Hency et al v. St. Clair County et al

Filing 41

OPINION and ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 39 MOTION for Reconsideration re 38 OPINION and ORDER; and Granting Defendants' 40 MOTION for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment (As to Count XI Only) and Motion to Adjourn Final Pretrial and Trial, re 37 Notice to Appear, (Second Motion due by 11/11/2019). Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GINNIFER HENCY, et al.,

Case No. 2:17-cv-12040

Plaintiffs,

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

v.
ST. CLAIR COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [39]
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (AS TO COUNT XI
ONLY), AND MOTION TO ADJOURN FINAL PRETRIAL AND TRIAL [40]
On September 24, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' motion for summary judgment ("Order"). ECF 38. On September 30,
2019, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, ECF 39, and a motion for leave
to file a second motion for summary judgment as to claim eleven in the complaint,
ECF 40. For the reasons below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the
motion for reconsideration and grant the motion for leave to file a second motion for
summary judgment only as to claim eleven.
I.

Motion for Reconsideration
The Court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to two claims:

(1) Ms. Hency's claim against Defendant Spadafore for unlawful seizure of her person,
and (2) Plaintiffs' conspiracy to interfere with their civil rights claim as to all
Defendants. See ECF 38, PgID 3725. Defendants moved for reconsideration as to both
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claims. ECF 39. The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only when the
movant demonstrates that: (1) the Court was misled by "a palpable defect," and (2)
"correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case." E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(h)(3). Here, Defendants failed to meet both prongs for either claim.
A.

Ms. Hency's Claim Against Defendant Spadafore

As to Ms. Hency's claim against Defendant Spadafore for unlawful seizure of
her person, Defendant Spadafore emphasized the Court's statement that whether Ms.
Hency "stated an intent to transfer her marijuana to the Shattucks is immaterial to
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest her." ECF 39, PgID 3730 (quoting
ECF 38, PgID 3711) (emphasis added). The quoted sentence, however, was an
unfortunate scrivener's error. As indicated by the content surrounding the quoted
sentence, the sentence should have stated that Ms. Hency's intent was material to
whether the officers had probable cause.
And the evidence Defendant Spadafore cited regarding Ms. Hency's arrest was
already considered by the Court and failed to establish that there was no genuine
dispute of material fact. Her quoted statement to Deputy Maxey was only that she
"sometimes" traded strains with Dale Shattuck. See ECF 39, PgID 3745 (quoting Ms.
Hency's interview with Deputy Maxey the day of her arrest). She did not actually
state that she was at DNA Wellness to trade with Dale Shattuck that day. And, more
importantly, the interview provides no information about what statements Ms. Hency
made to Defendant Spadafore or other officers who were present prior to her arrest.
Absent a statement about what she said to the officers at DNA Wellness before they

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arrested her, Ms. Hency's statements to Deputy Maxey after the fact are irrelevant
to whether Defendant Spadafore had probable cause to arrest her at the time.
Ms. Hency's deposition statements about what she said to the officers before
they arrested her, see ECF 38, PgID 3710, were not contradicted by the contents of
her interview with Deputy Maxey. Further, Dale Shattuck testified in his deposition
only that Ms. Hency sometimes traded strains with him and that he "vaguely
remember[ed] . . . having a trade of some sort" set up with her that day. See ECF 302, PgID 1382–83, 1406. But he simultaneously testified that he did not have any
marijuana on him that day, so it is unclear how a trade would have occurred. Id. at
1406. Most importantly, Dale Shattuck did not say anything about what Ms. Hency
said to the officers before they arrested her. Ms. Hency's deposition statements
regarding what transpired prior to her arrest were not undermined by her interview
with Deputy Maxey or by Dale Shattuck's deposition testimony, but they did
contradict the officers' version of what transpired, creating a genuine dispute of
material fact. See id. at 3708; ECF 39, PgID 3744 (quoting Defendant Spadafore's
report). And, as the Court already determined, Defendant Spadafore did not have
probable cause to arrest Ms. Hency if her version of what transpired prior to her
arrest was true. ECF 38, PgID 3711. There is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding Ms. Hency's alleged statement. Whether her version of events or the
officers' version of events is more trustworthy is a question of fact for the jury.
Defendant Spadafore's argument that he had probable cause to arrest Ms.
Hency "independent of her admission" is unavailing. ECF 39, PgID 3748. First, on a

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motion for reconsideration, the Court does not consider arguments about "the same
issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication." E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). The Court already considered the evidence presented by both sides
regarding Ms. Hency's arrest and determined that if she did not make the disputed
statement then probable cause did not exist to arrest her. ECF 38, PgID 3711.
Second, even if the Court reconsidered the argument in the first instance,
Defendant Spadafore did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. Hency absent her
alleged statement. Defendant Spadafore's argument that he had probable cause
absent Ms. Hency's disputed statement is that: (1) DNA Wellness had been illegally
operating and "selling a large volume of marijuana to the open public," (2) "[b]ecause
of the volume it was selling, a valid issue was where the supply was coming from," (3)
Ms. Hency showed up at DNA Wellness on a Doctor's Day when DNA Wellness was
not illegally selling marijuana, and (4) she did not explain her presence at DNA
Wellness that day "with a backpack full of marijuana" to Defendant Spadafore's
satisfaction. ECF 39, PgID 3749. But Defendant Spadafore does not argue that Ms.
Hency previously appeared at DNA Wellness with a pattern or frequency to merit
suspicion that she supplied DNA Wellness with marijuana. And he admits that the
day he arrested her was a day when DNA Wellness was not illegally selling
marijuana. Further, it is undisputed that Ms. Hency's "backpack full of marijuana"
was a locked backpack containing an amount of marijuana that she was legally
permitted to possess as a registered caregiver. Absent Ms. Hency's alleged statement

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that she was at DNA Wellness to trade with Dale Shattuck, Defendant Spadafore did
not have probable cause to arrest her.
The only palpable defect in the Order regarding Ms. Hency's claim against
Defendant Spadafore for unlawful seizure of her person was therefore the Court's
own scrivener's error. And a correction of that error would not change the outcome of
the Order. The Court will therefore grant in part the motion for reconsideration to
amend the word "immaterial" on PgID 3711 of the Order to say "material." The Court
will otherwise deny the motion for reconsideration as to Ms. Hency's claim for
unlawful seizure of her person against Defendant Spadafore.
B.

Conspiracy Claim

As to the conspiracy claim, Defendants admitted that they "should have
expressly addressed [the claim] in their Brief and apologize[d] to the Court for the
same." ECF 39, PgID 3750. As the Court noted in the Order, it simply could not grant
summary judgment on a claim that Defendants failed to explicitly address in their
motion for summary judgment. See ECF 38, PgID 3725. The Court was not misled by
any palpable defect when making its determination, so the Court will deny the motion
for reconsideration as to the conspiracy claim. But, for the reasons below, the Court
will grant Defendants' motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment
as to the conspiracy claim.
II.

Motion for Leave to File
Second, Defendants moved for leave to file a second motion for summary

judgment only as to Plaintiffs' conspiracy to interfere with civil rights claim. ECF 40.

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"A party must obtain leave of court to file more than one motion for summary
judgment." E.D. Mich. 7.1(b)(2). But "[d]istrict courts may in their discretion permit
renewed or successive motions for summary judgment" because the denial of
summary judgment is not entitled to preclusive effect. Kovacevich v. Kent State
University, 224 F.3d 806, 835 (6th Cir. 2000).
Here, Defendants followed the proper procedure by moving for leave to file
their second motion for summary judgment. Because "good reasons exist" to grant the
motion, the Court will do so. Id. (quoting Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530 (7th
Cir. 1995)). As noted in the Order, the Court is "skeptical about the merits of"
Plaintiffs' conspiracy to interfere with civil rights claim. ECF 38, PgID 3724–25. The
Court denied Defendants summary judgment on the claim because they failed to
explicitly address the claim in their original motion for summary judgment. Id. But
Defendants represented that the failure was inadvertent. ECF 40, PgID 3787. And
the failure is understandable because in the complaint the claim was cushioned
between Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and their request for punitive damages
and thereby separated from the rest of the substantive claims. See ECF 1, PgID 30–
31. Defendants' motion for leave also presented several plausible grounds on which
they will move for summary judgment. ECF 40, PgID 3789–90. In the interest of
justice and judicial economy, the Court will therefore grant Defendants leave to file
a second motion for summary judgment only as to claim eleven—Plaintiffs' conspiracy
to interfere with civil rights claim.

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Defendants represented that they would be prepared to file their second motion
for summary judgment within 72 hours of the Court granting their motion for leave
to file. Id. at 3793. The Court will therefore order Defendants to file their motion no
later than November 11, 2019. And because Defendants are permitted to file a second
motion for summary judgment, the Court will adjourn the final pretrial conference
and trial dates until further order of the Court.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion for
reconsideration [39] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court's order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment [38] is AMENDED to
change the word "immaterial" on PgID 3711 to "material."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for leave to file second
motion for summary judgment (as to count XI only), and motion to adjourn final
pretrial and trial [40] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall FILE their second
motion for summary judgment as to the conspiracy to interfere with civil rights claim
no later than November 11, 2019.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final pretrial conference and trial
dates are ADJOURNED until further order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 10, 2019

s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on November 10, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ David P. Parker
Case Manager

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