Hussein et al v. Beecroft et al

Filing 37

OPINION AND ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss; denying 22 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ABDOLSALAM MOHAMED HUSSEIN and
TAHANI HUSSEIN AHMED ABDULRAB,
Plaintiffs,

Case Number 17-12356
Honorable David M. Lawson

v.
R. STEPHEN BEECROFT, AMBASSADOR,
UNITED STATES EMBASSY — CAIRO, and
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING
MOTION TO AMEND PETITION, AND DISMISSING CASE
Plaintiff Abdolsalam Mohamed Hussein (a U.S. citizen) has been attempting to obtain
authorization for his wife, Tahani Hussein Ahmed Abdulrab (a citizen of Yemen), to enter the United
States. The couple has been married since 1993 and they have five children together. The
government approved Hussein’s I-130 petition (petition for admission of an alien relative) for his
wife in 2012. But the plaintiffs have not been able to obtain approval of a visa to allow Abdulrab
to enter the country. The plaintiff filed a petition in this Court for a writ of mandamus to compel
certain officials of the State Department to adjudicate the visa application. The defendants — all
government officials sued in their official capacities and the Department of State — responded with
a motion to dismiss, asserting that the visa application was denied on two occasions, and the decision
is insulated from judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The plaintiff then
filed a motion to amend the petition, seeking to clarify certain facts and add parties. Because the
State Department has twice denied the visa application for a legitimate reason, there is no basis to

issue a writ of mandamus. The plaintiff’s proposed amended petition would be futile. Therefore,
the Court will deny the motion to amend the petition, grant the motion to dismiss, and dismiss the
case.
I.
The petition alleges that plaintiff Abdolsalam Mohamed Hussein is a United States Citizen
and the husband of plaintiff Tahani Hussein Ahmed Abdulrab, who is a citizen of Yemen. At the
time the petition was filed, defendant R. Stephen Beecroft was the Ambassador of the United States
Embassy in Cairo, Egypt. His oversight duties included the consular section, which processed and
adjudicated visa applications. On July 27, 2012, Hussein filed an I-130 “Petition for Alien Relative”
on behalf of his wife. Hussein maintained that they had been married since 1993. On June 6, 2013,
the petition was approved by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)
division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and forwarded to the National Visa Center
(NVC), where it was assigned a case number. Ms. Abdulrab was interviewed at the Cairo Embassy
in early 2016, and, after the interview, the petition was placed in “administrative processing” status.
Counsel for the plaintiffs subsequently contacted the Embassy by email several times, to inquire
about the status of the petition, but received no response.
Ellen Eiseman, an “attorney advisor” in the Department of State’s Visa Services Directorate,
Bureau of Consular Affairs, attested that the petition was received by the Department of State’s
National Visa Center on June 27, 2013. Ms. Abdulrab appeared for an interview relating to the
petition and her visa application at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, Egypt on September 29, 2015. After
the interview, the consular officer refused the visa application, citing Section 221(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1201(g), which is a general provision that states: “No visa
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or other documentation shall be issued to an alien if (1) it appears to the consular officer, from
statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such alien is ineligible to
receive a visa or such other documentation under section 1182 of this title, or any other provision
of law, (2) the application fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter, or the regulations
issued thereunder, or (3) the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien is
ineligible to receive a visa or such other documentation under section 1182 of this title, or any other
provision of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
Apparently, the consular officer had doubts about the validity of the 1993 marriage
representation, stemming from his belief that the marriage document appeared to have been altered,
and Hussein’s representation in a 1996 passport application that he was not married. On April 19,
2016, the consular officer contacted plaintiff Hussein by telephone and recommended that Ms.
Abdulrab submit DNA test results for herself, plaintiff Hussein, and their eldest son, who was born
in 1994, as corroborating evidence that the 1993 marriage — upon which the I-130 petition was
based — was genuine. That same day, the consular officer contacted Ms. Abdulrab by telephone and
“noted that the applicant would come to the Embassy for [a] new refusal letter.” Mot. to Dismiss.,
Ex. A, Ellen Eiseman decl. ¶ 6 (Pg ID 61). On June 7, 2016, the consular officer noted in the case
record that no further information had been received. The consular officer tried to contact the
plaintiffs again by telephone on October 5, 2017, but the phone numbers provided for them were out
of service; the consulate also sent an email to the address on record asking the petitioners to schedule
an appointment at the Embassy on October 9 or 10.

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On October 7, 2017, the Embassy received an email from attorney Julie Goldberg, the
plaintiffs’ attorney, stating that Ms. Abdulrab had returned to Yemen, but that Ms. Goldberg would
convey the information.
In a later declaration, Eiseman attested that Ms. Abdulrab appeared again at the Embassy for
an interview on November 9, 2017. According to Eiseman, the consular officer interviewed Ms.
Abdulrab under oath, but Ms. Abdulrab did not submit any further information in support of her
application. On November 13, 2017, the consular officer “determined that, based on information
provided in the visa application, the applicant failed to establish that she and [the] petitioner are in
a legal marriage.” Reply, Ex. C, Ellen Eiseman decl. ¶ 6 (Pg ID 94-95).
On November 14, 2017, the consular officer drafted a memo to accompany the petition
explaining the results, and the next day the I-130 petition was returned with the memo to the
National Visa Center for reconsideration and possible revocation. The memo sent to USCIS to
explain the return of the application presumably included the following information, which was
recorded in case log entries made by the consular officer:
On March 4, 2016, the consular officer entered a case note that “since 1993 marriage
document does appear altered, and [petitioner’s] 1996 ppt [passport] application
indicates he was not married in 1996, so [sic] the 1993 marriage is suspicious” and
further reflects that the consular officer noted that “to resolve, recommend that Tahini
do DNA testing with the oldest son Yassin Abdosolam Hussein [born in 1994], who
lives with the father in the U.S.”
Eiseman decl. ¶ 5 (Pg ID 185). Some DNA results were delivered by the petitioners to the consular
authority after the visa application was returned to USCIS, but those results were for a younger child
born in 2011, not for the eldest child born in 1994.

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According to the recent declaration of a representative of USCIS, the petition presently is
assigned to the agency’s California Service Center (CSC) and is listed as “pending reopening and
re-adjudication.” Gov’t Resp. [25], Ex. B, Christine Sung decl. ¶¶ 1, 5 (Pg ID 190-91). Sung
attested that the reason for the return stated in the consular memo was that “information was
unavailable to USCIS at the time of the petition’s approval which indicates that there is insufficient
evidence to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the marriage is valid for
immigration purposes.” Id. ¶ 5. The CSC presently has 8,000 pending petitions in “consular return”
cases, meaning petitions that were returned by the consular officer for further review, and the center
has 15 assigned Immigration Services Officers adjudicating I-130 petitions. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Sung
attested that “[c]onsular return cases are reopened and re-adjudicated when capacity and resources
are available,” and that a higher priority is given to other types of cases under Department of State
policy. Id. ¶ 4.
The plaintiffs filed their petition for a writ of mandamus on July 20, 2017. The petition
pleads claims seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus (Count I) to compel adjudication of the
petition, an order compelling administrative action based on arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable
delay under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) (Count II), and a non-substantive count
seeking congruent declaratory relief (Count III). The petition also alleges in Counts IV and V that
the defendants violated plaintiff Hussein’s procedural and substantive rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying his right to make personal decisions concerning his
family relations (i.e., prohibiting him from realizing his desire to have his spouse reside in the U.S.
with him). In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs ask that the Court declare that the delayed

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adjudication of the petition was arbitrary and capricious and violated Hussein’s Due Process rights,
and compel the defendants to issue a decision on the petition within 30 days.
The proposed amended petition would add additional facts that have developed since the
original filing. It also would add as defendants the USCIS Director and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security.
The defendants oppose the motion to amend and seek dismissal. The Court heard oral
argument on February 8, 2018.
II.
The government insists that it has adjudicated the plaintiffs’ visa application — twice — and
denied it “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 770 (1972). It reasons that because the visa application was fully adjudicated, the
mandamus claim brought by the plaintiff is moot. Mootness, says the government, means an absence
of subject matter jurisdiction for want of a live controversy. Moreover, courts cannot look behind
the reasons for the denial in the absence of a plausible showing of bad faith, which has not been
made out here.
The plaintiffs respond that the government’s proffered reason for denial of the adjudication
— section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) — does not constitute
a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for refusal of the visa application. The plaintiffs insist
that until a consular officer issues a denial on the basis of a valid statute defining inadmissibility, see
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(10), there has been no “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the
denial, and therefore no final adjudication, to which the plaintiffs are entitled. Therefore, they say,
their claim is live, and the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not apply.
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The government’s motion to dismiss is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
That rule “provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright
v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction can challenge the sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence
of subject matter jurisdiction (factual attack).” Ibid. (citing United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592,
598 (6th Cir. 1994)). “A factual attack,” like the one brought here, “challenges the factual existence
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Ibid. When the factual basis for jurisdiction is challenged, the Court
may consider a variety of sources of evidence, even evidence beyond the pleadings, “and has the
power to weigh the evidence and determine the effect of that evidence on the court’s authority to
hear the case.” Id. at 759-60. The “[p]laintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter
jurisdiction exists.” Id. at 760 (citing DLX, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516
(6th Cir. 2004)).
It is beyond question that “[t]he power of the federal courts is limited to hearing actual cases
and controversies.” Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “To establish
Article III standing, the plaintiff seeking compensatory relief must have ‘(1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., --- U.S. ---,
137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016)). “Mootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue

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throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68
n.22 (1997) (quotations omitted).
The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq., allows certain persons to apply
for entry to the United States based on their status as an “immediate relative” of a United States
citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b)(2)(A)(i) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘immediate
relatives’ means the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States.”). “[A]ny
citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled to . . . immediate relative status under
section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) of this title may file a petition with the Attorney General for such
classification.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). “A citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United
States petitioning under section 204(a)(1)(A)(i) . . . of the Act for a qualifying relative’s
classification as an immediate relative under section 201(b) of the Act . . . must file a Form I-130,
Petition for Alien Relative.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1).
The visa application process begins with submission of the petition to USCIS (which is part
of DHS), which arranges for an investigation of the facts stated in it by various government agencies.
“After an investigation of the facts in each case . . . the Attorney General shall, if he determines that
the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an
immediate relative specified in section 1151(b) of this title, . . . approve the petition and forward one
copy thereof to the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall then authorize the consular
officer concerned to grant the preference status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). “When a visa application has
been properly completed and executed before a consular officer in accordance with the provisions
of INA and the implementing regulations, the consular officer must either issue or refuse the visa
under INA 212(a) or INA 221(g) or other applicable law.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a).
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Section 1201(g) of the INA, however, instructs that no visa can issue if the applicant is
ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, the visa application does not comply with applicable statutes or
regulations, or the consular officer “has reason to believe” that the alien applicant is ineligible for
a visa “under . . . any other provision of law.” And a governing regulation states that “[t]he consular
officer shall suspend action in a petition case and return the petition, with a report of the facts, for
reconsideration by DHS . . . if the officer knows or has reason to believe that . . . the beneficiary is
not entitled to the status approved.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.43(a).
It is undisputed in this case that the consular officer twice interviewed Ms. Abdulrab and
thrice denied her visa application, each time citing section 1201(g) of the INA as the basis for the
refusal. The declaration of the government’s agent further indicates that the applicant was informed
on each occasion that the visa was refused because she had failed to carry her burden of establishing
that she has a bona fide marital relationship with a United States citizen.
The plaintiffs contend that the consular file notes are ambiguous and perplexing in that they
only cite section 1201(g) generally, which allows several bases for refusal of an application, and that
the unadorned statutory citation supplies no hint as to the specific factual basis of the decision. They
contend, therefore, that there was no “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the denial.
However, the statute plainly permits refusal when the consular officer “has reason to believe that [the
applicant] is ineligible” for the status claimed, including specifically the status of qualifying as an
“immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen. And, whatever ambiguity there may have been in any other
communications with the plaintiffs, it now is beyond dispute that they fully have been informed of
the specific factual basis for the denial, based on the attestation of the government’s consular legal
officer stating that the refusal was based on failure to establish the bona fides of the marriage. The
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plaintiffs also argued in their response that the administrative process was not complete because the
petition had not been returned to the National Visa Center. But that position, like the petition itself,
is rendered moot by the government’s undisputed assertion that the petition was returned to the
NVC, with a memo stating the reasons for the refusal, in November of last year.
The plaintiffs also have filed a motion seeking to amend their petition to add as defendants
the USCIS and DHS, and officials of those domestic agencies, and to add a claim that plaintiff
Abdulrab was “harassed” by the consular officer, premised on a refusal to consider DNA testing
evidence that was submitted to the Embassy in January 2018, and disregard of certain other
information that the plaintiffs contend was submitted to authenticate the marriage. However, all of
the putative claims and arguments by the plaintiffs that invite the Court to look beyond the facial
basis for the refusal of the classification and visa applications are without merit, since the consular
decision denying the application is not open to substantive review by the Court. As Justice Kennedy
explained in his concurrence in Din (which, as the government points out, is the narrowest basis of
the Court’s holding in that case), “‘an executive officer’s decision denying a visa that burdens a
citizen’s own constitutional rights is valid when it is made ‘on the basis of a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason.’” Kerry v. Din, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770). “Once this standard is met, ‘courts will neither look behind
the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against’ the constitutional
interests of citizens the visa denial might implicate.” Ibid.
The plurality in Din also held that there was no cognizable Due Process right implicated by
a case such as this, and that any explanation of the basis for the denial of an application for entry of
a non-citizen spouse was more than was required by the Due Process clause. The concurring
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minority held that, even if such a right existed, it fully was vindicated by the statement of a facially
legitimate justification, and further judicial inquiry is prohibited.
The plaintiffs insist, however, that the citation of section 1201(g) does not satisfy the
requirement of a legitimate reason for denying the application; they maintain that the consular officer
must identify one of the 10 statutory grounds for inadmissibility under section 1182. But section
1201(g) contains no such exclusivity. Instead, the statute instructs that no visa will issue if, among
other reasons, “the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to
receive a visa or such other documentation under section 1182 of this title, or any other provision
of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(3) (emphasis added).
The decisions cited by the plaintiffs in their papers on the motion to amend the petition do
not change that reality, or the fact that the decision not to issue the visa is unreviewable. Those
decisions readily recognize that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability “sweeps broadly,
‘appl[ying] even where it is alleged that the consular officer failed to follow regulations, where the
applicant challenges the validity of the regulations on which the decision was based, or where the
decision is alleged to have been based on a factual or legal error.’” Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious
Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the United States v. Kerry, 168 F. Supp. 3d 268, 290
(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Van Ravenswaay v. Napolitano, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009))
(collecting cases). “‘[T]he doctrine also applies where a plaintiff attempts to circumvent the doctrine
by claiming that he is not seeking a review of the consular officer’s decision, but is challenging some
other, related aspect of the decision.’” Ibid. (quoting Malyutin v. Rice, 677 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46
(D.D.C. 2009)).

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In the Nine Iraqi Allies case, the district court found that the doctrine of nonreviewability did
not apply because “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not triggered until a consular officer
has made a decision with respect to a particular visa application.” Ibid. But that case readily is
distinguishable because in Nine Iraqi Allies the petitioners’ cases had been left to languish
interminably in an “administrative processing” status, which the district court found was an
intermediate step in the process of consular review that did not indicate that any final decision had
been made. Id. at 268, 282, 283-84, 289. Here, by contrast, the petition is not in “administrative
processing” status, but has been returned to the USCIS with a recommendation to revoke the prior
determination of the petitioners’ marital status. The petitioners have not pointed to any authority
holding that the consular officer has any further task that has not been performed since the petition
was returned to USCIS. Moreover, the consular officer did exactly what the pertinent regulations
require upon the discovery of information that led him to conclude that the determination of marital
status by the USCIS may have been in error. 22 C.F.R. § 42.43(a) (“The consular officer shall
suspend action in a petition case and return the petition, with a report of the facts, for reconsideration
by DHS . . . if the officer knows or has reason to believe that . . . the beneficiary is not entitled to the
status approved.”).
If any of the prior communications with the petitioners failed adequately to set forth the
specific factual basis of the consular officer’s decision, then the administrative record presented in
the case certainly conclusively has explained it: The consular officer found that the proffered
certificate of marriage appeared to have been altered, and that Mr. Hussein had stated that he was
not married in a prior passport application submitted in 1996 — three years after the claimed date
of the suspect nuptials. Whether or not the consular officer disregarded other information submitted
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by the petitioners — unreasonably, or even unlawfully — is of no consequence to this case, because
the Court is prohibited from looking beyond the facially stated basis for the decision to return the
petition to USCIS. “‘[A]n executive officer’s decision denying a visa that burdens a citizen’s own
constitutional rights is valid when it is made ‘on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason.’” Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770).
“Once this standard is met, ‘courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test
it by balancing its justification against the constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might
implicate.” Ibid.
The petitioners contend that the case of Atiffi v. Kerry, No. 12-3001, 2013 WL 5954818 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 6, 2013), is analogous and favors their position that the consular authority never stated any
facially legitimate or bona fide reason for refusing to issue a visa. But the Atiffi case is
distinguishable because there the form letter sent to the petitioner did not indicate any basis for the
refusal. As the district court explained:
The USCIS letter gave Ms. Atiffi no information about why her visa application was
refused. Even though the USCIS letter states that the statutory grounds for the denial
of Ms. Atiffi’s application are “marked with ‘X,’” in fact, no statutory grounds were
so marked. Rather, the letter advised Ms. Atiffi only that: “Your petition has been
returned to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) through the National
Visa Center (NVC) for reconsideration and disposition. Further inquiries should be
directed to the USCIS office that processed your petition.”
Atiffi, 2013 WL 5954818, at *1 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Here, by contrast, there is no
indication that any form letters sent to the petitioners had pertinent sections left blank, and the
administrative record otherwise amply illuminates the specific basis of the refusal.
The plaintiffs’ main request for relief in the petition and proposed amended petition is
mandamus. “Mandamus is available only if: (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the
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defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff.”
Carson v. U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 633 F.3d 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2011). “Mandamus is not an
appropriate remedy if the action that the petitioner seeks to compel is discretionary.” Ibid. (citing
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)).
It is now undisputed that the claims for mandamus and relief under the APA against the
original defendants are moot, because the consular role in the process of reviewing the application
fully was performed upon the return of the application to the National Visa Center. The plaintiffs
propose freshly to allege that the consular authority acted unreasonably in refusing to consider DNA
test results submitted after the petition — at their own insistence — was returned to the domestic
immigration authorities. But they have not cited any statutory authority that would permit
consideration or reconsideration of such new information in support of an application that no longer
is within the purview of the consular officials.
The plaintiffs ask to amend the petition, and generally “[t]he court should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2). But it is well established that leave to amend
will be denied when the proposed amendment would be futile. Head v. Jellico Housing Auth., 870
F.2d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989); Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 801 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir.
1986); Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir.
1980). The various arguments mounted in the proposed amended petition that the consular official
failed to give appropriate consideration to the information that the plaintiffs did submit is immaterial
under any reading of Mandel and Din, because the denial was based on a facially legitimate statutory
and factual basis, and no further judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of that factual basis is permitted
under those controlling decisions. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ putative claims that the DHS and USCIS
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have “unreasonably delayed” acting on the petition since it was returned to the National Visa Center
in November 2017 are devoid of any apparent credible factual basis, given the short time since the
application was returned.
III.
The plaintiffs’ request for mandamus is moot, and the amended petition could not withstand
a motion to dismiss, and therefore the amendment would be futile. See Head, 870 F.2d at 1123
(quoting Martin, 801 F.2d at 248). The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a moot
claim.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss [dkt. #12] is
GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the petition [dkt. #22] is
DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the petition is DISMISSED.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: July 25, 2018
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or
first class U.S. mail on July 25, 2018.
s/Deborah Tofil
DEBORAH TOFIL

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