Nykoriak v. Thomas et al
Filing
18
ORDER granting 14 defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TARAS P. NYKORIAK,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-CV-11202
vs.
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
DETROIT POLICE OFFICER
RONALD THOMAS and CITY
OF DETROIT,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS=
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. 14]
Plaintiff Taras Nykoriak’s action arises out of an incident that
occurred on May 1, 2014 when Detroit Police Officer Ronald Thomas
initiated a traffic stop of plaintiff in the City of Detroit. Thomas issued
plaintiff three citations and had plaintiff’s vehicle towed from the scene. On
April 17, 2017, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging unlawful search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, malicious prosecution and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Officer Thomas. Plaintiff
alleges a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment by the City of Detroit.
-1-
The matter is before the court on the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court is familiar with the case and has read the pleadings
filed by both sides. The court does not believe that it would benefit from
oral argument in this case and therefore decides the motion on the briefs.
For the reasons given below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2014, between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., plaintiff was pulled
over by Officer Thomas for disregarding a stop sign. Thomas was
stationary in a fully marked police vehicle when he observed the infraction,
activated his police lights and drove after plaintiff to initiate the traffic stop.
Thomas requested plaintiff’s driver’s license, automobile registration and
proof of insurance. Plaintiff presented the requested documents.
Officer Thomas attempted to run plaintiff’s name through the Law
Enforcement Information Network (“LEIN”) in his car, but it was not
operating properly. Thomas then telephoned the 11th Precinct and spoke
with a LEIN Operator who ran plaintiff’s driver’s license number through the
LEIN system at the precinct. The LEIN Operator informed Thomas that
plaintiff’s driver’s license was suspended.
-2-
Based on this information, and knowledge acquired while working as
a traffic enforcement officer that people frequently present fraudulent
insurance documents, Thomas called Progressive Insurance Company to
verify that plaintiff’s insurance information was valid. The Progressive
Insurance service representative informed Thomas that plaintiff’s insurance
police had been cancelled.
Thomas issued three citations to plaintiff for: (1) driving on a
suspended license; (2) driving with no proof of insurance; and (3)
presenting fraudulent insurance documents. Thomas also requested a tow
truck to remove plaintiff’s vehicle from the scene. Plaintiff testified that the
incident, from the time of the stop to the time the tow truck removed his
vehicle, took one hour. (Taras Nykoriak dep., p. 30) He also testified that
no hostile words were exchanged. (Nykoriak dep., p. 32)
After his vehicle was towed, plaintiff went to the Secretary of State
and presented the clerk with his driver’s license. The clerk informed
plaintiff that his driver’s license was valid. (Nykoriak dep., p. 34) Plaintiff
testified that he also called Progressive Insurance to verify that his
insurance policy was valid. (Nykoriak dep., pp. 34-35) After doing this,
plaintiff went to the Detroit Police Department 11th Precinct to complain
about the tickets and the towing of his vehicle.
-3-
While plaintiff was at the precinct, Officer Thomas was summoned by
the supervising Sergeant at the desk. Thomas asked the LEIN operator to
run plaintiff’s information again and at that time he learned that plaintiff’s
driver’s license was in fact not suspended. Instead, the report showed that
plaintiff’s license to carry a concealed weapon had been suspended.
Thomas also called Progressive Insurance again and was informed that
since the time of his first phone call, the policy had been reactivated
because they had received payment on the insurance premium. (Nykoriak
dep., p. 45)
Officer Thomas told plaintiff that he did not have authority to cancel
tickets that had already been issued, but that plaintiff should attend court
on the citations and that he would explain the situation to the prosecutor.
Plaintiff was arraigned and attended a pretrial conference. On the date of
trial, Officer Thomas explained the situation to the city attorney, who, after
learning that plaintiff’s insurance policy was still active and his license was
valid, dismissed all of the tickets issued on May 1, 2014.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render
summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
-4-
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Redding v.
St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has
affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair
and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored
procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986);
see also Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.
1995).
The standard for determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate is "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.'" Amway Distributors Benefits Ass’n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The evidence and all
reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding, 241 F.3d at 532 (6th Cir. 2001). "[T]he
"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
-5-
fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)
(emphasis in original); see also National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis,
Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).
If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule
56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968); see also McLean v.
988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). Mere allegations
or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden, nor will
a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248, 252. Rather, there must be evidence on which a jury
could reasonably find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
ANALYSIS
I. City of Detroit
Plaintiff alleges that the City of Detroit violated his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing citations based on information
it knew was untrue and failing to withdraw said citations. “A municipality
cannot be liable for the constitutional torts of its employees; that is, it
-6-
cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory.” Powers v. Hamilton Cty.
Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
A plaintiff seeking to impose liability against a municipality under §
1983 must establish the existence of an underlying policy or custom
causing the alleged injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. First, a plaintiff must
show that he suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right. Second, the
plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation occurred at the hands of the
actor, while acting under color of law. Thus, a municipality can only be
liable for a constitutional violation if the plaintiff can show that “the
municipality engaged in a ‘policy or custom’ that was the ‘moving force’
behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Powers, 501 F.3d at 607
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The deprivation of plaintiff’s rights must
result from execution of the policy or custom at issue, whether established
by the municipality’s “lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy . . . .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Plaintiff argues that the City of Detroit has an unconstitutional policy
of refusing to rescind tickets that they admit were erroneous. The policy
that existed at the time of this incident, as described by Officer Thomas,
was that once a citation was written it was turned over to the officer’s
-7-
supervisor and the officer could not withdraw that citation. Thomas stated
that he believed his supervisor could withdraw a citation before it had been
turned over to the prosecutor.
Under Monell, the policy at issue must cause the deprivation of a
constitutional right. In this case, there is no issue of fact that Officer
Thomas had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. Contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion, Thomas testified at his deposition that he had an
independent memory of witnessing plaintiff go “through the stop sign
without stopping.” (Thomas dep., p. 24). The only contrary evidence is
plaintiff’s own self-serving testimony that he came to a complete stop. This
court is “not required to accept unsupported, self-serving testimony as
evidence sufficient to create a jury question.” Brooks v. Am. Broadcasting
Cos., Inc., 999 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the initial stop of
plaintiff was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
To the extent that plaintiff has alleged negligence or any intentional
torts against the City of Detroit, the City is immune from tort liability under
the Governmental Liability for Negligence Act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to plaintiff’s
claims against the City of Detroit.
-8-
II. Officer Thomas
A governmental officer who violates an individual’s clearly
established constitutional rights is entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the
officer believed his or her conduct did not violate those rights and (2) the
officer’s belief was objectively reasonable. Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183
(1984). The objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions is determined
by the law existing at the time of the conduct at issue. Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
As discussed above, the court finds that reasonable suspicion
existed for Officer Thomas to stop plaintiff for committing the traffic
infraction of failure to stop. Officer Thomas’ actions that occurred after the
traffic stop are protected by qualified immunity. First, Thomas received
information from the LEIN operator that plaintiff’s driver’s license was
suspended and it was reasonable for him to rely on this information in
issuing a citation for “driving on a suspended license.” Next, Thomas was
reasonable in relying on information provided by the insurance company
that plaintiff’s automobile policy was not effective in issuing a citation for
“no proof of insurance” and “fraudulent insurance.” Because it is against
the law to operate a vehicle without a valid driver’s license and with no
proof of insurance, Thomas’ decision to tow the vehicle did not violate a
-9-
clearly established right. A warrantless seizure is appropriate where there
is probable cause to believe that an automobile is associated with criminal
activity. Autoworld Specialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 814 F.2d 385, 389
389 (6th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is granted for Thomas on
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Governmental employees are immune from tort liability for intentional
torts, as well as negligence claims, for injury caused during the course of
their employment if (1) the employee was acting within the scope of their
authority; (2) the acts were undertaken in good faith or were not
undertaken with malice; and (3) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to
ministerial. MCL 691.1407(2); Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459, 480
(2008).
Regarding plaintiff’s claims of malicious prosecution and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against Officer Thomas, the evidence
supports a finding that Thomas’ actions were taken in good faith and
without malice. Plaintiff himself testified that he and Thomas did not
exchange any hostile words during their encounter. Thomas’ determination
determination that he had reasonable suspicion to stop plaintiff, and his
decision to issue the citations and tow plaintiff’s vehicle, were discretionary
acts. Thomas relied on his judgment in making the decisions. See Odom,
- 10 -
Odom, 482 Mich. at 459. For these reasons, the court finds that defendant
defendant Thomas is entitled to governmental immunity for the intentional
torts of malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
judgment is GRANTED.
Dated: September 11, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
September 11, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk
- 11 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?