the Court may not rely on “the harsh light of hindsight”
to evaluate counsel’s performance. Harrington, 562 U.S. 107 (quotation omitted). Petitioner has
not shown that the state court had “no reasonable basis” for concluding that he failed to establish
prejudice. Id. at 98.
Third, petitioner has not shown a likelihood that the trial court would have accepted
the plea agreement and sentenced him to a ten-year minimum sentence. The minimum sentence
guidelines range calculated at sentencing for the torture conviction was fourteen years and three
months to twenty-three years and nine months. Sentencing Hr’g 10/10/2012 at 36-37 (docket entry
12-10, PageID.600-01). The court sentenced petitioner at the high end of the guidelines, imposing
a minimum sentence of twenty-three years and nine months. Id. at 37-38 (PageID.601-02). The
fact that the minimum sentence ultimately imposed for the torture conviction is at the high end of
the minimum sentence range “strongly suggests the trial court would not have been willing to
sentence” petitioner to a ten-year minimum sentence. See McGowan v. Burt, 788 F.3d 510, 518
(6th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, petitioner has failed to show that the Michigan Court of Appeals’
decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.
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IV. Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed
unless a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings requires that a court “issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A COA may be issued “only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates “that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In the present case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the
conclusion that the instant petition does not state a claim upon which habeas relief may be granted.
Therefore, the Court shall not issue a certificate of appealability.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition in this matter for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied because
petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner may not proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis, as any appeal in this matter would be frivolous.
s/Bernard A. Friedman
Bernard A. Friedman
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: June 18, 2020
Detroit, Michigan
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or party of
record herein by electronic means or first-class U.S. mail on June 18, 2020.
Aaronn Jermaine Owens, 851904
Chippewa Correctional Facility
4269 W. M-80
Kincheloe, MI 49784
s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams
Case Manager
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