Byrd v. Haas et al

Filing 114

OMNIBUS OPINION and ORDER: Affirming 103 Objections; Overruled in Part 98 Report and Recommendation; Granting 80 Motion for Summary Judgment; Granting 111 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GERALD BYRD,

Case No. 2:17-cv-11427

Plaintiff,

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

v.
RANDALL HAAS, et al.,
Defendants.
/

OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gerald Byrd filed a pro se prisoner complaint in 2017 that alleged
Defendants had violated his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. ECF 1. The
Court previously granted summary judgment or qualified immunity in favor of
Defendants Haas, Leach, McKee, and Umeh as to all claims for monetary or
injunctive relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF 109. But the
Court denied summary judgment to Defendant Haas for Byrd's injunctive relief claim
that alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. Id. The
Court did not rule on the RLUIPA claims and requested supplemental briefing on the
issues. ECF 108. In the interim, Defendants moved for reconsideration of the Court's
decision denying summary judgment to Defendant Haas on the Due Process issue.
ECF 111. The Court will address the RLUIPA claims and the motion for
reconsideration in turn.

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BACKGROUND
The Court's prior order explained the pertinent background of the litigation.
ECF 109, PgID 3056–59.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court will undertake de novo review if the parties "serve and file specific
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2)–(3). When it conducts a de novo review, the Court "may accept, reject, or
modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter
to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection that
merely states a disagreement with a magistrate judge's suggested resolution, or
simply summarizes prior arguments, is not a valid objection that warrants review.
See Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508–09 (6th Cir.
1991).
To establish a claim under RLUIPA, an inmate must show that he sought to
exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs and that the government substantially
burdened that religious exercise. Cavin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th
Cir. 2019). If the initial burden is met, then the government must show that the
burden imposed furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing it. Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

RLUIPA Claims
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommended

denying summary judgment to Defendants Haas, Leach, and McKee under RLUIPA
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because "[q]uestions of fact remain as to whether these defendants substantially
burdened [P]laintiff's religious practice." ECF 98, PgID 2611–12. Defendants objected
to the Report and argued that there was no dispute of fact over whether a "substantial
burden" existed because Byrd only experienced a "mere inconvenience." ECF 103,
PgID 2727–28. But due to both parties' incomplete briefing on the RLUIPA issue, the
Court required supplemental briefing. ECF 108.
A.

Qualified Immunity for RLUIPA Claims

Qualified immunity is unavailable for the RLUIPA claims in this case.
Although the statutory authority in RLUIPA does provide for a private right of action,
the statute does not authorize monetary judgments against individuals in their
individual capacity. See Cavin, 927 F.3d at 460 ("When Congress legislates with its
Spending Clause and Commerce Clause powers, as it did to pass RLUIPA, Congress
must speak clearly. RLUIPA doesn't clearly authorize money damages."); see also
Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 570 (6th Cir. 2014). And qualified immunity only
applies to claims for money damages, not claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.
See Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The defense of qualified
immunity protects officials from individual liability for money damages but not from
declaratory or injunctive relief."). Thus, the defense of qualified immunity is
inapplicable to Byrd's claims of RLUIPA violations against the Defendants.
B.

Relief under RLUIPA as to Defendants Haas and Leach

The claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA against Defendants Haas and
Leach will be dismissed as moot. Defendant Haas was the Warden at the Macomb

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Correctional Facility from February 2015 until February 2018, when he retired from
the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). ECF 80-10, PgID 949, 954.
Similarly, Defendant Leach retired as the Special Activities Coordinator for MDOC
in November 2018. ECF 80-4, PgID 787. A claim for injunctive relief against a
defendant is moot when there is no chance of future injury to the plaintiff by the
specific defendant. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) ("The
equitable remedy [of injunction] is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable
injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or
immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again[.]"). Because Defendants
Haas and Leach have both retired from their positions at MDOC, there is no chance
of real or immediate harm or a threat of them to Byrd. Thus, the RLUIPA claims
against Defendants Haas and Leach are moot. See Brooks v. Celeste, 201 F.3d 440
(Table), No. 98-4027, 1999 WL 1204879, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Clearly no injunctive
relief can be granted from any [alleged misconduct by a defendant], as he retired from
[the correctional facility] approximately four years ago. Thus, we find that the claim
for injunction . . . is moot.").
C.

Relief under RLUIPA as to Defendant Umeh

Likewise, the injunctive relief claim under RLUIPA against Defendant Umeh
is moot. Defendant Umeh is a correctional officer at the Macomb Correctional Facility
and was serving in that position while Byrd was incarcerated at that facility. ECF
80-12, PgID 1115–16. But Byrd has not been incarcerated at Macomb since August
2017. ECF 80-5, PgID 861–62. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, when a prisoner seeks

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declaratory or injunctive relief against a specific prison facility or prison employee,
the claim is moot when that prisoner "is no longer confined to the prison that
[committed the alleged offense]." Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996);
see also Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:18-CV-6, 2019 WL 4686426, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 26, 2019), aff'd, No. 19-2264, 2020 WL 6364583 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2020)
("[A] prisoner cannot seek declaratory or injunctive relief against prison officials at a
certain facility once he is transferred out of the facility[.]"). Because Byrd is no longer
a prisoner at the Macomb Correctional Facility and the only remaining claim against
Defendant Umeh is for injunctive relief under RLUIPA, the claim is dismissed as
moot.
D.

Relief under RLUIPA as to Defendant McKee

And finally, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendant McKee on
the claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA. Although an RLUIPA claim may be
ripe against Defendant McKee because he currently works for MDOC and that work
is not specific to any particular MDOC prison facility, summary judgment is proper
because there is no genuine dispute of material fact over his involvement in Byrd's
request.
Defendant McKee is a deputy director of correctional facilities administration
and has served in that role since 2015. ECF 80-11, PgID 1075. Under MDOC Policy
Directive 05.03.150, the deputy director holds final decision-making power over
whether prisoners may hold new group religious services or possess new religious
items not currently listed in the MDOC policy. ECF 80-2, PgID 763. The policy

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directive also clearly sets out a chain of command that outlines how a request would
reach the deputy director. Id. Before Defendant McKee had any authority to decide
Byrd's request, the request must first have funneled through Byrd's warden or
designee, then through the CFA Special Activities Coordinator, and finally through
the Chaplain Advisory Council ("CAC") for review, "as needed" before reaching
McKee, the deputy director. Id.
In short, Defendant McKee did not play any role in the requests from Byrd
until Byrd's warden or designee and the CFA Special Activities Coordinator reviewed
the request. Defendant McKee testified that he did not receive a request for group
religious services or religious items from the CAC or Special Activities Coordinator.
ECF 80-11, PgID 1081, 1083–84. Instead, the only evidence that suggested Defendant
McKee was involved is a letter sent directly to Defendant McKee from Byrd. Id. at
1083–84. The letter included copies of other letters Byrd had sent to his warden. Id.
Still, Defendant McKee testified that he did not recall receiving the letter, but if he
had, then he would have given it to the Special Activities Coordinator as the proper
recipient. Id. at 1083.
There is no evidence Defendant McKee ever received a request from Byrd
through the proper channels set out in Policy Directive 05.03.150. Without any
evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact over whether Defendant McKee
substantially burdened Byrd's religious practice. The Court will therefore grant
summary judgment to Defendant McKee as to Byrd's RLUIPA claim against him.

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In sum, Defendant's objection to the Report is affirmed. The RLUIPA claims
as to Defendants Haas, Leach, and Umeh are dismissed as moot. And summary
judgment is granted to Defendant McKee on the RLUIPA issue.
II.

Motion for Reconsideration of Due Process Claim
The Court denied summary judgment to Defendant Haas on Byrd's Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claim for injunctive relief, and found a genuine dispute of
material fact over whether Byrd's requests were received by Defendant Haas and why
the requests were never forwarded. ECF 109, PgID 3069–70. Defendants moved for
reconsideration, ECF 111, and the motion correctly asserted that because Defendant
Haas is retired and because Byrd is no longer housed at Macomb Correctional Facility
the injunctive relief claim under the Due Process Clause is now moot.
To succeed on a motion for reconsideration, "[t]he movant must not only
demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court . . . [has] been misled but also show
that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case." E.D. Mich.
LR 7.1(h)(3). A palpable defect is one that is "obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest,
or plain." Mich. Dep't of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (citations omitted). A motion for reconsideration will not be granted if it "merely
present[s] the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable
implication." E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). "It is an exception to the norm for the Court to
grant a motion for reconsideration." Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d 759,
780 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citation omitted).

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Here, the Court made a clear mistake in finding that the injunctive relief claim
against Defendant Haas was ripe. Without a ripe claim, there is no case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution for the Court to
adjudicate. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478 (1990) ("Under
Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing
cases or controversies. To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must
have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.") (citations omitted). Because
there is no ongoing injury or threat that Byrd would be wronged again by Defendant
Haas, even a favorable decision for injunctive relief will not redress the alleged injury.
In all, the issue is moot and the motion for reconsideration is granted. The Court will
dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim for injunctive relief against
Defendant Haas as moot.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' objection to the
RLUIPA portion of the Report [103] is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [98] is
OVERRULED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the RLUIPA claims against Defendants
Haas, Leach, and Umeh are DISMISSED as MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED in favor
of Defendant McKee as to Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim [80].

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for reconsideration
[111] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Haas is DISMISSED as MOOT.
This is a final order that closes the case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2020

s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on November 23, 2020, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ David P. Parker
Case Manager

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