Malloy v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society
Filing
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ORDER Granting 34 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LINDA D. MALLOY,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-10635
v.
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
WATCHTOWER BIBLE
AND TRACT SOCIETY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [#34]
I.
INTRODUCTION
In response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss on October 10, 2017. Dkt. No. 34. Plaintiff has filed a response, and the
Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on December 20, 2017.
For the
reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against
Defendant, a religious organization also known as the “Jehovah Witnesses.” On May
2, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. A clerk’s entry of default was entered
on May 24, 2017, but it was set aside on August 30, 2017 due to improper service.
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After acceptance of service of the Amended Complaint, Defendant filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint consists of 752 pages (her initial complaint was
174 pages). Plaintiff asserts six claims in her Amended Complaint, one count based
on an alleged violation of each of the following federal laws: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1201;
(2) 18 U.S.C. §241; (3) Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)); (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1346; (5) 18
U.S.C. § 2340A; and (6) Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Plaintiff’s
claims stem from a number of alleged actions by Defendant that harmed Plaintiff,
including:
[K]idnapping in infancy and as a young adult, [being] separated from
parent, family and country for 53 yrs.[,] [Defendant] unlawfully took my
children and had adopted, arranged (5) sexual aggravated offenses
including statutory, mutilated and dismembered, denied education for
self and children, denied legitimate employment for 38 yrs, orchestrated
(5) car accidents to injure-causing multiple injuries, defamation of
character, physical and mental torture for 16 yrs, physical abuse for 49
yrs, monopolized and defrauded of revenue, secretively implanted the
Nkultra Military Device, forged identity, inundated compulsive
conceptions, attempts of murder, inventions of criminal an[d]
psychological incidents, 30 yrs. of destruction of property, innumerable
irreversible damages and 53 yrs in a conspiracy that denies liberty and
justice and coerces slavery.
See Dkt. No. 11, PgID 1204.
III.
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
A.
Personal Jurisdiction - Rule 12(b)(2)
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1.
The Law
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2),
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction over the
defendant exists. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th
Cir. 2002); Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). In
addressing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court may, in its
discretion: (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual issues, (2)
proceed to discovery, or (3) decide the issue based on the pleadings and affidavits
alone. McCluskey v. Belford High Sch., 795 F.Supp.2d 608, 615 (E.D.Mich. 2010)
(citing Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat. Assn., 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989) (the
court may conduct an evidentiary hearing or allow discovery if the written
submissions raise disputed issues of fact or seem to require determinations of
credibility)).
When the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, it must consider the
pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lifestyle Lift
Holding Co., Inc. v. Prendiville, 768 F.Supp.2d 929, 932 (E.D. Mich. 2011). “In this
circumstance, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction; the court
does not consider the controverting assertions of the party moving for dismissal.” Id.
In a diversity case, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case when it shows that
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the federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants is authorized
by both the law of the forum state and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 888.
A federal district court applies the jurisdictional statute, or long-arm statute, of
the state in which it sits. See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Kope Food Products, Inc., 840
F.Supp. 78, 80 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Michigan’s long-arm statute allows Michigan
courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the federal due process
requirements. Michigan Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954
F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992). In order for a Michigan court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant to be consistent with due process, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant had “certain minimum contacts with [Michigan] such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enterprises, 885 F.2d 1293, 1299 (6th Cir. 1989)
(quoting International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Personal jurisdiction exists in two forms: “general” or “specific.” Bird v.
Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002). General jurisdiction exists over a
defendant when his “contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and
systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant
even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.” Id. (citing
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Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir.
1989)). Plaintiff asserts that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. Specific personal jurisdiction in Michigan is governed by MCL §
600.715, which states, in pertinent part:
The existence of any of the following relationships between a
corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of
jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited
personal jurisdiction over such corporation and to enable such courts to
render personal judgments against such corporation arising
out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state . . .
The transaction of any business necessary for limited personal jurisdiction
under MCL § 600.715(1) may be established by the slightest act of business in
Michigan. Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1998). At
a minimum, specific jurisdiction requires that a defendant purposefully establish
minimum contacts within Michigan such that the defendant should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court here. LAK, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1300 (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The requirement is
satisfied where the defendant “purposefully avail[s] [it]self of the privilege of acting
in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.” Beydoun v. Wataniya
Restaurants Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Southern
Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)).
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The Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant if
Defendant’s contacts with Michigan satisfy the three-part test established by the Sixth
Circuit in Southern Machine:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities
there. Third, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
Southern Machine, 401 F.2d at 381. In determining whether a party “purposefully
availed” itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state, courts must determine
whether the party established minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. Jurisdiction
is proper where the contacts proximately result from the actions of the defendant,
which create a substantial connection with the forum state. Conti v. Pneumatic Prods.
Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1992).
2.
Analysis
The Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant,
like many religious organizations, maintains a presence in the State of Michigan,
including in the Eastern District of Michigan. Defendant conducts religious services
at Kingdom Halls of Jehovah Witnesses (such as the one Plaintiff describes in
Dearborn, Michigan and the one Defendant formerly utilized on Plymouth Road in
Detroit, Michigan).
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The Court finds that it has general jurisdiction over Defendant because its
“contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.” Bird, 389 F.3d at 873 (citation
omitted). The Court also finds that Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting in Michigan (and causing a consequence here). Plaintiff has
alleged that her harm stems from Defendant’s activities in Michigan and those
activities have a substantial enough connection with Michigan to make the exercise
of jurisdiction over Defendant reasonable. Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.
B.
Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief can be Granted - Rule 12(b)(6)
1.
The Law
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Accepting all factual allegations as true, the court will review the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t of
Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). As a general rule, to survive a
motion to dismiss, the complaint must state sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The complaint must demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that the
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defendant’s conduct was unlawful. Id. at 556. Claims comprised of “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
2.
Analysis
Each of the claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendant must be dismissed.
Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 are based on federal criminal statutes. Each of those statutes
serves as a basis for the Government to file criminal charges against a person, but
none of them provides that an individual may bring a civil lawsuit against another
person. See, e.g., Collins v. Palczewiski, 841 F.Supp. 333, 340 (D. Nev. 1993)
(quoting Bass Angler Sportsman Soc. v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F.Supp. 412,
415 (S.D. Ala. 1971), citing United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878); United
States v. Jourden, 193 F. 986 (9th Cir. 1912)) (“Long ago the courts of these United
States established that ‘criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions.’”).
Only in very limited circumstances have courts found private actions
maintainable under criminal statutes. Without exception, the plaintiffs
have been members of the public that the statutes were specifically
designed to protect. American Post. Wkrs. U., Detroit v. Independent
Post. Sys., 481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir.1973); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78-82, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975) (finding that
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§ 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 did not create a
right in favor of the plaintiff, as a member of the general public).
Collins, 841 F.Supp. at 340.
With respect to Plaintiff’s first claim, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits the
kidnapping of another person and provides for imprisonment for a term up to life if
convicted, but does not provide for private actions. Plaintiff’s second claim, based on
18 U.S.C. §241, provides that two or more persons conspiring to harm or threaten a
person in any United States territory, can be fined and/or imprisoned for up to 10
years, but there is no private cause of action. In claim four, Plaintiff cites a statutory
section that defines “scheme or artifice to defraud,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1346, in the
context of health care fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347. Not only is this a criminal statute
that does not provide for a private cause of action, Plaintiff has not made any
allegations of health care fraud by Defendant. The statute identified in claim five (18
U.S.C. § 2340A) prohibits acts of torture and provides for fines and/or imprisonment
of up to 20 years (absent death) or death (if torture resulted in death of the victim).
That statute does not provide for any civil remedy or cause of action. The Court also
finds that Plaintiff has not alleged, nor is there reason to believe, that Plaintiff is a
member of the public that any of the statutes cited were specifically designed to
protect.
Plaintiff’s third claim is rooted in Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)), which
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prohibits employers from discriminating against employees (or potential employees)
on a prohibited classification such as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Plaintiff has not alleged, and there is no reason to believe based on the allegations, that
Defendant employed Plaintiff. Plaintiff also has failed to allege that she was not
employed, or was terminated from Defendant’s employ, based on any of the
prohibited classifications of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. For those
reasons, Title VII is not relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations and cannot serve as statute
upon which Plaintiff can recover.
Plaintiff’s sixth claim relies on Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972. In order to adequately plead a Title IX case, Plaintiff must allege that: (a) a
recipient of federal funding discriminated against a student on a prohibited basis; (b)
the recipient had notice or knowledge of the discrimination; and (c) the recipient
responded to the discrimination with deliberate indifference. See Dibbern v. Univ. of
Mich., 2013 WL 6068808, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1989)). Plaintiff has not alleged that: (1) Defendant is
a recipient of federal funding (and there is no reason to believe Defendant is federally
funded); (2) Plaintiff was a student at Defendant’s school; (3) Defendant had
knowledge of any discrimination against Plaintiff; or (4) Defendant responded to such
discrimination with deliberate indifference.
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For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to
allege in her Amended Complaint any claim upon which relief can be granted. The
Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and dismisses Plaintiff’s cause of action.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 34) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s cause of action is DISMISSED.
Judgment shall be entered separately.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: December 21, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on December 21, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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