Bridgeforth v. Hoffner

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Paris Bridgeforth. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (SPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PARIS BRIDGEFORTH,
Petitioner,
Case Number 17-12265
Honorable David M. Lawson
v.
BONITA HOFFNER,
Respondent.
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Paris Bridgeforth has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
' 2254 to challenge his convictions for drug offenses, obstruction of justice, and resisting a police
officer. He was sentenced to indeterminate prison terms ranging from eight years at minimum to
30 years maximum. He complains about the ineffectiveness of his appellate attorney and argues
that the sentencing judge mis-scored his sentencing guidelines. Bridgeforth was in state custody
when he filed his petition; however, according to the records maintained by the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC), he has completed fully his sentence and is not on parole.
Because he is no longer “in custody” within the meaning of section 2254(a), the petition will be
dismissed.
I.
Bridgeforth was convicted by a Monroe County, Michigan jury of drug trafficking and
other charges stemming from the execution of a search warrant at his residence in 2010. His
conviction was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals in July 2010, but the court remanded
-1-

the case for resentencing. The trial court resentenced Bridgeforth in April 2013. Due to confusion
over whether Bridgeforth asked for appellate counsel to appeal that sentence, the trial court did
not appoint an attorney for him until February 3, 2014. That attorney filed a claim of appeal, but
the Court of Appeals dismissed it as untimely. A delayed application for leave to appeal met a
similar fate. After the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, Bridgeforth litigated postconviction motions in the trial court through February 2015 and appealed, unsuccessfully, the
denial of those motions. In 2016, Bridgeforth asked the trial court to reissue the judgment of
sentence so he could have a fresh start through the appellate process, but the trial court denied that
request as well.
Bridgeforth filed his habeas petition in this Court on July 10, 2017. At the time, he was
confined at the Lakeland Correctional Facility where the respondent was the warden. Before
answering the petition, the respondent attempted to resolve the case by proposing that Bridgeforth
be given a new appeal in the state court, but no agreement was reached. In her answer to the
petition, the respondent admitted that the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling on the timeliness
of his petition, conceded error on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, asserted
that the sentencing claim is not cognizable on habeas review, and argued that the appropriate
remedy on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim would be for the petitioner to
receive a new direct appeal from the trial court’s re-sentencing decision. Bridgeforth contends
that a new appeal would be insufficient and seeks release from custody.
It appears that Bridgeforth got his wish. According to the MDOC records, he has been
discharged from his sentences, released from state custody, and is no longer on parole. See
Offender

Profile,

http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=296671
-2-

(showing that the petitioner was fully discharged from his sentences on November 20, 2019). He
confirmed that he was released on a 24-month parole in November 2018 and resides in Detroit.
II.
A writ of habeas corpus may only be granted to a person who is “in custody.” 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989); see also Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (explaining that under sections “2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) [and]
. . . the common-law history of the writ . . . that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody”). Under sections 2241 and 2254, custody status is
determined at the time that the complaint is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968).
Bridgeforth plainly met that requirement, as he was serving his custodial sentences when he filed
his habeas petition.
If, however, during the pendency of a case, an event occurs that makes it impossible for a
court to grant any relief to the prevailing party, the case must be dismissed. Church of Scientology
of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); Edwards v. Dewalt, 681 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir.
2012). That is because under “Article III[,] . . . a justiciable case or controversy must remain
‘extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” United States v.
Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 67 (1997)). The Court “lacks jurisdiction to consider any case or issue that has ‘lost its
character as a present, live controversy’ and thereby becomes moot.” Demis v. Sniezek, 558 F.3d
508, 512 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969)). “Because the exercise of
judicial power under Article III of the Constitution depends on the existence of a live case or
-3-

controversy, mootness is a jurisdictional question.” Ibid. (citing Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).
“[A] petitioner’s habeas challenge is not necessarily mooted by the petitioner’s release
from incarceration so long as the petitioner can demonstrate ‘collateral consequences’ that follow
from his conviction and remain ongoing.” Demis, 558 F.3d at 515. “However, although a habeas
action is not necessarily mooted by the expiration of a petitioner’s sentence, some concrete and
continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole — some collateral consequence
of the conviction — must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Ibid. The petitioner cannot rely on
“generalized and hypothetical” consequences that attend any criminal conviction to defeat
mootness. Id. at 516. “Instead, [he] must articulate concrete injuries or deprivations that are
consequences of the challenged [actions] and that remain live controversies for which the courts
could provide meaningful relief.” Ibid.
Habeas cases generally recognize that a person is considered to be “in custody” when his
liberty is directly circumscribed by government oversight, such as parole, Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1963), bail, Hensley v. Mun. Ct., San Jose Milpitas Jud. Dist., 411 U.S.
345, 349 (1973), or probation, McVeigh v. Smith, 872 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir.1989). However, the
Supreme Court has “never held . . . that a habeas petitioner may be ‘in custody’ under a conviction
when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is filed.”
Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491. And it is generally acknowledged that “after a petitioner’s sentence for
a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are insufficient
to render him ‘in custody’ under § 2254(a).” Clemons v. Mendez, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1102-03
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492) (additional citation omitted). When a
-4-

petitioner has been fully discharged from his sentence and his claims only concern sentencing
matters, there are no continuing collateral consequences that can be redressed by a favorable court
decision. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
Both of Bridgeforth’s habeas claims concern sentencing matters. The first addresses his
appellate attorney’s missteps, which deprived him of the opportunity to appeal the alleged error
committed by the trial court on resentencing, and the second goes to the substance of that
sentencing error.

But Bridgeforth has been discharged completely from his sentences.

Consequently, the Court can provide no further remedy, and his habeas claims have become moot.
See Hood v. Wilson, 389 F. App’x 522 (6th Cir. 2010) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claim regarding sentencing was moot given habeas petitioner’s discharge from custody); see also
United States v. Waltanen, 356 F. App’x 848, 851 (6th Cir. 2009) (“If a prisoner does not challenge
the validity of the conviction but rather only challenges his sentence or some aspect of it, the
request for relief is moot once the challenged portion of the sentence has expired.”).
III.
Because the petitioner’s claims have been rendered moot by his discharge from custody
and release from parole, there is no longer a live controversy under Article III of the Constitution,
and the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas petition.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: November 12, 2020
-5-