Kelmendi v. Pacito et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER granting defendant DTE's Motion for Summary Judgment 22 , granting defendant Shelby Township Police Department's and Walsh's Motion to Dismiss 34 , granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint (within 21 days), and giving notice that the court will dismiss the case with prejudice if plaintiff fails to amend the complaint. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN P. KELMENDI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-12325
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

vs.
BRUNO PACITO, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DTE’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 22), GRANTING DEFENDANT
SHELBY TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT’S AND WALSH’S
MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 34), GRANTING PLAINTIFF
LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, AND GIVING NOTICE
THAT THE COURT WILL DISMISS THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE
IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff John P. Kelmendi sued defendants Bruno Pacito, Steve
Klein-Knecht, Robert Sizemore, DTE Energy Company, Beth Walsh, and
the Shelby Township Police Department. This matter is presently before
the Court on two motions. DTE filed a motion for summary judgment, (Doc.
22), in which Pacito, Klein-Knecht, Walsh, and the Shelby Township Police
Department concurred, (Doc. 24 and 25). Walsh and the Shelby Township
Police Department also filed their own motion to dismiss. (Doc. 34).
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), the Court shall rule without oral argument.

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For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motions are GRANTED and the
court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
I. Background
On or about June 4, 2014, Kelmendi allegedly removed two electrical
meters from a home he had shared with his former spouse. (Doc. 6 at
PageID 18). Pacito is the father of Kelmendi’s former spouse. (Doc. 6 at
PageID 18). Police records from the Shelby Township Police Department
establish that Pacito is the criminal complainant. (Doc. 22 at PageID 140).
Walsh was dispatched to Pacito’s home the morning of June 4, 2014.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 138-40). Pacito stated that Kelmendi had recently been
evicted from the home. (Doc. 22 at PageID 140). Following the eviction,
Pacito discovered that the home had no electricity. (Doc. 22 at PageID
140). Pacito thereafter observed that DTE electric meters were missing.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 140). Pacito told Walsh that he investigated by
questioning his neighbor, Klein-Knecht. (Doc. 22 at PageID 140). KleinKnecht’s home is one house north of Pacito’s and has a clear view of the
north side of Pacito’s home where the electric meters were located. (Doc.
22 at PageID 140). Pacito told Walsh that Klein-Knecht observed Kelmendi
take the electrical meters. (Doc. 22 at PageID 140).

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Walsh attempted to confirm these details with Klein-Knecht the
morning of June 4, 2014, but Klein-Knecht was unavailable. (Doc. 22 at
PageID 140). Walsh left a business card at Klein-Knecht’s home and stated
her intent to follow up with Klein-Knecht. (Doc. 22 at PageID 140).
Walsh had evidence tech Dowty respond to the scene and take
photographs. (Doc. 22 at PageID 141). Seven photographs appear in a
subsequent police report. (Doc. 22 at PageID 148).
Walsh called Kelmendi and left a voice message on June 4, 2014.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 141).
Walsh also called DTE and spoke with corporate security employee
Robert Sizemore. (Doc. 22 at PageID 141). Walsh’s notes indicate that
Sizemore advised that DTE would prosecute the missing electrical meters.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 141).
Later that afternoon, Walsh was able to make contact with KleinKnecht. (Doc. 22 at PageID 143). Klein-Knecht stated that he saw
Kelmendi exit his vehicle with a pair of pliers, pry the electrical meters off
the side of the home, place them in his car, and leave. (Doc. 22 at PageID
143, 149).
Walsh’s report states her intent to submit a warrant request for
larceny under $200.00. (Doc. 22 at PageID 143).
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A criminal complaint was filed against Kelmendi on June 18, 2014.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 132). Kelmendi was arrested on November 5, 2014.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 133). His family posted bail on November 6, 2014.
(Doc. 22 at PageID 133). The case did not proceed to trial. The matter was
instead resolved on July 17, 2015, when Kelmendi paid restitution. (Doc. 22
at PageID 135). Kelmendi maintains that he did not steal the electrical
meters.
Kelmendi filed suit on July 17, 2017. (Doc. 1). DTE asserts that it was
never served with the original complaint. (Doc. 22 at PageID 120). On
October 17, 2017, Kelmendi filed his first amended complaint (FAC). (Doc.
6). Plaintiff raises three claims; False Arrest, (Count I); Malicious
Prosecution, (Count II); and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
(Count III).
On November 27, 2017, DTE moved for summary judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. (Doc. 22). Pacito and
Klein-Knecht concurred in DTE’s motion on December 21, 2017. (Doc. 24).
Walsh and the Shelby Township Police Department also concurred in
DTE’s motion on December 21, 2017. (Doc. 25). Kelmendi filed a response
brief on February 28, 2018. (Doc. 31). Kelmendi filed a supplemental brief

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on March 2, 2018. (Doc. 32). DTE filed a reply on March 11, 2018. (Doc.
33).
On April 5, 2018, the Shelby Township Police Department and Walsh
filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 34). Kelmendi filed a response brief on May
9, 2018. (Doc. 37). The Shelby Township Police Department and Walsh
filed a reply brief on May 21, 2018. (Doc. 38).
II. Legal Standard
A court confronted with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must construe the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and determine
whether the plaintiff's factual allegations present plausible claims. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2007). “[N]aked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” and “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations,
but its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the
complaint are true.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland,
502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers a court to render
summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Williams v.
Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate is “‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.’” Amway Distrib. Benefits Ass’n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). Mere allegations or
denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden, nor will a
mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 252. There must instead be evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find for the non-movant. McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224
F.3d 797, 800 (2000) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). The evidence and
all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532
(6th Cir. 2001).
III. Analysis
A. Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5827, a claim for false
arrest/imprisonment or malicious prosecution “accrues at the time the
wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time
when damage results.” Kelmendi was arrested on November 5, 2014 and
released on bond on November 6, 2014. His criminal case ended on July
17, 2015 upon payment of restitution. DTE argues that, pursuant to Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.5805, Kelmendi’s claims accrued on or before these
dates.
Statutes of limitation for injuries to persons or property in Michigan
are governed by Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.5805. The statute, in
relevant part, states:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to
recover damages for injuries to persons or property
unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or
to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the
action is commenced within the periods of time
prescribed by this section.
...

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(3) Subject to subsections (4) to (6), the period of
limitations is 2 years for an action charging assault,
battery, or false imprisonment.
(4) Subject to subsection (6), the period of
limitations is 5 years for an action charging assault
or battery brought by a person who has been
assaulted or battered by his or her spouse or former
spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had
a child in common, or a person with whom he or she
resides or formerly resided.
...
(6) The period of limitations is 10 years for an action
to recover damages sustained because of criminal
sexual conduct. For purposes of this subsection, it
is not necessary that a criminal prosecution or other
proceeding have been brought as a result of the
conduct or, if a criminal prosecution or other
proceeding was brought, that the prosecution or
proceeding resulted in a conviction or adjudication.
(7) The period of limitations is 2 years for an action
charging malicious prosecution.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805. Subsections 4 and 6 do not apply here.
Counts I and II are therefore subject to a two year period of limitations.
Kelmendi’s original complaint was filed on July 17, 2017. As such, a timely
claim must have accrued by July 17, 2015.
Kelmendi’s false arrest/imprisonment claim accrued in November
2014 and therefore is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court shall

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DISMISS Count I as it pertains to DTE, Pacito, Klein-Knecht, Walsh, and
the Shelby Township Police Department.
Kelmendi’s malicious prosecution claim, however, appears to be
timely. DTE asserts that Kelmendi’s claim must have accrued by July 17,
2015; the date the charges were resolved. Kelmendi filed his original
complaint exactly two years later, on July 17, 2017. (Doc. 1). As such,
DTE’s argument to dismiss Count II under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805
fails.
B. Count II
Under Michigan law, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution
has the burden of proving (1) that the defendant has
initiated a criminal prosecution against him, (2) that
the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, (3)
that the private person who instituted or maintained
the prosecution lacked probable cause for his
actions, and (4) that the action was undertaken with
malice or a purpose in instituting the criminal claim
other than bringing the offender to justice.
Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 456 Mich. 365, 378,
(1998). “It is difficult to prove all four of the required elements and it is
meant to be, since those who report a perception of crime should not be led
by fear of liability to withhold information from police and prosecutors.”
Radzinski v. Doe, 469 Mich. 1037 (2004) (citation omitted).

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Malicious prosecution generally only applies to private citizens. See,
e.g., Ringo v. Richardson, 88 Mich. App. 684, 690 (1979) (evaluating a
citizen's satisfaction of the probable cause standard). “[T]he only situation
in which an action for malicious prosecution [against a police officer] would
properly lie is where a police officer knowingly swears to false facts in a
complaint, without which there is no probable cause.” King v. Arbic, 159
Mich.App. 452, 466 (1987). Kelmendi did not plead that Walsh and the
Shelby Township Police Department knowingly swore to false facts.
Kelmendi must show that DTE, Pacito, and Klein-Knecht initiated the
prosecution. Kelmendi alleges that Pacito initiated the prosecution by filing
a complaint with the Shelby Township Police Department, (Doc. 6 at
PageID 18), while Klein-Knecht allegedly made false statements, (Doc. 6 at
PageID 18). Kelmendi faults DTE because its employee, Sizemore,
allegedly ratified Klein-Knecht and Pacito’s false accusations. (Doc. 6 at
PageID 19).
“[A] private individual accused of malicious prosecution cannot be
found to have initiated the prosecution where the prosecutor or police
conduct their own investigation independent of the defendant's statement.”
D.J.Y., ex rel. York v. Ypsilanti Cmty. Sch., No. 14-CV-11467, 2015 WL
630860, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2015) (citing Matthews, 456 Mich. at
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386; Christy v. Rice, 152 Mich. 563, 565 (1908); Renda v. Int'l Union, UAW,
366 Mich. 58, 91 (1962)).
Here, DTE submits numerous police reports from the Shelby
Township Police Department. (Doc. 22 at PageID 138-56). As outlined
above, the police visited the scene, conducted interviews, took
photographs, and recorded their intent to pursue a warrant and
prosecution. While the police did speak with Pacito, Klein-Knecht, and
Sizemore, they led an investigation and considered more than any single
defendant’s statements. The Court therefore concludes that the police
conducted their own independent investigation.
Further, Kelmendi’s larceny prosecution did not terminate in his favor.
Kelmendi was scheduled for trial, but on July 15, 2015, the case was
dismissed on the motion of the prosecuting attorney upon Kelmendi’s
agreement to pay $200.00 restitution. (Doc. 34-4 at PageID 264). The
Shelby Township Police Department and Walsh argue that this amounts to
a stipulated dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a plea agreement, which,
pursuant to Delorean v. Cork Gully, 118 B.R. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1990), does
not amount to a termination in a plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 939 (citing Kauffman
v. Shefman, 169 Mich. App. 829 (1988)). It is not apparent that Kelmendi’s
larceny case ended in a stipulated dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a
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plea agreement. Kelmendi’s facts are more similar to the “termination of an
action by virtue of a settlement or compromise of the claims,” which “does
not amount to a termination in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Brand v.
Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590 (1888)).
Finally, in response to DTE’s motion, Kelmendi does not refute DTE’s
arguments. Instead, Kelmendi asserts that he intends to plead a § 1983
claim, alleging that the events of his prosecution and arrest violate his
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Kelmendi appears to
abandon his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under Michigan
law and instead asks the Court to grant him leave to amend and state a §
1983 claim. (Doc. 31-1 at PageID 198-200).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Kelmendi has failed to state a
claim for malicious prosecution against DTE, Pacito, Klein-Knecht, Walsh,
and the Shelby Township Police Department. Count II is DISMISSED.
C. Leave to Amend
As stated above, Kelmendi seeks leave to amend his complaint and
state a § 1983 claim. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: “[e]very
person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured.” “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (U.S. 1988) (citing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled in part on other
grounds)).
“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires
that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.’” Id. at 49 (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). “[I]f a defendant's conduct satisfies the
state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘that conduct [is]
also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.’”
Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982)).
To constitute state action, the deprivation must be
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State ... or by a person for whom the
State is responsible, and the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor. [S]tate employment is generally
sufficient to render the defendant a state actor. It is
firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit
acts under color of state law when he abuses the
position given to him by the State. Thus, generally,
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a public employee acts under color of state law
while acting in his official capacity or while
exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.
Id. at 49-50 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
DTE asserts that it cannot be liable for a § 1983 claim because it is
not a government actor. The United States Supreme Court has held that
even if a utility company provides a public function and is extensively
regulated by the state, the furnishing of utility services is not a state
function. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
Another judge in the Eastern District of Michigan applied Jackson to a §
1983 claim against DTE to conclude that while DTE “is a privately owned
and operated utility subject to regulation by the Michigan Public Service
Commission[,] . . . in providing utility services, Defendant has not engaged
in the exercise of authority or action normally associated with state
sovereignty.” Sanford v. DTE Energy Co., No. 07-15451, 2009 WL 790496,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2009). As such, the court concluded that “no §
1983 liability can be attached to this defendant.” Id. For these reasons, the
Court concludes that DTE is not subject to a § 1983 claims.
Pacito and Klein-Knecht are private individuals. They are not
employed by the state or clothed with the authority of state law. Nor did
they act did they act under the color of state law when they spoke with the

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Shelby Township Police Department. As such, they are not liable under §
1983.
Shelby Township Police Department asserts that it cannot be sued
under § 1983. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a township police
department is subsumed within the township as a municipal entity to be
sued under § 1983. Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir.
2007). As such, a township police department is not properly included as a
separate defendant. Id. See also Laise v. City of Utica, 970 F.Supp. 605,
608 (E.D.Mich.1997) (noting that a city police department is merely an
agency of the city, and therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983
lawsuit).
The Shelby Township Police Department argues that any § 1983
claim against Shelby Township would be untimely. The parties agree that §
1983 claims have a three year statute of limitations under Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.5805. Hirmuz v. City of Madison Heights, 469 F. Supp. 2d 466,
477 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“the statute of limitations for claims filed in Michigan
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years, not two years. That is true even
if the underlying wrongful conduct stems from a false arrest. (Under state
law false arrest claims themselves must be commenced within two years.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2)).”). The Shelby Township Police
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Department asserts that a § 1983 claim is barred because it was not
asserted prior to the statute of limitations lapse in November, 2017. (Doc.
38 at PageID 306). This argument fails because Kelmendi filed his
complaints prior to November 2017. Kelmendi’s original complaint, which
named the Shelby Township Police Department as a defendant, was filed
on July 17, 2017. Kelmendi’s amended complaint, which also named the
Shelby Township Police Department as a defendant, was filed on October
17, 2017.
The Shelby Township Police Department further argues that a § 1983
claim against Shelby Township does not relate back to Kelmendi’s
complaint. The Court disagrees. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when the claim
is not barred by the relevant statute of limitations, the amendment asserts a
claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the
original pleading, and the party to be brought in by the amendment knew or
should have known that the action would have been brought against it but
for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.
Kelmendi’s proposed § 1983 claim is based on his arrest,
imprisonment, and prosecution between November, 2014 and July, 2015.
Kelmendi’s complaints were filed within three years of November 2014. The
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proposed claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth in Kelmendi’s prior complaints. Finally, the Court finds it
reasonable to infer that Kelmendi, who was a pro se litigant when he filed
his complaints, did not have the training to understand that he ought to
have sued Shelby Township instead of the Shelby Township Police
Department. But, as evidence by its brief, the Police Department seems
aware that the Township itself was the proper defendant. The Court
therefore concludes that Shelby Township should have known the action
would have been brought against it but for the then pro se Kelmendi’s
mistake.
This Court shall therefore permit Kelmendi to amend his complaint to
include a § 1983 claim against Walsh and Shelby Township, but not
against DTE, Pacito, Klein-Knecht or the Shelby Township Police
Department.
D. Count III Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must prove “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or
recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Roberts v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602 (1985). The extreme and
outrageous conduct conduct must be “so outrageous in character and so
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extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Mich.App. 571, 577 (2004) (quoting
Graham v. Ford, 237 Mich.App. 670, 674 (1999)). “A defendant is not liable
for ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities.’” Lewis v. LeGrow, 258 Mich. App. 175, 196 (2003)
(quoting Doe v. Mills, 212 Mich. App. 73, 91 (1995)). “The test to determine
whether a person's conduct was extreme and outrageous is whether
recitation of the facts of the case to an average member of the community
‘would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
DTE’s conduct is not outrageous. At most, Sizemore noted the value
of the electrical meters, ratified the theft report, and stated that DTE would
consent to prosecution. This conduct does not go beyond the bounds of
decency, particularly where DTE is not alleged to have known that Pacito
and Klein-Knecht submitted a false report. Kelmendi argues that DTE acted
outrageously by skipping hearings in the state larceny case. But it is not
clear that DTE had any duty to attend these hearings. As such, Kelmendi’s
intentional inflict of emotional distress claim against DTE shall be
dismissed.
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Similarly, Pacito and Klein-Knecht’s conduct is not outrageous. At
most, Pacito and Klein-Knecht lied to a police officer. While undesirable,
this conduct is not sufficiently extreme.
Finally, Walsh’s and the Shelby Township Police Department’s
conduct was not outrageous. Kelmendi does not allege that either party
knew or even suspected Pacito and Klein-Knecht to have provided false
information. As such, Walsh’s and the Shelby Township Police
Department’s conduct in investigation the alleged theft is what would be
expected by society.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
Count I is DISMISSED with prejudice as it pertains to DTE, Pacito,
Klein-Knecht, Walsh, and the Shelby Township Police Department.
Count II DISMISSED with prejudice as it pertains to DTE, Pacito,
Klein-Knecht, Walsh, and the Shelby Township Police Department.
Count III is DISMISSED with prejudice as it pertains to DTE, Pacito,
Klein-Knecht, Walsh, and the Shelby Township Police Department.
Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), the Court will allow Kelmendi to amend his
complaint to include a § 1983 claim against Walsh and/or Shelby
Township. If Kelmendi wishes to amend his complaint, he SHALL FILE an
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amended complaint within TWENTY ONE DAYS of the entry of this opinion
and order. If Kelmendi fails to file an amended complaint within this time,
the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Walsh.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 17, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
August 17, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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