Byrd v. Haas et al
Filing
109
OMNIBUS OPINION and ORDER: Overruling in Part and Affirming in Part 103 Objections, Overruling 102 Objections, Adopting in Part and Overruling in Part 98 Report and Recommendation. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GERALD BYRD,
Case No. 2:17-cv-11427
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
v.
RANDALL HAAS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gerald Byrd filed a pro se prisoner complaint in 2017 that alleged
Defendants had violated his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. ECF 1. The
complaint identified eight Defendants: Randall Haas, David Leach, John Doe, Leroy
White, Heidi Washington, Jane Doe Taylor, Darrell Steward, and Richard Russell.
Id. at 1. In August 2017, Byrd filed a supplemental complaint and added Defendants
Kenneth McKee and Cyril Umeh and terminated Defendant John Doe. ECF 24. The
Court referred all pretrial matters to Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis.
ECF 9. The Court later dismissed Defendants Taylor, White, Russel, Steward, and
Washington. ECF 63. And in December 2019, the case was reassigned to Magistrate
Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk.
On January 29, 2020 the remaining Defendants—Haas, Leach, McKee, and
Umeh—moved for summary judgment. ECF 80. Then, in May 2020, Magistrate Judge
Hluchaniuk submitted a report and recommendation ("Report") and recommended
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that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. ECF 98. Both Defendants and Byrd raised timely objections. ECF 102, 103.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the Report, the summary judgment motion, and
the objections. For the reasons below, the Court will adopt in part and reject in part
the Report and will grant the motion for summary judgment in part. The Court will
address the RLUIPA claims in a separate order.
BACKGROUND
As an initial matter, Defendants objected to the Report's recitation of the facts
of the case. ECF 103, PgID 2710. Defendants claimed the Report "homes [sic] in on
one factual scenario it believes should permit Byrd to proceed." Id. at 2709–10. For
this reason, the Court will provide a brief recitation of the facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to Byrd as required by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56.
Byrd is a Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") inmate. ECF 98,
PgID 2588. In 2015, Byrd made a religious declaration to MDOC as an adherent of
the Ifa religion. ECF 80-5, PgID 860. Ifa is also known as "Yoruba,"1 and refers to a
cultural group from West Nigeria that predominantly practices Ifa. Id. Although
MDOC recognized Yoruba as a religion, it did not authorize its adherents to conduct
group religious services. ECF 80-2, PgID 774. Under MDOC's policies, adherents of
Yoruba may possess one set of sixteen cowrie shells, one strand of white consecrated
beads, and one unframed picture of The Orisha. Id.
Because MDOC used the word "Yoruba" to describe adherents of Ifa, the Court will
do the same for consistency and clarity.
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2
Yet, according to Byrd, to properly practice Yoruba he needed to possess
several other religious items and attend group services. ECF 80-5, PgID 873. In
September 2015 Byrd sent a request to Defendant David Leach, the Special Activities
Coordinator at Saginaw, and requested group services and additional religious items
for Yoruba adherents. ECF 80-3, PgID 776–79.
But in December 2015, Byrd was transferred from the Saginaw Correctional
Facility to the Macomb Correctional Facility. While at Macomb, Byrd received
Defendant Leach's response to his initial September 2015 request. ECF 80-6.
Defendant Leach explained that MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 required requests
for religious items to be submitted in writing to the prison warden.2 Id. at 892. And
because of the requirement, Byrd's request was "returned for submission in
accordance with PD [Policy Directive] 05.03.150." Id.
In January 2016, Byrd took his original request that was addressed to
Defendant Leach, added a handwritten "cc" portion, and sent out several copies—one
to Defendant Randall Haas (warden at Macomb), a copy to Kenneth McKee (Deputy
Director of MDOC), and an additional copy to Defendant Leach. ECF 87-4, PgID
1393–94.
In February 2016, Byrd sent Defendant Haas another letter and explained that
he practiced Yoruba and that Defendant Leach directed him to submit a copy of his
The Court notes that the process for requesting group religious services mirrors the
process for requesting additional religious items, contrary to Report's statement. ECF
98, PgID 2587; ECF 87-3, PgID 1284. Byrd's objection to the factual statement is
therefore affirmed.
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request directly to his warden. ECF 80-7. Byrd also enclosed Defendant Leach's
response and his requests for additional religious items. Id. The record indicates that
Defendant Haas then forwarded Byrd's note to Chaplain Leroy White and asked him
to discuss the request with Byrd. ECF 87-15, PgID 2161.
In March 2016, Byrd sent his request letter again, this time to Defendants
Leach and McKee. ECF 87-20, 87-22. In response, Defendant Leach asked Chaplain
White to discuss the request with Byrd because the "proposal has to reach [him]
through the chain of command first." ECF 87-14, PgID 2156. Chaplain White told
Defendant Leach that Byrd had sent the request to Defendant Haas in September
2015, to which Leach responded, "That should be fine." Id. Then, in June 2016 Byrd
wrote to Defendant Haas for a status update, ECF 87-16, and Byrd claimed that he
spoke with Chaplain White again in July. ECF 24, PgID 95.
Defendant McKee did not recall ever receiving a letter from Byrd, and there is
no dispute that McKee did not receive a request from the Chaplain's Advisory
Council, as required by the chain of command (that is laid out in the Policy Directive).
ECF 80-11, PgID 1081, 1085.
A year later, Cyril Umeh packed up Byrd's cell after he was sent to segregation.
ECF 87-4, PgID 1448. At an MDOC facility, when a cell is packed up due to a transfer,
the officer completes a "transfer pack up slip" itemizing everything, including
anything that looks like trash, that was found in the cell. ECF 80-12, PgID 1142. All
the items are then placed in a bag or bin in storage. Id. Defendant Umeh did not
recall the specifics of packing Byrd's cell, but insisted that he never threw away any
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property without permission. Id. at 1177–78. To the contrary, however, Byrd insisted
that Defendant Umeh intentionally threw away his four cowrie shells. ECF 87-4,
PgID 1448. The shells were not included on the inventory packing list completed by
Defendant Umeh.
Byrd sued in 2017 and claimed that various officers at MDOC had violated the
First Amendment Free Exercise clause, RLUIPA, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
ECF 24, PgID 104–05. He asked for both injunctive relief and money damages. Id. at
112. Defendants filed a series of motions to dismiss that were ultimately denied. ECF
27, 28, 49, 55, 63. After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. ECF
80. Byrd responded, ECF 87, and the Report was issued. ECF 98.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Civil Rule 72(b) governs the review of a magistrate judge's report. A
district court's standard of review depends on whether a party files objections. The
Court need not review any portion of a Report to which no party has objected. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985). A de novo review is required, however, if the parties
"serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). In conducting a de novo review, "[t]he
district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
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DISCUSSION
I.
Objections to Report Regarding § 1983 Claims Against Haas
A.
First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
The Report recommended denying summary judgment to Defendant Haas on
Byrd's First Amendment Free Exercise claim. ECF 98, PgID 2609. Defendants
objected to the Report and argued that Haas was entitled to qualified immunity and
summary judgment. See ECF 103.
1.
Monetary Damages
Here, Byrd alleged that Defendant Haas personally violated his First
Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by refusing to approve group religious
services and possession of certain religious personal property. ECF 24, PgID 92. Byrd
specifically alleged that Defendant Haas ignored and did not pass along his request
for group religious services and personal religious items. Id. at 95–96; ECF 80, PgID
722. Before reaching the merits of Byrd's First Amendment claim, the Court must
determine whether Defendant Haas was entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (finding that government officials sued in their
individual capacity are entitled to seek qualified immunity unless their actions
violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known"); see also Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 291 (6th Cir.
2010).
First, the Court must properly define the constitutional right at issue. Here,
Byrd described the rights violation as "restricting Plaintiff from freely practicing his
religion by refusing to approve group religious services and personal religious
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property. . . ." ECF 24, PgID 92. The Court will frame the question differently: Do
prison officials violate inmates' Free Exercise rights when they do not approve group
religious services or expansions of personal religious property through an appropriate
process?
A qualified immunity analysis requires a two-pronged inquiry. First, the Court
considers whether the facts, "when taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, show the [defendant's] conduct violated a constitutional right[.]"
Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)). Second, the Court determines whether the right was
"clearly established such 'that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.'" Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201–02). The Court may
use its discretion to determine which prong to analyze first. Id. (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). Ultimately, "[p]laintiff bears the burden of
showing that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity." Maben v. Thelen,
887 F.3d 252, 269 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901,
907 (6th Cir. 2009)).
To determine whether a constitutional violation occurred here, the Report
applied the four-part balancing inquiry established by the Supreme Court's decision
in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). ECF 98, PgID 2601–02. But Turner addresses
facial challenges to prison regulations and not as-applied challenges against the
officials implementing those valid regulations. 482 U.S. at 99–100. Reliance on
Turner was misplaced because Byrd did not challenge the facial validity of the MODC
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Regulation. Instead, Byrd only argued that the regulation—as applied by Haas—
violated his constitutional rights.
Given Byrd's as-applied challenge, the Sixth Circuit, in related contexts,
seemed to explain that "isolated incident[s]" or actions resulting from "confusion or
miscommunication," do not violate the First Amendment. See Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d
1076, 1083 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing, in part, Beebe v. Birkett, 749 F. Supp. 2d 580, 597
(E.D. Mich. 2010)); Colvin, 605 F.3d at 293–94. Here, Byrd has not alleged that
Defendant Haas's failure to approve his request for group religious services or
personal religious property was anything more than either an isolated incident or the
result of confusion or miscommunication. And, as the Report explained, the record
indicated that Defendant Haas was not the decisionmaker with authority to grant or
deny Byrd's ultimate request. ECF 98, PgID 2596. As a result, Defendant Haas's
failure to act did not violate Byrd's First Amendment Free Exercise rights, and he is
therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to the monetary damages under this
claim.
2.
Injunctive Relief
Because Byrd also sued for injunctive relief as to his First Amendment Free
Exercise claim, the Court must consider whether Defendant Haas is entitled to
summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim as well. Summary judgment is
proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Generally, the defense of
qualified immunity is unavailable for "§ 1983 cases against individuals where
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injunctive relief is sought instead of or in addition to damages." Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009). But because the Court found that Defendant Haas's actions
do not violate Byrd's constitutional rights, i.e., that there has been no constitutional
violation, Defendant Haas is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, Defendant
Haas is entitled to summary judgment as to injunctive relief under the First
Amendment Free Exercise claim. The Court will therefore sustain Defendant's
objection to the First Amendment claim and overrule the Report's recommendation
denying summary judgment and qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.
B.
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
Next, the Report recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of
Defendant Haas on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. Id. at 2610,
2620. Byrd objected to the Report's recommendation. ECF 102, PgID 2700. Byrd
alleged that Defendant Haas violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights because Haas knew that the MDOC policy allowed other religious believers to
gather for group services or to possess personal items similar to those Byrd requested.
ECF 87, PgID 1275. Byrd did not challenge the MDOC policy itself, but rather Haas's
implementation of it.3 The Report recommended granting summary judgment to
Defendant Haas on the claim because Byrd failed to show that any alleged differential
treatment resulted from "intentional or purposeful discrimination by Haas." ECF 98,
PgID 2605 (emphasis in original). The Court agrees.
The Court notes that none of the remaining Defendants hold policymaking authority
within MDOC and therefore a claim about the constitutionality of the policy itself is
not before the Court.
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1.
Monetary Damages
There is no evidence in the record that showed Defendant Haas's failure to
forward Byrd's request for group religious services or personal religious property
stemmed from any animus for Yoruba or followers of Ifa. Byrd did not offer any
evidence that Defendant Haas treated other religions—conventional or otherwise—
any differently than Yoruba. Without that sort of evidence, all that is left is Byrd's
speculation that Defendant Haas's failure to act stemmed from discriminatory intent.
But "speculations or intuitions" cannot survive summary judgment. Frazier v. USF
Holland, Inc., 250 F. App'x 142, 148 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287
F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2002)). And without proof of discriminatory intent,
discriminatory enforcement, or animus there is no equal protection violation. See Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) ("Proof
of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (asserting that
laws created out of animus towards a class violate the Equal Protection Clause); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (explaining that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated if a facially valid law is administered unequally).
Byrd also encouraged the Court to look to the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in
Koger v. Moher to evaluate his equal protection claim. 964 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2020).
But the present case is distinguishable from Koger in at least one very important
respect. The court in Koger evaluated an Equal Protection claim about "'a facially
discriminatory distinction between' Islam and Rastafarianism." Koger, 964 F.3d at
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545 (emphasis added) (quoting Maye, 915 F.3d at 1086). Unlike the claims in Koger,
Bryd did not allege any discriminatory MDOC policy, he merely alleged
discriminatory enforcement of a facially neutral policy.
In short, without a constitutional violation, Defendant Haas is entitled to
qualified immunity as to Byrd's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim for
monetary damages.
2.
Injunctive Relief
Defendant Haas is entitled to summary judgment for injunctive relief as to the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim as well. As set forth above, Byrd's
claim that Defendant Haas acted with discriminatory intent when he failed to
forward along Byrd's request for additional religious items and group religious
services is speculative at best. And Byrd has not shown that Defendant Haas
administered the MDOC Policy Regulation in an unequal manner. Speculation is
insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Frazier, 250 F. App'x at 148 (citing
Mulhall, 287 F.3d at 552). Defendant Haas is therefore entitled to summary
judgment as to the injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claim. The Court will overrule Byrd's objection and will adopt the Report's
finding that there was no Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation against
Defendant Haas entitled to injunctive relief.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
As to the final claim against Defendant Haas, the Report found that to the
extent that Byrd had intended to raise a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
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process claim based on a property interest, it failed, and Haas was entitled to
summary judgment. ECF 98, PgID 2610. The Report also recommended denying
summary judgment to Defendant Haas as to Byrd's liberty interest claim, finding
that "Haas'[s] improper processing of the request effectively imposed an atypical and
significant hardship on plaintiff, and his improper handling of the request took away
what process [Byrd] had [] under prison policy." Id. at 2609. Defendants objected to
the Report's determination and argued that no constitutional violation occurred and
that Haas was therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the claim. ECF 103, PgID
2723–24. In response, Byrd clarified that he had only claimed that Defendants
violated his liberty interest to "practice his religion." ECF 105, PgID 2756.
1.
Monetary Damages
To prove a violation of a person's procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must
show: "1) a liberty . . . interest protected by the due process clause, 2) a deprivation
of that protected interest within the meaning of the due process clause; and 3)
defendant's failure to afford adequate procedural rights prior to the deprivation."
Russell v. Wilkinson, 79 F. App'x 175, 178 (6th Cir. 2003). In the context of the liberty
interests owed to a prisoner, the "inmate must show that the actions of prison officials
either had the effect of altering the length or term of imprisonment or amounted to
'atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.'" Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Thus, to find
a constitutional violation, the Court must determine whether Defendant Haas's
actions created an "atypical and significant hardship" for Byrd.
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The Report accurately noted, "[w]hat constitutes an atypical and significant
hardship is not clearly defined, at least not in the context of a free exercise claim like
[P]laintiff's." ECF 98, PgID 2607. Neither the parties, nor the Report, nor the Court's
research have revealed any Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit case law that outlines
that a warden's ineffective processing of a prisoner's request for group religious
services as an "atypical and significant hardship." Russell, 79 F. App'x at 178. See
also Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) ("In determining whether a right was clearly
established, we look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to our own
precedents, and then to decisions of other courts of appeal, and we ask whether these
precedents 'placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.'"). The Court also
does not believe Defendant Haas's action or inaction is clearly established based on a
"general statement[] of law" or general obviousness. Hearring, 712 F.3d at 280
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))
As a result, Defendant Haas's actions cannot have violated a "clearly
established right" and therefore, Haas is entitled to qualified immunity as to
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim for monetary damages. Id. at
279 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818) ("[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from
liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.") (internal quotations
omitted). Defendants' objection is therefore affirmed and the Report is overruled as
to the due process claim for monetary damages.
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2.
Injunctive Relief
The Court must consider whether to grant summary judgment to Defendant
Haas on Byrd's injunctive relief as to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim
based on an alleged liberty interest violation. Unlike the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection claims when qualified immunity was appropriate based on prong one, the
lack of a constitutional violation, the Court granted qualified immunity based on
prong two: a lack of clearly established law. Because answering prong two provides
less insight into whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law, the Court must engage in a more thorough summary judgment analysis for the
Due Process claim.
And the Court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must identify specific
portions of the record that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving
party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must present "specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis omitted).
A fact is material if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential
element of the cause of action or defense. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174
(6th Cir. 1984). A dispute over material facts is genuine "if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences "in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party." 60 Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d
1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
Defendants argued that Byrd "had no constitutional right to have his request
forwarded" and that "prison regulations [do not] create a protected liberty interest."
ECF 80, PgID 742. Thus, Defendant argued that because the Due Process Clause did
not cover Byrd's claims, the claims fail as a matter of law. Id. To the contrary, Byrd
argued that the MDOC policy acts as a complete denial of his ability to practice his
faith, outside the bounds of the "ordinary incidents of prison life." ECF 87, PgID 1276.
The question before the Court, therefore, is whether Defendant Haas failed to
forward Byrd's requests because MDOC policy prevented him from forwarding a
defective request or because Defendant Haas negligently failed to forward Byrd's
properly submitted requests. If Byrd's requests were defective, then Defendant Haas
was merely enforcing the MDOC policy by not forwarding them. See ECF 80-2, PgID
763. In his deposition testimony, Defendant Haas testified that he did not recall
receiving any requests for new religious items or requests for group religious services
during his time at Macomb Correctional Facility. ECF 80-10, PgID 1007–08. Even so,
there is evidence in the record that at least one of Byrd's requests, though perhaps
defective, was received. ECF 80-7, PgID 894; ECF 87-21, PgID 2283–88. Thus, there
is a genuine dispute of material fact over the requests sent by Byrd, the requests
received by Defendant Haas as warden, and why such requests were never forwarded.
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Defendant's objection is therefore overruled and the Report is affirmed as to the due
process claim for injunctive relief.
II.
Byrd's Objection to the Grant of Qualified Immunity to McKee
Next, the Report found that "qualified immunity should attach to Defendant
McKee for the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against him." ECF 98, PgID
2599. Byrd objected and argued that Defendant McKee should be denied qualified
immunity and held liable under a theory of supervisory liability. ECF 102, PgID
2694–99.
As a Deputy Director of MDOC, Policy Directive 05.03.150 tasked Defendant
McKee with "the final decision as to whether the religious item will be approved. . ."
but only after such a request had gone to the prisoner's warden, the SCFA Special
Activities Coordinator, and the Chaplain's Advisory Committee. ECF 80-2, PgID 763.
There is no dispute that Byrd's requests never reached Defendant McKee. The Report
recommended granting Defendant McKee qualified immunity because he did not
have a duty to act on Byrd's request until it reached him through the chain of
command—an event that never occurred. ECF 98, PgID 2599. Byrd objected and
argued that Defendant McKee was not entitled to qualified immunity because he is
"liable for [employees'] constitutional violations as the[ir] supervisor." ECF 102, PgID
2695.
Under Sixth Circuit precedent:
[Section] 1983 liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more
than the right to control employees. Section 1983 liability will not be
imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior. There must be a
showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
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misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a
minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory is at least
implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.
Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). Thus, supervisory liability
under § 1983 only arises if the subordinates in question have participated in
unconstitutional behavior. See DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App'x 418, 430
(6th Cir. 2006) ("[I]f there is no unconstitutional conduct by an offending subordinate,
as in the instant case, a plaintiff cannot make the required [supervisory liability]
showing."). Because the Court has found that Defendant McKee's subordinates did
not commit unconstitutional behavior, Byrd failed to prove supervisory liability under
§ 1983. The Court overrules Plaintiff's objection and adopts the Report's finding that
Defendant McKee is entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore the claim for
monetary damages is dismissed.
The Report failed to make any recommendation as to whether Byrd was
entitled to injunctive relief for the actions of Defendant McKee. Instead, the Report
is limited to a brief, qualified immunity analysis. ECF 98, PgID 2599. But because
Byrd requested injunctive relief against all defendants and claims for injunctive relief
are excluded from qualified immunity, the Court must consider the claim as well. As
previously stated, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the moving part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56. There is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the actions of
Defendant McKee. It is clear that Defendant McKee became responsible for requests
17
in the MDOC system only after such a request had gone to the warden, the Special
Activities Coordinator, and the Chaplain's Advisory Council. ECF 80-2, PgID 763.
There is no dispute that Byrd's request never went past the initial step. ECF 98, PgID
2599. Thus, Defendant McKee can only be held liable under a theory of supervisory
liability. But because the Court finds that Defendant McKee's subordinates' actions
do not violate Byrd's constitutional rights, there is no supervisory liability and
Defendant McKee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendant
McKee is also entitled to summary judgment as to the injunctive relief claimed
against him.
III.
Defendants' Objection to the Report Regarding the RLUIPA Claim
The Report recommended denying summary judgment to Defendants Haas,
Leach, and McKee under RLUIPA because "[q]uestions of fact remain as to whether
these defendants substantially burdened [P]laintiff's religious practice." ECF 98,
PgID 2611–12. The Court will address the RLUIPA claims in a separate order.
IV.
Objection to Report Regarding Claims Against Umeh
The Report recommended denying summary judgment to Defendant Umeh on
Byrd's First Amendment Free Exercise claim but granting summary judgment to
Defendant Umeh on Byrd's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and RLUIPA
claims. ECF 98, PgID 2620. Neither party objected to the Report's recommendation
granting Defendant Umeh summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment
18
claims, so the Court will adopt the Report and grant summary judgment as to that
claim.
Defendants did, however, object to the Report's recommendation that Plaintiff
had a viable First Amendment claim against Defendant Umeh. See ECF 103. The
Report found that Defendant Umeh was not entitled to qualified immunity as to the
Free Exercise claim against him because "it was clearly established in June 2017 that
[Byrd] had the right to the free exercise of his religion unless that exercise posed a
security risk in the prison." ECF 98, PgID 2619. Defendants objected and argued that
no evidence supported a First Amendment claim against Defendant Umeh. ECF 103,
PgID 2729.
A.
Monetary Damages
Like the claim against Defendant Haas, the Report alluded to the four-part
balancing test in the Supreme Court's decision in Turner as the means to addressing
whether Defendant Umeh's actions constituted a constitutional violation. ECF 98,
PgID 2619. But again, Turner addresses facial challenges to prison regulations, not
as-applied challenges brought against individual officers who implement those valid
regulations. Again, like the claim against Defendant Haas, Byrd did not challenge
the constitutionality of the MDOC regulation that Defendant Umeh allegedly failed
to follow.
So, as set forth above, the Sixth Circuit has illustrated that "isolated
incident[s]" or as the result of "confusion or miscommunication" do not violate the
First Amendment. See Maye, 915 F.3d at 1083 (citing, in part, Beebe, 749 F. Supp. 2d
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at 597); Colvin, 605 F.3d at 293–94. The facts viewed in the light most favorable to
Byrd, show that Byrd left some cowrie shells on his altar on his desk when he went
into segregation. ECF 80-5, PgID 883. Defendant Umeh was later tasked with
packing up Byrd's cell. ECF 87-23, PgID 2346–47. And when Byrd returned from
segregation the cowrie shells were gone. ECF 87-4, PgID 1448–49. The reasonable
inference, therefore, is that Umeh lost or threw away the shells during the packing
up process. And Umeh denies that conduct. Regardless, Byrd has failed to show that
Defendant Umeh's behavior was anything more than an "isolated incident" in which
his property was misplaced or thrown away. Byrd has not shown that Defendant
Umeh, or any other officer, regularly threw away religious items belonging to Yoruba
practitioners or any other faith tradition. Byrd has not shown that Defendant Umeh
understood that the cowrie shells were a religious item and that his actions were
deliberate, rather than the result of confusion. As a result, Defendant Umeh's failure
to act did not violate Byrd's First Amendment Free Exercise rights, and he is
therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim for monetary damages.
Defendant's objection to the First Amendment claim is sustained, and the Report is
overruled as to the monetary damages.
B.
Injunctive Relief
Because Byrd has failed to show Defendant Umeh's actions were deliberate
rather than the result of confusion, nor that they extended beyond an "isolated
incident," he has failed to show Defendant Umeh's actions constituted a First
Amendment violation. Nor is there any genuine dispute of material fact regarding
20
the incident with Defendant Umeh. Because the Court finds that Defendant Umeh's
actions do not violate Byrd's constitutional rights, i.e., that there has been no
constitutional violation, Defendant Umeh is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant Umeh is therefore entitled to summary judgment as to the injunctive relief
under the First Amendment Free Exercise claim. Defendant's objection to the First
Amendment claim is sustained, and the Report is overruled as to the monetary
damages.
V.
Byrd's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority
Byrd recently moved for leave to file supplemental authority for the proper
standard for evaluating an equal protection claim at the summary judgment stage.
ECF 107. Specifically, Byrd pointed to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Koger v. Moher,
964 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2020). ECF 107, PgID 3047. The Court will grant the motion
and has taken the precedent in Koger into consideration.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' objections [103] are
OVERRULED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's objections [102] are
OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [98] is
ADOPTED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Haas is ENTITLED to
qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise, Fourteenth
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Amendment Equal Protection, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims for
monetary damages.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED in favor
of Defendant Haas on Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise and Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claims for injunctive relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is DENIED as to
Defendant Haas on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim for
injunctive relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendant McKee is ENTITLED to qualified
immunity as to Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claim and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims for monetary damages.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED in favor
of Defendant McKee as to Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims for
injunctive relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Umeh is ENTITLED to
qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim for monetary damages.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment shall be GRANTED
in favor of Defendant Umeh on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim and First
Amendment claim for injunctive relief.
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The Court will refrain from ruling on the RLUPA claim and will address it in
a separate order.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: October 19, 2020
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on October 19, 2020, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ David P. Parker
Case Manager
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