Youkhanna et al v. Sterling Heights, City of et al
Filing
89
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT[#69] AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#67]. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAMAL ANWIYA YOUKHANNA,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.: 17-cv-10787
Honorable Gershwin A. Drain
v.
CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS,
et al.,
Defendant.
___________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT[#69] AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#67]
I.
INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for Summary
Judgment. These matters are fully briefed and a hearing was held on May 7, 2018.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and will deny the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant dispute stems from the American Islamic Community Center,
Inc.’s (“AICC”) attempt to build a mosque in the City of Sterling Heights, which
permits places of worship and religious community centers in residential zoned (R-
60) areas through special land use.
In 2015, the AICC applied for a special land use with the City to build a
mosque
on
Fifteen
Mile
Road
between
Ryan
Road
and
Mound
Road. After working with then City Planner Donald Mende for approximately one
year, the AICC appeared at a public hearing before the City’s Planning
Commission on August 13, 2015, seeking approval of its application. At the
meeting, Mende reported that the application met all of the objective standards set
forth in the zoning code. He indicated that the mosque would cover approximately
11% of the property, well under the 30% limit on R-60 zoned property, the height
of the mosque’s dome and spires complied with the zoning code, and the proposed
130 parking spaces exceeded the required 109 spaces. Mende further reported that
the location of the mosque on a major thoroughfare was also appropriate.
Mende next discussed whether the discretionary standards of the zoning
code had been met. This included consideration of the paint to be used, that no
audio devices would be used outside of the building, allowance of future liquor
sales at nearby businesses, and limiting use of the multi-purpose room to AICC
members only. He further discussed that increased traffic was not a concern
because “[t]he average traffic counts [sic] at this location is approximately 11,000
vehicles per day, which is actually average for major roads” and that “accidents
have actually been steadily decreased since 2011.” Mende recommended that the
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AICC’s application be approved.
The Commission thereafter took public comments.
Audience members
raised concerns about traffic, size, use of the building, and safety.
During
deliberations, Commissioner Jeffrey Norgrove, also a Plaintiff herein, indicated
that he was thinking of asking for a “full impact study with socioeconomic
numbers” and stated that “I’m not exactly comfortable with making this decision
tonight after everything I’ve heard.”
Commissioner Jerry Rowe suggested a
postponement to allow the AICC to “review the scale of the building.”
Commissioner Stephan Milltello challenged the postponement stating that “I would
be against [postponing] . . . [I]f this was a church, a Catholic Church or anything
else, we wouldn’t be, we wouldn’t [need a postponement].” The Commission then
voted 6 to 1 to postpone the matter.
On September 10, 2015, the AICC appeared again at another public hearing
before the Commission, seeking approval of its Application based on revised plans
submitted to the City following the August 13, 2015 meeting. Over 200 people
attended this meeting and, before the meeting, many of them engaged in protests
outside of City Hall against the building of the mosque. At the meeting, Mende
reported that the AICC had agreed to reduce the height of the mosque’s spires by
approximately 13% and increase the size of the dome by 12%. At the meeting’s
conclusion, Plaintiff Norgrove made a motion to deny the AICC’s application
3
based on the following discretionary standards set forth in §25.02 of the zoning
code: the location and height of the mosque interferes with and discourages the
appropriate development and use of adjacent land and buildings, lack of size
compatibility with established long term development patterns, a likely shortage of
off-street parking when the principal and ancillary uses are combined, additional
parking spaces are required, and the scale of the mosque is not harmonious with
the neighboring areas. The Commission then voted to deny the application.
The AICC disagreed with the Commission’s decision, essentially claiming
that the denial was pretext and was truly based upon religious discrimination.
Thereafter, the AICC filed a lawsuit against the City alleging, among other things,
multiple violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, et. seq., as well as violation of the AICC’s First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also investigated the
denial of the application and filed a lawsuit alleging the Commission’s decision
violated the RLUIPA and discriminated against the AICC. The DOJ further alleged
that Plaintiff Norgrove attended an anti-mosque protest on August 30, 2015 and
improperly influenced the other Commissioners due to his alleged bias against
Muslims.
In addition, the DOJ asserted that Plaintiff Norgrove opposed the
construction of a different mosque in 2011 and posted anti-Islamic statements on
4
his social media stating: “Oh no the terrorists are gonna attack, according to the
media this weekend. Come to the Detroit area. They don’t [sic] bomb their
revenue source.” The DOJ also claimed that Norgrove shared a picture of a pig
with the statement “share this pig if your [sic] not celebrating Ramadan [sic].”
Finally, the DOJ maintained that Norgrove contacted Commissioners between the
first and second meetings and informed them that he would be making a motion to
deny the application.
The City’s answer to the complaints denied any wrongdoing, maintaining
that the decision by the Commission was based on legitimate land use concerns.
The parties participated in facilitation with Magistrate Judge Anthony Patti. With
the Magistrate Judge’s assistance, the parties fashioned a potential resolution of the
lawsuits taking into consideration the issues raised by the Commission, as well as
balancing the AICC’s right to free exercise of religion.
The potential resolution was proposed to the City Council at its February 21,
2017 meeting. More than 240 people attended the meeting, which exceeded the
capacity of Council Chambers so the City added seating in the vestibule located
outside of the Chambers. The City employed a “one in, one out” procedure to
allow audience members to rotate into the Chambers to provide their comments.
Due to the size of the audience, Mayor Michael Taylor, a named Defendant in
these proceedings, proposed that speaking time be limited to two minutes per
5
person so that everyone present would have an opportunity to speak. The vestibule
area outside of Chambers had windows through which audience members could
watch the meeting and televisions on which the meeting was broadcast live.
The meeting began with the City’s Attorney, Ann McClorey McLaughlin,
who explained the terms of the Consent Judgment and the concessions received.
See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. L, 2/21/17 Mtg. Video at 1:42:00-48:06).
Specifically, she indicated that the Consent Judgment would approve a special land
use to build the mosque in the City and that the AICC agreed to reduce the height
of the mosque’s dome and spires, to provide off-site parking and shuttling for
events exceeding available on-site parking, and not to use any outdoor sound
projection or call to prayer. Id. McLaughlin further explained that the Consent
Judgment required that the dome be painted with non-reflective paint, that all
religious activities be conducted indoors, and affirmed the City’s ability to institute
permit parking on surrounding residential streets and to enforce parking
ordinances. Id. She noted that the City was not admitting liability and that by
resolving the matter now, the City could control the situation rather than leaving it
to a judge or jury to decide. Id.
After McLaughlin concluded her comments, Defendant Taylor opened the
floor for public comment, having previously provided the following explanation of
the City’s Rules:
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We have 181 seats, I believe, in this Council Chamber; every seat is
taken (save for maybe one or two) and we also have overflow of at
least 25 to 30 or more in the vestibule. So, it is currently 9:07 p.m. . .
we have other agenda items to get to on the agenda tonight aside from
this . . . . Our Council Rules allow for us to reduce the speaker time
limit and judging by the size of the crowd unless there is objection
from Council, I recommend reducing the speaker time on this item
only to two minutes . . . . Speakers will be required to stay on point.
Your comments during this agenda item must be related to this agenda
item. This agenda item is to consider settlements, consent order, and
consent judgments in these two cases . . . . If you fail to abide by the
Council’s Rules, you will be called out of order . . . and you will be
asked to go back to your seat. If you do not go back to your seat, we
will recess and you will be removed from the auditorium. So please
don’t make us do that . . . . Outbursts from the audience can be
grounds for being called out of order . . . . So again, let’s just please
be as respectful as we can of each person. We do not need any
comments about anybody’s religion, that is not the purpose of this
meeting tonight and any comments regarding other religions or
disagreements with religions will be called out of order. It’s simply
not relevant to what’s going on tonight.
Id. at 1:37:49-41:02. Despite Defendant Taylor’s ground rules, there were twentysix outbursts by audience members, both individually and as a body, forcing
multiple recesses. The outbursts included people speaking out of turn, shouting,
applauding, and other disruptive behavior, including attacks on Islam and the
AICC for being “terrorists” and wanting to “destroy the American Constitution.”
Id. at 2:20:35-21:14,2:32:54-33:43.
With respect to the Plaintiffs herein, all of the Plaintiffs who were in
attendance were permitted to speak uninterrupted and none of the Plaintiffs chose
7
to utilize their full two-minute speaking time. Id. at 1:52:37-53:48, 1:53:54-55:27.
1:59:05-37, 2:03:11-41, 2:59:00-25. After every audience member who wished to
speak was heard, a motion was made by Councilman Douglas Skrzniarz to approve
the Consent Judgment. Id. at 3:04:09-54. During Council’s deliberation, the
audience began screaming at Councilman Skrzniarz, mid-sentence, forcing another
recess. Id. at 3:04:56-08:13.
When Defendant Taylor was in the process of calling this recess, Plaintiff
Rrasi approached the dais and began speaking loudly at Defendant Taylor.
Defendant Taylor has specifically testified that Plaintiff Rrasi “came close to the
council diaz [sic] and was making gestures with her hands, making threatening
comments, and was being disruptive . . . I was trying to do my best to maintain
order in there, and in a split second I recall Debi coming up, making a threatening
gesture, coming towards the council table, and I believe I asked that the police
officer to escort her out.” See Taylor Dep. at 101:2-5; 102:10-15. After Defendant
Taylor asked that she be escorted out of Council Chambers, Plaintiff Rrasi began
yelling at him because she was mad. Because she refused to leave chambers, the
officer proceeded to escort her out of the room. See Rrasi Dep. at 53:14-18, 54:125; 55:1-2.
Upon returning from recess, Defendant Taylor warned the audience that any
more interruptions would require him to clear Chambers to allow Council to
8
conclude the agenda item. Ignoring his warning, the audience members continued
to interrupt the meeting multiple times. As a result, Defendant Taylor called
another recess and ordered that all audience members except for the press be
removed to the vestibule where they could view the proceedings. Council returned
from recess and voted to approve the Consent Judgment.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against the City and Taylor
claiming that the Consent Judgment was approved in violation of the City’s Zoning
Code and Michigan law. They also assert violations under the Due Process, Equal
Protection and Establishment Clauses and the First Amendment. Plaintiff Rrasi
has also alleged a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim.
III.
LAW & ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) “directs that summary judgment shall
be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). The court
must view the facts, and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuine dispute of material
fact exists where the record “taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
9
to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Ultimately, the
court evaluates “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
B.
Validity of the Consent Judgment
1.
The City’s Zoning Code and the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act
(“MZEA”)
The crux of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is that the approval of the Consent
Judgment should be invalidated because the Council purportedly failed to abide by
the City’s Zoning Code by neglecting to consider the discretionary standards set
forth in § 25.02. Plaintiffs’ further assert that the Consent Judgment should be
invalidated because the City did not comply with the notice requirements under the
MZEA. Both of Plaintiffs’ arguments are without merit.
Plaintiffs’ first argument rests on the theory that the terms “reviewing
authority” and “approving authority” are used interchangeably in the Zoning Code.
The relevant provisions state that:
When the City Council is the reviewing authority with respect to a
special land use, it shall have the same reviewing authority and shall
consider the same standards of the Planning Commission under the
special approval land use criteria applicable to such use in a particular
zoning district and Article 25.
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Zoning Code, § 25.01(C). Thus, the Zoning Code unambiguously requires the City
Council to consider the discretionary standards with respect to a special land use
application when it is the “reviewing authority.” Conversely, when City Council is
designated the “approving authority” only, the Zoning Code is silent with respect
to the same requirement to consider the discretionary standards under the Code.
Id. at § 25.01(A)(4) (stating that the City Council shall be the approving authority
with respect to special approval land use pursuant to a consent judgment).
Plaintiffs have cited no provision in the Code which designates the Council
as the reviewing authority when it approves a special land use by consent judgment
to settle pending litigation. In fact, Plaintiff Norgrove, a former Commissioner,
has testified that there is a distinction between the terms approving authority and
reviewing authority under the Zoning Code. Plaintiffs’ reliance on § 25.03(A)(2)
in support of their position is unavailing because this provision is only applicable
when the Council is the “reviewing authority.” Id. at §25.03(A)(2).
Plaintiffs’ position is further undermined by the fact that §25.01 has been
amended. The former version of the section stated that “[t]he City Council shall be
the reviewing authority with respect to a special approval land use which is
requested pursuant to a Planned Unit Development project, a conditional rezoning,
or consent judgment . . . .” 2005 Zoning Code, § 25.01. The Code current
11
iteration of this section removes Council as the reviewing authority over the
settlement of lawsuits by consent judgment, adopting the current language of the
Code.
2009 Zoning Code, § 25.01. This change effectively removed the
requirement that Council consider subjective standards set forth in § 25.02 before
granting a special land use by consent judgment.
This court must enforce the
current Zoning Code as written and may not read words into the ordinance or read
into the ordinance authority above and beyond the express authority conferred. See
Brandon Charter Twp. v. Tippett, 241 Mich. App. 417, 616 N.W.2d 243 (2000).
In support of their position, Plaintiffs continue to rely upon League of
Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2007), in support of their position.
However, in League of Residential
Neighborhood Advocates, the City of Los Angeles’s Zoning Code did not permit
the City Council to approve a special land use as part of a Consent Judgment. In
contrast, the City Council of Sterling Heights is permitted to approve a special land
use by consent judgment. League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates has no
bearing on the instant dispute.
Additionally, Plaintiffs also rely on Pentecostal Church of God v. Douglas
Cnty., No. 3:16-CV-00400-LRH-WGC, 2018 WL 1611184 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 2018),
which is connected to their argument that the Consent Judgment is invalid under
League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates.
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This argument is likewise
without merit. Pentecostal Church of God is distinguishable from the instant
matter because in that case there was no suggestion of religious animus in the
decision to deny a special land use for a church. Conversely, the AICC and the
DOJ lawsuits alleged that then Planning Commissioner, Plaintiff Norgrove, made
anti-Islamic posts on the internet, previously opposed the construction of another
mosque, attended an anti-mosque protest, and contacted other Planning
Commissioners prior to the vote to approve the mosque to inform them he would
be making a motion to deny the AICC’s application. As such, Norgrove’s conduct
placed the City at risk of being found to have violated federal law. As such, there
is no merit to Plaintiffs’ reliance on this authority.
Plaintiffs further claim that the City violated the MZEA because it failed to
give proper notice of the February 21, 2017 meeting’s agenda item. However,
Plaintiffs read a key word out of the statute, which states that notice is only
required when an “application” for special land use is filed. While an application
was filed by the AICC, the City did comply with MZEA because it conducted two
public hearings on the application and denied it. The Consent Judgment was a
settlement of the subsequent lawsuits filed by the AICC and DOJ stemming from
the Commission’s denial of the application. Moreover, the Zoning Code expressly
provides that a public hearing is not required when Council approves a special land
use by consent judgment to settle pending litigation. Zoning Code, §
13
25.03(A)(3)(b).
Accordingly, because the Consent Judgment was not approved in violation
of the Zoning Code or the MZEA, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs’
Declaratory Judgment claim.
2.
Michigan Open Meetings Act (“OMA”)
Plaintiffs also seek to invalidate the approval of the Consent Judgment by
claiming the City violated the OMA by removing audience members during the
meeting. This claim is also due to be denied.
The OMA provides “[a]ll meetings of a public body shall be open to the
public and shall be held in a place available to the general public.” MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 15.263(1). Also, “a public body may establish reasonable rules and
regulations in order to minimize the possibility of disrupting the meeting.” Id. A
person can be excluded from a meeting due to “a breach of the peace actually
committed at the meeting.” Id. at § 15.263(6). Lastly, a council may limit the
amount of time that each person can speak at a meeting. Id. § 15.263(5).
Consistent with the OMA, the City’s rules state that “[n]o comments shall be
made from another location, and anyone making ‘out of order’ comments may be
subject to removal from the meeting.”
Moreover, [t]here will be no
demonstrations during or at the conclusion of anyone’s remarks or presentation,”
and “[t]hese rules are intended to promote an orderly system of holding a public
14
hearing, to give every person an opportunity to be heard, and to ensure that no
individual is embarrassed by exercising his or her right of free speech.” Rules at 7.
The rules also provide that “[a] person may be called to order by the Chair or any
Council member for failing to be germane to the business of the City, for use of
vulgarity, for a personal attack on persons or institutions . . . .” Rules at 5. Lastly,
Robert’s Rules of Order govern City Council meetings to the extent they do not
conflict with City’s rules. As such, pursuant to Robert’s Rules, the Council has the
right to remove a person from the meeting.
In the instant case, the Mayor removed audience members only after public
comment was completed and 26 interruptions, several warnings, and 3 forced
recesses so that Council could conclude the agenda item. The removed audience
members were permitted to watch the remainder of the agenda item and live vote
through the windows and on television in the vestibule of chambers. Moreover,
the entire meeting was streamed live on the City’s website and YouTube channel
and was broadcast live on cable television.
To the extent that Plaintiffs suggest
that the Council conducted its vote in secret, the evidence before this Court shows
otherwise. Plaintiffs have failed to come forward to demonstrate that the OMA
was violated. Under the OMA, the City was authorized to remove the unruly and
disruptive audience members without turning the vote on the Consent Judgment
into a secret vote. Defendants, as opposed to Plaintiffs, are likewise entitled to
15
summary judgment on this issue.
B. Due Process
Plaintiffs further argue that because of the “alleged failure to provide proper
notice and an opportunity to be heard, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their right
to due process.” However, Plaintiffs have alleged no cognizable property interest.
In order to have a protected property interest, “one must possess more than a
unilateral expectation to the claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate
claim of entitlement.” York v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 263 Mich. App. 694, 689
N.W.2d 533, 539 (2004). Yet, even neighboring landowners do not have a legally
protected property interest with respect to claims of increased traffic and
generalized aesthetic and economic loss. See, e.g., Unger v. Forest Home Twp.,
65 Mich. App. 614, 237 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1975).
Here, Plaintiffs Norgrove, Jabbo, Catcho, and Rrasi do not own property
near the location of the proposed mosque. While Youkhanna and McHugh own
real property ¾ of a mile and 3 miles away from the site of the proposed mosque,
there is no evidence that they have been deprived of any interest in that property,
or, if they were, that the alleged deprivation is anything other than generalized,
unsupported grievances concerning traffic and loss of aesthetic and economic
value.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Due Process
16
claim. Rather, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Due
Process claim.
C. First Amendment and Equal Protection
Plaintiffs next argue that their speech was improperly restricted and that they
were treated differently under the City’s rules. Because their claim involves an
intersection of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, the United
Supreme Court has instructed courts to decide both claims under a First
Amendment analysis. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4
(1992).
Specifically, Plaintiffs claim their speech was impermissibly chilled when
they and other audience members were limited to a two-minute speaking time,
prevented from speaking critically of the Islamic faith, and removed from the
meeting for being disruptive.
However, “[t]he First Amendment does not
guarantee persons the right to communicate their views at all times or in any
manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). When the government designates a limited public
forum for speech, as is the case of a city council meeting, it may apply restrictions
to the time, place, and manner of speech so long as those restrictions “are contentneutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.” Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg,
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409 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 2005).
In Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2009), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether a school
board policy was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest. Under the policy, persons were allowed to apply to speak and
they would be permitted to speak for a maximum of five minutes provided the
content of their speech was “not frivolous, repetitive, nor harassing.” Id. at 433.
The Sixth Circuit held that the policy was both content-neutral and narrowly
tailored:
The policy’s stated justifications include: allow[ing] everyone a fair
and adequate opportunity to be heard;” “assur[ing] that the regular
agenda of the Board is completed,” and “recogniz[ing] the voluntary
nature of the Board[’s]time and us[ing] that time efficiently.” Each of
these justifications has nothing to do with the subject of an
individual’s proposed speech and everything to do with conducting
orderly, productive meetings. The school board’s policy is narrowly
tailored because it prohibits speech only when it is “repetitive,”
“harassing” or “frivolous.”
Id. Courts have recognized that a person may be entirely excluded from a limited
public forum without violating the Constitution when the person is disruptive or
wishes to speak on a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum. See,
e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Warren, 873 F. Supp.2d 850,
863 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Beaton v. City of Allen Park, No. 14-CV-13590, 2015 WL
18
3604951 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Jones v. Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.
1989). Lastly, alternative channels of communication need not be the best means
of communication if the intended audience can still be reached. Phelps-Roper v.
Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372-73 (6th Cir. 2008).
In this case, the purpose of the February 21, 2017 meeting was to discuss the
approval of the Consent Judgment, thus comments about Islam were irrelevant to
the discussion before the Council. Moreover, Defendant Taylor indicated at the
outset that commentary regarding anyone’s religion was not relevant to whether
the Consent Judgment should be approved and the reason for the speaking
limitation and removal provision was to maintain order and to ensure that all
audience members wishing to speak had the opportunity to do so.
As such,
Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence that the City’s rules were
not content-neutral or narrowly tailored.
Additionally, Plaintiffs had ample alternative channels of communication.
The City established a location just outside City Hall, where individuals, including
the Plaintiffs, could gather and express their opinions and concerns about
individuals who practice Islam, terrorism and other views not germane to whether
the Consent Judgment should be approved. Lastly, the contact information for
each Councilmember is available on the City’s website and Plaintiffs were able to
contact the members to express their views.
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For these reasons, Defendants are likewise entitled to the summary judgment
on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims.
D. Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff Rrasi claims that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
she was removed from the City Council meeting.
As an initial matter, the
February 21, 2017 meeting was a limited public forum and Defendant Taylor was
allowed to restrict non-germane speech and remove individuals who were being
disruptive without violating the Constitution. Moreover, interference with a city
official during the performance of official duties is a misdemeanor offense. See
City Ordinance, §35-16(M).
Here, the record reveals that Plaintiff Rrasi approached the dais and used
gestures in a threatening manner. She was escorted out of Chambers when she
refused to leave after being called out of order by Defendant Taylor. As such,
there was no unlawful seizure under the facts of this case. In any event, even if an
unlawful seizure occurred, Defendant Taylor would be entitled to immunity
because he was engaged in a legislative activity. See Hogan v. Twp. of Haddon,
278 F. App’x 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is therefore denied to the
Plaintiffs on this claim and granted in favor of the Defendants.
E. Establishment Clause
Lastly, Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim is without merit and
20
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. The law is well
settled that “[s]ince the advent of zoning, churches have been held proper in
residential districts” and that “[t]he concerns underlying the Establishment Clause
arise not when religion is allowed by government to exist or even flourish, but
when government sets a religious agenda or becomes actively involved in religious
activity.”
Boyajian v. Gatzunis, 212 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Government action does not violate the Establishment Clause where it has a
secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion by conveying a message that the government was endorsing a
religion, and it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion. Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir.
2015) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) and Lynch v
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor J. concurring). When determining
the purpose of government action or the effect of its implementation, the court
must view the evidence from the perspective of a reasonable observer. Smith, 788
F.3d at 590. The reasonable observer is deemed aware of the history and context
of the community as well as the context in which the challenged government
activity took place. Id.
Based on the evidence, the Court is compelled to conclude that a reasonable
21
observer would know that the purpose of the speech restrictions at the Council
meeting were designed to facilitate an orderly and productive meeting that
permitted all audience members an opportunity to speak on whether the Consent
Judgment should be approved. The purpose of the Consent Judgment was to
permit the AICC the free exercise of religion through a special land use and to
resolve pending litigation against the City. Moreover, the City has no connection
to the AICC or the proposed mosque, thus there is no entanglement with Islam.
Here, the City did not violate the Establishment Clause by enabling the AICC’s
members the free exercise of religion by approving the Consent Judgment and
thereby permitting a special land use for the construction of the mosque.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons articulated above, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [#69] is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [#67] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 1, 2018
/s/Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
August 1, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
/s/ Tanya Bankston
Deputy Clerk
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